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Abstract
The allocation of fishing opportunities is one of the most difficult challenges for high
seas fisheries management. There is an ongoing search for equitable and transparent
allocation frameworks. This thesis explores whether, under what conditions, and with
what shortcomings, a legal concept of equity can provide assistance in the development
of such a framework. To this end, it reviews the historical origins of allocation of quotas
in international fisheries, and summarizes the current global and regional legal
frameworks for allocation and regional practices. It then analyzes whether
intergenerational and intra-generational equity is considered in the international legal
framework for high seas fisheries, and what the legal and practical implications of their
inclusion are. It provides some suggestions on how to integrate intergenerational and
intra-generational equity more effectively into allocation decisions. It concludes by
highlighting the contribution of law in the search for allocation frameworks.
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Chapter 1. Introduction
High seas fisheries are in a crisis. Numerous recent studies demonstrate that high
seas fisheries resources are declining,1 that management regimes are ineffective,2 and that
international fisheries management is scientifically unsound3 and economically wasteful.4
The sources of the difficulties to achieve effective management in international
fisheries are both economic and legal. From an economic perspective, high seas fish
stocks are renewable, but exhaustible, natural resources. In addition, they have a high
economic value and are, therefore, in high and increasing demand. These two
characteristics make them scarce resources. From a legal perspective, the regime for high
seas governance is founded on four pillars codified in international conventions: freedom
of the high seas, States‘ sovereignty, States‘ equality, and States‘ cooperation.
Accordingly, high seas fisheries are open to all States, while restrictions on fishing
activities require agreement of the participating States.5
Those economic and legal features are the underlying cause of the many
difficulties of the high seas regime.6 One of those difficulties, and indeed a crucial one, is
the problem of participation and access to high seas fisheries resources. The fact that high
seas fisheries resources are both open access (or ―common pool‖)7 and scarce resources
1

See, for example: FAO, The state of world fisheries and aquaculture 2008 (Rome: FAO, 2009) [hereafter
SOFIA 2008], particularly at 35; Sarika Cullis-Suzuki and Daniel Pauly, ―Failing the High Seas: A Global
Evaluation of Regional Fisheries Management organizations‖ Marine Policy [forthcoming in 2010], in
particular at 5-7.
2
See, for example: Cullis-Suzuki and Pauly, ibid; Robin Allen, International Management of Tuna
Fisheries: Arrangements, Challenges and a Way Forward, FAO Fisheries and Aquaculture Technical
Paper Nr. 536 (Rome: FAO, 2010), in particular section 3 and 41.
3
See, for example: Allen, ibid, at 41; Marjorie L. Mooney-Seus and Andrew A. Rosenberg, Regional
Fisheries Management Organizations: Progress in Adopting the Precautionary Approach and EcosystemBased Management, Recommended Best Practices for Regional Fisheries Management Organizations,
Technical Study Nr. 1, (London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2007), online Chatham House
<http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/papers>.
4
See: World Bank and FAO, The Sunken Billions: The Economic Justification for Fisheries Reform,
(Washington DC: World Bank, 2008), as cited by Allen, ibid, at 5.
5
This description is deliberately over-simplistic. The legal framework will be analyzed with more details in
chapter 3 of this thesis.
6
Some of those problems are: lack of accurate and timely data, scientific assessment, technical capacity,
decision-making, monitoring, controlling and surveillance activities, non-cooperation by non-parties to
cooperative regimes (―free riders‖), non-compliance by, and enforcement problems with, parties and
cooperating non-parties to cooperative regimes, and lack of transparency.
7
Gordon Munro, Annick Van Houtte, and Rolf Willmann, The conservation and management of shared
fish stocks: legal and economic aspects, FAO Fisheries Technical Paper No. 465 (Rome: FAO 2004), at 11.

1

implies that not all States can fish all they want (at least not sustainably). Restrictions are
necessary, and those restrictions imply the need for a distribution of the available fish.
Paraphrasing Franck, the high seas fisheries regime presents the two conditions that make
distribution (or allocation) of the scarce resource ―possible and necessary‖.8 Those two
conditions are the existence of limited or scarce resources, and a community of interests
over those resources.9
Allocation of high seas fishing opportunities has been singled out as the most
difficult aspect of the international fisheries management regime.10 The regional fisheries
organizations established to provide a forum to manage fish resources in the high seas
have faced significant challenges and conflicts in allocating fishing opportunities among
participating States.11 Allocation mechanisms in those organizations have been criticized
by members and non-members as inequitable and non-transparent. There is an ongoing
search for a more objective, transparent, predictable, reasonable and fair allocation
framework.
The problem of allocating high seas fisheries opportunities has been the subject of
a number of studies. Most of them address the allocation problem from an economic

8

Thomas M. Franck, Fairness in International Law and Institutions (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995) at 9.
Ibid, at 9-10.
10
Ted L. McDorman, ―Implementing existing tools: Turning words into actions – decision-making
processes of regional fisheries management organizations (RFMOs)‖ (2005) 20 Int‘l J. Mar. & Coast. L.
423, at 425; D. J. Agnew, D. Aldous, M. Lodge, P. Miyake, and G. Parkes, ―Discussion Paper: Allocation
Issues for WCFPC Tuna Resources,‖ prepared for the WCFPC Secretariat by MRAG Ltd., October 2006,
at 15, online: WCFPC <http://www.wcpfc.org>. Willock and Lack state: ―The allocation of fishing
opportunities, or participatory rights, within RFMOs has proven to be one of the most contentious issues
dealt with in these forums. Experience as shown that it has the potential to dominate debate, undermine
conservation measures and virtually render an RFMO moribund‖ (A. Willock and M. Lack, Follow the
leader: Learning from experience and best practice in regional fisheries management organizations (WWF
International
and
TRAFFIC
International,
2006)
at
26,
online
TRAFFIC
<http://www.traffic.org/fisheries>).
11
Cullis-Suzuky and Pauly, supra note 1, at 6. Lodge et al., citing Fisheries and Ocean Canada (DFO), note
that the most common objection to conservation and management measures in the Northwest Atlantic
Fisheries Organization (NAFO) has been with respect to national quota allocations. The objection rate is
not insignificant: on average 10 objections per year were filed against NAFO decisions in the late 1980s
and the early 1990s, dropping to two and four objections per year in more recent years (Michael W. Lodge,
David Anderson, Terje Løbach, Gordon Munro, Keith Sainsbury, and Anna Willock, Recommended Best
Practices for Regional Fisheries Management Organizations: Report of an independent panel to develop a
model for improved governance by Regional Fisheries Management Organizations (London: The Royal
Institute
of
International
Affairs,
2007)
at
39,
online
Chatham
House
<http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/papers>).
9

2

perspective.12 In particular, game theory has been resorted to as an analytical tool
addressing the conflicts of cooperation, participation and access in high seas fisheries.13
There are also a number of analyses from the perspective of political science. 14 And of
course, allocation has been included in several studies that provide policy advice on high
seas fishing.15 Legal studies have been, however, relatively scarce.16 The scarcity of legal
studies is probably the result of the widespread opinion that allocation of fishing
opportunities is a political rather than a legal issue.17 Allocation is a matter to be
12

See, for example: R. Quentin Grafton et al., The Economics of Allocation in Tuna Regional Fisheries
Management Organizations (RFMOs), Australian National University, Economics and Environment
Network Working Paper EEN0612, 14 December 2006, online: Australian National University, Economic
and Environment Network <http://een.anu.edu.au>; Allen, supra note 2.
13
See, for example: Munro, Van Houtte and Willmann, supra note 7, at 10-11; Gordon Munro, ―Game
theory and the development of resource management policy: the case of international fisheries‖ (2008) 14
Environment and Development Economics 7; T. Bjørndal, V. Kaitala, M. Lindroos, and G. Munro, ―The
management of high seas fisheries‖ (2000) 94 Annals of Operations Research 183; P. Pintassilgo, ―A
coalition approach to the management of high seas fisheries in the presence of externalities‖ (2003) 16
Natural Resource Modeling 175.
14
See, for example: Áslaug Ásgeirsdóttir, Who Gets What?: Domestic Influences on International
Negotiations Allocating Shared Resources (New York: State University of New York, 2008); Arild
Underdal, The Politics of International Fisheries Management: The Case of the Northeast Atlantic (Oslo:
Universitetsforlaget, 1980); Alf Håkon Hoel and Ingrid Kvalvik, ―The allocation of scarce natural
resources: The case of fisheries‖ (2006) 30 Marine Policy 347.
15
See: Lodge et al., supra note 11; Mooney-Seus and Rosenberg, supra note 3; Willock and Lack, supra
note 10; OECD, Strengthening Regional Fisheries Management Organizations (OECD, 2009); Douglas S.
Butterworth and Andrew J. Penney, ―Allocation in high seas fisheries: avoiding meltdowns‖ in A.I.L.
Payne, C.M. O‘Brien and S.I. Rogers (eds.), Management of Shared Fish Stocks (Malden, MA: Blackwell
Pub., 2004) 165.
16
See: Erik Jaap Molenaar, ―Participation, Allocation and Unregulated Fishing: The Practice of Regional
Fisheries Management Organizations‖ (2003) 18 Int‘l J. Mar. & Coast. L. 457 [Molenaar, ―Participation‖];
Rosemary Rayfuse, ―Regional allocation issues or Zen and the art of pie cutting‖ University of New South
Wales Law Research Paper Nr. 2007-10 (paper presented at the Sharing the Fish Conference 06:
Allocation Issues in Fisheries Management, Perth, 26 February – 2 March 2006); Daniel Owen, Practice of
RFMOs Regarding Non-members, Recommended Best Practices for Regional Fisheries Management
Organizations, Technical Study No. 2 (London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2007), online
Chatham House <http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/papers>. Important analysis on allocation
of fishing opportunities was also included in Erik Jaap Molenaar, ―The South Tasman Rise Arrangement of
2000 and other Initiatives on Management and Conservation of Orange Roughy‖ (2001) 16 Int‘l J. Mar. &
Coast. L. 77 [Molenaar, ―The South Tasman Rise Arrangement‖]. Some mentions to allocation of high seas
fishing opportunities are also included in general studies on the law of the sea or high seas fisheries, and in
particular in legal studies on the United Nations Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the Conservation and
Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, 4 August 1995, 34 ILM 1542
(1995); 2167 UNTS 88 (entered into force 11 December 2001) [hereafter UNFSA].
17
Lodge et al. note: ―The allocation of participatory rights and the mechanisms used to assimilate the
dynamics of both the fisheries themselves and the broader geopolitical landscape invariably result from a
negotiated outcome between sovereign States. (…) [E]xperience to date has been that allocation is
invariably a political decision‖ (Lodge et al., supra note 11, at 34). Molenaar, in turn, considers that ―[t]he
allocation process is to a large extent governed by political and negotiating factors, and constrained only by
very general rules and principles of international law‖ (Molenaar, ―Participation‖, ibid, at 479).

3

negotiated and agreed upon by the involved parties without significant guidance in the
form of substantive rules. Oda has categorically asserted that in the issues of allocation of
benefits and burdens of ocean management and conservation,
the concept of equity has a predominant impact, while legal norms play little or
no role. Equity comprises no objective legal criterion and varies in each
circumstance. Its evaluation or determination is not a simple matter. Solutions in
the above categories nonetheless will need to be found; but they will not be found
simply in rules and regulations of law, and they are not subject simply to judicial
determination.18
This dismissal of the discipline of law in the resolution of allocation problems
seems at odds with several recent developments in international law and in international
fisheries law. First, and perhaps most importantly, it contradicts the increasing role of
equity and equitable principles as a legal standard for the allocation of scarce resources in
international law. This role has been recognized by several scholars. Schachter, for
example, identified five manifestations or uses of equity. One of those manifestations is
to provide a legal standard for allocation of scarce resources. Furthermore, he asserts that
―[e]quitable principles of a more specific substantive character have come to have an
especially significant role in regard to shared resources and delimitation problems‖
(emphasis added).19 Shelton, in turn, considers that there are three categories of
substantive legal norms that promote the idea of justice: norms addressing the
consequences of wrongful actions; norms of humane treatment; and norms allocating
scarce resources.20 Furthermore, the concepts of equitable delimitation and equitable use
have been widely considered as the legal substantive norms governing the delimitation of
maritime areas and the apportionment of shared resources. As such, they have been
applied by the Permanent Court of Arbitration and the International Court of Justice (ICJ)
in the legal resolution of disputes between parties.

18

Shigeru Oda, ―Some reflections on recent developments in the law of the sea‖ (2002) 27 Yale J. Int‘l L.
217, included in Shigeru Oda, Fifty Years of Law of the Sea, with a special section on the International
Court of Justice: selected writings of Shigeru Oda (The Hague; New York: Kluwer Law International,
2003) 685, at 690.
19
Oscar Schachter, International Law in Theory and Practice (Dordrecht, the Netherlands; Boston:
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1991) at 58.
20
Dinah Shelton, ―Describing the elephant: international justice and environmental law‖ in Jonas Ebbesson
and Phoebe Okowa (eds.), Environmental Law and Justice in Context (Cambridge, UK; New York:
Cambridge University Press 2009) 55, at 65.

4

The dismissal of legal principles from allocation of fishing opportunities also
ignores the importance of equity as a component of the concept of sustainable
development, which in turn has an increasing influence in the interpretation and
implementation of international law. The concept of sustainable development recognizes
a particularly important role to be fulfilled by the principle of intergenerational equity,
which addresses the fair allocation of resources between present and future generations,
and the principle of intra-generational equity, which address the fair allocation of
resources within current generations.21
Equity is also considered an element of the ecosystem approach to natural
resource management, defined as ―a strategy for the integrated management of land,
water and living resources that promotes conservation and sustainable use in an equitable
way.‖22 The ecosystem approach has been explicitly accepted as a guiding principle and
objective for fisheries management for both areas under national jurisdiction and the high
seas,23 and has been included as such in both binding24 and non-binding25 fisheries
instruments at the global and regional level. In the particular context of ecosystem
21

See, for example: New Delhi Declaration of Principles of International Law Relating to Sustainable
Development, adopted by the 70th Conference of the International Law Association, held in New Delhi,
India, 2-6 April 2002, included in (2002) 2 International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and
Economics 211 [hereafter ILA New Delhi Declaration], at 212-213. The role of intergenerational equity
and intra-generational equity in international law in the field of sustainable development will be addressed
in detail in chapters 4 and 5 of this thesis.
22
Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), Decision V/6 adopted during
Fifth Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity, Nairobi, Kenya,
15 - 26 May 2000 (CBD COP 5 Decision V/6), section A paragraph (1), online: CBD
<http://www.cbd.org>.
23
S.M. Garcia, A. Zerbi, C. Aliaume, T. Do Chi, and G. Lasserre, The ecosystem approach to fisheries:
Issues, terminology, principles, institutional foundations, implementation and outlook, FAO Fisheries
Technical Paper No. 443 (Rome: FAO, 2003).
24
See, for example: UNFSA, article 5 subparagraphs e) and d); Convention on the Conservation and
Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean, 5 September
2000, 40 ILM 278 (2001) [hereafter WCFPC Convention], articles 5 subparagraph d) and 12(3)
subparagraphs b) and c). More importantly, the recently adopted Convention for the Conservation and
Management of High Seas Fisheries Resources in the South Pacific makes and explicit reference to
―ecosystem approach‖ and considers it as a necessary means to achieve the objective of the Convention
(Convention on the Conservation and Management of High Seas Fishery Resources in the South Pacific
Ocean, adopted at Auckland, November 14, 2009, online: South Pacific Regional Fisheries Management
Organization (SPRFMO) <www.southpacificrfmo.org> [hereafter SPRFMO Convention] preamble para. 9
and articles 2, 3(1) subparagraph b) and 3(2) subparagraph b).
25
Reykjavik Declaration on Responsible Fisheries in the Marine Ecosystem, adopted by the FAO
Conference in its Thirty-first session, Rome, 2-13 November 2001, online: FAO <http://www.fao.org>;
FAO, Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries, FAO Doc. 95/20/Rev/1; UN Sales No. E98.V.11 (1998);
1995 WTS 3, online: FAO <http://www.fao.org/fishery/en> [hereafter FAO Code of Conduct], in particular
article 6.
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approach to fisheries management, equity has been explicitly recognized as one of its
core principles.26
Furthermore, the assertion that allocation is a political and not a legal issue
appears to ignore that there is a perceived need for a framework for allocations of fishing
opportunities that is objective, transparent, predictable, reasonable, and fair. Those are,
precisely, roles that law fulfills in the organization of society.
Section 1. Objective and Structure of the Study
The starting point of this thesis is, therefore, that equity plays an important role as
a legal standard for allocation of scarce resources in international law; a legal standard
which has been defined and refined in the context of international law, international
environmental law, and international law in the field of sustainable development. The
purpose of this thesis is to explore whether, under what conditions, and with what
shortcomings, a legal concept of equity can provide assistance for the allocation of high
seas fishing opportunities. This analysis is undertaken both from the perspective of
allocation of fishing opportunities between generations (intergenerational or intertemporal allocation), and from the perspective of allocation within generations (intragenerational allocation). It should be noted from the outset, though, that as the thesis
progresses, this over-simplified starting point will be qualified and clarified precisely to
answer those questions.
To achieve the objective of this thesis, this study is divided in three main parts: a
first part providing a background on allocation; a second part analyzing allocation from
the perspective of intergenerational equity; and a third part analyzing allocation from the
perspective of intra-generational equity.
The first part has the objective of providing an in-depth understanding of the
current status of allocation of fishing opportunities in the high seas, both at the level of
global and regional legal framework and at the level of regional practices. This in-depth
analysis is undertaken in chapters 2 and 3. Chapter 2 provides an historical recount of the
emergence of total allowable catches (TACs) and allocation of national quotas as a
26

See: Garcia et al., supra note 23, at 26; FAO, The Ecosystem Approach to Fisheries, Technical
Guidelines for Responsible Fisheries No. 4 Suppl.2 (Rome: FAO, 2003) at 15 and Annex 2 on Principles of
Relevance to an Ecosystem Approach to Fisheries.
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fundamental conservation and management measure for international fisheries
management, and of its evolution to this day. Emphasis is placed on the rationale behind
the implementation of TACs and allocation of national quotas, its recognition in legal
frameworks, and the role of equity in this evolution. Chapter 3 analyses the current legal
framework for allocation of fishing opportunities, and the current regional allocation
practices. An emphasis is put on the shortcomings of the existing legal framework to
solve the different conflicts of interests involved in an allocation issue.
These preliminary chapters provide the foundation to address allocation from the
perspective of intergenerational and intra-generational equity. Chapter 4 addresses the
legal linkages and the practical impacts of allocation of fishing opportunities on
intergenerational equity. For this purpose, it analyzes the concept of intergenerational
equity, its status in international law, and how the concept is recognized in international
fisheries law. It then addresses the practical implications of allocation of fishing
opportunities for intergenerational equity.
Chapter 5 addresses allocation of fishing opportunities from the perspective of
equity within the present generation, or intra-generational equity. As in the preceding
chapter, it starts by analyzing the concept of equity and its status in international law and
in international law in the field of sustainable development. This analysis provides an
opportunity to understand the richness of the concept of equity, its different meanings or
emphasis, its current acceptance in international law, and its evolving status. It is with
this deeper understanding of equity that the thesis addresses its recognition in
international fisheries law.
The previous analysis allows concluding that equity – and in particular
autonomous equity - can be considered a fundamental norm for allocation of fishing
opportunities. This conclusion only opens the door for furthering the comprehension of
the legal concept of equity and its normative content. For this purposes, the chapter
analyzes three equitable principles identified and applied in other areas of international
law. These three equitable principles are: equitable delimitation, equitable use, and
common but differentiated responsibility. These three analyses provide valuable lessons
for the construction of a normative concept of equity. They also provide valuable insights
on the influence and evolution of certain categories of factors that are traditionally
7

considered relevant in the distribution of resources, and that have been also considered in
the legal framework for the distribution of high seas fishing opportunities. Those are:
historical or prior use, geographical and jurisdictional considerations (or zonal
attachment), and socio-economic factors. This information allows re-examining the
conflicts involved in the allocation of fishing opportunities in the high seas in the light of
an evolving concept of equity.
To complete the analysis of allocation of high seas fishing opportunities in the
light of a normative concept of equity, the thesis addresses two final topics in chapters 6
and 7. Chapter 6 considers the institutional and procedural implications of the adoption of
a normative concept of equity for allocation of fishing opportunities. Finally, chapter 7
addresses one emerging and particularly important aspect of allocation - the tradability of
national quotas - in light of equity considerations.
Before undertaking this analysis, however, some background information on high
seas fisheries resources and high seas fisheries governance is needed. This background
information will be provided in the next section of this chapter, which also serves to
specify the scope of this thesis.
Section 2. High Seas Fisheries Management: Basic Concepts
This section provides an overview of important concepts of international fisheries
management that are required as a conceptual framework for the subject of TAC and
allocations. Those elements are: the different jurisdictional areas in the law of the sea; the
classification of resources according to their distribution between those areas; the
economic importance of high seas resources; the role of regional fisheries bodies and
regional fisheries management organizations in high seas fisheries management; and the
conservation and management measures that these organizations may adopt for the
sustainable management of high seas fisheries. It is also considered relevant to give a
wider perspective on the sharing of ocean resources, albeit this approach will not be
pursued further in the thesis. The analysis undertaken here is neither novel nor extensive,
since its objective is only to provide necessary background for the following chapters.
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High Seas and High Seas Fisheries Resources
The law of the sea, which has developed over many centuries, is currently
reflected mainly in the 1982 United Nations Law of the Sea Convention (LOSC).27 The
LOSC adopts a geographical and jurisdictional approach to oceans management. As
stated by van Houtte, ―the main trust (sic) of the 1982 Convention is the division of the
ocean space into different jurisdictional areas and the identification of the rights and
duties of States within those various areas.‖28 These various ocean areas are: internal
waters, territorial sea, contiguous zone, exclusive economic zone (EEZ), archipelagic
waters, continental shelf, high seas, and the Area (seabed and ocean floor and subsoil
thereof, beyond the limits of national jurisdiction). For purposes of fisheries jurisdiction,
however, the relevant areas are the territorial sea, the EEZ, and the high seas.
The territorial sea is an area of up to 12 nautical miles, measured from baselines
determined in accordance with the LOSC.29 In this area, the coastal State exercises
sovereignty, subject to the provisions of the LOSC and other rules of international law. 30
The main limitation imposed by the LOSC is the coastal State‘s obligation to allow the
innocent passage of vessels flying the flag of another country. 31 Thus, in exercising
sovereignty, the coastal State has exclusive jurisdiction for the conservation and
management of the living marine resources that occur in this ocean belt.

27

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 10 December 1982, 1833 UNTS 3; 21 ILM 1261
(1982) (entered into force November 16, 2004) [hereafter LOSC].
28
Annick Van Houtte, ―Legal Aspects in the Management of Shared Fish Stocks‖, in FAO, Papers
presented at the Norway-FAO Expert Consultation on the Management of Shared Fish Stocks, Bergen,
Norway, 7-10 October 2002, FAO Fisheries Report Nr. 695Suppl. (Rome: FAO, 2003) 30, at 30.
29
LOSC, article 5: ―Except where otherwise provided in this Convention, the normal baseline for
measuring the breadth of the territorial sea is the low-water line along the coast as marked on large-scale
charts officially recognized by the coastal State.‖ LOSC, article 6: ―In the case of islands situated on atolls
or of islands having fringing reefs, the baseline for measuring the breadth of the territorial sea is the
seaward low-water line of the reef, as shown by the appropriate symbol on charts officially recognized by
the coastal State.‖ LOSC, article 7(1): ―In localities where the coastline is deeply indented and cut into, or
if there is a fringe of islands along the coast in its immediate vicinity, the method of straight baselines
joining appropriate points may be employed in drawing the baseline from which the breadth of the
territorial sea is measured.‖ Article 7 of the LOSC provides guidance and conditions to draw straight
baselines.
30
LOSC, article 2(1) and 2(3): ―The sovereignty of a coastal State extends, beyond its land territory and
internal waters and, in the case of an archipelagic State, its archipelagic waters, to an adjacent belt of sea,
described as the territorial sea. (...) The sovereignty over the territorial sea is exercised subject to this
Convention and to other rules of international law.‖
31
LOSC, article 17: ―Subject to this Convention, ships of all States, whether coastal or land-locked, enjoy
the right of innocent passage through the territorial sea.‖
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The EEZ is an area beyond and adjacent to the territorial sea, extending up to 200
nautical miles from the baselines from which the territorial sea is measured.32 In this area,
the coastal State exercises sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting,
conserving and managing the natural resources, whether living or non-living, of the
waters superjacent to the seabed and of the seabed and its subsoil, and with regard to
other activities for the economic exploitation and exploration of the zone, such as the
production of energy from the water, currents and winds.33 It also exercises jurisdiction
with regard to the establishment and use of artificial islands, installations, and structures;
marine scientific research; and the protection and preservation of the marine
environment; as well as other rights and duties provided for in the Convention.34
The sovereign rights that coastal States exercise in their EEZs over natural
resources entail the right to determine the TAC of the fish stocks within this zone (thus
defining the conservation goals independent of other States) and to optimally use those
stocks. However, ―[w]here the coastal State does not have the capacity to harvest the
entire allowable catch, it shall, through agreements or other arrangements (…) give other
States access to the surplus of the allowable catch‖.35 In so doing, some particular
provisions should be taken into account by the coastal State.36
The high seas encompass ―all parts of the sea that are not included in the
exclusive economic zone, in the territorial sea or in the internal waters of a State, or in the
archipelagic waters of an archipelagic State.‖37 It includes, therefore, the water column
over the extended continental shelf claimed by States in accordance to article 76 of
LOSC, and the water column above the Area. This vast maritime space is open to all
32

LOSC, articles 55 and 57. The EEZ breadth is, therefore, only 188 nautical miles.
LOSC, article 56.
34
LOSC, article 56(1).
35
LOSC, article 62(2).
36
These are: the significance of the living resources of the area to the economy of the coastal State
concerned and its other national interests (including the fishing communities or fishing industries of the
coastal State); the rights of landlocked and geographically disadvantaged States; the requirements of
developing States in the sub-region or region in harvesting part of the surplus; the need to minimize
economic dislocation in States whose nationals have habitually fished in the zone; and the need to
minimize economic dislocation in States which have made substantial efforts in research and identification
of stocks. In particular relation to landlocked and geographically disadvantaged States, the LOSC
considers: the need to avoid a particular burden for any single coastal State or a part of it; the nutritional
needs of the populations of the respective States; and the rule that developed States can only participate in
the exploitation of living resources in the EEZ of developed coastal States of the same subregion or region
(LOSC, article 62).
37
LOSC, article 86.
33
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States, whether coastal or land-locked.38 In this area, every State has the freedom of
navigation; the freedom of overflight; the freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines;
the freedom to construct artificial islands and other installations permitted under
international law; the freedom of fishing; and the freedom of scientific research.39 The
freedoms of the high seas must be exercised with due regard for international law and the
provisions of the LOSC;40 and with due regard for the interests of other States in their
exercise of the freedoms of the high seas.41
Figure 1. Maritime Zones

Source: R.R. Churchill and A. V. Lowe, The Law of the Sea, 3d ed. (Oxford:
Manchester University Press, 1999) at 30.
The spatial jurisdiction of the LOSC does not coincide with the biological
distribution or migration patterns of fisheries resources. There are, therefore, some fish
stocks42 that are distributed over, or migrate across, ocean areas under different
38

LOSC, article 87(1).
LOSC, article 86(1).
40
See: LOSC, article 86(1).
41
LOSC, article 86(2). The article adds that the freedoms of the high seas must be exercised with due
regard for the rights under this Convention with respect to activities in the Area. Since the management
regime for the seabed beyond areas under national jurisdiction is not analyzed, this reference has been
omitted.
42
A fish stock is a ―subset of a species with similar growth and mortality parameters within a given
geographical area and with negligible interbreeding with other stocks of the same species in adjacent areas‖
(Jean-Jacques Maguire, Michael Sissenwine, Jorge Csirke, Richard Grainger, and Serge Garcia, The state
39
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jurisdiction. These are usually classified in four categories: transboundary stocks, highly
migratory stocks, straddling stocks, and discrete stocks.
The fish stocks that straddle between the EEZ of two or more States are usually
known as transboundary stocks.43 Article 63(1) of the LOSC, in establishing the regime
for these stocks, refers to them simply as ―stock or stocks of associated species [that]
occur within the exclusive economic zones of two or more coastal States‖.
Some stocks also straddle or migrate between the EEZ of one or more States and
the high seas: highly migratory and straddling stocks.44 The LOSC does not contain a
conceptual definition of highly migratory stock. However, Annex I of the LOSC contains
a closed list of resources that are legally considered highly migratory. This list includes
all tuna and tuna-like fish stocks (marlins, sailfishes, swordfish),45 as well as some other
species that have similarly wide distribution and migration patterns.
The LOSC does not contain a legal definition of straddling stocks, either.
However, following the wording of article 63(2) of LOSC, it is generally understood that
a straddling stock refers to "the same stock or stocks of associated species [which] occur
both within the exclusive economic zone and in an area beyond and adjacent to the
zone"46 and that are not included in Annex I of the LOSC. A straddling stock may be

of world highly migratory, straddling and other high seas fishery resources and associated species, FAO
Fisheries Technical Paper No. 495 (Rome: FAO, 2006), at 3). Given its independence from other groups of
the same species, the stock is usually chosen as a unit for management purposes.
43
According to Munro, Van Houtte and Willman, the fish stocks that are distributed over, or migrate
across, areas of the ocean under different jurisdiction, or occur in the high seas, are known as shared stocks
(Munro, Van Houtte, and Willmann, supra note 7, at 3). Van Houtte, in a previous work, noted that
fisheries lawyer use the generic term transboundary resources to refer to fish stocks that can be found on
two sides of a boundary, and the specific term shared stocks to refer to those stocks that distribute over, or
migrate across, the EEZ of two or more States (Van Houtte, supra note 28, at 30). The term shared fish
stock has not been used by international practitioners, however. The FAO Code of Conduct refers to
transboundary stocks to refer to stocks that occur in the EEZs of two or more States (FAO, Code of
Conduct, supra note 25, article 7.1.3). In addition, the term ―shared resource‖ has been subject to an
extensive debate in the International Law Commission (ILC). For this reason, this thesis follows the
terminology of the FAO Code of Conduct.
44
It has been noted that the distinction between highly migratory stocks and straddling stocks followed
political, rather than biological, imperatives (Munro, Van Houtte and Willmann, ibid, at 36, citing William
T. Burke, The New International Law of Fisheries: UNCLOS 1983 and Beyond (Oxford: Clarendon Press;
New York: Oxford University Press, 1994) at 200). Maguire et al., in turn, note that the definition of highly
migratory stock is a legal rather than a scientific definition based on the actual migratory behavior of the
species (Maguire et al., supra note 42, at 4).
45
See: Maguire et al., ibid, at 10.
46
Ibid, at 4.
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distributed mostly inside the EEZ, or mostly in the high seas; as long as there is directed
fishing effort on either side of the EEZ, the stock is considered to be straddling.47
It is worth mentioning, at this point, that the limited provisions of the LOSC for
the conservation and management of straddling and highly migratory stocks have been
further developed by the United Nations Agreement for the Implementation of the
Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982
relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly
Migratory Fish Stocks (UNFSA).48 The Agreement, however, does not define either of
these concepts. There are also stocks that occur only or exclusively in the high seas.
These are known as ‗discrete stocks‘. Fishing for ‗discrete stocks‘ is relatively recent.
The fishery was first developed off New Zealand and Australia in the late-1970s and
1980s, and expanded rapidly elsewhere since the 1990s.49 Most of the known discrete
stocks are deep-water species: orange roughy (Hoplostethus atlanticus), oreos (Allocyttus
spp., Neocyttus spp., Pseudocyttus spp.), alfonsinos (Beryx spp.), Patagonian toothfish
(Dissostichus eleginoides) or armourhead (Pseudopentaceros spp.).50 It has been noted,
however, that ―several others may exist for pelagic species.‖51 The term ‗discrete stock‘
is also recent and does not appear in the LOSC, although it refers to high seas living
resources in Part VII. The term has been subject to criticism, and the term ‗high seas fish
stock‘ has been preferred.52 However, since straddling and highly migratory stocks also
have a high seas component, the term discrete stocks will be used in this thesis. High seas
fisheries resources in this thesis will encompass, therefore, straddling, highly migratory
and discrete stocks.

47

Ibid.
See: UNFSA, supra note 16.
49
Maguire et al., supra note 42, at 50.
50
Ibid, at 49-55. It should be noted, however, that their condition as discrete stock depends on the stock
distribution. This has often been source of contention between parties. See, for example: Erik Jaap
Molenaar, ―South Tasman Rise‖, supra note 16, at 85.
51
Maguire et al., ibid, at 49.
52
FAO Code of Conduct, supra note 25, article 7.1.3; Maguire et al., ibid, at 4. Maguire et al. note note
that ―the discreteness of such stocks is generally unknown (e.g. fish caught on distinct seamounts hundreds
or thousands of kilometres apart may not necessarily belong to discrete/separate biological units)‖ (Maguire
et al., ibid). Munro, Van Houtte, and Willmann use the term discrete stock (Munro, Van Houtte, and
Willmann, supra note 7, at 3 and 55).
48
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Figure 2. Types of stocks occurring partially or entirely in the high seas.
Top panel: 1. Highly Migratory; 2. Straddling (extensive distribution); 3. High seas.
Bottom panel: 4. Pelagic straddling (mostly within EEZ); 5. Demersal straddling (mostly
within EEZ); 6. Straddling (transboundary); 7. Straddling (mostly in the high seas); 8.
Straddling (evenly distributed).

Source: Jean-Jacques Maguire, Michael Sissenwine, Jorge Csirke, Richard Grainger,
Serge Garcia, The state of world highly migratory, straddling and other high seas fishery
resources and associated species, FAO Fisheries Technical Paper No. 495 (Rome: FAO,
2006) at 6.
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Despite the fact that the LOSC adopts an approach to fisheries jurisdiction that is
mainly geographical, it also establishes some particular rules for anadromous stocks,53
catadromous stocks54 and marine mammals,55 without defining the terms. Anadromous
and catadromous species refer to those species that migrate between fresh water and the
oceans. Anadromous species utilize freshwater river and streams for spawning and
juvenile rearing, and oceanic environments during adult life stages (e.g. salmon and
sturgeon); while catadromous species spawn in the ocean and use freshwater habitats
during adult life stages (e.g. most eels). Marine mammals, in turn, are a diverse group of
mammals that are primarily ocean-dwelling or dependent on the ocean for food. They
include cetaceans (whales, dolphins and propoises) and pinnipeds (seals, sea lions, and
walruses). Anadromous and catadromous species, and marine mammals may, as well,
have high seas distribution.
This thesis focuses on TAC and allocation of fishing opportunities for stocks that
have a high seas component (i.e., straddling stocks, highly migratory stocks and discrete
stocks) with the exception of anadromous and catadromous stocks and marine mammals.
It does, therefore, not address the management of stocks occurring within the EEZ of two
or more States (i.e. transboundary resources).
The Economic Importance of High Seas Fisheries Resources
High seas areas cover approximately 60% of the oceans.56 However, their
productivity (or at least the productivity of known species with readily available and costeffective technology) has been considered, traditionally, much less than in areas of the
EEZ. The precise economic importance of high seas fisheries is hard to establish.57 The
main reason for this is the structure of the catch statistical system. Marine catches are
reported by countries to the Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations
(FAO) according to statistical areas for fishery purposes established in the 1950s and
thus, before the codification of the concept of the EEZs in the LOSC in 1982. Because

53

LOSC, article 66.
LOSC, article 67.
55
LOSC, article 65.
56
IUCN, 10 Principles for High Seas Governance, October 2008, online: IUCN <www.iucn.org>.
57
Munro, Van Houtte and Willmann, supra note 7, at 6; FAO, SOFIA 2008, supra note 1, at 14.
54
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the boundaries of the FAO statistical areas and of the EEZs do not correspond, the data
on catches in EEZ and high seas are aggregated. As a consequence, the data on catches in
the high seas cannot be obtained from the data submitted to FAO.58 FAO has initiated a
project in collaboration with RFMOs on the modification of statistical areas, but this
project is ongoing and has yet to show results.59
Despite this shortcoming, ―there is enough evidence to indicate that the
significance of shared fish stocks in world capture fisheries is decidedly non-trivial.‖60 In
2003, Munro et al., estimated that the total annual harvest of highly migratory and
straddling stocks represented approximately 20% of the total harvest of world marine
capture fisheries.61 More recently, Cullis-Suzuki and Pauly have estimated that catches in
the high seas represents approximately 15% of the world catches.62
The proportion of world catches coming from high seas fisheries may still grow,
as a consequence of an increased depletion of fisheries in the EEZs and advances in
technology that makes high seas fishing (and particularly deep-sea fishing) possible and
commercially viable. For example, FAO has recently estimated at 133 the number of
species classified as deep-water (thus presumably discrete stocks). This is more than
double the number of the first classification based on 1999 data.63 In addition, catches of
the highly migratory stocks of tuna continue to grow.64
Most importantly, several high seas fish resources have a significant commercial
value. That is particularly the case with tuna stocks. While tuna catches represent less
than 5% of the world catch, ―their landed value has been estimated to account for nearly
20 percent of the global marine total.‖65 Orange roughy, a deep-sea species that may be
classified as a straddling or a discrete stock, is also an economically important species
and thus object of increasing demand.
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FAO, SOFIA 2008,ibid, at 14.
Ibid, at 15.
60
Munro, Van Houtte and Willmann, supra note 7, at 6. The authors used the term ―shared fish stock‖ to
refer to transboundary, straddling, highly migratory and discrete stocks.
61
Ibid, at 7.
62
Cullis-Suzuki and Pauly, supra note 1.
63
FAO, SOFIA 2008, supra note 1, at 14.
64
Ibid, at 12.
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Maguire et al., supra note 42, at 10.
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These studies show, therefore, that high seas fish stocks are now, and are expected
to be in the future, under considerable fishing pressure.
Regional Fisheries Bodies, Organizations and Arrangements
The LOSC relies, for the conservation and management of high seas fish
resources, on States cooperation.66 Cooperative regimes are usually established at the
regional level and institutionalized through regional fisheries organizations or bodies, or
formalized through regional fisheries arrangements.67
A regional fisheries body has been understood as a
(...) mechanism through which three or more States or international organizations
that are parties to an international fishery agreement or arrangement
collaboratively engage each other in multilateral management of fishery affairs
related to transboundary, straddling, highly or high seas migratory stocks, through
the collection and provision of scientific information and data, serving as a
technical and policy forum, or taking decisions pertaining to the development and
conservation, management and responsible utilization of the resources.68
FAO lists currently 42 regional fisheries bodies.69 These bodies differ in their
mandates, functions, structure and financial resources.70 Most importantly for this thesis,
many of the regional fisheries bodies do not have a mandate to adopt conservation and
management measures, i.e., they are advisory bodies but without management
authority.71 The regional fisheries bodies that have such a mandate are known as
Regional Fisheries Management Organizations (RFMOs). The FAO defines RFMOs as
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LOSC, article 118: ―States shall cooperate with each other in the conservation and management of living
resources in the areas of the high seas. States whose nationals exploit identical living resources, or different
living resources in the same area, shall enter into negotiations with a view to taking the measures necessary
for the conservation of the living resources concerned. They shall, as appropriate, cooperate to establish
subregional or regional fisheries organizations to this end.‖
67
According to article 118 of the LOSC, ―States shall cooperate with each other in the conservation and
management of living resources in the areas of the high seas. States whose nationals exploit identical living
resources, or different living resources in the same area, shall enter into negotiations with a view to taking
the measures necessary for the conservation of the living resources concerned. They shall, as appropriate,
cooperate to establish subregional or regional fisheries organizations to this end.‖
68
FAO, Report of the Meeting of FAO and non-FAO Regional Fishery Bodies or Arrangements, Rome, 1112 February 1999, FAO Fisheries Report No. 597, FIPL/R597 (Rome: FAO, 1999), Appendix E, ―Major
Issues Affecting The Performance of Regional Fishery Bodies‖, para. 1, footnote 3.
69
See online: FAO <www.fao.org/fishery/rfb/search/en>.
70
Judith Swan, Regional Fishery Bodies and Governance: Issues, Actions and Future Directions, FAO
Fisheries Circular No. 959 (Rome: FAO, 2000), at 1.
71
Of the regional bodies recognized by FAO, 23 have only advisory mandate. See: supra note 69.
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―intergovernmental fisheries organizations or arrangements, as appropriate, that have the
competence to establish fisheries conservation and management measures‖.72
The difference between an organization and an arrangement lies in the
institutional setting: a RFMO is an international organization with a specific operational
structure (usually consisting of a Commission or Meeting of the Parties, Secretariat,
Scientific Committee, Compliance Committee, and Financial or Administration
Committee), while a regional fisheries management arrangement is a management
agreement between States that does not consider such a structure.
Figure 3. Regional Fisheries Bodies

FAO. © 2008-2010. RFB web site. Regional Fishery Bodies (RFB). In: FAO Fisheries
and Aquaculture Department [online]. Rome. Updated 20 October 2008. [Cited 26
August 2010] <http://www.fao.org/fishery/rfb/en>.
The role and importance of regional fisheries bodies, and of RFMOs and regional
fisheries management arrangements in particular, as vehicles for oceans governance has
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FAO, International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated
Fishing, adopted by FAO‘s Committee on Fisheries (COFI) on 2 March 2001 and endorsed by the FAO
Council on 23 June 2001, para. 6(c), online: FAO <http://www.fao.org/fishery/en> [hereafter IPOA-IUU].
The definition has been recently included in the FAO Agreement on Port State Measures to Prevent, Deter
and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing, approved by the 36th Conference of FAO held
in Rome, 18-23 November 2009, online: FAO <http://www.fao.org/fishery/en> [hereafter FAO Port State
Measures Agreement].
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been emphasized in the 1993 FAO Agreement,73 in the 1995 Code of Conduct,74 the 1995
Rome Consensus on World Fisheries,75 the 1995 Kyoto Declaration and Plan of Action
on the Sustainable Contribution of Fisheries to Food Security,76 and in UNFSA.77 It is
widely accepted that RFMOs and agreements, as the primary mechanisms for achieving
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Agreement to Promote Compliance with International Conservation and Management Measures by
Fishing Vessels in the High Seas, November 24, 1993, adopted by the FAO Conference at its 27 th Session,
33 ILM 968 (1994), 2004 ATS 26 [hereafter FAO Compliance Agreement] preamble, para. 7: ―The Parties
to this Agreement, Calling upon States which do not participate in global, regional or subregional fisheries
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organizations or with parties to such organizations or arrangements with a view to achieving compliance
with international conservation and management measures.‖
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included a paragraph stating that the Conference ―[u]rges FAO to strengthen Regional Fisheries Bodies in
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regional and global cooperation and coordination in fisheries‖ (FAO Code of Conduct, ibid, Annex 2, para.
7).
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The Rome Consensus on World Fisheries urges governments and international organizations to take
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arrangements for implementing conservation and management measures (FAO, Rome Consensus on World
Fisheries, adopted by the FAO Ministerial Conference on Fisheries, Rome, 14-15 March 1995, Non-serial
publications AC441/E, online: FAO <http://www.fao.org/documents>).
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The Kyoto Plan of Action on Sustainable Contribution of Fisheries to Food Security includes, among
other, the following actions: enhance subregional and regional cooperation and establish, where it is
considered appropriate, subregional and regional fishery conservation and management organizations or
arrangements for straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks; and cooperate to strengthen,
where necessary, existing subregional and regional fishery conservation and management organizations and
arrangements in order to carry out their assigned tasks (FAO, Kyoto Declaration and Plan of Action on the
Sustainable Contribution of Fisheries to Food Security, adopted by the International Conference on the
Sustainable Contribution of Fisheries to Food Security, hosted by the Government of Japan in cooperation
with FAO at Kyoto, 4 to 9 December 1995, Plan of Action para. 2, online: FAO
<http://www.fao.org/documents>).
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According to article 8 of UNFSA, coastal States and States fishing on the high seas shall, in accordance
with the LOSC, pursue cooperation in relation to straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks
either directly or through appropriate subregional or regional fisheries management organizations or
arrangements, taking into account the specific characteristics of the subregion or region, to ensure effective
conservation and management of such stocks. According to paragraph 5, ―where there is no subregional or
regional fisheries management organization or arrangement to establish conservation and management
measures for a particular straddling fish stock or highly migratory fish stock, relevant coastal States and
States fishing on the high seas for such stock in the subregion or region shall cooperate to establish such an
organization or enter into other appropriate arrangements to ensure conservation and management of such
stock and shall participate in the work of the organization or arrangement.‖ Paragraph 4 adds that ―only
those States which are members of such an organization or participants in such an arrangement, or which
agree to apply the conservation and management measures established by such organization or
arrangement, shall have access to the fishery resources to which those measures apply.‖

19

cooperation among high seas fishing countries, play a critical role in the global system of
fisheries governance.78
Furthermore, there have been continuous calls to strengthen the role of RFMOs
and to improve their performance ―in accordance with the demands of strengthened
international fishery instruments aimed at better conservation and management of fishery
resources.‖79 According to article 13 of UNFSA, States ―shall cooperate to strengthen
existing subregional and regional fisheries management organizations and arrangements
in order to improve their effectiveness in establishing and implementing conservation and
management measures for straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks.‖ As a
consequence of this perception, there have been various initiatives, studies, reports and
guidelines80 directed to improving the performance of RFMOs, including various RFMOs
performance reviews.81
This thesis focuses on the work of RFMOs in relation to one particular
conservation and management measure. Nevertheless, not all the RFMOs recognized by
FAO have been considered in the analysis. Some RFMOs do not have jurisdiction on the
high seas,82 some have jurisdiction over anadromous species83 or marine mammals,84 and

78

Lodge et al., supra note 11, at 1.
Lodge et al., ibid, at vii.
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See, for example: Lodge et al., ibid; Mooney-Seus and Rosenberg, supra note 3; Willock and Lack,
supra note 10; Cullis-Suzuki and Pauly, supra note 1.
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The RFMOs that have undertaken a performance review are: CCAMLR, ICCAT, CCSBT, NEAFC, and
IOTC. ICCAT, NEAFC and CCAMLR had a performance review undertaken by an expert panel that
included external reviewers. CCSBT had a review undertaken by an international committee, reviewed by
an external expert. The respective reports are: CCAMLR, Performance Review Panel Report, 1 September
2008, online: CCAMLR <http://www.ccamlr.org> [hereafter CCAMLR Performance Review Report];
G.D. Hurry, M. Hayashi and J. J. Maguire, Report of the Independent Review, International Commission
for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT), PLE-106/2008, Part I, section 4(4), [hereafter ICCAT
Performance Review Report]; CCSBT, Report of the Performance Review Working Group, Canberra,
Australia, 3–4 July 2008, and Report of the Independent Expert, September 2008, online: CCSBT
<http://www.ccsbt.org> [hereafter CCSBT Performance Review Report]; NEAFC, Report of the
Performance Review Panel, November 2006, online: NEAFC <http://www.neafc.org > [hereafter NEAFC
Performance Review Report]; and IOTC, Report of the Performance Review Panel, January 2009, online:
IOTC <http://www.iotc.org> [hereafter IOTC Performance Review Report]. Among the organizations that
have postpone the RFMO performance review, for different reasons, are NAFO, IATTC and WCPFC.
Some other organizations have adopted terms of reference for performance reviews that are currently
ongoing. SEAFO has recently approved the terms of reference for a performance review that will be
undertaken in 2010. These terms of reference were drafted mostly considering the terms of reference of
CCAMLR, which has no allocation procedures in place. As a result, allocation procedures are not in the
terms of reference of this performance review.
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That is the case of the Lake Victoria Fisheries Organization (LVFO) and Regional Commission for
Fisheries (RECOFI).
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two have jurisdiction over enclosed seas.85 For these reasons, they will not be the focus of
this thesis. The focus will be the on the ten RFMOs that have jurisdiction over highly
migratory stocks, straddling stocks or discrete stocks.
The RFMOs considered in this thesis that have jurisdiction over highly migratory
stocks, or tuna RFMOs, are the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission (IATTC),86
the International Convention for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT), 87 the
Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC),88 the Commission for the Conservation of
Southern Bluefin Tuna (CCSBT),89 and the Western Central Pacific Fisheries
Commission (WCPFC).90 The selected RFMOs with jurisdiction over straddling stocks,
and in some cases discrete stocks, are the Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic
Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR),91 the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization
(NAFO),92 the North East Atlantic Fisheries Commission (NEAFC),93 the South East
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That is the case of the North Pacific Anadromous Fisheries Commission (NPAFC), the Pacific Salmon
Commission (PSC), and the North Atlantic Salmon Conservation Organization (NASCO).
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That is the case of the International Whaling Commission (IWC).
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That is the case of the Convention on the Conservation and Management of Pollock Resources in the
Central Bering Sea (CCBSP) and General Fisheries Commission for the Mediterranean (GFCM).
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Established by the Convention for the Establishment of an Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission,
United States of America and Republic of Costa Rica, 31 May 1949, TIAS 2044, 1UST 230, 80 UNTS 3,
modified by the Convention for the Strengthening of the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission
established by the 1949 Convention between the United States of America and the Republic of Costa Rica,
27 July 2003 (entered into force 27 August 2010), online: IATTC <http://www.iattc.org> [hereafter IATTC
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Established by International Convention for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas, 14 May 1966, 20 UST
2887; 673 UNTS 63 (entered into force 21 March 1969), amended by the Protocol of Paris to Amend the
International Convention for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas, 10 July 1984 (entered into force 14
December 1997), and the Madrid Protocol to Amend Paragraph 2 of Article X of the International
Convention for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas, 5 June 1992 (entered into force 10 March 2005)
[hereafter ICCAT Convention].
88
Established by the Agreement for the Establishment of the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission, 25
November 1993, 1927 U.N.T.S. 329 [hereafter IOTC Convention].
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Established by the Convention for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna, 10 May 1993, 1819
UNTS 360; 1994 ATS No. 16 [hereafter CCSBT Convention].
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Established by the WCFPC Convention, supra note 24.
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Established by the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, 20 May 1980,
1329 UNTS 48; 19 ILM 841 (1980) [hereafter CCAMLR Convention].
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Established by the Convention on Future Multilateral Cooperation in the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries, 24
October 1978, 1135 UNTS 369 (entered into force 1 January 1979) [hereafter NAFO Convention].
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Established by the Convention on Future Multilateral Co-operation in North-East Atlantic Fisheries, 18
November 1980, 1285 UNTS 129; 1981 OJ (L 227) 21 (entered into force 17 March 1982) [hereafter
NEAFC Convention].
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Atlantic Fisheries Organization (SEAFO),94 and the recently adopted South Pacific
Organization (SPRFM, not yet in force).95
The selected RFMOs differ in several respects. Many pre-date the LOSC,96 while
others have been established in recent years.97 Most are non-FAO bodies, while one is a
fishery organization adopted under Article XIV of the FAO Constitution.98 Some regulate
only one stock,99 while many regulate all the highly migratory stocks, or all the straddling
stocks, in their area of competence. Their membership also varies both in number and
composition. Some have a very limited membership,100 while others have more than 25
member States.101 In some cases the member States are predominantly developed
States,102 while in others there is a strong participation of developing States.103
It should be pointed out that some of these organizations have been given more
attention because of their progress in adopting allocation frameworks or guidelines, and
allocation practices.104 In particular, the analyses of this thesis focus on the efforts
undertaken by NAFO, ICCAT, CCSBT and WCFPC. Similarly, the research for this
thesis included the allocation keys and agreements for different stocks under the mandate
of these RFMOs. However, only a sample of those cases is referred to in the following
chapters.
Conservation and Management Measures
As noted earlier, RFMOs are a particular type of regional fishery bodies:
organizations that have a mandate to adopt binding conservation and management
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Established by the Convention on the Conservation and Management of Fishery Resources in the South
East Atlantic Ocean, 20 April 2001, 41 I.L.M. 257 (2002) [hereafter SEAFO Convention].
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NAFO, NEAFC, IATTC, ICCAT, IOTC, CCAMLR.
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CCSBT, WCPFC, SEAFO, SPRFMO.
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That is the case of IOTC.
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That is the case of CCSBT, which has jurisdiction exclusively over the Southern bluefin tuna stock.
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For example, SEAFO has 6 members (Angola, European Union, Japan, Namibia, Norway, and South
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measures for the stocks under their jurisdiction. A few words on conservation and
management measures are therefore required.
In an unregulated ocean, the enormous wealth of living marine resources is, in
theory, available to everyone and, in practice, obtained by those who engage in fishing
activities and to extent of their engagement in those activities. Because living marine
resources have proven to be exhaustible in face of the incredible fishing capacities
developed by modern technology, that laissez-faire approach is a matter of the past.
Restrictions and limitations are necessary to ensure that fish stocks are exploited at levels
that are sustainable, i.e., in a manner consistent with their renewal. Those restrictions and
limitations are known as conservation and management measures.
FAO distinguishes three options for regulating fisheries: a) technical measures
(e.g. gear restrictions, area and time restrictions, marine protected areas, minimum size
and maturity restrictions); b) input (effort) control (e.g. restrictions on the number of
fishing units through limiting the number of licenses or permits, restrictions on the
amount of time units can spend fishing, and restrictions on the size of vessels and/or
gear); and c) output (catch) control (e.g. TACs, or quotas).105
All restrictions on fishing activities have a consequence in the way benefits and
burdens of conservation are shared among users; i.e., they all have distribution or
allocation implications.106 However, there are two measures that not only have an
allocation implication but also require a precise allocation decision: the quota system, and
the limitation of fishing effort.
This thesis focuses on the legal framework for, and regional practices of, TACs or
quotas in international fisheries management. Some mention is also made to conservation
and management measures directed to limit fishing effort by restricting the number of
fishing units (number of vessels or time spent fishing). The term ―fishing opportunities‖
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FAO, Fisheries Management: Technical Guidelines or Responsible Fisheries Nr. 4 (Rome: FAO, 1997),
at 46-51.
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For example, a minimum size of the mesh for the capture of a specific stock affects differently those
who fish only for that stock, then those that fish simultaneously for another stock of different size.
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is thus used to refer to the opportunity to engage in a high seas fishery that has been
limited through allowable catch or allowable effort.107
There are mainly two ways to distribute the limited living marine resources. One
way is ―to let free competition among fishing nations determine the share of each
nation‖.108 According to this approach, the ―share of each State is a function of the extent
to which it undertakes such operations‖109, which in turn depends on the fishing
operations of the other participants. In other words, it is a form of ―first come-first
served‖ system to decide who gets what.
A second method to allocate fishing opportunities in the high seas is to agree on
specific limits to the fishing opportunities of each State. In theory, this limit could be
agreed by auction, lottery, or an administrative (authoritative) decision. The decision can,
in turn, take different forms: limiting fishing effort by freezing the existing fishing effort
or catch to existing levels; by freezing the effort or catch to the levels of a reference
period; or by limiting the effort or catch to a specified quantity (expressed either in terms
of percentage of the TAC or in tonnage). All these forms have been used, and are still
used, in international fisheries management. However, it is the latter one (establishing a
specified effort or catch limit) which is the generally preferred management measure.
In international fisheries management, the TAC is allocated to States. In theory, it
is possible to think of a management regime that allocates the high seas fisheries quotas
to fishing companies directly. Such a model has been proposed, 110 but has not been
implemented. States, however, mostly do not engage in fishing activities directly. Thus, it
is the States‘ responsibility to determine how the national quota or effort will be
distributed among their fishing companies and communities. This latter aspect is mostly
not considered part of the international regime. Beside a few references precisely to note
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(Willock and Lack, supra note 10, at 26; Agnew et al., supra note 10, at 5).
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Albert W. Koers, International Regulation of Marine Fisheries: A Study of Regional Fisheries
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Koers, ibid.
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See, for example: Allen, supra note 2, at 38; Richard Barnes, ―Entitlement to Marine Living Resources‖
in Alex G. Oude Elferink and Erik J. Molenaar (eds.), The International Legal Regime of Areas beyond
National Jurisdiction: Current and Future Developments (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2010) 83,
at 107. See also: infra note 123 and accompanying text.
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this particular situation, the national implementation of quotas allocated by RFMOs will
not be addressed in this thesis.
The effectiveness of TAC and allocation (as well as any conservation and
management measure) in achieving sustainable fisheries supposes two relevant elements.
First, it supposes that the relevant scientific data is available in a timely manner for the
adoption of the TAC. And secondly, it supposes that the allocated quotas, and thus the
TAC, are complied with. This, in turn, assumes that members of the RFMO comply with
their allocated quotas, and that non-members to the RFMO abstain from fishing, or fish
within the fishing opportunities assigned to non-members. As will be seen in detail in the
following chapters, the fishing opportunities for new entrants to the fishery is indeed one
of the key allocation conflicts faced by RFMOs.
Ensuring that allocations are complied with by both members and non-members
of RFMOs is an endeavour that faces significant legal and practical challenges, as has
been widely addressed by the literature.111 The international community, both at the
regional and global level, has undertaken various initiatives in this respect. Examples
thereof are: the FAO Plan of Action to prevent, deter, and eliminate illegal, unreported
and unregulated fishing (IPOA-IUU);112 FAO International the FAO Compliance
Agreement;113 the RFMOs ―black lists‖ of vessels engaging in IUU fishing, and ―white
lists‖ of vessels authorized to fish in the RFMO area; 114 the FAO Global Record of
Fishing Vessels, Refrigerated Vessels and Fishing Support Vessels; 115 the recently
adopted FAO Port State Agreement;116 trade-related measures adopted by RFMOs,
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including catch documentation schemes and import or export prohibitions;117 and the
FAO Expert Consultation on Flag State Performance.118 These initiatives, and in
particular those directed to non-members of RFMOs, are necessarily linked to allocation
decisions. Nevertheless, they will not be analyzed further in this thesis. Indeed, the
interest of this thesis is the framework for the distribution of fishing opportunities, and
not the enforcement of any given distribution.
Sharing Benefits of the Oceans: A Wider Picture
Addressing allocation of fishing opportunities, as explained in the preceding
section, implies addressing the question of how to distribute access to limited fishing
resources, or how to share limited fish resources. Traditionally, the benefits of the ocean
(or the participation in the wealth of the ocean) have been reserved to those who actually
engage in fishing activities. This is the assumption on which this chapter has been
written.
It has been proposed, however, that for purposes of sharing marine resources, the
wealth of the ocean can be divorced from the actual fishing activity. 119 An example of
such an arrangement, usually mentioned in the literature, is the North Pacific Fur Seal
Treaty of 1911.120 Japan, Canada, USA and Russia were involved in North Pacific Seal
hunting, which by the end of the 19th century showed clear signs of overexploitation. The
four parties agreed to prohibit pelagic sealing, a measure that affected mostly the
countries that hunted seals in the open sea (Japan and Canada). The treaty, however,
compensated Japan and Canada for their loss by providing that USA and USSR must
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deliver a certain percentage of the annual harvested skins.121 Thus, Japan and Canada
participated in the economic benefits of the fishery, although they did not actively
participate in it.
Following the example of the Fur Seal Convention, it has been suggested that
divorcing the benefits of the ocean from the actual fishing activity would allow States to
broaden the scope of negotiation through the establishment of side payments or
negotiation facilitators.122 This, in turn, would improve the possibilities of achieving
stable cooperative arrangements.
To date, however, there is no other arrangement that explicitly follows the
example of the North Pacific Fur Seal Commission. A few reasons can be suggested for
that: such a system ignores the non-monetary benefits associated with fishing activities
(employment, food supply, etc.); and it does not take into account the need to establish an
appropriate international structure.
A similar idea has been proposed, not for a single stock or at the regional level,
but on a global scale. In 2007, Crothers and Nelson argued that the existing governance
arrangements are inadequate and that overfishing on the high seas is a result of the lack of
incentives for States or RFMOs to act responsibly in dealing with the effects of an
overcapitalized fisheries sector. They offered an alternative of a governance structure
based on sole owners (High Seas Fisheries Corporations) with explicit and exclusive
authority to manage the high seas fisheries under their licence, including the allocation of
fishing opportunities directly to fishing companies. The High Seas Fisheries Corporations
would be owned collectively by States, which therefore would benefit from high seas
fishing according to their participation in the corporation.123
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Ideas similar to this have been presented in the past as well.124 However, so far
such proposals have not had political support.125 The idea of having a single global
authority responsible for the management of high seas fisheries was suggested during the
Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, which led to the adoption of the
LOSC. During the conference, some delegations suggested that high seas fisheries should
be considered the common heritage of mankind and put under the same regime and under
the jurisdiction of the Seabed Authority.126 As noted by Rayfuse and Warner:
[a] [common heritage of mankind] regime therefore differs fundamentally from a
common property regime in that it allows all states to participate in the benefits
gained from exploitation of a resource even if they do not or cannot participate in
that exploitation.127
This proposal was, however, blatantly rejected.
It is important to keep those views in mind when analyzing alternatives for an
effective regime for the high seas. At least for the moment, however, there does not seem
to be any support for models of global or centralized management. For this reason, this
thesis does not focus on such models. Instead, it addresses the potential role of equity in
allocation of fishing opportunities taking as an initial point of analysis the current high
seas fisheries model based on cooperative regimes institutionalized through RFMOs.
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Chapter 2. TAC and Allocation: Its Origin and Evolution in
International Fisheries Management
The adoption of TAC and national allocations as conservation and management
measures is generally considered best practice in fisheries management. However, its
consideration as a management tool is relatively recent, and the evolution of its legal
recognition and practical implementation reveals that it is still maturing as a management
measure. The objective of this chapter is to describe that evolution, both in global and
regional fora.
The chapter begins with an account of the initiatives and studies that introduced
TAC and allocations to modern fisheries management, describing its theoretical
foundations, its main objectives, the assumptions under which it was designed, and the
challenges foreseen. Then, the chapter describes the early implementation schemes in
three RFMOs. Afterwards, it analyzes the developments of the measure in the legal
framework of global and regional instruments. Finally, it summarizes the current state of
the management measure in the legal framework and practices of RFMOs.
Section 1. The Theoretical Foundations for a TAC and Allocation of National
Quotas
The first international agreements for the conservation of high seas resources had
a focus on cooperation for scientific purposes, on exchanging data and, in the most
progressive cases, on the adoption of appropriate technical measures to achieve a
conservation goal.128 Establishing limits to fishing effort or catches, and allocating them
among participants, was not a standard fisheries management strategy and was simply not
in their mandates.
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Three parallel developments in the 1950s and 1960s were to make a significant
change in the fisheries management approach, including but not restricted to international
management. The first of those developments related to several advancements in fisheries
technology and science, which made the environment propitious for the implementation
of TACs as a management tool. On one hand, the echo sounder and asdic technology
used in surveys of biomass abundance improved the ability to estimate stock sizes.129 In
turn, during the 1950s, mathematical models of fish population dynamics were developed
in response to fishing pressures. These models ―allow scientists to calculate quantitatively
the probable effects of fishing on fish stock and thus provide advice to managers on
fisheries regulations.‖130 Those models were improved by statistical methods for
calculating strengths of year classes: the Virtual Population Analysis (VPA) and the
simplified Pope‘s ‗cohort analysis‘. These models improved the scientific tools for
estimating the actual size of a fish stock. VPA, in particular, allowed scientists to
calculate stock size in actual tonnage, which in turn suited the political demands for
simple and ―feasible allocation and administration.‖131
At the same time, contributions were made by the incipient discipline of fisheries
economics. The work of H. Scott Gordon (1954),132 J.A. Crutchfield (1956)133 and
Anthony Scott and Francis T. Christy (1965),134 as well as several conferences addressing
economic aspects of fisheries regulation organized in the late 1950s and early 1960s,135

129

Stig S. Gezelius, ―The Arrival of Modern Fisheries Management in the North Atlantic: A Historical
Overview‖ in Stig S. Gezelius and Jesper, Raakjær, Making Fisheries Management Work: Implementation
of Policies for Sustainable Fishing (Dordrecht: Springer, c. 2008), at 33.
130
Ibid, at 34. The models referred to are: the Beverton-Holt model (Beverton and Holt, Dyanmics of
Exploited Fish Populations, 1957); and the Ricker model (Bill Ricker, 1958).
131
Ibid, at 35.
132
H. Scott Gordon, ―The Economic Theory of a Common-Property Resource: The Fishery‖ (1954) The
Journal of Political Economy 88.
133
J.A. Crutchfield, ―Common Property Resources and Factor Allocation‖ (1956) 22 The Canadian Journal
of Economics and Political Science 292.
134
Francis T. Christy, Jr. and Anthony Scott, The Common Wealth In Ocean Fisheries: Some Problems of
Growth and Economic Allocation (Baltimore: Published for Resources for the Future by The Johns
Hopkins Press, 1965). See also: S.M. Garcia, ―Ocean Fisheries Management: The FAO Programme‖ in
Paolo Fabbri (ed.), Ocean Management in Global Change (London and New York: Elsevier Applied
Science, 1992) 381, at 387 and 389.
135
For example, two conferences on the economics and biology of fishery management organized by the
University of Washington, Seattle, and three conferences organized by FAO: 1956 Round Table on the
Economics of Fisheries (organized in cooperation with the International Economic Association), the 1958
Technical Meeting on Costs and Earnings of Fishing Enterprises, and the Expert Meeting on the Economic
Effects of Fishery Regulation in 1961 (FAO, Economic Effects of Fishery Regulation (Rome: FAO, 1962)

30

―underlined the economic aspects of fisheries management and the problems of common
property resources laying the basis for the development and application of fisheries
economics‖.136
These two parallel developments paved the way for a bio-economic management
paradigm that was presented to national and international fisheries administrators and
became dominant in fisheries management.137
The third component in the process was the urgent need to introduce new
approaches to international fisheries management. By the 1950s, it was clear that the
conventional fisheries management strategies were failing to avoid over-exploitation of
stocks. In particular, the depletion of the fish stocks of the North Atlantic made it clear
that a new strategy was required.138 The RFMOs of the North Atlantic (the International
Commission for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries, ICNAF139 and the North East Atlantic
Fisheries Commission NEAFC140) began, in an interlinked and mutually supportive
process, to analyze other conservation approaches. As stated by Gezelius, ―it was the
discussions in the North Atlantic fisheries commissions in the 1960s which focused the
attention of administrators and scientists on the need to restrict fishing intensity, and
which generated the common view that catch quotas were the best way to do this‖.141
at 2). Later, in 1966, FAO, with the support of ICNAF, organized a Study Group on Economic Aspects of
Fishery Management (FAO, A Note on Economic Aspects of Fishery Management, FAO Fisheries Circular
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The initiative was taken mostly by ICNAF. In 1963, the Commission decided to
task the Standing Committee on Research and Statistics to consider the question of the
adequacy of the Commission‘s conservation measures. The report was to be presented in
the 1964 meeting. This was the first time the issue was placed on the agenda of ICNAF.
At the 1964 meeting, it was recommended that the Chairman of the Research and
Statistics Committee, Dr. W. Templeman (Canada), and the Chairman of the Assessment
Subcommittee, Mr. J. Gulland (England), prepare a report on the various kinds of action
which might be taken by the Commission for the purpose of maintaining the fish stocks
in the Convention Area at a level which could produce maximum sustained yields. The
report, entitled ―Review of possible conservation actions for the ICNAF area,‖ 142 was
presented during the next meeting.
The Report relied heavily on economic and efficiency considerations. The
possible conservation measures were analyzed not only considering the benefits arising
from increased catches (through enhancement of the stocks), but also considering the
benefits arising from improved fishing efficiency (through reductions of cost of unit
fishing effort).143 The conclusions made it clear that technical measures, such as mesh
regulations, were not sufficient in a scenario of increasing fishing activities, and that
―there must be some direct control of the amount of fishing. All methods of doing this
raise difficulties, but that presenting least difficulties is by means of catch quotas. There
must be separate quotas for each stock of fish, e.g. for cod at West Greenland, and
preferably be allocated separately to each section of the industry.‖144 The possibility of
allocating by member countries was also presented as an option, although it was
recognized that ―difficulties of allocating between countries with a long and stable fishery
142
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in ICNAF area and those whose fisheries in the area are developing are obvious.‖145 It
was also mentioned that a national allocation would allow different countries to use the
potential surplus in different ways.146
Following this report, in 1966 ICNAF resolved to establish a Working Group on
Joint Biological and Economic Assessment of Conservation Actions, charged with the
evaluation of management measures based on limitations of either total effort or total
catch. The working group met twice between 1966 and 1967, and presented its results to
the 17th annual meeting in 1967.147 This Report supported the conclusions of the
Chairmen‘s Report, and concluded that:
a) of the methods of reducing the rate of fishing mortality available to the
international commissions, there are only two that would enable member
countries to reduce their production costs: i.e. an allocation of definite shares of
an agreed total amount of fishing expressed in terms of either (a) catch or (b)
standard units of fishing effort.148
b) the use of fishing effort, e.g. days on ground, as a measure of the amount of
fishing under quota control would raise very great problems of inter-gear
calibration and the like and for that reason, may be set aside for the present.149
c) on the contrary, limiting fishing mortality through quotas could be feasible as
soon as 1968 since considerable quantity of data was already available to the
commission.
d) the method adopted by each country to restrict fishing operations to the
assigned limit may be chosen to suit national objectives and would be irrelevant
to the general effectiveness of the management program.150
The reasons provided in the different reports to justify the need to allocate
national quotas to participating States were varied, but all rooted in the need to eliminate
the competition among fishing fleets, and thus eliminate the economic interdependence
arising from the fact that different fleets exploit one common, and limited, asset (the fish
stock). The first and predominant reason provided in the report was again one of
economic efficiency: an unallocated quota creates a race to fish, in which every unit
[State, companies and vessels] strives ―to maximize its share (…) [which] causes most of
145

Ibid, at 55.
Ibid.
147
Report of the Working Group on Joint Biological and Economical Assessment of Conservation Actions,
supra note 143, at 48.
148
Ibid, at 56.
149
Ibid.
150
Ibid.
146

33

the potential benefit of reducing mortality to be lost.‖151 A second, more subtle, reason
suggested in the Templeman – Gulland report was to protect particular sections of the
industry from inequities resulting from rampant competition for a limited resource, or due
to the design of the measure.152 A third reason was that this mechanism allows each
country to make a sovereign decision on its fisheries management objectives (i.e., on how
the surplus of the fishery will be used).153 As stated by Crutchfield, ―the national quota
regime provides the maximum possible incentive and opportunity for member nations to
improve net economic benefits from the fishery while preserving the right of each nation
to define its own objectives and pursue them without pressure from or prejudice to the
interests of others.‖154
The proponents of the national quota system were aware of some drawbacks and
difficulties in its implementation. From a conservation perspective, a national catch quota
system ―would not allow the refined biological management that would maximize
aggregate physical yield from several stocks involved.‖155 It could also ―open the door to
undue concentration of fishing effort on particular stocks either by accident or design‖.156
It was also acknowledged that a catch system would need constant revision and
adjustment due to either mismanagement or natural fluctuations in stock abundance,
which affect the fishing mortality rate.157 The need for accurate scientific data and
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analysis was also stressed.158 In addition, the difficulties associated with monitoring,
control, surveillance and enforcement mechanisms were highlighted.159
From an economic perspective, it was noted that the system does not provide
―significant pressure for reduction of unnecessary inputs‖ (and thus for increasing net
economic yields).160 Nothing, indeed, guarantees that States will not prefer to pursue nonefficient, albeit rational, objectives.161 This was considered, however, unavoidable to
respect States‘ sovereignty. The Report of the Working Group on Joint Economic and
Biological Assessment of Conservation Actions explicitly stated that the national policies
and/or mechanisms to restrict fishing activities to comply with the nationally allocated
catch or effort limit were irrelevant for the effectiveness of the international management
program.162 In other words, the design and success of the international regime was
considered to be divorced from the national policies, objectives and regulations (provided
that the catch limits were complied with).
Most importantly for this thesis, equity considerations involved in the allocation
of quotas were raised in those early reports. The mechanism and basis for determining
national quotas was identified as one considerable problem, particularly in fully utilized
fisheries.163 The problem of new entrants to the fisheries was considered as significant, or
more so,164 with special reference to developing countries.165 However, the economic
emphasis of the studies left the distributional effects of the proposed measure mostly
unaddressed.166 It was acknowledged that ―the losses and gains will not be equal for all
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sections of the fishery‖,167 and expected that, as long as these differences were small, the
inequalities could be considered acceptable.168
Section 2. Early Allocation Schemes and Practices
The numerous reports described above unanimously concluded that the best tool to
ensure the maximum sustainable yield of international fisheries, was the establishment of
TAC and its allocation to participating States. However, regional fisheries management
organizations had to address two pending issues to actually adopt it as management
measure: a) the legal mandate to do so; and b) the allocation schemes, keys or criteria to
distribute the TAC among participating States. In most cases, both processes evolved
simultaneously.
TAC and Allocation in ICNAF
The fisheries in the North West Atlantic were put under international management
just after World War II, with the signature and entry into force (in 1949 and 1950,
respectively) of the International Convention for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries. 169 This
Convention established a Commission, which was responsible ―in the field of scientific
investigation for obtaining and collating the information necessary for maintaining those
stocks of fish which support international fisheries in the Convention area‖. 170 In
addition, the Commission had the function of proposing measures, for joint action by the
contracting governments, designed to keep the stocks of those species of fish which
support international fisheries in the Convention area at a level permitting the maximum
sustained catch.‖171 The exhaustive list of possible measures included open and closed

decision-making that must be involved.‖ (FAO, A Note on Economic Aspects of Fishery Management,
supra note 135, at 2).
167
Chairmen‘s Report, supra note 142, at 56.
168
Ibid. The acceptability was linked to the expected enhanced economic net benefits. Even in the case of a
perceived inequitable share, the economic benefits resulting from that share would probably exceed the net
benefits resulting from a bigger share in a traditional ―free competition‖ system. Crutchfield noted that ―the
point is clear; even a portion of that pie is well worth realizing and dividing up, even if the division itself is
not completely equitable or completely satisfactory to every participant‖(Crutchfield, supra note 154, at
270).
169
ICNAF Convention, supra note 139.
170
Ibid, article VI.
171
Ibid, article VIII(1).

36

seasons, closing spawning areas or areas populated by small or immature fish, size limits,
prohibiting certain fishing gear and appliances, and prescribing an over-all catch limit for
any species of fish.172 Thus, the allocation of national quotas was not allowed in the
original Convention.
To overcome this legal difficulty, the Commission negotiated and adopted the 1969
Protocol amending its Convention in order to ―provide greater flexibility in the types of
fisheries regulatory measures which the Commission might propose‖173 under the terms
of article VIII paragraph 1 of the Convention. The Protocol amended articles VII and
VIII of the Convention to allow the Panels to make recommendations, and the
Commission to transmit proposals for joint action by the contracting governments
designed to achieve the optimum utilization of the stocks of those species of fish which
support international fisheries in the Convention area.174 Those measures were
understood to include TAC and national quotas.175 The Protocol entered into force on
December 15, 1971.
In parallel to this process, ICNAF resolved to establish a Standing Committee on
Regulatory Measures (STACREM) with the task of considering the economic and
administrative aspects of the problems of introducing regulatory measures, including:
a) procedure for fixing annual catch quotas;
b) the nature of the quotas to be fixed with respect to species and areas;
c) problems of enforcement;
d) principles of distributing quotas between countries; and
e) administration of quotas within countries.176
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Most of the work of STACREM was done during a January 1969 meeting, where
the Committee prepared guidelines for the management, enforcement and monitoring of
catch limits, including guidelines for the negotiation of quota allocation. The guidelines
were revised in a June 1969 meeting, in particular in light of developments in the North
East Atlantic, but no changes were made to them and they were forwarded to the
Commission, which endorsed the guidelines. In January 1970, the Committee was
required to revise the guidelines to analyze the ―sliding scale‖ concept revised in the
North East Atlantic, which was then accepted and incorporated into the guidelines.
The adopted guidelines considered the following aspects:


A catch limit involves the establishment of (a) a total allowable catch, and (b) the
proportion in which this total catch is to be shared among participating countries.



The first decision would be decided by the Commission with some predefined
conservation objectives, and in light of scientific evidence provided by the
Standing Committee on Research and Statistics.



Shares of the participating countries should be based mainly on historical
performance (average catches over a datum period(s).



Both a short and long term historical performance should be used: 3- year history
and 10-year history, weighted 40% each.177



A small proportion of the quota should be set aside for new entrants to the fishery,
for non-members fishing countries, for member countries with developing
fisheries, for coastal State preferences, and for the fleets of member countries
which were incapable of being diverted to other fisheries. Later, the proportion
was set in 10% for coastal States and 10% for new entrants.



There should be a ―sliding scale‖, according to which, were the lower the TAC,
the greater the degree of preference to those countries having special needs.



There was also consensus in the Committee that schemes should be flexible, in
the sense that the shares initially fixed could not continue in force indefinitely but
would be capable of adjustment in the light of experience.



In cases of over-catches, it was agreed that the share for the subsequent year
should be reduced. Some countries considered it sufficient to deduct the excess
catches, while others considered that the reduction should be at least twice as
great.



In case of under-catches, there was consensus in that it would be sufficient to take
account of under-utilization in general reviews referred to above.



Additional guidelines for enforcement and monitoring were offered.

177

It appears that while in 1972, the preferred reference period for the long-term catch history was 7 years,
by 1973 it changed to a period of 10 years (see: Chepel, supra note 174, at 134, 139 and 165).

38

The conclusions reached through the deliberations that took place in the STACREM
meetings in relation to the principles for distribution of quotas among participating States
are generally known as the 40:40:10:10 formula: 40% distributed according to catches
recorded on the last 3 years; 40% distributed according to catches recorded on the last 10
years; 10% for coastal States; and 10% for new interests and non-members.178 It was
understood by STACREM, however, that the distribution could not follow a fixed
mathematical formula, and that flexibility was required.
After the entry into force of the 1969 Protocol and the preparation of the allocation
scheme by the STACREM, the Commission was in the position to adopt a catch
allocation regime. The opportunity arose during a special joint meeting of panels 4 and 5
held in January 1972 to analyze management solutions for the declining herring stocks.
Despite the preparatory work, negotiations were difficult. The meeting discussed the
application of the STACREM guidelines. However, some of the members of the joint
panel considered that they resulted in an equal sacrifice and were, thus, unacceptable. In
order to achieve a solution, it was proposed that a working group be formed by delegates
of those countries whose vessels fished for any of the three adult stocks of herring in the
Grand Bank, Gulf of Main and Nova Scotia Bank, and that this working group should
meet to discuss and agree on a catch limitation scheme.179 The group, ―recognizing the
economic benefits to be gained by the allocation of national catch quota‖, 180 achieved
agreement. The allocation was based primarily on the principle of equal sacrifice from
1971 catch levels, but with subsequent re-allocation by negotiation in the case of special
needs.181
This was, indeed, an historical moment: for the first time, a TAC and national quotas
were adopted for multi-national fisheries. This landmark, combined with the declining
status of most fisheries (and probably also by threats of extensions to national
jurisdictions)182 opened the doors for management of several other stocks. The 1972 June
178

Ibid, at 139.
ICNAF, Report of the First Special Meeting of ICNAF, Rome, January 31-February 7, 1972, in ICNAF,
Annual Proceedings, vol. 22 for the year 1971-72 (Dartmouth, NS: ICNAF, 1973); and in Chepel, ibid, at
129.
180
Ibid.
181
Ibid.
182
In the 1972 June Meeting, were most of the quotas and allocation were agreed upon, the U.S. delegate,
Honorable James Lynn, made an initial speech making clear that, if the Commission did not adopt the
179

39

Annual meeting adopted quotas and allocation for 17 other stocks. Again, a ―closeddoor‖ ad hoc committee on quota allocation was necessary to achieve agreement on
allocation of quotas.183 The ad hoc Committee agreed that there should be no record of its
deliberations, except for the table with national quotas put forward for the consideration
of the respective panels and Commission.184 By 1974, 60 stocks were managed under an
allocated quota regime.
It seems evident that the 40:40:10:10 formula provided a general framework used as a
starting point for the negotiation and led to a more or less acceptable consensus.185 The
formula was generally followed, although adjustments were usually made. 186 In addition,
it was acknowledged that ―there was sometimes slippage in the early days of quota
negotiation and sometimes TACs were changed in order to make it possible to reach
agreement on sharing‖.187 It was perceived, though, that this practice was no longer
followed at the end of ICNAF‘s existence.188
The new conservation and management measure was not timely and effective enough
to stop the decline of fish stocks. By 1977, most coastal States had extended their
fisheries jurisdiction to 200 nautical miles. Fisheries management in the Northwest
Atlantic was going to undergo a major revision, since many stocks would be under
national jurisdiction in this new ocean reality.
TAC and Allocation in the North East Atlantic
The history TACs and allocations in the North East Atlantic developed in parallel
to that of the North West Atlantic, in a process that is intertwined and constitute really
one single evolution towards ―modern‖ fisheries management. The process of NEAFC,
however, faced more difficulties than at the other side of the Atlantic.
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The North East Atlantic Fisheries Commission was established by the 1959 North
East Atlantic Fisheries Convention,189 as a successor of the Permanent Commission
established under the 1946 Convention for the Regulation of Meshes and Fishing Nets
and the Size Limits of Fish. As in the case of ICNAF, NEAFC adopted technical
measures for the protection of the stocks, which soon proved insufficient to avoid overexploitation of the high-value stocks of the North East Atlantic. Article 7 of the 1959
Convention provided:
1. The measures relating to the objectives and purposes of this Convention which
the Commission and Regional Committees may consider, and on which the
Commission may make recommendations to the Contracting States, are
a) any measures for the regulation of the size of mesh of fishing nets;
b) any measures for regulation of the size limits of fish that may be retained on
board vessels, or landed, or exposed or offered for sale;
c) any measures for the establishment of closed seasons;
d) any measures for the establishment of closed areas;
e) any measures for the regulation of fishing gear and appliances, other than
regulation of the size of mesh of fishing nets;
f) any measures for the improvement and the increase of marine resources, which
may include artificial propagation, the transplantation of organisms and the
transplantation of young.
2. Measures for regulating the amount of total catch, or the amount of fishing
effort in any period, or any other kinds of measures for the purpose of the
conservation of the fish stocks in the Convention area, may be added to the
measures listed in paragraph (1) of this Article on a proposal adopted by not less
than a two-thirds majority of the Delegations present and voting and subsequently
accepted by all Contracting States in accordance with their respective
constitutional procedures.
3. The measures provided for in paragraphs (1) and (2) of this Article may relate
to any or all species of sea fish and shell fish, but not to sea mammals; to any or
all methods of fishing; and to any or all parts of the methods of fishing; and to any
or all parts of the Convention area.
Albeit paragraph 2 of article 7 allowed the adoption of measures for regulating the
amount of catch, or any other measure for the purpose of the conservation of the stock
(which could have included TAC and allocations), it required a proposal adopted by a
qualified majority. In 1970, NEAFC adopted a resolution to activate the powers of article
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7(2) and adding some measures to the list of article 7(1).190 The added measures were: a)
any measures for the regulation of the amount of total catch and its allocation to
contracting States in any period; and b) any measures for the regulation of the amount of
fishing efforts and its allocation to contracting States in any period.191 The resolution was
only adopted by the required majority in 1974. While negotiating this resolution, member
States stressed the need to avoid discrimination in the allocation of catch or effort quotas,
and the need that quotas be firmly based on scientific advice.192 For this purpose, it was
agreed that the document communicating this decision to the contracting parties should
make clear that the Commission, in exercising these powers, would ―in accordance with
normal practice, base its decision on the results of scientific research and investigations,
after taking into consideration the views and economic interests of all Member States.‖193
In parallel to this process, the adoption of restrictions on fishing mortality for
particular stocks was discussed. The issue entered formally in the agenda of NEAFC for
the first time in 1966.194 However, the delegates decided to study the issue further
together with ICNAF and FAO.195 The reports presented to ICNAF, indeed, were
presented almost simultaneously to the NEAFC.196 In 1968, NEAFC decided to form an
Ad Hoc Study Group to examine the possibility of restricting fishing on demersal species
– Northeast Arctic cod and haddock. The following year, an Ad Hoc Study Group was
formed to analyze management options for herring. Both groups concentrated their focus
on a system based on catch quotas, which was recommended as the most effective way to
protect the stocks.197 However, both due to the legal constraints and hesitation on the part
of member States, the Commission was unable to agree on such measures.198
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The inability of the Commission to move forward the TAC agenda by adopting
the amendment to article 7.1 pursuant the mechanisms of article 7.2. led some member
States to take independent action. The abrupt decline of Norwegian Spring Spawning
Herring (or Atlanto-Scandian Herring) precipitated this action. Iceland, Norway and
USSR began discussions outside the NEAFC framework and ultimately agreed on an
allocated quota for the stock for 1971.199 Similarly, the main fishing States for Northeast
Arctic cod and haddock - Norway, UK, USSR - agreed on a TAC and its allocation
outside the NEAFC framework. However, the agreement broke down when USSR
withdrew due to excessive fishing from non-signatories.200
In 1974, NEAFC took over the task of adopting and allocating TACs. In its June
1974 meeting, the organization established a quota for North Sea herring for the 19741975 fishing season,201 as well as a quota for other pelagic and demersal stocks for the
1975 fishing season.202
Contrary to the experience in ICNAF, where STACREM was mandated to
analyze the best principles for quota distribution, NEAFC proceeded on an ad-hoc basis
establishing working groups for specific stocks.203 The criteria for allocation developed in
these different working groups shared some common elements; however, they differed in
the weight they assigned to each criterion. It was agreed that the main criteria for
allocation should be historical performance. In some cases a 6/4 formula was adopted
(the story of the first 6 years of the previous 10 year period, and the catches of the latter 4
of the same period, weighted equally in the distribution of fishing opportunities). It was
199
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also agreed that a ―nominal‖ percentage (1% to 5%) should be reserved to new members
or to provide for special needs. A share was usually allocated to coastal States, and
distributed among them either on the basis of their historical performance using the 6/4
formula, or on an egalitarian basis.204
As in the case of ICNAF, the development of guidelines was a useful, but
insufficient, mechanism. The TACs ultimately adopted and allocated in 1974, although
negotiated using the criteria developed, were ultimately a compromise among differing
views on both the weight that should be accorded to each criteria, and particular
circumstances that needed to be taken into account for a particular stock. 205 And just as in
the case of ICNAF, in many cases compromises were made at the expense of the
allocated stock. The TAC was often increased to satisfy the expectations of the different
participants.206 Despite those compromises, consensus could not generally be reached and
objections were frequent.207
TAC and Allocation for Atlantic Tunas
In 1966, the International Convention for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas208
was adopted ―to co-operate in maintaining the populations of these fishes at levels which
will permit the maximum sustainable catch for food and other purposes‖. 209 The
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Convention establishes the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic
Tuna (ICCAT), which general mandate is,
(...) on the basis of scientific evidence, make recommendations designed to
maintain the populations of tuna and tuna-like fishes that may be taken in the
Convention area at levels which will permit the maximum sustainable catch.210
The ICCAT Convention does not refer to TACs or allocation of fishing
opportunities, and it was never amended to explicitly recognize the possibility of
adopting TACs and national quotas. The general interpretation seems to be, however, that
they may be adopted under that general mandate of the Commission. However, it should
be noted that on different occasions during the early discussions of TAC and national
quotas, some delegations expressed that a ―system of quota is foreign to the spirit of the
Convention.‖211
The establishment of TAC and allocation for some tuna stocks was considered by
ICCAT early on. The first stock that concentrated the attention of the Commission was
yellowfin tuna. In 1971, an analysis was made by the Standing Committee on Research
and Statistics (SCRS) of the management alternatives for this stock, including: a) no
regulation, b) direct control of fishing effort, c) assignment of fixed quota, and d)
assignment of country quotas. This early report of the SCRS concluded that, in view of
the range of vessels and gears types then employed in the fishery, and the difficulty of
ensuring that any change in efficiency would be observed and appropriate corrections
made, a fishing effort control would be impracticable.212 Quotas, either as global quotas
or country quotas, were therefore the alternatives recommended to the Council, although
with the cautionary advice that the information and statistics needed to be improved for
these management measures, and that real time catch reporting was necessary in the event

210

ICCAT Convention, ibid, article VIII(1)(a).
ICCAT, Report for biennial period, 1982-83, Part I (1982), English version, (Madrid, Spain, 1983),
Annex 8, Reports of the Meetings of Panels 1-4, Agenda item 6 of Panel 2, at 79, online: ICCAT
<http://www.iccat.int>.
212
ICCAT, Report for biennial period, 1972-73, Part I (1972), English version, (Madrid, Spain, 1973),
Annex 9, Report of the Standing Committee on Research and Statistics (SCRS), Madrid, November 20-28,
1972, paragraph 70 at 81, online: ICCAT <http://www.iccat.int>.
211

45

that global quotas were preferred.213 It is worth mentioning that in these early studies, the
experiences in the North West Atlantic (ICNAF) were particularly considered. 214
The Commission approached the matter with caution. In 1972, it agreed on
establishing a working group on yellowfin tuna to ―study the desirability and feasibility
of concrete measures for the conservation and management of yellowfin stocks in the
Convention area from a scientific and practical point‖.215 The issues to be considered
included ―the need for regulatory measures, size of total catch quota, ways of
implementing the total catch quota, for example, free competition, a national catch quota
system, or any feasible method of implementation; possibility of curtailing fishing effort,
other possible regulatory measures, data requirements for implementation, and the factors
involved in enforcement‖.216
With the exception of Japan, who had already proposed the establishment of an
unallocated quota for yellowfin tuna in 1972, the members of the Commission considered
it premature to establish a definite catch quota for the stock, recognizing the need for a
more careful review of the subject.217 One delegation stated that they were not in the
position to accept a quota system that ―does not take into account the interests of the
coastal countries, does not define who should be assigned a quota, and does not mention
the disproportion in the fishing potential of the countries.‖218 Other delegations stated that
a quota system in itself was unacceptable.219 As a consequence, despite the initiatives for
an early establishment of a quota and allocation scheme and the experiences in other
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areas of the Atlantic, no such measure was adopted for yellowfin tuna at that time. Still
today, the stock remains without such management measure.220
The declining Atlantic bluefin tuna stock soon concentrated the concerns of the
ICCAT members and led to a different result. Again, the increasing exploitation of the
stock suggested that mechanisms to control fishing mortality were necessary. Not without
difficulties, the efforts to restrict fishing mortality succeeded in 1974, when a
recommendation was adopted which established a minimum size for North bluefin tuna
and, ―as a preliminary step, the Contracting Parties that are or those that incidentally
catch it in significant quantities shall take the necessary measures to limit the fishing
mortality of bluefin tuna to recent levels for a period of one year‖.221
Although initially adopted for one year, the measure to limit mortality was
subsequently extended until 1981. That year, the scientific evidence suggested that the
West stock of bluefin tuna required further measures. Again with difficulties, a
recommendation was adopted by which contracting parties committed to ―take measures
to prohibit the capture of bluefin tuna for a period of two years in the western Atlantic
Ocean, as defined on the attached map (…), except under conditions to be agreed upon
by the Contracting Parties whose nationals have been actively fishing for bluefin tuna in
the western Atlantic; such conditions to be based on the requirement to index the
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abundance of the stock.‖222 For this purpose, the contracting parties actively fishing
should conclude consultations prior to February 15, 1982.223
That consultation on the Western Atlantic bluefin management measures took
place in Miami, Florida, on February 8 to 12, 1982, with the presence of the three States
actively fishing for Northern bluefin tuna (US, Canada, Japan) and one interested
contracting party, Brazil. The meeting discussed, among other subjects, the allocation of
quotas among the countries participating in the fishery. A first proposal by USA, with an
allocation scheme based on the catch reports of the 1970-1974 period, was discussed but
agreement could not be reached.224 To move the agenda forward, closed sessions were
held with the heads of delegations. The closed session proved to be a useful mechanism
to achieve agreement. The delegations agreed on limiting annual catch of bluefin tuna
during 1982 and 1983 to 1,160 t, and dividing it among Canada, Japan, and US (250, 305
and 605 tonnes respectively). Brazil and Cuba, at that time catching each less than 50 t of
bluefin tuna, were exempted from catch limitations. The Chair of the working group later
explained to the Commission that ―various factors were taken into account in determining
these proportions such as effective monitoring needs, historical catches and economic
factors. Special consideration was given to the Cuban and Brazilian fisheries, even
though Cuba did not participate in the Miami meeting.‖225
The adoption of such measure was controversial. During the next meeting of the
Commission, it was argued by some delegations that such a measure should have not
been adopted by a small working group.226 Others argued that the term quota used in the
Miami Report is misleading since it was an allowance for scientific purposes only. The
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very system of quota was also objected.227 In addition, the Standing Committee on
Research and Statistics (SCRS) determined that the assessment on which the 1981
recommendation was adopted should not be used for 1983 because of two factors:
changes in the historical data base reported during 1981-1982, and an erroneous stockrecruitment relation. This served as argument for some delegations to attempt to reestablish the 1974 fishing mortality measure. Despite this considerable opposition, the
1982 meeting adopted a similar measure for 1983, albeit increasing the TAC to 2,660.
The allocation scheme was maintained.
This first allocation exercise in ICCAT established the precedent for Northern
bluefin tuna management, which remained mostly unchanged until 1998.228 It also set the
precedent for other allocation exercises that took place in the 1980‘s. In the case of North
Atlantic swordfish, Eastern and Mediterranean bluefin tuna and North Atlantic albacore,
agreement was reached first to freeze the fishing mortality to the levels of a certain
reference point.229 Freezing the fishing mortality was an implicit sharing arrangement of
the stock. However, such arrangements were imperfect due to various considerations.
First, statistical misreporting and reporting corrections increased the fishing mortality
beyond the levels upon which the decision was made. Secondly, limitations involving
number of fishing vessels only indirectly limited fishing mortality. Thirdly, the
limitations did not necessarily relate to a sustainable pattern of exploitation. And finally,
the limitations were often not complied with.
The second regulatory step was the adoption of an explicit TAC and quota
allocation arrangements. TACs and allocation schemes were adopted for North Atlantic
swordfish in 1994, for Eastern and Mediterranean bluefin tuna in 1998, and for North
Atlantic albacore in 2000. In all cases, the allocation arrangements were agreed upon in
227
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informal sessions by the contracting parties actively fishing for the stocks. This was
actually seen as the most effective way to reach agreement.230 The results of that
negotiation were then endorsed by the respective Panel and the Commission.
The sharing agreements (allocation keys) were usually based on past performance
and in particular the levels of catches in the period of reference for the measures limiting
fishing mortality. However, a certain amount of negotiation not reflected in the official
reports influenced the agreements. Allocation agreements often included exceptions for
some States or categories of States, which aim was to allow small-scale fishing nations,
and particularly coastal States, a certain level of development. These exceptions were
usually introduced due the concern expressed by coastal developing States on the
limitations that the quota regulations represented for their fishing development
aspirations. Nevertheless, consent was usually difficult, TAC and allocations were often
subject to objections, and dissatisfaction with the system, mostly by developing coastal
States, became evident.
Section 3. TAC and Allocation in the Advent of the EEZ
The efforts of the organizations to achieve sound management of international
fisheries were not timely and successful enough to stop the increasing trend of extending
national jurisdiction. By 1982, the LOSC incorporated what had become the common
practice of coastal States by the late 1970s: the right of coastal States to claim an
exclusive economic zone (EEZ).231 In recognizing an EEZ, the LOSC adopted a
jurisdictional and spatial approach to the allocation of natural resources of the oceans. It
was believed that this new distribution of the ocean‘s wealth would solve the cooperative
problems faced by the international community, since most fisheries were within the EEZ
of coastal States. In other words, the LOSC was believed to have solved the problems of
the ―commons‖ by re-allocating jurisdiction over fisheries resources to coastal States.232
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The new configuration of the oceans naturally impacted the jurisdiction and
mandate of regional organizations, and the balances between coastal States and distant
water fishing nations (DWFNs) in the adoption of TAC and allocation, as well as in the
adoption of other management measures. The different RFMOs adapted differently,
taking into account their particular realities, as will be described below.
The EEZ in the North West Atlantic
In January 1977, Canada extended its fisheries jurisdiction out to a distance of
200 nautical miles from its coast.233 At the same time, France and Denmark extended
their jurisdiction to 200 nautical miles off the costs of Greenland and the islands of St.
Pierre and Miquelon. U.S.A, in turn, extended its jurisdiction in March 1977, and
withdrew from ICNAF on December 31, 1976.234 These unilateral extensions of fishing
zones implied that many fisheries previously managed by ICNAF were no longer
international fisheries. As a consequence, a major revision of both the ICNAF
Convention and of management practices was necessary.
It was agreed that the quotas for stocks completely outside national jurisdiction
(Division 3M Flemish Cap) would be set by the Commission on the recommendation of
Panel 3. Stocks of common concern to Denmark and Canada in Subarea 1 and Statistical
Area 0 would be considered by bilateral negotiations between the two countries. For
shared stocks, or stocks completely inside the Canadian EEZ, Canada sought the
scientific advice of STACRES and undertook a series of informal intergovernmental
consultations during the ICNAF meeting. It referred the results of those consultations to a
joint Panel either for information (in the case of stocks completely inside their fishing
zone) or for recommendation and adoption by the Commission (in the case of straddling
stocks). This agreement paved the way for current practices in NAFO: the organization
manages independently the discrete stocks occurring east of the EEZ limit, and jointly
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with Canada the stocks that straddle the 200-mile limit. The number of stocks managed
under the jurisdiction of the newly established NAFO decreased to 10 stocks of common
interest,235 a number that over the years increased to 20 stocks regulated today.236
In parallel to this short term arrangement, the ICNAF members initiated a
Diplomatic Conference on Future Multilateral Cooperation in the Northwest Atlantic
Fisheries with the aim of preparing a new Convention to address the international
management of fisheries in the Northwest Atlantic in this new era, and to provide a
smooth transition to this new regime. The Convention on Future Multilateral Cooperation
in the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries, done at Ottawa, on 24 October 1978, came into force
on 1 January 1979, with the ratification by seven signatories. 237 The new Convention has
a provision dealing with allocation of catches. Article XI(4) states that
[p]roposals adopted by the Commission for the allocation of catches in the
Regulatory Area shall take into account the interests of Commission members
whose vessels have traditionally fished within that area, and, in the allocation of
catches from the Grand Bank and Flemish Cap, commission members shall give
special consideration to the Contracting Party whose coastal communities are
primarily dependent on fishing for stocks related to these fishing banks and which
has undertaken extensive efforts to ensure the conservation of such stocks through
international action, in particular, by providing surveillance and inspection of
international fisheries on these banks under an international scheme of joint
enforcement.
The contracting party referred in the second part of the provision is understood to
be Canada only.238 This provision was recognition of the ICNAF guidelines on allocation.
Indeed, at least in the first meetings, allocations mostly rolled over from the previous
ICNAF work and were not discussed explicitly.
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The EEZ in the North East Atlantic
Following the extension of areas under national jurisdiction in 1977, the member
States of NEAFC also negotiated a new Convention to adapt to the new political reality.
The Convention on Future Multilateral Co-operation in North-East Atlantic Fisheries,239
was signed on 18 November 1980, and entered into force on 17 March 1982. This new
Convention recognizes the competence for the Commission to, inter alia, establish total
allowable catches and their allocation to contracting parties, and regulate the amount of
fishing effort and its allocation to contracting parties, in the high seas of the North East
Atlantic.240 It does not include, however, any provision regarding criteria for allocation.
Despite the new mandate, in practice NEAFC‘s role in establishing conservation
and management measures suffered. The high seas area (i.e. Regulatory Area) in the
Convention Area was reduced considerably.241 As a consequence, the number of stocks
that required international management decreased, and excluded most of the
economically important ones.242 In addition, the over-exploited status of the stocks had
affected their distribution, and they rarely extended to the high seas areas. Consequently,
former NEAFC stocks were subsequently managed by coastal States and by bilateral or
multilateral fisheries agreements in the case of transboundary stocks. 243 In addition, many
of the original members of NEAFC withdrew from the organization when joining as
members of the European Union.
For these reasons, following the implementation of EEZ, NEAFC was considered
as ―a forum for consultation and exchange of information in the context of a regime
which would give coastal States very full powers to regulate their own zones as they saw
fit.‖244 Its significance to fisheries managements was lost for many years.245
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Currently, NEAFC manages mainly four fish stocks with a high seas
component.246 TACs and allocations were only agreed upon in 1995.247 Since then,
several years agreement has not been possible.248 Coastal States have an important role in
the conservation and management of stocks. Some stocks are, indeed, managed primarily
by coastal States. In the cases of Norwegian spring spawning herring, mackerel and blue
whiting, the respective coastal State groups adopt management measures (including TAC
and allocations) for the whole distribution area of the fish stocks, and propose those
measures for adoption by NEAFC for areas beyond their jurisdiction.249 If agreement by
the coastal States is not reached, NEAFC in turn does not adopt any management
measures.250 In the case of pelagic redfish, management rests primarily on NEAFC. The
organization adopts management measures and allocations for the area of distribution of
the stock inside and beyond the jurisdiction of contracting parties.251
The EEZ in ICCAT
The ICCAT Convention signed in 1966 considers as the area of application all
waters of the Atlantic Ocean, including the adjacent seas. It adds that nothing in it shall
be considered as affecting the rights, claims or views of any contracting party in regard to
the extent of jurisdiction over fisheries under international law. Contrary to the processes
in NAFO and NEAFC, the unilateral extensions of exclusive economic zones during the
70‘s and early 80‘s did not trigger a review of the Convention. The practice of the States
did not make jurisdictional distinctions between States in whose fishing zones the highly
migratory stock occurs and those considered DWFNs. The allocation keys did not reflect
minimum mesh size for capelin (1985) and minimum mesh size for blue whiting (1987) (Sen, supra note
197, at 93).
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those two groups either. Of course, the coastal States participate in the negotiations,
concur through their votes in the adoption of a decision, and have the alternative of filing
an objection to an allocation scheme if so warranted.
The perception that the adoption of EEZs by coastal State members did not
demand a revision of ICCAT Convention, or that the allocation decision-making process
and allocation keys did not require jurisdictional distinctions, has as a plausible
explanation in an historical interpretation of the LOSC with respect to highly migratory
stocks. Indeed, the initial interpretation of the LOSC by some States, and particularly the
USA, was that coastal States had no jurisdictional claim over highly migratory species
within their EEZs.252 This interpretation was officially reversed when the U.S. revised the
Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act in the early 1990s.253 However,
when the first allocation was established in the 1982 meeting between U.S., Canada, and
Japan, it is to be assumed that there was pressure to adopt an allocation practice that
respected that early interpretation. And as has been noted, that first allocation set the
model for the allocations to follow.
It should be noted that those early practices, that in many respects are maintained
to this day, have created a certain amount of uncertainty in the legal regime. Indeed, it
appears to be no ―official‖ interpretation on how the rights of coastal States and the
jurisdiction of ICCAT interact.254 This is, mostly, an un-addressed issue that has
generated conflict in allocation discussions, as will be seen further below.
Section 4. Allocation in Global Instruments and Fora: UNFSA and Beyond
The geographical approach adopted by the LOSC promptly proved to be
insufficient to address the problems of cooperative management of stocks that occur both
within and outside areas under national jurisdiction, – i.e. straddling stocks and highly
252
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migratory stocks - or exclusively in the high seas – i.e. discrete stocks. The LOSC did not
significantly alter the legal framework for high seas fishing. In particular, the LOSC did
not address the conflict of interests produced by ever scarcer resources and increasing
demand, and thus, competition.
The problem was particularly acute with respect to straddling stocks and highly
migratory stocks. Coastal States, in their newly acquired EEZs, felt that the still
unregulated areas of the high seas undermined their sovereign rights. The tension was, at
that time, particularly a tension between coastal States and DWFNs.
The issue was discussed in different international fora, not only addressing
fisheries but also addressing sustainable development. The issue of straddling stocks and
highly migratory stocks was, indeed, the most controversial issue discussed in Chapter 17
of the oceans during the 1992 UN Conference on Environment Development (UNCED or
1992 Rio Conference); the only issue outstanding after Preparatory Conference III and
Preparatory Conference IV; and one that at the end could not be tackled directly. All that
could be achieved was to convene an international conference to discuss the issue.
Chapter 17 of Agenda 21255 includes the following action:
17.50. States should convene, as soon as possible, an intergovernmental
conference under United Nations auspices, taking into account relevant activities
at the sub-regional, regional and global levels, with a view to promoting effective
implementation of the provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea on straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks. The
conference, drawing, inter alia, on scientific and technical studies by FAO, should
identify and assess existing problems related to the conservation and management
of such fish stocks, and consider means of improving cooperation on fisheries
among States, and formulate appropriate recommendations. The work and the
results of the conference should be fully consistent with the provisions of the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, in particular the rights and
obligations of coastal States and States fishing on the high seas.
The mandate of Agenda 21 explicitly prescribed that the work and the results of
the Conference should be fully consistent with the LOSC. This was the origin of the
negotiation that adopted the UNFSA in December 1995.
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The conference was prepared by other meetings. In particular, a Meeting of the
Group of Technical Experts on High-Seas Fisheries, held at United Nations Headquarters
from 22 to 26 July 1991; and an FAO consultation on high seas fishing held in September
1992.
Both preparatory conferences seem to conclude, or even just assume, that limiting
fishing effort or catches, and allocating the total allowable effort or catch among the
participating member States, constitute fisheries management best practices.256 Both
recognized, as well, the difficulties of achieving allocation agreements.257 Both
conference reports also emphasized the challenges of new entrants and participation in
regional fisheries management organizations, and highlighted the special challenges that
participation in high seas fisheries poses for developing countries.
The UNFSA Conference, however, did not address allocation of fishing
opportunities directly. Neither the document ―A Guide to the issues before the
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DOALOS, supra note 126, para. 112 at 34: ―As contemplated by article 119, a total allowable catch has
to be set for each high seas stock; a quota management system then requires individual quotas to be
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arrangements in place. While the division of resources between coastal States and the high seas will be
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high-seas effort levels based on objective scientific parameters, allocation among contracting parties is
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Meeting of the Group of Technical Experts on High-Seas Fisheries, held at United Nations headquarters
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Conference‖,258 prepared by the Chairman (A/CONF/164/10), 24 June 1993, and
presented in the first substantive session, nor the subsequent texts presented during the
second, third and fourth substantive session,259 addressed the issue of distribution of
fishing effort or catches.260 This was despite the fact that since the very first document
presented to the Conference, TACs were mentioned as a necessary conservation and
258

The guide recognizes as a responsibility of the RFMO/As to provide a forum for agreeing on the
allocation of quotas to participating States or other measures relating to the regulation of fishing effort. It
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management measure, and allocation of fishing opportunities (quotas or other measures
relating of the regulation of fishing effort) were included as a matter of responsibility for
RFMO or regional fisheries management arrangements.261 It seemed that the delegates
had a common interest in not raising that topic, probably because a discussion on
allocation would aggravate the coastal State – DWFN division that was predominant
during the negotiation.262
The fact that the UNFSA did not address directly or explicitly the issue of
allocation, does not mean that it did not include several provisions that have an allocation
implications. UNFSA could not avoid the conflict of interests that were at the basis of the
Conference itself. The issues with allocation implications addressed are: the compatibility
of measures adopted for areas under national jurisdiction and those adopted for the high
seas; participation in regional fisheries management organizations; fishing opportunities
for new members; and the special requirements of developing States.263 These provisions
will be analyzed in more detail in the next chapter.
The provisions on those topics provide some guidance on distributional aspects. It
is widely agreed, however, that they fall short in providing a complete legal framework
that addresses the main question on how to balance the different rights, interests and
aspirations over high seas fish stocks.264 So, the search for a legal framework for
allocation decisions continues.
There seems to be widespread agreement that the development of a more refined
framework for allocation decisions must be undertaken region by region and stock by
stock; and as a consequence that this is a task for the various RMFOs. That opinion was
261
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expressed already in the FAO Report of the Technical Consultation on High Seas Fishing
held prior to the UNFSA Conferences.265 It has been thereafter reinforced in the most
important development and fisheries fora. The World Summit on Sustainable
Development in Johannesburg in 2002 addressed the issue in the Johannesburg Plan of
Implementation,266 Chapter IV, paragraph 31, which includes the following as an action
required to achieve sustainable fisheries:
(e) Encourage relevant regional fisheries management organizations and
arrangements to give due consideration to the rights, duties and interests of
coastal States and the special requirements of developing States when addressing
the issue of the allocation of share of fishery resources for straddling stocks and
highly migratory fish stocks, mindful of the provisions of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea and the Agreement for the Implementation of
the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10
December 1982 relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish
Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, on the high seas and within exclusive
economic zones.
The issue was, as usual, not easy to settle. It was one of the outstanding issues after the
Preparatory Conference IV, and required careful re-drafting before it was adopted by the
participating States.267
The Johannesburg Plan of Implementation was considered at the subsequent 2005
St. John‘s Conference on the Governance of High Seas Fisheries and the United Nations
Fish Agreement, Moving from Words to Action. The Ministerial Declaration adopted in a
closed meeting by 19 of the attending Ministers of Fisheries268 gathered in St. John‘s
during the Conference reaffirms the commitment to the implementation of the relevant
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parts of Agenda 21 and Johannesburg Plan of Implementation. 269 Furthermore, the
Ministers committed to work with RFMO/As to implement a decision making process
that
(...) uses criteria for allocations which properly reflect the interests and needs of
coastal States and developing States, including small island developing States, in
whose areas of national jurisdiction the fish stocks also occur, as well as those of
fishing States.270
Shortly after this meeting, in July 2005 the United Nations Open-ended Informal
Consultative Process on Oceans and the Law of the Sea made another, albeit rather
neutral, reference to allocation criteria as well. Its report simply welcomed and urged
efforts by regional fisheries management organizations and arrangements to ―develop
criteria for allocations‖.271
Four months afterwards, in November 2005, the Sixtieth Session of the United
Nations General Assembly adopted Resolution 60/31 on Sustainable fisheries,272 which
in the section on subregional and regional cooperation included a paragraph urging
RFMO/As to ―ensure that their decision-making processes (…) develop criteria for
allocation which reflects, where appropriate, the relevant provisions of the
Agreement‖.273 It is compromise wording, since the criteria are only required to reflect
―where appropriate‖ the ―relevant‖ provisions of the Agreement. As mentioned above,
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and will be analyzed further in the next chapter, the Agreement does not give much
guidance on what interests the criteria should (primarily) reflect. The resolution on
sustainable fisheries adopted the following year maintained and expanded the reference,
urging regional fisheries management organizations to
(...) improve transparency and to ensure that their decision-making processes are
fair and transparent (…) address participatory rights, including through, inter alia,
the development of transparent criteria for allocating fishing opportunities which
reflects, where appropriate, the relevant provisions of the Agreement, taking due
account, inter alia, of the status of the relevant stocks and the respective interests
in the fishery.274
This language has been maintained in subsequent resolutions.
Another recent instance where the allocation of fishing opportunities has been
debated in global fora is the work developed by the Informal Meeting of the States
Parties to the UNFSA to agree on elements for assessing the adequacy and effectiveness
of the Agreement, in preparation of the Review Conference.275 One of the elements
agreed upon was ―participatory rights – extent to which RFMOs have agreed, as
appropriate, on participatory rights, such as allocation of allowable catch or levels of
fishing effort‖.276
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The Review Conference of UNFSA provided yet another opportunity for the issue
to be raised in international fora. During the Conference it was recognized by the
delegates that, while ―articles 10(b) and 11 of [UNFSA] provided the framework for
participatory rights‖, and although ―some regional fisheries management organizations
have undertaken efforts to address participatory rights and allocation issues‖, ―further
work is needed to develop more detailed criteria for participatory rights, bearing in mind
the importance of addressing social and economic interests in a manner consistent with
conservation objectives.‖277 The Conference agreed to recommend that States,
individually and collectively, through regional fisheries management organizations,
―address participatory rights through, inter alia, the development of transparent criteria
for allocating fishing opportunities, taking due account, inter alia, of the status of the
relevant stocks and the interests of all those with a real interest in the fishery‖.278
The discussions on allocation issues were not easy during the Review Conference
either. An observer to the Conference noted that ―a few non-parties felt that key issues
such as trade measures and participatory rights were being sidelined in the drafting,
suggesting that the process was being led by a restricted group of countries‖.279
The negotiation history of these non-binding instruments of international law
deserves two observations. First, the negotiating parties are reluctant to address the topic
of participatory rights. It is often one of the most difficult issues to reach agreement on,
and one that always requires extensive negotiations and careful drafting. In particular,
special care has been given to ensure a neutral language in the recognition of the interests
277
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that need to be taken into account in the allocation processes, in particular, if the
document is discussed in a fisheries forum.280 It seems that many States don‘t have an
interest in opening such discussion, at least in the global fora.
The second observation is that negotiating States have explicitly avoided the word
―equitable‖ while describing the qualities that the allocation criteria should possess.
Instead, adjectives such as ―transparent‖ and ―according to international law‖ have been
preferred. This will be addressed in more detail in chapter 5.
Since the predominant view is that allocation criteria and mechanisms have to be
developed by the RFMOs, the next section will address how that has been done at the
regional level to date. However, it should be mentioned that certain voices have
advocated that at least some role should be played by global fora. During the negotiation
process of UNFSA, some statements were made in that direction, albeit in a very limited
and indirect way.281 In recent years, however, the idea has been explicitly proposed as a
means to facilitate the negotiation process of allocation in RFMOs. Michael Lodge and
Satja Nandan suggest that FAO could support the efforts of RFMOs to develop and apply
equitable allocation criteria by elaborating guidelines on the implementation of articles
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The early declarations made at the World Summit on Sustainable Development stressed the need to
―give due consideration to the rights, duties and interests of coastal States and to the special requirements
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10 and 11 of UNFSA,282 and recommends action by FAO and RFMOs to develop
equitable allocation criteria.283 Lodge, indeed, has stated broadly that
[t]here are strong arguments in favour of a global approach to (…) the allocation
on an equitable basis of shares of harvests and fleet capacity. International
fisheries are no longer the exclusive preserve of a few technologically advanced
States. If we are to achieve long-term sustainable management of international
fisheries, the key challenge for the future will be to establish a globalized regime
in which all nations have the incentive to cooperate.284
Section 5. Developments in Regional Allocation Frameworks
As described in the previous section, there is a perceived need for RFMOs to
develop criteria for allocation ―according to international law‖. The need to develop
allocation criteria was triggered not only at the global level, but also within RFMOs. In
particular, there was an increasing dissatisfaction with traditional allocation practices
which based allocation mainly on the criterion of historical catches. This criterion, it was
argued, did not consider adequately the different rights, interests and aspirations that were
recognized in the global legal framework.
This dissatisfaction with the status quo triggered difficult processes of revision of
existing allocation criteria in two organizations: NAFO and ICCAT. It also led to new
RFMOs devoting specific provisions to allocation. Both these processes are described
below.285
The Revision of the Allocation Framework in NAFO
Allocations in NAFO were roll-over year after year, tracing their origins back to
the ICNAF era, albeit accommodations were made for the EC to become a member.
Other ―new members‖, however, were dissatisfied with allocation scheme. In 1997, US
proposed the establishment of a working group to address the problem of allocation of
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fishing opportunities to contracting parties.286 The proposal was supported by the
meeting, and it was agreed that it would meet before March 1998.287
The Working Group on Allocation of Fishing Rights to Contracting Parties met
three times on March 4 to 6 1998, April 13 to 15 1999, and March 28 to 30 2000. The
working group promptly agreed that rules should be written regarding how NAFO would
deal with future new members in terms of allocation. After the second meeting, the group
submitted a draft resolution on this topic that was adopted by the General Council in its
21st Annual Meeting on September 1999.288
Agreement on guidelines on allocation of fishing opportunities to contracting
parties, however, proved a much harder task. There was a profound conflict between the
position of the member States that sought a revision of the allocation agreements (mainly,
US and Korea) and those who did not want to affect the status quo (EU, Canada, etc.).
The different views of the member States proved insurmountable. At the September 2000
meeting, the Fisheries Commission decided that the working group would not meet in
2001. It was noted by a delegate that ―there is a lack of political will among contracting
parties to move the issue forward‖.289
In 2002 the Fisheries Commission reopened the issue in the agenda by providing
terms of reference to the working group, which included the need to ―develop options
whose terms are explicit and predictable for allocation to Contracting Parties from current
fisheries with NAFO TACs, fisheries previously not subject to NAFO TACs, new
fisheries, closed fisheries being reopened, and fisheries for which fishing rights are or
will be allocated in terms other than quotas (e.g. effort limits).‖ Pursuant to this
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agreement, the working group reconvened its work on March 26 to 27, 2003. During this
- their last - meeting, the group adopted document Working Paper 03/3 Draft Guidelines
for future allocation of fishing opportunities not currently allocated. However, agreement
could not be reached on two aspects of the document. One was the very fundamental
issue of the scope of the guidelines. While USA insisted on making it applicable to all
NAFO stocks, most delegations rejected that possibility and maintained that these criteria
would be applicable only to allocation decisions for NAFO fish stocks not yet under a
national quota regime. The other disagreement related to the mention of UNFSA, which
was rejected by Latvia and Lithuania.
The working group agreed to submit the guidelines as an annex to the report of
the Fisheries Commission, but since consensus could not be reached on some aspects of
its substance, not to make specific recommendation on adoption of guidelines to the
Commission. The Fisheries Commission, in turn, simply adopted the Report of the
working group. With this, the work on allocation criteria was concluded.
There have been three opportunities for the application of the draft guidelines to
the allocation of previously unregulated fisheries: thorny skate in division 3LNO, white
hake in division 3NO and redfish in Division 3O. In none of these cases were the draft
guidelines mentioned. The respective TACs were allocated ―based on standard allocation
criteria‖, which were identified as coastal State status, percent biomass inside and outside
Canada‘s 200 mile EEZ, coastal community dependence, contribution to science and
enforcement, and catch history.290 No further details on how these criteria were applied to
each stock were included in the reports.
USA made a further attempt to advance a reform on the allocation criteria during
the NAFO reform process. During the 27th meeting of the General Council, NAFO
adopted the decision to undertake a revision of the NAFO Convention.291 For this
purpose, it established an ad hoc Working Group on NAFO Reform to review and, where
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appropriate, develop recommendations to modify and/or complete the provisions of the
NAFO Convention. The ad-hoc working group met in Montreal, 25-28 April 2006, and in
Lunneburg, 12-17 September 2006. Additionally, a technical editing working group met
in Brussels, 22 and 23 May 2007.
During this process, the USA expressed its concern that ―inequities remain in the
draft revised NAFO Convention text relative to both the NAFO dues assessment
procedure and the NAFO allocation practice.‖292 To address these inequities, the USA
submitted proposals to modify article VI paragraph 7 of the Convention,293 as well as the
provisions on contribution to the budget.294 The proposed amendment to article VI aimed
at recognizing explicitly that ―proposals for the allocation of fishing opportunities shall
be applied in a fair and equitable manner with the goal of ensuring opportunities for all
qualifying Contracting Parties‖.295 It also included, among the criteria for allocation of
fishing opportunities, ―the contribution of the Contracting Parties to the Commission and
to the conservation and management of the stock, including the provision of accurate data
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and their contribution to the conduct of scientific research in the convention area.‖296
None of these proposals was included among the amendments to the NAFO Convention
officially adopted at the General Assembly 29th Annual Meeting held in Lisbon, Portugal,
between the 24 and the 28 of September, 2007. The revision of allocation criteria again
failed in NAFO.
The Revision of the Allocation Framework in ICCAT
Perhaps the most significant developments with respect to allocation practices
have taken place in ICCAT. The trigger, in this case, has been the powerful combination
of coastal States being developing States. They emphasized the lack of recognition of
both their sovereign rights in their exclusive economic zones, and their urgent needs and
development aspirations. Their dissatisfaction led to an ―allocation crisis‖ and this, in
turn, led to ―the search for a new allocation scheme within ICCAT‖.297
The trigger for this process was the difficult negotiation on a sharing agreement
for South Atlantic swordfish. ―First warning of the need for a TAC for South Atlantic
swordfish were sounded in 1996, but agreement could not be reached on allocations at
that meeting, largely as a result of the insistence by Brazil that the new criteria listed in
the UN Fish Stocks Agreement replaced past performance as the basis for developing a
sharing agreement.‖298 An inter-sessional meeting of Panel 4 was hosted in Brazil in
1997. Negotiations again proved difficult, and agreement could be reached only on a
closed session by heads of delegations.299 Despite this agreement, developing States
remained unsatisfied. Some parties argued they were not present in the meeting; some
that the allocation scheme was unfair. As a consequence of the unsatisfactory results, in
1998 Brazil, on behalf of several developing countries, succeeded in the initiative of
establishing a working group to analyze the allocation criteria generally, and not with
respect to a particular stock. The working group on allocation criteria met four times
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between 1998 and 2001. In 2001, they finished their work with the adoption of the nonbinding Resolution 2001-15 on Allocation criteria for fishing possibilities.300
As in the case of NAFO, a major discussion concerned the scope of application of
the criteria. While some States (in particular developed DWFNs) wanted to limit the
scope of application of the criteria to the stocks not currently allocated, others (mostly
developing coastal States) expected the criteria to be applicable to all stocks, when
allocated by ICCAT. Contrary to NAFO, the latter interpretation prevailed.301 The
developed States succeeded in balancing the broader scope of application of the criteria
by adding a paragraph stating that the allocation criteria should be applied to all stocks in
a gradual manner, over a period of time to be determined by the relevant panels, in order
to address the economic needs of all parties concerned, including the need to minimize
economic dislocation.302
The guidelines were received with great hope by the developing States, which
qualify this as a breakthrough moment in the life of ICCAT. It was considered that the
criteria adopted were in line with current international law, and in particular the LOSC
and other relevant international fisheries agreements. The fact that it respected the rights
and interests of coastal States in their exclusive economic zone was highlighted by many
contracting parties. Indeed, some coastal States that were, at the time, observers to
ICCAT decided to join the organization mainly because the new criteria ensured the
recognition of the right to develop a fishery in their fishing zones.303
The practical implementation of the criteria proved those hopes to be excessively
optimistic. The same year that the criteria were adopted, the Eastern and Mediterranean
bluefin tuna and the Southern swordfish negotiations failed over the allocation issue.
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Some States estimated that the new criteria were not applied; others that they were
misunderstood. For the first time, ICCAT failed to even roll over the previous
management measures, and thus they were left without a TAC or sharing arrangement.304
In the case of East bluefin tuna and Southern swordfish, agreement was finally reached in
2002. In the case of bigeye tuna, agreement was reached in 2004. These agreements have
been attributed to ―a slow acceptance of the merits (and perhaps inevitability?) of
opposing arguments, and a resultant gradual compromise.‖305 It is probably also true that
agreement was possible because the TAC was consistently set above the scientifically
recommended level, in order to accommodate new aspirations without reducing the share
of traditional fishing States. In any event, the allocation issue in ICCAT has not been
completely settled: dissatisfaction with current allocation agreements by contracting
parties are common and, reportedly, growing.306
Allocation Criteria in Other RFMOs
The developments within NAFO and ICCAT are marked to a great extent to the
need to supplement the provisions of the Conventions which established these
organizations. RFMO Conventions adopted after UNFSA had the advantage of these
previous experiences and the inspiration of this global agreement. For this reason, they
generally recognized TAC and allocation of national quotas as important conservation
and management measures; and furthermore, they explicitly consider a list of criteria
guiding allocation decisions. That has been the case with WCFPC, SEAFO, CCSBT,307
and the recently signed SPRFMO Convention text (not yet in force).308
The criteria of the RFMO Conventions apply to allocation of fishing opportunities
to both contracting parties and new participants. In general, they follow closely the
provisions of UNFSA and in particular article 11 on new entrants (including the case of
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SEAFO that has jurisdiction over straddling and discrete stocks).309 Some organizations
have included certain modifications or added criteria that reflect the specific
characteristics of the regions or stocks involved.310
In addition to the provisions of their Convention texts, some organizations have
developed additional guidelines for allocation of fishing opportunities. That is the case of
CCSBT. Two other organizations – WCPFC and IOTC - have at least started a process to
develop detailed allocation criteria.
CCSBT adopted, in 1994, a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) for allocation
of fishing opportunities among the three original contracting parties. 311 The MoU was not
applied until 2010. In addition, the CCSBT is discussing the adoption of a Strategic Plan
that includes, among other actions, the implementation of existing decisions that impact
upon member allocations and the development of options for the long-term allocation
arrangements of all members, including new members, and apply to TAC increases and
decreases.312
WCFPC, in turn, agreed during its second meeting to initiate a process to develop
a framework for the implementation of the allocation provisions in article 10(3) of the
Convention. For this purpose, it tasked the Executive Secretary with producing a
discussion paper on the issue of allocation.313 However, the work was later suspended.314
Finally, the IOTC, during its last session in March 2010, adopted Resolution
10/01 for the conservation and management of tropical tuna stocks in the IOTC area of
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competence.315 According to this resolution, the Commission ―shall adopt an allocation
quota system or any other relevant measure for the yellowfin and bigeye tunas at its
plenary session in 2012.‖316 For this purpose, it was agreed that a technical committee
should be held prior to the Commission Plenary session in 2011 to discuss allocation
criteria for the management of the tuna resources of the Indian Ocean and recommend an
allocation quota system or any other relevant measures.317
Section 6. Concluding Remarks
This chapter reviewed the evolution of the allocation of TAC in RFMOs from its
first implementation at the international level to the current legal framework and
practices. In this section, some aspects of this evolution will be highlighted.
A first important observation is that TAC and allocation has become an important,
even fundamental, conservation and management measure. The LOSC recognizes TAC
explicitly as a management measure to be adopted in the high seas. UNFSA not only
considers the determination of a TAC, but also its allocation among participating sates, as
a matter of responsibility for RFMOs. Most RFMOs, including pre-UNFSA RFMOs with
amended Convention texts, also identify the management measure explicitly in their
mandates and functions.
TAC and allocation were recommended as best (available) management tool
considering two aspects

of fisheries

management:

biological

and economic

considerations. TACs were necessary to limit an increasing fishing mortality that
threatens to overexploit fisheries; allocation of national quotas was necessary to eliminate
competition (Olympic race) that results in economic waste in a scenario of
interdependence.
The early studies made it clear, however, that allocation of national quotas did not
in itself produce economic efficiency. It just provided the appropriate incentives for
States to pursue economic efficiency in their national fishing policies. Therefore, the
achievement of economic efficiency was dependent upon the national implementation of
315
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the quotas by the participating States. The determination of the national policies was,
however, a matter of State sovereignty and outside the scope of international
management. Thus, the establishment of national quotas protected and actually reinforced
State sovereignty, creating ―boxes‖ of exclusive jurisdiction in an otherwise common
resource. Thus, the role of international fisheries management was reduced to ―dividing
the pie.‖ National fisheries policies for the exploitation and use of fisheries resources
remained under the veil of State sovereignty, without even a relationship at the level of
communication with the international regime.
As a consequence of the emphasis on biology and economics of the fisheries
management paradigm, social objectives other than conservation and efficiency, and
distributional consequences of the quota system – i.e. equity considerations - were not at
the center of the discussion leading to the recognition of TACs and allocation as best
available management practices. The Report of a FAO Study Group on Economic
Aspects of Fisheries Management clearly stated
These remarks apply, however, only to the efficiency effects of regulatory actions.
These actions may also have distributions effects (…) [I]t must be acknowledge,
without reservations, that economic analysis as such can provide no basis for
distribution decisions of this type. It can only clarify the alternatives, and thus
improve the essentially political decision-making that must be involved.318
The economist John Crutchfield, one of the main proponents of a national quota
system for international fisheries, provides a quote that summarizes the lack of attention
to equity concerns. In one of the early conferences held to discuss the quota system, and
while addressing the issue of new entrants, he asked ―but who is to define equity, and
who is to establish criteria for eligibility?‖319 The question posed by Crutchfield is at the
heart of the search for a regulatory framework for TAC and allocations.
It is necessary to point out that some distributional aspects were included in the
work of some RFMOs in the early implementation of TAC and allocation. In particular,
ICNAF and, to a lesser extent, NEAFC, engaged in analysis to determine appropriate
frameworks for the allocation of quotas. Those frameworks considered the ―special
needs‖ or ―special circumstances‖ of coastal States, coastal communities, the case of
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fishing fleets with less diversion possibilities, and new entrants. Nevertheless, it was the
criteria of historical catches which had preeminence in these theoretical frameworks for
allocation, and which has also had preeminence in the practical implementation of
management measures. Allocations followed, and still follow, mainly the criterion of
historical catches.
Another aspect of the process that needs to be highlighted relates to the allocation
practices after the establishment of EEZs. This aspect is particularly important because it
is an unresolved conflict between coastal States and DWFNs. The consequences of the
extension of fisheries jurisdiction for allocation issues were dealt with mostly by
individual organizations in a way that better suited their particular reality and power
distribution. There was, therefore, no generally-held view on how coastal State and
DWFNs should address, either procedurally or substantially, the distribution of fishing
opportunities for straddling and highly migratory stocks.
Another important observation relates to the procedure for the adoption of TACs
and allocations. In every case in ICNAF, NEAFC and ICCAT, discussions for allocation
took place in closed meetings, with no records of deliberations, and often a limited
number of participants. Indeed, this was considered the ―most effective way‖ to move
forward the allocation agenda. Allocation negotiations relegated transparency to the
perceived benefits of political compromise.
The distributional implications of allocation have remained mostly unaddressed
and even understated. After some progress was made by including some provisions with
allocation implications in UNFSA, the global fora has limited itself to recommending to
RFMOs the development of ―transparent‖ allocation criteria ―in accordance with
international law.‖ While referring to this perceived need, references to equity have been
consistently deleted from the international documents.
RFMOs have made some progress in the development of a framework for
allocation. In particular, ICCAT has developed non-binding guidelines, and most postUNFSA RFMOs include allocation criteria in their Convention texts. However, and as
the next chapter will attempt to demonstrate, progress has been insufficient. Crutchfield‘s
question remains without a clear answer; an answer is, however, badly needed. It seems
apparent that the international community and the RFMOs are still in search of a
75

substantive framework to resolve the conflicts arising from allocations of scarce fisheries
resources.
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Chapter 3. TAC and Allocation: Legal Analysis
The previous chapter has analyzed the evolution of the TAC since its inception in
the early 1970s to this day. It has been mentioned that the global legal framework, and in
particular the LOSC and UNFSA, provide some insights on allocation issues but fail to
solve the allocation problem. It has been also explained that the development of an
allocation framework is widely considered to be the responsibility of RFMOs, and that,
although RFMOs have made some progress, frameworks are still incomplete.
This chapter describes and analyzes the substantive framework in more detail.
Procedural aspects will be dealt with in chapter 6. The first section of this chapter will
address general aspects of the global legal framework. The second section will address a
more detailed analysis of the legal provisions in relation to some of the main conflicts of
rights, interests and aspirations in high seas fisheries: the coastal State – DWFN conflict;
the new entrant problem; and the special needs of developing States. The third section
will analyze the additions that have been made to this framework by regional instruments.
Finally, the fourth section will identify the main types of allocation agreements that have
been adopted in the practice of RFMOs.
Section 1. Global Framework for Allocation: Some General Aspects
The analysis of the legal framework for allocation of fishing opportunities
considers global and regional instruments, which in turn can be binding or non-binding.
The binding legal framework is established, at the global level, in the LOSC and UNFSA.
Non-binding instruments addressing allocation of fishing opportunities in high seas
fisheries do not provide much help. As described in the previous chapter, resolutions,
recommendations and declarations at the global fora call for the development of
transparent criteria for allocation, but do not elaborate on how to achieve this task. Only
one instrument can be considered to provide some substantive guidance to the process:
the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation. This instrument encourages RFMOs to give
―due consideration‖ to the rights, duties and interests of coastal States and the special
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requirements of developing States when addressing the issue of the allocation of
straddling and highly migratory fish stocks.320
At the regional level, the framework for allocation is contained in RFMO
Convention texts, as well as in binding and non-binding documents of general application
– decision, guidelines, and recommendations. In some cases, elements of an allocation
framework can be found in specific recommendations adopted for particular stocks.
Regional frameworks for allocation should be consistent with international law,
particularly LOSC and UNFSA. In assessing this consistency, however, two
considerations should be kept in mind. The first of these considerations relates to the
ratification status of LOSC and UNFSA. Not all States have ratified those international
treaties. In the case of the LOSC, this consideration is not so important because it has
been widely ratified and many of its provisions are considered customary international
law.321 That is, however, not the case with UNFSA. A table with the status of ratification
for both LOSC and UNFSA by States participating in one or more RFMOs is provided in
the Appendix.
It should be mentioned, however, that in recent years, the ratification and
accession rate of UNFSA has increased considerably.322 In addition, the general
acceptance of its main provisions has been expressed in several UN General Assembly
(UNGA) resolutions adopted without a vote or by consensus, as well as in other
international declarations and resolutions.323 Furthermore, some of the obligations
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recognizes the general acceptance of the UNFSA as a means to achieve sustainable fisheries. The text of
the resolutions call upon all States and fishing entities ―that have not done so to ratify or accede to the
Agreement and in the interim to consider applying it provisionally‖ (see, for example: UNGA Resolution
64/72, Sustainable fisheries, including through the 1995 Agreement for the Implementation of the
Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the
Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, and related
instruments, online: DOALOS <www.un.org/Depts/los/index.htm>, paragraph 19 at 8). The acceptance of
the UNFSA by the international community can be tracked to 1995 and the Resolution 50/24, followed by
the Resolutions 51/35 adopted in 1996, 52/28 adopted in 1997-1998, 54/32 adopted in 1999, 56/13 adopted
in 2001, and 57/143adopted in 2002. In 2003, the GA started adopting two resolutions on oceans issues.
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included in UNFSA (and in particular those that ratify and give more precise content to
the obligations of the LOSC) may be considered part of customary international law.324
Furthermore, the practice of States in the RFMOs, including both parties and non-parties
to UNFSA, follow closely the provisions and guidelines of this international agreement.
Based on these considerations, it can be argued that the main corpus of UNFSA has been
accepted by States as governing their relations with respect to high seas fishing
cooperation.325 Nevertheless, the membership of UNFSA has to be kept in mind while
analyzing the global legal framework in particular situations.
A further aspect of UNFSA that needs to be taken into account while assessing
consistency of regional frameworks with international law is its scope. UNFSA governs
the high seas conservation and management of two particular types of stocks - straddling
stocks and highly migratory stocks. There are, however, other high seas stocks that do not
fall into those categories: discrete stocks. It has been recently suggested that most of the
principles of UNFSA can be applied, mutatis mutandis, to discrete stocks.326 This
proposal has been generally accepted and no objection has been raised. However,
international management of discrete stocks is very recent and still scarce. 327 Indeed, only
One is entitled Oceans and the Law of the Sea, the second as indicated before. That practice has been
maintained to present day. All resolutions have been adopted by consensus, or without a vote. It is worth
mentioning that each of these resolutions calls upon States and fishing entities to ratify or accede to
UNFSA, or to take measures to implement the agreement.
324
The most evident example is the application of the precautionary approach, explicitly included in article
6 of UNFSA. Its wide acceptance is reflected not only in UNFSA provisions, but also RFMO Conventions,
FAO Code of Conduct, UNGA resolutions, and other instruments. The resolutions cited in ibid refer to
precautionary approach explicitly (see, for example: UNGA Resolution 64/72, ibid, paragraph 6 and 8, at
6).
325
That is probably not the case with provisions that have been more controversial and rejected by some
States in international fora. That may be the case, for example, of the provisions of high seas control and
enforcement of articles 21 and 22.
326
See, for example: UN, Report of the Review Conference on the Agreement for the Implementation of the
Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982, supra note 278,
para. 64 and 65 at 14; and its Annex ―Outcome of the Review Conference‖, para. 2 at 31, and para. 16 at
33. An obvious exception is the provision of compatibility of management measures established in article 7
of UFNSA.
327
Maguire et al. note that ―on the high seas, management of deep-water fisheries has lagged behind the
development of the fisheries, even where there are Regional Fisheries Bodies with a purview over the
species‖ (Maguire et al., supra note 42, at 50). It is also noted that ICES only provided scientific advice for
the management of deep-water resources to NEAFC in 2005 (ibid). It should be noted that, in accordance
with UNGA Resolution 59/25 on Sustainable fisheries, including through the 1995 Agreement for the
Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December
1982 relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish
Stocks, and related instruments, 17 January 2005, para. 66 to 69, online: DOALOS
<http://www.un.org/Depts/los/index.htm> ; and UNGA Resolution A/RES/61/105, supra note 274, para. 83
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few discrete stocks have been managed internationally.328 Due to the lack of State
practice, it is probably early to allow an application of those principles to discrete stocks
based on customary international law.
The third aspect that needs to be taken into account, while assessing the
consistency between international (global) and regional frameworks, is that the
provisions of the LOSC and UNFSA are general in character. As discussed in the
previous chapter, they are the result of difficult compromises. As a consequence, they
often lack clarity, precision and operational details. Different interpretations are often
supported by the same texts. This aspect of the framework will be addressed in more
detail in the next section.
The LOSC addresses the high seas in Part VII, articles 86 and following. It
addresses in particular the conservation of living resources in Part VII Section 2, articles
116 and following. In addition, articles 63 and 64 contain some regulation for straddling
stocks and highly migratory stocks. These provisions set the fundamental pillars on
which high seas fisheries law is founded. Those pillars are: the freedom of the high seas,
including a qualified freedom to fish,329 the primary jurisdiction of the flag State over the
vessels flying their flags in the high seas,330 the obligation to conserve the natural
to 90, several RFMOs have adopted a moratoria on deep-sea fishing activities in new fishing grounds,
usually joined by requirements to develop appropriate conservation and management measures before
expanding fishing activities (see, for example: SPRFMO, Interim Management Measures adopted at the 3 rd
meeting of the International Consultations on the proposed South Pacific Regional Fisheries Management
Organization,
held
in
Reñaca,
Chile,
on
May
4
2007,
online:
SPRFMO
<http://www.southpacificrfmo.org>; NAFO, Conservation and Enforcement Measures 2010, supra note
236, Chapter I bis). Other RFMOs have closed specific areas (NEAFC, Recommendation on the protection
of Vulnerable Marine Ecosystems from significant adverse impacts in the NEAFC regulatory area, online:
NEAFC <http://www.neafc.org>). This can be considered as a preliminary measure for active management.
328
The most important international agreement for management of discrete stocks is probably the
Arrangement between the Government of Australia and the Government of New Zealand for the
Conservation and Management of Orange roughy on the South Tasman Rise, signed for New Zealand on
17 February 2000 and for Australia on 25 February 2000, in effect on 1 March 2000, on (2001)16 Int‘l J.
Mar. & Coast. L. 119. NEAFC has adopted specific management measures that go beyond moratoria and
closed areas for Orange roughy and other deep sea species in 2010 (Recommendation IX: 2010 on
Management Measures for Orange roughy in 2010 & 2011, and Recommendation VI: 2010 on
Conservation and Management Measures for deep-sea species in the NEAFC Regulatory Area 2010 to
2012, both online: NEAFC <http://www.neafc.org>).
329
LOSC, article 87, and in particular paragraph 1 subparagraph (e). It is worth noting that the freedom to
fish is subject to the conditions set in section 2 of Part VII. Furthermore, paragraph 2 of article 87 states:
―These freedoms shall be exercised by all States with due regard for ―the interests of other States in their
exercise of the freedom of the high seas, and also with due regard for the rights under this Convention with
respect to activities in the Area.‖
330
LOSC, article 92.
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resources of the ocean,331 the obligation to cooperate with other States in that
conservation,332 and the obligation not to discriminate against any States in the adoption
of conservation measures.333 In addition, the LOSC introduced the obligation to protect
the marine environment.334
The multinational character of fisheries in the high seas makes the cooperation
obligation pivotal for fisheries management. In relation to high seas fish stocks, in
general, the obligation to cooperate is included in article 118: ―States whose nationals
exploit identical living resources, or different living resources in the same area, shall
enter into negotiations with a view to taking the measures necessary for the conservation
of the living resources concerned.‖ With respect to straddling and highly migratory
stocks in particular, the LOSC call upon ―coastal State and the States fishing for such
stocks in the adjacent area shall seek, either directly or through appropriate subregional or
regional organizations, to agree upon the measures necessary for the conservation of
these stocks in the adjacent area‖.335 In the case of highly migratory stocks, the objective
of that cooperation is not only conservation of the fish stocks, but also ―promoting the
objective of optimum utilization of such species throughout the region, both within and
beyond the exclusive economic zone‖.336 UNFSA, in turn, establishes as an objective of
its provisions ―the long-term conservation and sustainable use of straddling fish stocks
and highly migratory fish stocks.‖337
The obligation to cooperate is best achieved, or at least is thought to be best
achieved, through RFMOs. They are considered the ―institutionalization‖ of the
obligation to cooperate. LOSC promotes their establishment by stating that States ―shall,
as appropriate, cooperate to establish subregional or regional fisheries organizations to
this end.‖338 UNFSA, in turn, not only promotes their establishment339 but also calls for
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LOSC, article 63, 64 and 117.
LOSC, article 63, 64, 117 and 118.
333
LOSC, article 119(3).
334
LOSC, Part XII.
335
LOSC, article 63(2).
336
LOSC, article 64.
337
UNFSA, article 2.
338
LOSC, article 118.
339
UNFSA, article 8.
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strengthening existing organizations in order to improve their effectiveness in
establishing and implementing appropriate conservation and management measures.340
The obligation to cooperate for the conservation of high seas stocks has as a goal
the establishment of conservation and management measures. Thus, these conservation
and management measures have to be established by agreement of participating States,
either directly or through the decision-making mechanism of an RFMO. This aspect
needs to be highlighted because it has important consequences, in particular, for
allocation of fishing opportunities: particular solutions are subject to a negotiation
process among participating States using appropriate decision-making frameworks.341
TACs are recognized explicitly as a conservation and management measure for
high seas fisheries, and indeed, as a fundamental measure in fisheries management, in the
LOSC. The chapeau of article 119, on conservation and management of the living
resources of the high seas, reads: ―in determining the allowable catch and establishing
other conservation measures for the living resources in the high seas (…)‖.342 UNFSA, on
the contrary, does not refer explicitly to TACs, but they are understood to be one of the
measures that can be adopted to achieve the objective of long-term conservation and
sustainable use of highly migratory and straddling stocks.343
The issue of allocation of fishing opportunities, on the contrary, is not addressed,
at least not explicitly, in the LOSC. No provision of the LOSC refers to allocation or
sharing agreements regarding quotas, effort, or participation, in the high seas, or for
resources that straddle or migrate between areas under national jurisdiction and the high
seas.344 However, it should be noted that in its preparatory meeting for UNFSA
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UNFSA, article 13.
These aspects will be addressed in chapter 6.
342
The fundamental role of TACs for conservation is also recognized in the EEZs in similar terms. Article
61 of conservation of living resources (of the EEZ) establishes, as a responsibility of the coastal State, the
determination of the allowable catch of the living resources in its exclusive economic zone.
343
The fact that it is considered one of the possible conservation and management measures is apparent
from Article 10(b), which refers to the allocation of the allowable catch.
344
The only reference to sharing agreements is included in article 62 of the LOSC, addressing the
obligation of coastal States to provide access to the surplus of the total allowable catch where the coastal
State does not have the capacity to harvest it. The lack of specific provisions should be no surprise. The
allocation ―issue‖ during the LOSC was resolved through the establishment of an extended area of
jurisdiction for the conservation and exploitation of resources (EEZ). LOSC adopted a jurisdictional and
spatial approach to the allocation of natural resources. This new distribution of ocean‘s wealth was believed
to solve the cooperative problems faced by the international community. As a consequence, the high seas‘
341

82

Conference, a group of technical experts on high-seas fisheries interpreted article 119 as
providing some guidance in this respect.
Article 119 calls upon States, in determining the TAC ―or other conservation
measures‖, to
(a) take measures which are designed, on the best scientific evidence available to the
States concerned, to maintain or restore populations of harvested species at levels
which can produce the maximum sustainable yield, as qualified by relevant
environmental and economic factors, including the special requirements of
developing States, and taking into account fishing patterns, the interdependence of
stocks and any generally recommended international minimum standards, whether
subregional, regional or global;
(b) take into consideration the effects on species associated with or dependent upon
harvested species with a view to maintaining or restoring populations of such
associated or dependent species above levels at which their reproduction may
become seriously threatened.
It further adds, in paragraph 3, that States concerned shall ensure that
conservation measures and their implementation do not discriminate in form or in fact
against the fishermen of any State.
The group of experts considered that the provision of article 119 may be
interpreted as applicable to allocation decisions, since they ―might be regarded‖ as a
conservation measure within the meaning of this provision.345 According to this
interpretation, allocation decisions should be qualified by the factors listed in this
provision, from which they cite in particular: environmental and economic factors, the
special requirements of developing States, and fishing patterns.346 As an additional factor
to be taken into account, not listed in article 119, the group included the enhancement
efforts undertaken by a State.347
UNFSA does not address allocation of fishing opportunities directly either.
However, the Conference could not avoid addressing distributional conflicts. The
negotiation was, in itself, the result of increasing conflicts of interests in the exploitation
of straddling and highly migratory fish stocks. The predominant conflict was the one
between coastal States and DWFN. However, the interests and aspirations of developing
regulation was not addressed in great detail, and the LOSC limited itself to repeating the main legal
provisions of customary international law.
345
DOALOS, supra note 126, at 33-34.
346
DOALOS, ibid.
347
DOALOS, ibid.
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States were also present in the discussion. This was a consequence of both the general
developments in international law, particularly in the field of sustainable development,
and the particular genesis of the negotiation process, i.e. the 1992 Rio Conference. It has
been noted that the UNFSA Conference was influenced by the recent debates in UNCED,
although this influence was resisted by some States.348
As a result of these unavoidable conflicts, UNFSA contains several provisions
with allocation consequences. These provisions address the conflict between conservation
and utilization (i.e. intergenerational equity as discussed in chapter 4). They also address
the main conflict between coastal States and DWFNs (in article 7); the issue of new
entrants to the fishery (in article 11); and the special situation of developing States
(arguably, in articles 24 and 25, and article 11). These different provisions will be
addressed in more detail below. However, a few remarks in relation to the general
approach taken by UNFSA are useful.
A first aspect of the framework that is important to highlight is that UNFSA does
not have an overarching provision or principle regarding allocation, but rather addresses
different conflicts of interests in different provisions. In other words, it provides separate
guidance on compatibility of measures within and outside EEZ, on new participants, and
on developing States, but does not address how a decision shall be made where all those
interests co-exist at the same time and in relation to the same stock. These provisions
have been considered as an ―encapsulation‖ of the distributional conflicts by UNFSA; 349
an encapsulation that represents a failure to address the distributional problem in its
integrity.
In addressing a particular distributional problem, the different provisions of
UNFSA with allocation implications require States to take into account a series of
elements, criteria, factors or facts. They are reproduced in table 1.
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It was noted, by observers, that the beginning of the Conference was a hybrid between UNCLOS and
UNCED (IISD, Earth Negotiations Bulletin, vol. 7, summary issue 16, supra note 260, in ―A Brief
Analysis of the Conference‖). It seemed that the discussion on opportunities for developing States, which
was pivotal in the UNCED negotiation, was spilling over into this conference. However, this trend was
contended by some delegates, who insisted that this was more a Law of the Sea issue than a sustainable
development issue (IISD, Earth Negotiations Bulletin, vol. 7, summary issue 30, supra note 260, in ―A
Brief Analysis of the Conference‖).
349
Agnew et al., supra note 10, at 19. The quote relates to the analysis of the needs of developing States
and articles 11 and 24 of UNFSA.
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Table 1. Provisions with allocation implications in UNFSA
Article

Criteria

Article 7
on
Compatibility
of
Conservation
and
Management
Measures

(a) take into account the conservation and management measures adopted and applied in
accordance with article 61 of the Convention in respect of the same stocks by coastal
States within areas under national jurisdiction and ensure that measures established in
respect of such stocks for the high seas do not undermine the effectiveness of such
measures;
(b) take into account previously agreed measures established and applied for the high seas
in accordance with the Convention in respect of the same stocks by relevant coastal States
and States fishing on the high seas;
(c) take into account previously agreed measures established and applied in accordance
with the Convention in respect of the same stocks by a subregional or regional fisheries
management organization or arrangement;
(d) take into account the biological unity and other biological characteristics of the stocks
and the relationships between the distribution of the stocks, the fisheries and the
geographical particularities of the region concerned, including the extent to which the
stocks occur and are fished in areas under national jurisdiction;
(e) take into account the respective dependence of the coastal States and the States fishing
on the high seas on the stocks concerned; and
(f) ensure that such measures do not result in harmful impact on the living marine
resources as a whole.
(a) the status of the straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks and the existing
level of fishing effort in the fishery;
(b) the respective interests, fishing patterns and fishing practices of new and existing
members or participants;
(c) the respective contributions of new and existing members or participants to
conservation and management of the stocks, to the collection and provision of accurate
data and to the conduct of scientific research on the stocks;
(d) the needs of coastal fishing communities which are dependent mainly on fishing for the
stocks;
(e) the needs of coastal States whose economies are overwhelmingly dependent on the
exploitation of living marine resources; and
(f) the interests of developing States from the subregion or region in whose areas of
national jurisdiction the stocks also occur.
a) the vulnerability of developing States which are dependent on the exploitation of living
marine resources, including for meeting the nutritional requirements of their populations or
parts thereof;
(b) the need to avoid adverse impacts on, and ensure access to fisheries by, subsistence,
small-scale and artisanal fishers and women fishworkers, as well as indigenous people in
developing States, particularly small island developing States; and
(c) the need to ensure that such measures do not result in transferring, directly or
indirectly, a disproportionate burden of conservation action onto developing States

Article 11
on
New
members
or
Participants

Article 24
on
Special
Requirements
of
Developing
States

This approach deserves four general observations. The first one is that all articles
require States to ―take into account‖ the factors included in the respective provisions. As
mentioned by Molenaar with respect to article 11, ―even though the chapeau uses the
word ‗shall‘, which thereby establishes a legal obligation, this is considerably softened by
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the qualification ‗take into account‘.‖ 350 Indeed , the obligation to take into account may
be satisfied by simply noting the factor, but not giving it any effect in the resultant
distribution.
What is said in respect to article 11 applies as well to article 7 and 24. However, it
should be noted that article 7 requires that more weight than a simple ―consideration‖ be
given to two particular factors. This weight is implicit in the fact that States are called
upon not only to consider, but also to ensure a specific result. Articles 7(2),
subparagraphs a) and f) state:
In determining compatible conservation and management measures, States shall:
(a) take into account the conservation and management measures adopted and
applied in accordance with article 61 of the Convention in respect of the same
stocks by coastal States within areas under national jurisdiction and ensure that
measures established in respect of such stocks for the high seas do not undermine
the effectiveness of such measures;
(f) ensure that such measures do not result in harmful impact on the living marine
resources as a whole. (emphasis added)
The second observation relates to the character of the lists included in articles 7,
11 and 24. The elements, criteria, factors or facts are included in either closed or nonexhaustive lists. Article 7 (which addresses the conflict between coastal States and
DWFNs) is a closed list, while article 11 (which addresses the fishing opportunities of
new entrants) and article 24 (which addresses the special requirements of developing
States) are non-exhaustive lists, as the phrases ―inter alia‖ or ―in particular‖ acknowledge.
In the two latter cases, therefore, States have latitude not only to ―take into account‖ a
factor but decide that it should not have an impact on the distributive result, but also to
consider other elements in their distributional decisions.
Another aspect that is worth noting is that the criteria in each of the lists constitute
a description of the interests that are involved in the respective conflict. However, the
provisions do not determine the weight that has to be given to each factor, do not
prioritize them, and do not give one or more of them any preference in the distributional
decision.

350

Molenaar, ―Participation‖, supra note 16, at 468.
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The fourth observation relates to the nature of the criteria or factors included. The
criteria are qualitative and general in nature. None of them can be applied to a
distributional issue without further refinement of its precise content. Even the most
objective criteria included in the lists – historical catches – leaves important elements to
be resolved by the negotiating parties (e.g. what is the reference period? the catches made
by a vessel flying the flag of a DWFN in the EEZ of a coastal State shall be considered
catches of the DWFN or the coastal State? Which statistics are to be used?) This lack of
specificity and operational details or parameters allows them to be interpreted
subjectively with different emphasis, strength and even meaning.
From this general description, it can be concluded that the approach of the current
global legal framework to the distributional conflict is to address specific conflicts of
interests in separate provisions, rather than providing a unitary or harmonized framework.
As a consequence, it does not contain a ―fundamental norm‖ that acts as a benchmark for
allocation.351 The different conflicts are addressed through the obligation to take into
consideration closed or open lists of qualitative criteria encompassing a broad range of
interests without establishing preferences, order, priorities or weight.
These circumstances give the RFMOs (and their member States) almost absolute
discretion in determining allocations. Despite the fact that they are included in a binding
document, the provisions regarding allocation have very little normative value. It can be
argued that LOSC and UNFSA do little more than acknowledge the competing interests
in an allocation process.352 There is no guidance on how to solve those conflicts of
interest.
Section 2. The Conflicts of Interests and Allocation Criteria
The previous section described the general shortcomings of the legal frameworks
for allocation as developed in global instruments and RFMOs frameworks. This section
undertakes an in-depth analysis on how that legal framework addresses particular
351

Molenaar, ―South Tasman Rise Arrangement‖, supra note 16, at 91; Molenaar, ―Participation‖, ibid, at
467.
352
Molenaar, citing articles 56(1)(a) and (3), 77(4) and 116, notes that the LOSC ―effectively does no more
than confirm the respective rights of states in their different capacities‖ (Molenaar, ―Participation‖, ibid).
As seen, the allocation criteria of UNFSA in articles 7, 11 and 24 add little more to the recognition of the
interests at stake.
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conflicts of rights and interests in international fisheries, with an emphasis on allocation
criteria. Identifying the main conflicts of rights and interests in the sharing of fish stocks
with a high seas component is not a difficult task, after having analyzed the history and
evolution of TACs and allocations as conservation and management measures. Indeed,
they were clearly exposed in the early studies for allocations undertaken in the 1960s.
The subsequent events only confirm the accuracy of these foresights.
In those early studies, it was asserted that coastal States should be given some
kind of preference due to their geographical proximity to the fishing grounds and the fact
that a coastal fishing industry is less movable than a distant water fishing fleet. 353 The
conflict of interest between coastal States and DWFNs remained despite the extension of
fishing jurisdiction. The distributional conflict that would be created by the accession of
new participants to the fisheries was also recognized and highlighted as one extremely
important question that needed to be faced in the design of a system of allocation of
national quotas.354 The especial situation of developing States was also acknowledged.355
All those conflicts remain as valid today as in the 1960s. They will be the focus of this
section.
Another important conflict is the one between providing fishing opportunities for
all interested parties, and the need to limit catches for the conservation of the target stock,
and its associated and dependent species. This particular conflict will be dealt in the next
chapter.
There are still other technical conflicts related to the interactions between
different types of fleet (i.e. a target fishery and a by-catch fishery, or fleets using different
fishing gears). In the current practice, it is left mostly to individual countries to address
the fleet conflicts within their national quotas. Exceptions to this general rule exist in
relation to quotas set for by-catch in a particular target fishery.356 For this reason, despite
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See: Alexander, ―Discussion Period‖ supra note 159, at 288.
See, for example: Crutchfield, supra note 154, at 272; Giulio Pontecorvo, ―Critique‖, in Alexander,
supra note 154, at 276; ―Discussion Period‖, ibid, at 279.
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See, for example: Crutchfield, ibid, at 272.
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See, for example, allocations for by-catch in: ICCAT, Supplemental Recommendation 08-04 concerning
the Western Atlantic Bluefin Tuna Rebuilding Program, para. 6.b, and ICCAT, Recommendation 07-03 on
the Southern Albacore catch limits for 2008, 2009, 2010 and 2011, para 6, both online: ICCAT
<http://www.iccat.int>.
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the impact they may have in allocation decisions, these issues will not be analyzed further
in this thesis.
Coastal State Interests vs. DWFN Interests
The distribution of fishing opportunities between coastal States, for the portion of
the stock that occurs in their EEZs, and DWFNs is a problem limited to straddling and
highly migratory stocks. It is, nevertheless, the most sensitive allocation issue. This
derives from the fact that straddling and highly migratory stocks account for a significant
proportion of the resources caught in the high seas; and from the jurisdictional and
substantive challenges of this distribution. Indeed, allocation is often framed as a conflict
between coastal States and DWFNs. It is important to note, however, that although such a
conflict is prominent in practice and discourse, allocation discussions exceed that frame.
The core of the high seas – EEZs distribution conflict lies in the reconciliation of
two different regimes: coastal States have an exclusive right for exploration, exploitation
and conservation of the living resources of their EEZs. DWFNs, in turn, have a ―right to
fish in the high seas‖, a right that is nevertheless not exclusive but shared with other
States. This reconciliation has two inter-linked aspects: jurisdictional and substantive.
The jurisdictional aspect relates to the decision-making process for conservation and
management measures, and in particular for the TAC, for stocks that occur in areas under
different jurisdictional regime. The substantive aspect relates to the consideration given
to coastal State rights in the distribution of fishing opportunities.357 This latter aspect is
the focus of this section.
The EEZ – high seas conflict was paramount in the UNFSA negotiation process,
and a very difficult problem to address. Both coastal States and DWFNs had an interest in
ensuring that the rights carefully negotiated during the LOS Conference did not suffer
any erosion. For that purpose, it was made clear already in the calling to the conference
that the results of the conference had to be consistent with the LOSC provisions.358 This
was, indeed, reflected in the text of UNFSA, in particular in article 4:
357

See: Oude Elferink, ―The Determination of Compatible Conservation and Management Measures for
Straddling and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks‖ (2001) 5 Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law 551,
at 556 and note 8.
358
United Nations, Agenda 21, supra note 255, para. 17.50.
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Nothing in this Agreement shall prejudice the rights, jurisdiction and duties of
States under the Convention. This Agreement shall be interpreted and applied in
the context of and in a manner consistent with the Convention.359
The simple recognition of the respective regimes of the EEZ and the high seas,
however, did little to balance the rights and interests at stake in cases of competition and
conflict. The solution of UNFSA to this problem rested on certain basic principles. One
of them is the principle of biological unit: conservation and management measures
adopted for a stock should be consistent over its range of distribution. This principle was
accepted by both coastal States and DWFNs from the outset.
As a consequence of the principle of biological unity, it was also accepted that
conservation and management measures adopted in both areas needed to be compatible
and coherent. A harder problem was to find the mechanism through which to achieve
compatible and coherent measures. The final solution is set out in Article 7.
Article 7 begins with an overall safeguard of respective interests: the sovereign
rights of coastal States for the conservation and exploitation of resources in their EEZ,
and the right to fish in the high seas. Article 7(1) reads:
Compatibility of conservation and management measures
1. Without prejudice to the sovereign rights of coastal States for the purpose of
exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the living marine resources
within areas under national jurisdiction as provided for in the Convention, and the
right of all States for their nationals to engage in fishing on the high seas in
accordance with the Convention:
(a) with respect to straddling fish stocks, the relevant coastal States and the States
whose nationals fish for such stocks in the adjacent high seas area shall seek,
359

In previous proposals, some States wanted to increase the influence of coastal States in the management
of those stocks, while other States attempted to ―introduce internationally adopted measures in the high
seas into the fisheries management‖ of the EEZ or other measures that would, in practice, have weakened
the sovereign rights of coastal States in their EEZ. The issue also tainted the discussion on the area of
application of the Agreement. Article 3 of UNFSA, in this respect, states:
―1. Unless otherwise provided, this Agreement applies to the conservation and management of straddling
fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks beyond areas under national jurisdiction, except that articles 6
and 7 apply also to the conservation and management of such stocks within areas under national
jurisdiction, subject to the different legal regimes that apply within areas under national jurisdiction and in
areas beyond national jurisdiction as provided for in the Convention.
2. In the exercise of its sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and
managing straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks within areas under national jurisdiction,
the coastal State shall apply mutatis mutandis the general principles enumerated in article 5.
3. States shall give due consideration to the respective capacities of developing States to apply articles 5, 6
and 7 within areas under national jurisdiction and their need for assistance as provided for in this
Agreement. To this end, Part VII applies mutatis mutandis in respect of areas under national jurisdiction.‖
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either directly or through the appropriate mechanisms for cooperation provided
for in Part III, to agree upon the measures necessary for the conservation of these
stocks in the adjacent high seas area;
(b) with respect to highly migratory fish stocks, the relevant coastal States and
other States whose nationals fish for such stocks in the region shall cooperate,
either directly or through the appropriate mechanisms for cooperation provided
for in Part III, with a view to ensuring conservation and promoting the objective
of optimum utilization of such stocks throughout the region, both within and
beyond the areas under national jurisdiction.
This provision must be read in conjunction with articles 3 and 4. They provide
safeguards that conservation and management measures are to be adopted, for each area,
under their respective jurisdictional authority. However, these authorities have to
cooperate so that the conservation and management measures are adopted on the basis of
similar standards, so that the management strategy of the whole distribution remains
stable and coherent (or, in UNFSA terms, so as to ensure ―conservation and management
of the straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks in their entirety‖). 360 Article
7(2) reads:
(2) Conservation and management measures established for the high seas and
those adopted for areas under national jurisdiction shall be compatible in order to
ensure conservation and management of the straddling fish stocks and highly
migratory fish stocks in their entirety. To this end, coastal States and States
fishing on the high seas have a duty to cooperate for the purpose of achieving
compatible measures in respect of such stocks (…).
In discharging this obligation to cooperate so as to achieve compatible
management measures, they have to take into account some elements, which are listed in
paragraph 2 of article 7:
2. (…) In determining compatible conservation and management measures, States
shall:
360

UNFSA, article 7(2). See: Oude Elferink, supra note 357, at 562-563 and note 23. Despite this explicit
recognition of the two different jurisdictional regimes of the EEZ and the high seas, most RFMOs with
jurisdiction over highly migratory stocks have an area of competence that includes both these maritime
zones, and adopt management decisions that are binding both within and outside the EEZ (ICCAT,
CCSBT). The decisions require, evidently, the consent of the coastal States, but the establishment of the
management measures is a unified process that reflects the obligation to cooperate to establish compatible
conservation and management measures (and without prejudice of sovereign rights of the coastal States).
Even in cases where there is a jurisdictional difference reflected in the area of competence, most RFMOs
seem to have adopted a practical approach that allows the adoption of one TAC allocated to participating
States, including the coastal State in that character and, if applicable, as a high seas fishing State. This
practical approach has been made explicit in the SPRFMO Convention, supra note 23, article 20(4) and
Annex III.
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(a) take into account the conservation and management measures adopted and
applied in accordance with article 61 of the Convention in respect of the same
stocks by coastal States within areas under national jurisdiction and ensure that
measures established in respect of such stocks for the high seas do not undermine
the effectiveness of such measures;
(b) take into account previously agreed measures established and applied for the
high seas in accordance with the Convention in respect of the same stocks by
relevant coastal States and States fishing on the high seas;
(c) take into account previously agreed measures established and applied in
accordance with the Convention in respect of the same stocks by a subregional or
regional fisheries management organization or arrangement;
(d) take into account the biological unity and other biological characteristics of
the stocks and the relationships between the distribution of the stocks, the
fisheries and the geographical particularities of the region concerned, including
the extent to which the stocks occur and are fished in areas under national
jurisdiction;
(e) take into account the respective dependence of the coastal States and the States
fishing on the high seas on the stocks concerned; and
(f) ensure that such measures do not result in harmful impact on the living marine
resources as a whole.
The criteria included in the closed list of article 7 include aspects related to stock
management, biological unit and geographical distribution, fishing practices, dependence,
and conservation. They shall be taken into account in the establishment of any
conservation and management measures, and not only in the case of allocation decisions.
As a consequence, some factors may play a limited role in allocations.361
The biological criteria relate in particular to the relationship between the
distribution of the stock, the fisheries and the geographical particularities of the region
concerned. This criterion is known as ―zonal attachment‖. The factor of geographical
distribution is particularly important, since it implies establishing which proportion of the
fish stock is present in each jurisdictional area, providing an objective criterion for
distribution of fishing opportunities. However, it should be noted that the criterion is less
361

As a general rule, the management aspects included in letters a) to c) will probably not have a
significant, or any, impact on allocation decisions because neither coastal States nor RFMOs would likely
allocate fishing opportunities before entering into compatibility exercises with each other. However, there
have been cases where coastal States have allocation arrangements before participation of distant water
fishing nations have occurred (e.g of NEAFC after the extension of EEZs). Also, cases where an RFMO
allocates fishing opportunities without participation of one or more coastal States have also occurred, and
resulted in difficult allocation problems (e.g. CCSBT and its relation with the non-member South Africa).
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objective than might be expected. Firstly, it requires a considerable level of scientific
knowledge, which is not always available. In addition, fish stocks do not have static
patterns of distribution, and are influenced by both the amount of fishing and
environmental factors. Furthermore, fish stocks distribute in different ocean areas at
different stage of their life cycle. In cases where a relevant stages of the cycle (i.e.
nursing) occurs in a specific jurisdictional area (e.g. EEZ), claims that the stock has a
particular attachment to that area, and thus that that area is entitled to a more significant
share, are probably going to be presented in the negotiation of a cooperative regime. 362
As a consequence, the decision on a model to quantify stock distribution in different
areas is often subject to a negotiation process itself, a process that it is scientific in nature
but strongly influenced by political considerations.363
It is also worth mentioning that the criteria of geographical distribution or zonal
attachment for highly migratory stocks has been resisted in even rejected by some States,
on the basis that the ―the changing distribution of tuna biomass and the fact that due to
the migratory character of the stocks concerned they do not belong to one zone in
particular.‖364
It is also worth mentioning that the letter of article 7 addressing the relationship
between the biological distribution of the stock, the fisheries, and other geographical
particularities, includes as one element the ―the extent to which the stocks (…) are fished
in areas under national jurisdiction‖. According to this, then, not only the presence of the
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In this respect, it should be mentioned that the following biological elements have been identified as
relevant for the implementation of the ―zonal attachment‖ criterion: the spawning areas, the distribution of
egg and larvae, the occurrence of juvenile fish, and the occurrence and migrations of the fishable part of the
stock (Hoel and Kvalvik, supra note 14, at 351, citing work undertaken by ICES). The authors include as
criterion the history of the fishery and the state of exploitation of the stock. They have been omitted in this
list because they do not correspond to aspects of biological distribution. However, their relevance in the
application of the compatibility criterion is mentioned in other sections of this analysis.
363
An example thereof was the process to determine zonal attachment for blue whiting in the North East
Atlantic. See: Ingolf Røttingen, ―Management of pelagic fisheries in the Norwegian Sea‖, in Hein Rune
Skjoldal, ed., The Norwegian Sea Ecosystem (Trondheim: Tapir Academic Press, 2004) 535, at 543-546.
364
Oude Elferink, supra note 357, at 556. EC stated that the ―changing distribution of tuna biomass makes
the ‗zonal attachment‘ proposal very difficult to implement from a practical perspective (ICCAT, Report
for biennial period, 1998-99, Part II (1999) (Madrid: ICCAT 2000), Annex 6, Report of the 1 st Meeting of
the ICCAT Group on Allocation Criteria, Madrid, 31 May – 2 June 1999, para. 6.47 at 90, online: ICCAT
<http://www.iccat.int>). Japan rejected that possibility on the basis that tuna ―stocks migrate freely and
such a proposal has no historical precedent or merit‖ and that ―highly migratory fish do not belong to one
zone, but that those areas through which they migrate instead represent a ‗transitional route‘ only‖ (ICCAT,
ibid, para. 6.44 and 6.50 at 90).
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stock is relevant for this criterion, but also the existence and extent of fishing activity.
Both may not coincide, and often they collide. However, by mentioning both elements in
the same provision and as elements of the same criterion, UNFSA leaves the
distributional problems open. As a consequence of these difficulties, different
interpretations of this one criterion (―zonal attachment‖) may and actually have occurred.
An example thereof is the dispute that faced NEAFC contracting parties in relation to the
Norwegian spring spawning herring (or Atlanto-Scandian herring). Although member
States agreed that zonal attachment should be the criterion for distribution, they had
different understandings on how to determine that zonal attachment. Some member States
proposed to establish it in terms of biomass per time; others argued that it should be
established in terms of catch only.365
In relation to the existence and extent of fishing activities, there is another
provision that may create more interpretation problems: article 62 of LOSC. According to
paragraph 2 of this provision,
[t]he coastal State shall determine its capacity to harvest the living resources of
the exclusive economic zone. Where the coastal State does not have the capacity
to harvest the entire allowable catch, it shall, through agreements or other
arrangements and pursuant to the terms, conditions, laws and regulations referred
to in paragraph 4, give other States access to the surplus of the allowable catch,
having particular regard to the provisions of articles 69 and 70, especially in
relation to the developing States mentioned therein.
The interactions between this provision and article 7 of UNFSA need to be
assessed. Does this provision apply to cases where the resources occur only within the
EEZ of a coastal State? Does the provision have any allocation consequence in relation to
article 7? Or does it regulate, not allocation of fishing opportunities for straddling and
highly migratory stocks, but access agreements to the EEZ? Those questions remain not
only unanswered but even unaddressed.366
365

Trond Bjørndal, ―Overview, roles, and performance of the North East Atlantic fisheries commission
(NEAFC)‖ (2009) 33 Marine Policy 685, at 692.
366
The question would be, then, if in application of the criteria included in article 7, it is even possible that
a coastal State will be allocated more fishing opportunities than it is capable of using? If a criterion of zonal
attachment understood as biological distribution is applied, that may be the case. But if the criterion is not
given sufficient weight, or if it is counterbalanced by existing fishing patterns or dependency, it may be
argued that the fishing opportunities should be allocated to other States and not the coastal State. Other
States still require a permission to fish in the coastal State‘s EEZ, but that would not be to fish the ―surplus‖
of the coastal State‘s quota.
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A further criterion that article 7 considers for establishing compatibility of
measures is the dependency of both coastal States and States fishing in the high seas. It
does not elaborate further on what shall be considered dependency, or how to assess it. It
has been proposed that ―[s]ome indication for the interpretation of the term ‗dependence‘
can be found in articles 11 and 24‖ of UNFSA.367 In particular, articles 11(1)
subparagraphs (d) and (e), and article 24(2) subparagraphs (a) and (b) are cited.
According to this interpretation, the dependence of the coastal Sates and DWFNs can be
established by reference to the importance of the stocks to the State concerned in relation
to its national economy; and the dependence of specific groups on the stocks concerned.
In the case of developing States, an additional relevant consideration is meeting the
nutritional requirements of their populations or parts thereof.
The description of the different criteria that needs to be considered in the cases
where coastal States‘ and DWFNs‘ aspirations cannot be simultaneously satisfied,
demonstrates that the provision of article 7 gives little guidance on how to solve the
allocation problem. Each party is able to find, in the same provision and sometimes in the
same criterion, the arguments that would support their contradictory positions.
Existing Participants vs. New Entrants
A second important source of conflict is the one between existing members and
new (or late) entrants. The LOSC establishes, as a pillar of high seas regime, the principle
of freedom to fish in the high seas. The freedom is, however, qualified by the obligations
to directly conserve high seas stocks, to cooperate with other States in their conservation
and, as appropriate, cooperate to establish subregional or regional fisheries organizations
to this end. The heart of the problem is to determine if the duty to cooperate implies a
duty to abstain from fishing, if the fishing stock is already fully exploited. Phrasing the
question in the reverse, the problem is to determine if RFMOs have an obligation to
accommodate and provide access to new (or late) entrants.
UNFSA reinforces the duty of cooperation by establishing, in article 8.4, that
―only those States which are members of [a regional] organization or participants in [a
regional] arrangement, or which agree to apply the conservation and management
367

Oude Elferink, supra note 357, at 567.
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measures established by such organization or arrangement, shall have access to the
fishery resources to which those measures apply.‖ It adds that a State which is not a
member of the organization or participant in an arrangement, and which does not
otherwise agree to apply the conservation and management measures established by such
organization or arrangement, is not discharged from the obligation to cooperate.368
Paragraph 3 adds that ―such State shall not authorize vessels flying its flag to engage in
fishing operations for the straddling fish stocks or highly migratory fish stocks which are
subject to the conservation and management measures established by such organization
or arrangement‖. Therefore, participation in the work of an RFMO is a crucial aspect of
allocation. In the words of Juda, ―[p]articipation in the management scheme thus has
been made the price of fishery access; free and unlimited access at will is ended, as
access now is tied to and limited by the conditions imposed by collective action.‖369
But at the same time, article 8(4) of UNFSA establishes that States with a real
interest in the fishery have the right and the duty to cooperate with other States by
becoming members of an organization or participants of an agreement; and the
organization or agreement could not legally preclude their participation.370 What that real
interest is has not been defined in the agreement, and its scope has been subject to
interpretation. It is generally recognized that the relevant coastal States (i.e. coastal States
whose maritime zones are included in, or adjacent to, the RFMO) and the States fishing
for the stock have a real interest in the fishery. ―Their real interest is implicit in their duty
to participate‖371, recognized in articles 8.4 and 8.5 of UNFSA. According to Orrego,
these are the only States with a real interest.372 Molenaar considers that there is no wellfounded argument for interpreting or applying the concept of ―real interest‖ as a bar to
participation in RFMOs per se.373
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UNFSA, article 17(1).
Lawrence Juda, ―The 1995 United Nations Agreement on Straddling Stocks and Highly Migratory
Stocks: A Critique‖ (1997) 28 Ocean Devel. & Int‘l L. 147, at 155.
370
UNFSA, article 8(4): ―The terms of participation in such organization or arrangement shall not preclude
such States from membership or participation; nor shall they be applied in a manner which discriminates
against any State or group of States having a real interest in the fisheries concerned.‖
371
Erik Jaap Molenaar, ―The Concept of ‗Real Interest‘ and Other Aspects of Co-operation through
Regional Fisheries Management Mechanisms‖ (2000) 15 Int‘l J. Mar. & Coast. L. 475, at 495.
372
Orrego Vicuña, supra note 126, at 208.
373
Molenaar, supra note 371, at 498-499. Molenaar distinguishes three categories of States different from
the relevant coastal States and States actively fishing for the stock, that may be considered to have a ―real
369
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The difference of interpretation may not be as substantive if one considers not
only the participation in the cooperative regime, but also the allocation of fishing
opportunities, i.e., access to the stocks, for new entrants. Article 11 of UNFSA on
participatory rights of new entrants contains a non-exhaustive list of criteria that shall be
taken into account while determining the nature and extent of participatory rights of new
members of a RFMO, or new participants to an arrangement.374 These criteria include:
(a) the status of the straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks and the
existing level of fishing effort in the fishery;
(b) the respective interests, fishing patterns and fishing practices of new and
existing members or participants;
(c) the respective contributions of new and existing members or participants to
conservation and management of the stocks, to the collection and provision of
accurate data and to the conduct of scientific research on the stocks;
(d) the needs of coastal fishing communities which are dependent mainly on
fishing for the stocks;
(e) the needs of coastal States whose economies are overwhelmingly dependent
on the exploitation of living marine resources; and
(f) the interests of developing States from the subregion or region in whose areas
of national jurisdiction the stocks also occur.
Orrego considers that states not having a real interest in the stock can only
participate in the organization as new members, and as such be allocated fishing
opportunities only ―to the extent possible‖.375 Molenaar, although having a broader
interpretation of the concept of real interest and thus of participatory rights in the regime,
also leaves open the possibility for restricting access to the stocks to new participants in
case it is necessary for conservation.376 In both cases, the authors seem to give priority to

interest‖: flag States that fished in the regulatory area previously and want to resume fishing; flag States
without a catch history that want to fish in the future; and States with no intention to fish that nevertheless
want to participate in the RFMO/A (Molenaar, ibid, at 495-496).
374
Molenaar points out that, although the chapeau uses the word ―shall‖, thereby establishing a legal
obligation to consider these criteria, this obligation is softened by the use of the expression ―take into
account‖ (Molenaar, ―Participation‖, supra note 16, at 468). It is also softened by the fact that the list is
non-exhaustive, and by the fact that the article does not prioritize nor assign relative weights to the different
criteria (Molenaar, ibid). These two circumstances give the RFMO/As considerable latitude in determining
the actual participatory rights of new members.
375
Chairman of the UNFSA Conference, as cited by Orrego Vicuña, supra note 126, at 210.
376
Molenaar, supra note 371, at 499.

97

the first criterion listed in article 11.377 Other authors, based on the same article, conclude
that new entrants must be offered a just and reasonable share of the TAC. 378 However,
they do not elaborate on the concept of ―just and reasonable‖ share.
It should be noted at this point that framing the problem of new entrants as a
conservation problem is misleading. It is true that the stock can support only a certain
amount of fishing effort and catches and thus, when that point is reached, no additional
fishing effort or catches shall be accepted. But that does not imply, necessarily, the
exclusion of new entrants to a fully exploited stock. The same protection can be achieved
by re-allocating fishing opportunities within accepted biological limits. In simple terms,
the exclusion of new entrants to a fully exploited fishery protects the stock (from
additional fishing effort) but also the existing fishing industry (from reducing its
participation).
Whether the interpretation of Orrego or Molenaar is followed, the determination
of the share of new entrants (if any) is to be established following the criteria of UNFSA
article 11. It is worth mentioning that the list of criteria is not closed, so other criteria
may be considered as well by the member States of an RFMO. The criteria listed in
article 11 can be classified in four main categories: biological (limits of the fishery),
historical catches (fishing patterns, practices and catches), contribution (to the
conservation, research and data submission), and need. The criterion of need, in turn,
considers the dependence of coastal communities and of coastal States, as well as the
interests of developing coastal States. It is possible to interpret that the interests of
developing coastal States shall be assessed against the criteria established in article 24 of
UNFSA, as will be explained below.

Developed vs. Developing States
According to article 119 of the LOSC, in adopting measures to maintain or restore
populations of harvested species at levels which can produce the maximum sustainable
377

This view seem to be supported by Michael Lodge and Satja Nandan, who assert that ―allocation rights
are subordinate to the obligation to conserve‖ (Lodge and Nandan, supra note 282, at 374).
378
Peter Örebech, Ketill Sigurjonsson, and Ted L. McDorman, ―The 1995 United Nations Straddling and
Highly Migratory Fish Stocks Agreement: Management, Enforcement and Dispute Settlement‖, (1998) 13
Int‘l J. Mar. & Coast. L. 119, at 123.
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yield, States shall take into account environmental and economic factors, including the
special requirements of developing States. UNFSA, in turn, devotes a special part to the
recognition of the special requirements of developing States in relation to conservation
and management of straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks and
development of fisheries for such stocks.379 In particular, States are required to take into
consideration:
a) the vulnerability of developing States which are dependent on the exploitation
of living marine resources, including for meeting the nutritional requirements of
their populations or parts thereof;
(b) the need to avoid adverse impacts on, and ensure access to fisheries by,
subsistence, small-scale and artisanal fishers and women fishworkers, as well as
indigenous people in developing States, particularly small island developing
States; and
(c) the need to ensure that such measures do not result in transferring, directly or
indirectly, a disproportionate burden of conservation action onto developing
States.380
It is unclear, however, to what extent these provisions shall influence either the
recognition of developing coastal States rights in the establishment of compatible
measures for the EEZ and high seas, or of developing States in the allocation of fishing
opportunities in the high seas. Some authors have concluded, on the basis of article 25(2),
that UNFSA imposes on members of RFMOs an obligation to cooperate that takes the
form ―of financial assistance, human resources development, technical assistance,
transfer of technology through joint venture arrangements, and advisory and consultative
services‖,381 but that ―[n]othing in [UNFSA] gives developing States a prima facie right
to an allocation of high seas fishing opportunities.‖382 Other authors, on the contrary,
consider that reading articles 25 and 11 together, they ―could be taken to mean that there
is a certain preferential right in this respect.‖383 Still, other authors argue, on the basis of
the nature of the special requirements listed in article 24(2), that the provisions of Part
379

UNFSA, Part VII on Requirements of Developing States, articles 24 and 25.
UNFSA, article 24(2).
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Agnew et al., supra note 10, at 19.
382
Agnew et al., ibid.
383
Orrego Vicuña, supra note 126, at 235. It must be noted, however, that Orrego has a limited
interpretation of the concept of real interest and of participatory rights of new entrants. Thus, it may be
argued that this ―preference‖ applies only to developing States insofar they are coastal States or are fishing
for the stock, i.e., insofar as they have a ―real interest‖.
380
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VII of UNFSA were drafted to target the requirements of developing States insofar as
they are coastal States.384
Article 25 considers, as one form of cooperation, the enhancement of the ability
of developing States, in particular the least-developed among them and small island
developing States, to conserve and manage straddling fish stocks and highly migratory
fish stocks and to develop their own fisheries for such stocks. Presumably, ―their own
fisheries‖ refers to the possibility of developing a fishery within their EEZs. Whether this
implies a certain preference for the allocation of fishing opportunities depends on the
weight assigned to the needs of (developing) coastal States in relation to other criteria
listed in article 7.
Article 25 also imposes the obligation to assist developing States to enable them
to participate in high seas fisheries, including facilitating access to such fisheries subject
to articles 5 and 11. The fact that an explicit reference is made to article 5 (on general
principles for conservation and management of straddling stocks and highly migratory
stocks) suggests that any access shall be subject to the state of exploitation of the stock.
Article 11, in turn, considers in particular the needs of developing States only insofar as
they are coastal States. Thus, the special recognition of developing States in high seas
fisheries appears to be, at least, limited.
A Summary of Allocation Criteria
The three main conflicts of interest for high seas fisheries allocations are
addressed separately in UNFSA. However, and as has been noted before, the conflicts are
often substantially and procedurally intertwined in the process of establishing a total
allowable catch and its allocation. What is attempted here is to summarize the main
factors to provide an integrated list of considerations that need to be taken into account in
the allocation process, drawing from each of the relevant provisions of UNFSA.
The summary of criteria does not eliminate the shortcomings noted for the legal
framework. It does not assign weights, preferences, or priorities; nor does it determine
the content with any more objectivity. Furthermore, it should be noted that in cases where
384

David H. Anderson, ―The Straddling Stocks Agreement of 1995: An Initial Assessment‖ (1996) 45
I.C.L.Q. 463, at 473. For the contrary opinion, see: Orrego, ibid, at 225.
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preferences or priorities are given to a particular criterion, or set of criteria, a stepsapproach may be preferable. The purpose of this summary is simply to provide a simpler
framework for further analysis.
In the allocation of fishing opportunities of straddling and highly migratory
stocks, five categories of criteria need to be taken into account: biological considerations
(which in turn include aspects of status of the stock and its distribution), management
considerations, historical catches, socio-economic factors (need), and contribution. The
criteria vary slightly for discrete stocks, in that the criteria for compatibility of measures
in two areas under distinctive jurisdiction is not necessary. Thus, the concept of zonal
attachment is not applicable.
The framework includes some elements that give each of these factors or criteria
some precision in its content. These elements have been extracted from different UNFSA
provisions.
The summary of criteria is the following:













a) Biological considerations
Status of the sotck:
 the exploitation status of the stock, and
 the harmful impact on the living marine resources as a whole
Distribution of the stock:
 the biological unit and other biological characteristics of the stocks
 the relationships between the distribution of the stocks, the fisheries and the
geographical particularities of the region concerned
b) Management considerations
Existing regulations in the EEZ for the same stock
Existing regulations in the high seas area for the same stock
Existing regulations in other high seas areas for the same stock
c) Historical entitlement
The fishing patterns and practices
The extent to which the stocks occur and are fished in areas under national
jurisdiction
d) Socio-economic factors
Dependence of coastal States, including:
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 needs of coastal fishing communities which are dependent mainly on fishing
for the stocks
 the coastal States whose economies are overwhelmingly dependent on the
exploitation of living marine resources
 the particular interests of developing coastal States
Dependence of States fishing on the high seas on the stocks concerned
Needs and dependence of developing States, including:
 vulnerability of developing States which are dependent on the exploitation of
living marine resources
 vulnerability of developing State to meet the nutritional requirements of their
populations or parts thereof;
 the need to avoid adverse impacts on, and ensure access to fisheries by,
subsistence, small-scale and artisanal fishers and women fishworkers;
 the need to avoid adverse impacts on, and ensure access to fisheries by,
indigenous people in developing States, particularly small island developing
States;
 the need to ensure that such measures do not result in transferring, directly or
indirectly, a disproportionate burden of conservation action onto developing
States.





e) Contribution
contribution to conservation and management of the stocks
contribution to the collection and provision of accurate data
contribution to the conduct of scientific research on the stocks
Section 3. Regional Frameworks for Allocation
The evolution of the legal framework for allocation addressed in chapter 2

highlighted the general recognition of the role of RFMOs in developing a transparent
framework for allocation decisions. RFMOs, in the practical implementation of
allocations in particular cases, have indeed had the opportunity to develop the allocation
framework further. Different RFMOs have done it, at least to some extent, through
allocation provisions in the Convention texts, or allocation guidelines adopted within the
Commission. These mechanisms will be analyzed in turn.
Allocation Provisions in RFMOs Conventions
Just as in the case of UNFSA, RFMOs Conventions have provisions potentially
affecting allocation processes. In particular, the rules for membership, the rules of
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compatibility of management measures, of allocation of fishing opportunities, and of
special requirements of developing States shall be taken into account.
SEAFO, WCPFC, CCSBT, and the recently signed SPRFMO Convention,
include explicit provisions on allocation of fishing opportunities in their constitutional
texts.385 In all cases, the provisions follow UNFSA provisions very closely, in particular
article 11. As such, it has been commented that RFMOs regard Article 11 as a minimum
list of criteria to decide on allocation of fishing opportunities.386 A noticeable difference,
however, is that the provisions on allocation of fishing opportunities, when included in
the Convention texts, guide the allocation between member States and not only
allocations of new members. Despite the fact that they are provisions addressing the
allocation problem directly, they should be read in connection with other provisions with
potential allocation implications.

385

See: SEAFO Convention, article 20; WCPFC Convention, article 10(3); CCSBT Convention, article
8(4); South Pacific RFMO Convention, article 20(3). NAFO, a pre-UNFSA Convention, also contains a
provision regarding allocation that is, however, rather limited in scope. NAFO Convention, article XI(4)
reads: ―Proposals adopted by the Commission for the allocation of catches in the Regulatory Area shall
take into account the interests of Commission members whose vessels have traditionally fished within that
Area, and, in the allocation of catches from the grand Bank and Flemish Cap, Commission members shall
give special consideration to the Contracting Party whose coastal Communities are primarily dependent on
fishing for stocks related to these fishing banks and which has undertake extensive efforts to ensure the
conservation of such stocks through international action, in particular, by providing surveillance and
inspection of international fisheries on these banks under an international scheme of joint enforcement.‖
386
Molenaar, ―Participation‖, supra note 16, at 472,

103

Table 2. Allocation criteria in RFMO Conventions
WCPFC

SEAFO

SPRFMO

In deciding upon allocations among
the Parties under paragraph 3 above
the Commission shall consider:

In developing criteria for allocation
of the total allowable catch or the
total level of fishing effort the
Commission shall take into account,
inter alia:

In determining the nature and extent
of participatory rights in fishing
opportunities, the Commission shall
take into account, inter alia:

(a) relevant scientific evidence;

(a) the status of the stocks and the
existing level of fishing effort in the
fishery;

(b) the need for orderly and
sustainable development of southern
bluefin tuna fisheries;

(b) the respective interests, past and
present fishing patterns and fishing
practices of participants in the
fishery and the extent of the catch
being utilized for domestic
consumption;
(c) the historic catch in an area;

(a) the state of fishery resources
including other living marine
resources and existing levels of
fishing effort, taking into account
the advice and recommendations of
the Scientific Committee;
(b) respective interests, past and
present fishing patterns, including
catches, and practices in the
Convention Area;

When taking decisions regarding
participation in fishing for any fishery
resource, including the allocation of a
total allowable catch or total allowable
fishing effort, the Commission shall take
into account the status of the fishery
resource and the existing level of fishing
effort for that resource and the following
criteria to the extent relevant:
(a) historic catch and past and present
fishing patterns and practices in the
Convention Area (or the relevant range of
distribution, with the consent of the
coastal State)
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CCSBT

(c) the interests of Parties through
whose exclusive economic or
fishery zones southern bluefin tuna
migrates;
(d) the interests of Parties whose
vessels engage in fishing for
southern bluefin tuna including
those which have historically
engaged in such fishing and those
which have southern bluefin tuna
fisheries under development;

d) the needs of small island
developing States, and territories
and possessions, in the Convention
Area whose economies, food
supplies and livelihoods are
overwhelmingly dependent on the
exploitation of marine living
resources;

(b) compliance with the conservation and
management measures under this
Convention;

(c) the stage of development of a
fishery;

(c) demonstrated capacity and
willingness to exercise effective flag
State control over fishing vessels;

(d) the interests of developing States
in whose areas of national
jurisdiction the stocks also occur;

(d) contribution to the conservation and
management of fishery resources,
including the provision of accurate data
and effective monitoring, control,
surveillance and enforcement;

WCPFC

SEAFO

(e) the contribution of each Party to
conservation and enhancement of,
and scientific research on, southern
bluefin tuna;

(e) the respective contributions of
participants to conservation and
management of the stocks,
including the provision by them of
accurate data and their contribution
to the conduct of scientific research
in the Convention Area;

(e) the fisheries development aspirations
and interests of developing States in
particular small island developing States
and of territories and possessions in the
region;

f) any other factors which the
Commission deems appropriate.

(f) the record of compliance by the
participants with conservation and
management measures;

(e) contributions to conservation
and management of fishery
resources in the Convention Area,
including the provision of
information, the conduct of research
and steps taken to establish
cooperative mechanisms for
effective monitoring, control,
surveillance and enforcement;
(f) contributions to new or
exploratory fisheries, taking account
of the principles set out in article 6.6
of the 1995 Agreement;

(g) the needs of coastal communities
which are dependent mainly on
fishing for the stocks;

(g) the needs of coastal fishing
communities which are dependent
mainly on fishing for the stocks in
the South East Atlantic; and

(h) the special circumstances of a
State which is surrounded by the
exclusive economic zones of other
States and has a limited exclusive
economic zone of its own;
(i) the geographical situation of a
small island developing State which
is made up of non-contiguous
groups of islands having a distinct
economic and cultural identity of
their own but which are separated
by areas of high seas;

(h) the needs of coastal States
whose economies are
overwhelmingly dependent on the
exploitation of fishery resources.

(g) the needs of coastal States and of
territories and possessions whose
economies are dependent mainly on the
exploitation of and fishing for a fishery
resource that straddles areas of national
jurisdiction of such States, territories and
possessions and the Convention Area;
(h) the extent to which a member of the
Commission is utilising the catch for
domestic consumption and the
importance of the catch to its food
security;
(i) contribution to the responsible
development of new or exploratory
fisheries in accordance with Article 22;
and
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CCSBT

SPRFMO

(f) the interests of coastal States, and in
particular developing coastal States and
territories and possessions, in a fishery
resource that straddles areas of national
jurisdiction of such States, territories and
possessions and the Convention Area;

CCSBT

WCPFC
(j) the fishing interests and
aspirations of coastal States,
particularly small island developing
States, and territories and
possessions, in whose areas of
national jurisdiction the stocks also
occur.

SEAFO

SPRFMO
(j) contribution to the conduct of
scientific research with respect to
fishery resources and the public
dissemination of the results of such
research.
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Allocation Guidelines
Some organizations do not have criteria in their Conventional texts, but have
developed non-binding allocation guidelines. Others have supplemented the conventional
provisions with such guidelines. They refer either to allocation of fishing opportunities to
new entrants only, or to the allocation of fishing opportunities among contracting parties
(including new entrants).
NAFO and NEAFC have adopted non-binding guidelines with respect to
allocation of fishing opportunities for new entrants. On 17 September 1999, the General
Council of NAFO adopted Resolution 1/99 to guide the expectations of future new
members with regard to fishing opportunities in the NAFO Regulatory Area. 387 In turn,
NEAFC member States agreed on Guidelines for the expectation of future new
contracting parties with regard to fishing opportunities in the NEAFC Regulatory Area at
their 22nd Annual Meeting in November 2003.388 Both of these documents, similar in
structure and wording, basically warn new entrants that fish stocks at the moment are
fully exploited and that fishing possibilities are restricted to the share of the quota
apportioned to the category ―others‖ or to new fisheries not currently allocated.389
NAFO also has developed some allocation guidelines applicable to contracting
parties, but due to lack of consensus on some of its fundamental components (and

387

NAFO, Resolution 1/99, supra note 288.
NEAFC, Guidelines for the expectation of future new Contracting Parties with regard to fishing
opportunities in the NEAFC Regulatory Area, agreed at the 22nd Annual Meeting of NEAFC in November
2003, online: NEAFC <http://www.neafc.org>.
389
NAFO Resolution 1/99, supra note 288, recognizes in paragraph 1 that NAFO is an open organization,
and that non-members may join the Organization by depositing an instrument of accession and become a
member of the General Council (albeit not necessarily of the Fisheries Commission). Paragraph 2 adds:
―Should any new member of NAFO obtain membership in the Fisheries Commission, in accordance with
Article XIII(1) of the Convention, such new members should be aware that presently and for the
foreseeable future, stocks managed by NAFO are fully allocated, and fishing opportunities for new
members are likely to be limited, for instance, to new fisheries (stocks not currently allocated by
TAC/quota or effort control), and the "Others" category under the NAFO Quota Allocation Table. NEAFC
guidelines, in turn, read: ―Non Contracting Parties of NEAFC should be aware that presently and for the
foreseeable future, stocks regulated by NEAFC are fully allocated, and fishing opportunities for new
members likely to be limited to new fisheries (stocks not currently allocated); New Contracting Parties will
participate, on the same basis as existing Contracting Parties, in future allocations of stocks which are
unregulated at the time when the application is made; New Contracting Parties who were previously
Cooperating Non Contracting Parties may request an allocation of a part of the relevant Co-operative quota.
Such allocations will be done on a case by case basis.‖
388
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particularly, its scope of application), they were never officially adopted. 390 ICCAT, in
turn, completed in 2001 the process of adopting a non-binding resolution on guidelines
for the allocation of fishing opportunities applicable to both contracting parties and new
members.
Both NAFO and ICCAT introduce a novel aspect in the allocation guidelines.
They distinguish two different set of criteria: qualifying criteria, and allocation criteria.
The qualifying criteria are a set of conditions that a State has to fulfill in order to be
eligible for an allocation.
Table 3. Qualifying criteria in ICCAT and NAFO guidelines
NAFO

ICCAT

Be a member of the Fisheries Commission, who:
− may exercise the right to vote;
− collects and provides accurate data for the relevant
stocks;
− contributes to scientific research on NAFO stocks;
− exercises effectively jurisdiction over the vessels
flying its flag operating in the Convention Area; and
− ensures compliance with the proposals adopted in
accordance with Article XI of the Convention and
notably the NAFO Conservation and Enforcement
Measures; and

1. Be a Contracting or Cooperating
Contracting Party, Entity or Fishing Entity.

Non-

2. Have the ability to apply the conservation and
management measures of ICCAT, to collect and to
provide accurate data for the relevant resources and,
taking into account their respective capacities, to
conduct scientific research on those resources

Have an interest in the allocation of fishing
opportunities of the relevant stocks in one or more
of the following ways:
− be a coastal State for relevant straddling stocks;
− have vessels that have traditionally fished the
relevant stocks in accordance with NAFO rules,
where applicable;
− have undertaken extensive efforts to ensure the
conservation of such stocks in particular by
providing surveillance and inspection of
international fisheries under the international
scheme of joint enforcement;
− have undertaken significant contribution to
research and data collection for the relevant stocks;
− have economies that are overwhelmingly
dependent on fisheries; or
− have coastal communities that are dependent on
fishing for the stocks regulated by NAFO.

390

NAFO, Draft Guidelines for future allocation of fishing opportunities for the stocks not currently
allocated (Allocation W.G. Working Paper 03/3-Rev. 3) in Annex 11 of Report of the Working Group on
Allocation of Fishing Rights to the Contracting Parties of NAFO, 26-27 March 2003, Miami, Florida, USA
(FC Doc. 03/2), online NAFO <http://www.nafo.int>.
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The qualifying criteria differ in several respects. First, NAFO requires the
participants to be members of the organization and more specifically, the Fisheries
Commission; while ICCAT foresees the possibility of allocating fishing opportunities to
non-members, if they are granted the status of cooperating non-member. ICCAT also
foresees explicitly the possibility of allocating fishing opportunities to fishing entities,
which is of considerable importance to account for fishing powers like EU and Chinese
Taipei. ICCAT requires, in addition to membership or cooperating non-member status,
the ability to comply with conservation measures and provide scientific data. The ability
to conduct of scientific resource is also considered, but qualified by the respective
capacity of the participant. NAFO, in turn, considers those elements but also adds a set of
other elements that relate not to its capacity but to an established interest in the fishery.
With respect to the second type of criteria, the allocation criteria, the approach of
NAFO and ICCAT also differ significantly. Both documents list several criteria that need
to be taken into account in the allocation process. However, NAFO draft guidelines
contain a very limited list of allocation criteria. ICCAT, in turn, has over 15 criteria that
need to be taken into account in the allocation process, which have been classified under
four main categories.
Table 4. Allocation criteria in NAFO and ICCAT guidelines
NAFO391
• historical fishing in accordance with NAFO
rules during a representative reference period;

391

ICCAT
A. Criteria Relating to Past/Present Fishing Activity
of Qualifying Participants
4. Historical catches of qualifying participants.
5. The interests, fishing patterns and fishing practices
of qualifying participants
B. Criteria Relating the Status of the Stock(s) to he
Allocated and the Fisheries
6. Status of the stock(s) to be allocated in relation to
maximum sustainable yield, or in the absence of
maximum sustainable yield an agreed biological
reference point, and the existing level of fishing effort
in the fishery taking into account the contributions to
conservation made by qualifying participants
necessary to conserve, manage, restore or rebuild fish
stocks in accordance with the objective of the
Convention.
7. The distribution and biological characteristics of the
stock(s), including the occurrence of the stock(s) in
areas under national jurisdiction and on the high seas.

The order of the criteria has been altered to reflect the comparable criteria in ICCAT guidelines.
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NAFO
• needs of coastal communities which are
dependent on fishing for the stock concerned;
and/or

• contribution to the NAFO Conservation and
Enforcement Measures
• contribution to research and data collection on
the stock concerned;

ICCAT
C. Criteria Relating to the Status of the Qualifying
Participants
8. The interests of artisanal, subsistence and smallscale coastal fishers.
9. The needs of the coastal fishing communities which
are dependent mainly on fishing for the stocks.
10. The needs of the coastal States of the region whose
economies are overwhelmingly dependent on the
exploitation of living marine resources, including
those regulated by ICCAT.
11. The socio-economic contribution of the fisheries
for stocks regulated by ICCAT to the developing
States, especially small island developing States and
developing territories1 from, the region.
12. The respective dependence on the stock(s) of the
coastal States, and of the other States that fish species
regulated by ICCAT.
13. The economic and/or social importance of the
fishery for qualifying participants whose fishing
vessels have habitually participated in the fishery in
the Convention Area.
14. The contribution of the fisheries for the stocks
regulated by ICCAT to the national food
security/needs, domestic consumption, income
resulting from exports, and employment of qualifying
participants.
15. The right of qualified participants to engage in
fishing on the high seas for the stocks to be allocated.
D.
Criteria
Relating
to
Compliance/Data
Submission/Scientific Research by Qualifying
Participants
16. The record of compliance or cooperation by
qualifying participants with ICCAT‘s conservation and
management measures, including for large-scale tuna
fishing vessels, except for those cases where the
compliance sanctions established by relevant ICCAT
recommendations have already been applied.
17. The exercise of responsibilities concerning the
vessels under the jurisdiction of qualifying
participants.
18. The contribution of qualifying participants to
conservation and management of the stocks, to the
collection and provision of accurate data required by
ICCAT and, taking into account their respective
capacities, to the conduct of scientific research on the
stocks.
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In addition, both NAFO and ICCAT include some rules under the title of
―allocation considerations‖ or ―conditions for the application of allocation criteria‖.
Again, NAFO‘s considerations are rather simple;392 while ICCAT lists 9 conditions
which include important principles that States are to follow in the allocation process.
Among them, the resolution explicitly states that the allocation criteria should be applied
on a stock-by-stock basis in a fair and equitable manner with the goal of ensuring
opportunities for all qualifying participants; and that they should be applied in a gradual
manner in order to address the economic needs of all parties concerned, including the
need to minimize economic dislocation. 393
What Do Regional Instruments Add to the Legal Framework for Allocation?
After describing the efforts of different RFMOs to address the allocation problem,
it is worth considering what these instruments add to the substantive allocation
framework of the organization. In general, it is easy to conclude that they add very little.
As has been pointed out, they follow UNFSA, and in particular article 11, very closely.
This implies that they share their main characteristics and prescriptive shortcomings.
In the case of RFMO Conventions, they also follow the practice of UNFSA of
addressing different conflicts of interests in different provisions. There is, mostly, no
―fundamental norm‖ that acts as a benchmark for allocation.
392

NAFO Resolution 1/99, supra note 288, in the pertinent section, reads: ―A part of the fishing
opportunities of the fishable stock(s) or, where appropriate, the portion of the fishable stock(s) in the
Regulatory Area, may be set aside as an others quota intended for Contracting Parties who have no record
of fishing on the stock concerned. Minimum fishing opportunities to be allocated to Contracting Parties
may be established for the relevant stock(s).‖
393
ICCAT Resolution 01-25, supra note 300, Paragraph IV, particularly 19, 20 and 21. Other conditions
included in Paragraph IV are: the application of the allocation criteria should take into account the
contributions to conservation made by qualifying participants necessary to conserve, manage, restore or
rebuild fish stocks in accordance with the objective of the Convention; the allocation criteria should be
applied consistent with international instruments and in a manner that encourages efforts to prevent and
eliminate over-fishing and excess fishing capacity and ensures that levels of fishing effort are
commensurate with the ICCAT objective of achieving and maintaining MSY; the allocation criteria should
be applied so as not to legitimize illegal, unregulated and unreported catches and shall promote the
prevention, deterrence and elimination of illegal, unregulated and unreported fishing, particularly fishing by
flag of convenience vessels; the allocation criteria should be applied in a manner that encourages
cooperating non-contracting parties, entities and fishing entities to become contracting parties, where they
are eligible to do so; the allocation criteria should be applied to encourage cooperation between the
developing States of the region and other fishing States for the sustainable use of the stocks managed by
ICCAT and in accordance with the relevant international instruments; no qualifying participant shall trade
or sell its quota allocation or a part thereof.
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The criteria themselves are included, in general, in open lists (using the
expression ―inter alia‖ or explicitly recognizing that the Commission may take other
elements into considerations). The guidelines impose only an obligation to take into
account the criteria listed, without any guidance on the weight, priority or preference that
each element should be afforded. The specific weights to be accorded to the various
factors are considered to be an issue that needs to be resolved on a case-by-case basis.394
In addition, the criteria are qualitative and lacking operational details.
This general assessment deserves some qualification. Some of the RFMO criteria
add some elements to the substantive framework. These elements relate to participation
and access to fisheries, and to general guiding principles. These two aspects will be
analyzed in turn.
Some regional criteria provide some guidance on access to the fisheries, mainly in
two ways. Firstly, the NAFO and NEAFC guidelines basically put a moratorium on new
entrants to the fisheries. It can be argued that these guidelines balance the different
interests by prioritizing conservation and existing fishing patterns. More interesting, from
the perspective of a legal framework is the contribution made by NAFO and ICCAT
guidelines on qualifying criteria. These qualifying criteria, as has been noted, define a
series of States‘ qualities and conducts that need to be fulfilled to be eligible for
allocation. In so doing, NAFO and ICCAT are not necessarily addressing the
interpretations problem surrounding the concept of ―real interest‖, which refers to
participation in the RFMO rather than allocation of quota. But certainly, since
participation in the RFMO is usually motivated by the expectation of quota, by defining
qualities and conducts that are required to be eligible for allocation they are addressing
the more critical aspect deriving from participation.
In addition to the guidance on access and effective participation in fisheries, ICCAT
makes an important contribution to the allocation framework by providing a series of
―conditions‖ that should be followed in the consideration of the different criteria. These
394

During the discussion in the ICCAT Working Group on Allocation, it was agreed not to weight the
different factors that need to be taken into account, since that was considered an exercise that needs to be
done by the panel while deciding a particular allocation scheme (ICCAT, Report for biennial period, 20002001, Part II (2001), supra note 303, Report of the 4th Ad hoc Working Group on Allocation Criteria,
Murcia, Spain, 7-9 November 2001 in Annex 7 of the Proceedings of the 17th Regular Meeting of the
Commission, at 180). See also: ICCAT, Resolution 01-25, supra note 300, para. 23.
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conditions qualify as general principles guiding the allocation process, including a
fundamental norm (equity) and subsidiary principles. These are:


The allocation criteria should be applied in a fair and equitable manner with the
goal of ensuring opportunities for all qualifying participants.



The allocation criteria should be applied to all stocks in a gradual manner, over a
period of time to be determined by the relevant Panels, in order to address the
economic needs of all parties concerned, including the need to minimize
economic dislocation.



The allocation criteria should be applied consistent with international instruments



The allocation criteria should be applied in a manner that encourages efforts to
prevent and eliminate over-fishing and excess fishing capacity and ensures that
levels of fishing effort are commensurate with the ICCAT objective of achieving
and maintaining MSY.



The allocation criteria should be applied so as not to legitimize illegal,
unregulated and unreported catches and shall promote the prevention, deterrence
and elimination of illegal, unregulated and unreported fishing, particularly fishing
by flag of convenience vessels.



The allocation criteria should be applied in a manner that encourages cooperating
Non-Contracting parties, Entities and Fishing Entities to become Contracting
Parties, where they are eligible to do so.



The allocation criteria should be applied to encourage cooperation between the
developing States of the region and other fishing States for the sustainable use of
the stocks managed by ICCAT.
Section 4. Allocation in Practice
The sections above have described the global and regional theoretical frameworks

for allocation of fishing opportunities, and their shortcomings. This section provides a
practical overview of implementation of allocation decisions. For this purposes, the
section provides a general description of the usual kind of allocation agreements adopted
by RFMOs, followed by some practical examples of each kind. Afterwards, some general
observations are made on the relationship between the theoretical framework (allocation
criteria and guidelines adopted by RFMOs) and its practical implementation through
allocation agreements.
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Allocation Agreements Adopted by RFMOs
The allocation agreements adopted by RFMOs can be implicit or explicit. It is
implicit (also called de facto395), if the adopted conservation measure contains a general
rule on limiting catches or effort to a certain reference period. The specific limit for each
country is not contained in the conservation measure, but it can be inferred from the
statistical data. The agreement is explicit, in turn, when the conservation measure assigns
a specific catch or effort limit to individual States.
An explicit agreement in practice can adopt a variety of modalities in relation to
its unit, its duration, and its scope. A catch allocation agreement may assign specific
catch quantities (expressed in tonnes) to individual States, or it may be expressed as
percentage participation on the TAC. There have been agreements that combine those
two methods. An effort allocation agreement may assign a number of authorized vessels
(usually joined by technical characteristics of the vessels), a limitation on a certain
technical indicator of effort (i.e., GRT), or a limitation on days or hours for engaging in
fishing activities.
Catch allocation agreements are usually one-year agreements, but they can also be
multi-year or long-term agreements. If this is the case, they may include pre-agreed
reduction or increase of national quotas as the result of reductions or increases in the
TAC.
The agreement can also involve all members of the RFMOs, or only a subset of
the member States (usually the main States fishing for the respective stock). In the latter
case, it may be understood that the participants that do not have an allocated quota cannot
participate in the fishery. In this case, the agreement is equivalent to assigning them a
quota zero. It may also be understood that they are allowed to fish without a quantitative
restriction. Or it may be agreed that States without a national quota participate in a
common quota duly established. Differential norms establishing catch or effort limits are
especially common in RFMOs with a significant participation of developing States.
The next paragraphs provide a sample of allocation agreements. They were
chosen as examples that demonstrate the variety of agreements that have been design in
different RFMOs and for different stocks. They first example, WCPFC limitation on
395

Agnew et al., supra note 10, at 25 and 45.
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effort and catches for swordfish, illustrates the common first step in an allocation process:
freezing catches or effort. It also illustrates one particular form of differentiated
treatment. The second example, the CCSBT MoU, illustrates a percentage and long-term
allocation agreement that includes provisions in case of variations in the TAC. The third
example, the ICCAT agreement on Western Atlantic bluefin tuna, illustrates a
combination of numeric and percentage agreement, with also provides for pre-agreed
modifications in case of TAC variations. Finally, the NAFO quota table illustrates the
simplest design of allocation agreement: a table of national quotas.
a) WCPFC Limitations on Effort and Catches for the Swordfish Fisheries
WCFPC first adopted a conservation measure for swordfish by Conservation and
Management Measure 2006-03, which was later replaced by Conservation and
Management Measures 2008-05 and 2009-03. The current measure establishes a limit
effort and catch in the following terms:
Commission Members, Cooperating Non-Members and participating Territories
(CCMs) shall exercise restraint through limiting the number of their fishing
vessels for swordfish in the Convention Area south of 20°S, to the number in any
one year between the period 2000-2005 (listed in Annex 1).
In addition to vessel limits established under paragraph 1, CCMs shall exercise
restraint through limiting the amount of swordfish caught by fishing vessels
flagged to them in the Convention Area south of 20°S to the amount caught in any
one year during the period 2000-2006.
The agreement results in an implicit limit of catches determined, for each State, by the
higher levels of effort and catches registered in the 2000-2005 and 2000-2006 period,
respectively. As a consequence, the TAFE and TAC are also implicitly determined by the
sum of those individual (higher) levels of effort and catches.
This conservation and management measure, however, has an exception. Paragraph 5
reads:
Paragraphs 1 to 4 and paragraph 9 shall not prejudice the legitimate rights and
obligations under international law of small island developing State and participating
Territory CCMs, in the Convention Area who may wish to pursue a responsible level
of development of their own fisheries in the Convention Area.
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The exception is an answer to the exclusive rights of coastal States in the area in
which waters under national jurisdiction the swordfish also migrates.
b) CCSBT and the MoU
In their first meeting, the member States of the CCSBT Japan, Australia and New
Zealand agreed upon distribution rules to be applied to the Southern bluefin tuna. They
agreed, firstly, to distribute the TAC with the following TAC and national quotas:
Japan
Australia
New Zealand

6065 tonnes
5265 tonnes
420 tonnes

According to the understanding, as the global quota is increased, the Australian
relative participation should move to equality with Japan's national allocation (Australia
moving up and Japan moving down) and New Zealand's allocation should increase to
either 1,000 tonnes or 6% of the global quota, whichever is greater. The adjustments
would occur over a series of 4 steps, each of them involving a variety of conditions that
required country's to achieve certain catch levels by qualifying fleets before moving to
the next step. The primary adjustments were to commence once the global quota reached
12,750 tonnes. However, the agreement also included an initial 30 tones increase to New
Zealand as soon as the global quota increased.396
The Memorandum of Understanding was not applied until 2010. During the
period 1994-2009, CCSBT allocations were marked by the scientific dispute between
Australia and New Zealand, on one side, and Japan, on the other, on the real status of the
stock; and the allocation of fishing opportunities for new participants in the fishery.
During the 2009 Meeting held in October, the member States (including now Japan,
Australia, New Zealand, the Republic of Korea, Indonesia, and the fishing entity of
Taiwan as member of the extended Commission) agreed to apply the Memorandum of
Understanding without taking into account the steps initially considered. However, the
national quotas were affected by a reduction in the TAC (applied after the terms of the
396

CCSBT has no official records of their first meeting. The information on the terms of the CCSBT
Memorandum of Understanding was provided by Robert Kennedy, Executive Secretary of CCSBT, in
private communication.
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Memorandum of Understanding) and by a temporal reduction of the Japanese quota due
to underreporting prior to 2006.
c) ICCAT and Percentage Agreements
The first ICCAT allocation agreements were expressed in tonnes. An example thereof is
the West Atlantic bluefin tuna. The agreement in 1982 considered the distribution of the
West Atlantic stock among the three main fishing States in the following quantities:
Canada

250 tonnes

Japan

305 tonnes

USA

605 tonnes

As the quota was increased or reduced, the participation of each member State
increased or reduced in the same proportion. In 1994, the proportional participation of
each State changed, to leave Japan with a lower comparative participation (from to ca.
26% to 13%), and Canada and USA with quotas that respected their participation in 1991.
In addition, the participation of each State was dependent upon the evolution of the TAC.
The greater the TAC, the bigger the percentage that Japan would have in the TAC,
recovering its ca. 26% when the TAC is above 2,660 tonnes. In addition, a few other
countries claimed and were granted some participation in the fishery, which were
expressed in tonnes. The current recommendation considers two steps for the allocation
of TAC, which are summarized in the following table:

Table 5. ICCAT, allocation of national quotas of Western Atlantic bluefin
tuna
First step: TAC initial reductions:
State
UK
France
Mexico
USA bycatch
Canada bycatch

Tonnes
4
4
95
25
15
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Second step: Distribution of the reminder among main fishing States:
State
Canada
Japan

< 2,413 t
23.75%
18.77%

USA

57.48%

If the reminder of the TAC is
2,413 t
> 2,413 t – 2,660 t
573
573
453
453 + increase
between 2,413 t &
2,660 t
1,387 t
1,387

> 2,660 t
21,54%
26,32%
52,14%

d) NAFO and Allocation Tables
The allocation agreements of NAFO are reflected in a table that expressed the national
quota, expressed in tonnes, for a particular year and TAC. No provisions are made as to
pre-agreed allocation agreement in cases of changing circumstances, including changes in
TAC, distribution of the stock, or changes in the participants. In the case of NAFO,
changes in participants, and particularly the acceptance of new entrants, is an excluded,
or at least very difficult, possibility in light of the Resolution to guide expectations of
new entrants adopted in 1999.
Usually, allocation agreements of this kind reflect an implicit distribution of each
stock that is respected in future allocations. In other words, although the table is
expressed in metric tonnes, it implicitly recognizes a percentage of participation that is
usually respected in future allocations over increased or reduced TACs. Clear examples
thereof are the fisheries for cod in division 3M and redfish in division 3LN. During the
2009 Meeting, the Fisheries Commission agreed to re-open these fisheries in 2010, after
more than 10 years of moratorium. TAC and allocations were adopted. The allocation
scheme respected the proportional participation of the States fishing for redfish and cod
in the respective statistical area in the year before the moratorium, as reflected in the last
allocation agreement. This decision, however, has faced opposition by some member
States.397

397

See: NAFO, Report of the Fisheries Commission and its Subsidiary Body (STACTIC) 31st Annual
Meeting, September 21-25, 2009, Bergen, Norway (FC Doc. 09/21), agenda item 8.1 at 6-7, online: NAFO
<http://www.nafo.int>.
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Canada
Cuba
Denmark
(Faroe
Islands and
Greenland)
European
Union
France (St.
Pierre et
Miquelon)
Iceland
Japan
Korea
Norway
Russian
Federation
Ukraine
USA
Others
TOTAL

398

3M

3%
3M

3NO

3LN

3%
3LN

3M

3O

-

44
204
1,229

0.80
3.70
22.35

0
-

1,491
343
-

42.60
9.80
-

500
1,750
69

6,000
-

-

3,136

57.03

0

638

18.23

7,813

7,000

-

-

-

-

-

-

69

-

509
356

9.25
6.47

0

1,007

28.77

*

22
5,500

0.40
100

0
*

21
3,500

0.60
100

3L

3LNO

3M

0
-

0
-

16,575
-

0
-

1,765

0
0

0

0

-

0

3,529

0

-

9,627
2,503
385

-

-

340

-

400
69
9,137

150
100
6,500

9,627
385
385
9,627
9,627

-

0

-

0

353

0
0

69
124
10,000

150
100
20,000

385
385
12,516

0
*

0
*

85
17,000

0
*

353
6,000

*

*

3NO

Capelin

SA2 +
1F +
3K
385
385
9,627

The NAFO table is included in NAFO, Conservation and Management Measures 2010, supra note 236.

3LNO

White
hake

Witch

American
plaice

Redfish

Cod
3L

Yellowtail

Table 6. Table NAFO Quota Table 2010,398 partial reproduction

3NO

3NO

0

Allocation Criteria: Any Influence for Allocation Decisions?
The influence and usefulness of the allocation criteria and guidelines for the allocation
negotiations and the final decisions is hard to assess for several reasons. Firstly, most
RFMOS that have allocation criteria in their Conventions, or have developed allocation
guidelines, have not consistently engaged in allocation practices. Only NAFO399,
NEAFC,400 ICCAT401 and the CCSBT manage most of the stocks under their jurisdiction
with TACs and allocations.402 Another pre-UNFSA organization (IATTC) has
traditionally adopted national limits on fishing effort. Only recently, it adopted a
conservation measure for bigeye tuna that includes a limit of fishing effort or limit of
catches and, for some participating States, a national quota.403 CCAMLR has not adopted
nationally allocated TACs. The use of the conservation and management measure has
been proposed, but rejected by the contracting parties.404

399

NAFO currently manages 20 stocks. For 2010, seven are under moratorium, but are expected to be
managed with TAC and national allocations when they recover to sustain a commercial fishery (cod in
divisions 3L and 3NO, American plaice in divisions 3LNO and 3M, witch in divisions 3L and 3NO, and
capelin in Division 3NO). Eleven are managed through TAC and national allocations (cod in division 3M,
redfish in divisions 3LN, 3M, 3O, subareas 2+3 and division 1F+3K, yellowtail in division 3LNO, white
hake in division 3NO, skates in division 3LNO, Greenland halibut in division 3LMNO, squids in subarea
3+4, and shrimp in division 3L(NO). One stock is managed through limits on fishing efforts and its national
allocation (shrimp in division 3M).
400
NEAFC currently manages 8 stocks. Two pelagic stocks are managed under a TAC and allocation
primarily agreed upon by the relevant coastal States (blue whiting and Norwegian spring spawning or
Atlanto-Scandian herring). With respect to another pelagic stock, mackerel, agreement could not be
reached and is currently not under TAC regulation. The pelagic redfish in the Irminger Sea is managed
through national quotas that, according to NEAFC recommendation, cannot be increased. The pelagic
redfish in the ICES subareas I and II is managed through an unallocated TAC. Orange roughy has also been
put under fishing effort and catch restrictions. Other demersal species, such as Rochall haddock, are
managed through closed areas.
401
ICCAT manages 6 stocks with a TAC and national allocations (Northwestern bluefin tuna and
Northeastern and Mediterranean bluefin tuna, Northern albacore, Northern and Southern swordfish, and
bigeye tuna). One stock is managed with a TAC and an incomplete system of allocation that allows the
main fishing States to catch a certain amount of the TAC in Olympic fishery (Southern albacore). Other
important commercial and non-commercial stocks have not been put into a TAC regime or any other form
of restricting fishing mortality (yellowfin tuna, skipjack tuna, blue and white marlin, small tunas and
sharks).
402
It must be remembered that in some cases, agreements have failed, have faced objections by one or more
contracting party, or are not comply with by contracting parties or non-contracting parties.
403
See: IATTC, Resolution C-09-01 on a multiannual program for the conservation of tuna in the Eastern
Pacific Ocean in 2009-2001, adopted at the IATTC 80th meeting held in La Jolla, California (USA), 8-12
June 2009, online: IATTC <http://www.iaatc.org>.
404
CCAMLR, Report of the eleventh meeting of the Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine
Living Resources, Hobart, Australia, 26 October - 6 November, 1992, online: <http://www.ccamlr.org>,
para. 9.29 -9.33, at 25.
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Recent RFMOs have not (yet) engaged in allocation of national quotas. In some
cases, they have not adopted conservation and management measures limiting fishing
effort or catches. That is the case of SEAFO, a new organization that has only adopted
few conservation measures to this day. Others RFMOs have adopted only measures to
limit fishing effort or catches to existing levels, or to the levels at a certain reference
period. That is the case of IOTC405 and WCPFC406. That is also the case of the nonbinding interim measures adopted in the context of South Pacific RFMO negotiation
process.407
Table 7 illustrates different levels of recognition of TAC and allocations in the
RFMOs texts, and different levels of development of allocation criteria and guidelines. It
illustrates clearly that most of the allocation practices take place in RFMOs that have a
weaker regulatory framework for allocations. It is difficult to assess, in that circumstance,
how the allocation criteria help the allocation negotiation process.

Has performance
been assessed?

Are criteria used?

Is allocation used
as conservation
tool?

Has the RFMO
developed criteria
for allocation?

Has the Convention
criteria for
allocation?

Has the Convention
explicit mandate
for TAC and
allocation

RFMO

Table 7. Allocation framework and practices in RFMOs

NAFO
IATTC
NEAFC
ICCAT
CCAMLR
IOTC
CCSBT
WCPFC
SEAFO
SPRFMO
405

See, for example: IOTC, Resolution 07/05 on Limitation of fishing capacity of IOTC Contracting
Parties and Cooperating Non-Contracting Parties in terms of number of longline vessels targeting swordfish
and albacore, superseded by IOTC Resolution 09/02 on the Implementation of a limitation of fishing
capacity of Contracting Parties and Cooperating Non-Contracting Parties, both online: IOTC
<http://www.iotc.org>.
406
See, for example: WCPFC, Conservation and Management Measure 2006-03 for Swordfish, online:
WCPFC <http://www.wcpfc.int>, and text above.
407
See: SPRFMO, Interim Management Measures, supra note 327, and SPRFMO, Revised Interim
Measures for Pelagic Fishing, adopted at the 8th meeting of the International Consultations on the Proposed
South Pacific Regional Fisheries Management Organization, held in Auckland, New Zealand, on 14
November 2009, online: SPRFMO <http://www.southpacificrfmo.org>.

121

A second reason why that assessment is difficult is that the deliberations on
allocation and the different proposals and their justifications are usually not made public.
The criteria, considerations, principles, goals or objectives that were taken into
consideration in adopting a particular allocation agreement, and the weight given to each
criterion, are not stated in the respective documents. Only in a few cases, the criteria and
their relative weight can be found in the records of the negotiation process. 408 More often,
the discussions take place in small closed meetings, in bilateral negotiations outside the
formal RFMOs Commission forum, or are simply not made public.
A preliminary assessment of the adequacy of the legal framework can be drawn
from the performance reviews undertaken by some RFMOs: ICCAT, CCSBT, NEAFC,
IOTC and CCAMLR.409 These performance reviews show different assessment of this
subject in different RFMOs. In ICCAT, the performance review committee noted a
growing dissatisfaction on allocation issues, attributed to a) the weak powers of the
commission according to article VIII of the Convention to recommend quota allocations;
b) the non-binding character of the criteria; b) the ambiguous formulation of the
criteria.410 In addition, transparency problems were raised by some member States. In
relation to ICCAT allocation practices, Butterworth and Penney point out that the ICCAT
criteria have served as little more than a ―shopping list‖411 from which each State seeks
the equity arguments that suit their national interest.

408

A good example thereof is the report of the failed negotiation on allocation of quotas for shrimp in
division 3M (managed through fishing effort allocation) and a re-negotiation of the allocation of quotas for
shrimp in division 3L. The report includes the debate and specific proposals tabled by different
participating States, which included the factors to be taken into account (mostly historical catches in
different periods between 1993 and 2007) and the weight to be assigned to each factor (NAFO, Report of
the Intersessional Meeting of the Fisheries Commission, 30 April 30 – 7 May 2008, Montreal, Canada (FC
Doc. 08/4), online: NAFO <http://www.nafo.int>).
409
See: supra note 81. ICCAT, CCSBT, NEAFC and IOTC included fishing allocation and opportunities in
their terms of reference. The terms of reference of ICCAT and CCSBT performance reviews were drafted
following the common guidelines developed by the initiative of the joint meeting of the tuna RMFOs held
in Kobe in 2007. The pertinent aspect to be review is: extent to which the RFMO agrees on the allocation
of allowable catch or levels of fishing effort, including taking into account requests for participation from
new members or participants as reflected in UNFSA Article 11. NEAFC also included allocation in their
terms of reference in two separate items: under fishing allocations expressed as the extent to which NEAFC
successfully allocates fishing opportunities, and under participatory rights of newcomers expressed as
extent to which NEAFC is determining participatory rights of new members in accordance with Article 11
of UNFSA.
410
ICCAT, ibid.
411
Butterworth and Penney, supra note 15, at 181.
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In the case of the CCSBT, the review committee noted that the allocation process
was unsatisfactory until 2006, and now satisfactory and with no need to improve.
However, the CCSBT has just recently implemented the Memorandum of Understanding
on allocation of fishing opportunities of 1994. In addition, Japan has a considerable, but
temporary, reduction of its TAC due to over-catches prior to 2006. In addition, some
cooperating

non-contracting

parties

have

expressed

dissatisfaction

with

their

allocations.412 Thus, it seems apparent that allocation is not settled, and is probably going
to become more intense in the future.
In the case of NEAFC, the panel noted the secondary role that NEAFC mostly
plays in allocation of fishing opportunities in the NEAFC area, and concludes that its
highest priority should be to encourage consistency and certainty into this process across
all fisheries in the Convention Area. Thus, it ―urged the organization to make every effort
to resolve outstanding allocation issues‖, paving ―the way for a change in NEAFC‘s
approach to management, moving away from management driven, bi annual (sic), ad hoc
negotiations amongst Coastal States, towards management systems driven by transparent
objectives and implementation processes.‖413
CCAMLR‘s case is different in that the organization has not adopted national
quotas as management measure. As a consequence, the allocation of fishing opportunities
was not included in the terms of reference approved for the review. The panel,
nevertheless, expressed concerned about the lack of effort and catch control and
incentives for overinvestment and overcapacity of the existing competitive catch
management model, in particular in light of increasing interest in krill and finfish
fisheries in the Convention Area.414 For this reason, it recommends to the Commission
the establishment of a small group of experts to explore and report on the advantages and
disadvantages (including cost and feasibility) of approaches and actions to prevent or
eliminate excess fishing capacity, including a ―system of annual tradable units of quota

412

CCSBT, Report of the Extended Commission of the Sixteenth Annual Meeting of the Commission, 20 23 October 2009, supra note 312, agenda item 13 at 6-8.
413
NEAFC, Performance Review Report, supra note 81, at viii.
414
CCAMLR, Performance Review Report, supra note 81, 60-2.
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with a very clear understanding that they bestow no ongoing rights and will be
reallocated for each successive fishing period.‖415
The different performance reviews demonstrate that the global and regional
regulatory framework for allocation of TACs, based in allocation criteria and non-binding
guidelines, is an insufficient basis for the resolution of the conflicts of interests inherent
to this conservation and management measure. The search for an adequate framework,
thus, continues.

415

CCAMLR, Performance Review Report, supra note 81, at 61-2.
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Chapter 4. Allocating to Future Generations: Intergenerational Equity
in International Fisheries Law
The fact that a resource is scarce, as is often the case with fisheries, implies that
there is a need to make choices for their utilization: not all demands can be satisfied. One
of those choices relates to the inter-temporal utilization of the resource: what proportion
of the resource should be allocated to current use or consumption, and what proportion
should be saved to be used in future periods. This is, as well, an allocation decision.
This allocation decision raises questions of equity between generations: the
decisions made today affect the possibilities, options and even livelihood of generations
not yet born.416 It is possible to conceive a model where present generations do not
consume anything, saving all the resources for the future (preservationist model), or a
model where present generations consume all what they want today, ignoring the needs
of future generations (opulent model).417 Between these two extremes, there is space for
trade-offs between the needs and preferences of present and future generations. The
theory of intergenerational equity addresses the fairness of those trades-offs.
This chapter analyzes the linkages between TAC and allocation and
intergenerational equity. For this purpose, the first section provides a general overview of
the theory of intergenerational equity and its critiques, and the extent to which the theory
has been accepted in international environmental law. The second section addresses
intergenerational equity in international fisheries law in particular. The third section
presents the theoretical and practical relationships between intergenerational equity and
TAC and allocation, which are then illustrated through several case studies in section
416

The unsustainable use of natural and cultural resources raises, according to Brown Weiss, three kinds of
equity problems: a) depletion of resources, which narrows the range of available natural resources for
future generations; b) degradation of environmental quality, which imposes serious health effects and
welfare costs on future generations, causes less flexibility in using their natural resources, and leads to
depletion of plant and animal life; and c) discriminatory access and use (Edith Brown Weiss, In Fairness to
Future Generations: International Law, Common Patrimony, and Intergenerational Equity (Dobbs Ferry,
NY; Transnational Publishers, Tokyo, Japan: United Nations University, 1989), at 6-15).
417
According to Brown Weiss, the opulent model is based either on the uncertainty of the existence of
future generations, or in the belief that maximizing the wealth today is the best way to maximize wealth for
future generations. In this latter case, Brown Weiss argue that the model overlooks the long-term and
irreversible degradations of the planet that may be generated, and the moral obligation to conserve the earth
for the sake of the earth system and not the human community (ibid, at 23).
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four. Finally, the fifth section addresses some proposals to further the needs of future
generations in the international fisheries regime.
Section 1. Intergenerational Equity and its Recognition in International
Environmental Law
The theory of intergenerational equity addresses the allocation of natural
resources, their benefits and the burdens of their conservation, at an inter-temporal scale,
i.e., between present and future generations.418 Its most comprehensive formulation has
been presented by Edith Brown Weiss in the book In Fairness to Future Generations.419
In this work, Brown Weiss postulates that
[w]e, as species, hold the natural and cultural environment of our planet in
common both with other members of the present generation and with other
generations, past and future. At any given time, each generation is both a
custodian or trustee of the planet for future generations and a beneficiary of its
fruits.420
The theory of intergenerational equity is based on a partnership among all
generations,421 a partnership that has the purpose of sustaining the welfare and well-being
of all generations.422 This includes: to sustain the life-support system of the planet; to
sustain the ecological processes, environmental conditions and cultural resources
necessary for the survival of the human species; and to sustain a healthy and decent
human environment.423 Thus, every generation has the obligation to pass the planet on in

418

Lawrence B. Solum identifies three meanings of generations: a demographic cohort generation; a lineal
descent generation; and the unborn future generation (Lawrence B. Solum, ―To Our Children‘s Children‘s
Children: The Problems of Intergenerational Ethics‖ (2001-2002) 35 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 163). In general,
the term is used in international environmental law to refer to the ―relation between all those currently
living, and generations yet unborn, indefinitely into the future‖ (Lynda M. Collins, Revisiting the Doctrine
of Intergenerational Equity in Global Environmental Governance‖ (2007) 30 Dal. L. J. 79, at 102). Kiss
notes, however, that conceptually there is no distinct generations but a constant flow, since every second
hundreds of human beings are born and die and more than 5 billion people of all ages co-exist (Alexandre
Kiss, ―The Rights and Interests of Future Generations and the Precautionary Principle‖ in David Freestone
and Ellen Hey, ed., The Precautionary Principle and International Law: The Challenge of Implementation
(The Hague; London; Boston: Kluwer Law International, 1996) 19, at 21.
419
Brown Weiss, supra note 416.
420
Ibid, at 17.
421
Ibid, at 23.
422
Ibid, at 23.
423
Ibid, at 23.
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no worse condition than it received it and provide equitable access to its resources and
benefits.424
To fulfill these purposes, Brown Weiss derives three basic principles of
intergenerational equity: a) the principle of conservation of options; b) the principle of
conservation of quality; and c) the principle of conservation of access. 425 According to
the principle of conservation of options, each generation should be required to conserve
the diversity of the natural and cultural resource base, so that it does not unduly restrict
the options available to future generations.426 According to the principle of conservation
of quality, each generation should be required to maintain the quality of the planet so that
it is passed on in no worse condition than the present generation received it. 427 According
to the principle of conservation of access, each generation should provide its members
with equitable right of access to the legacy from past generations and should conserve
this access for future generations.428
These three principles are the basis of certain planetary obligations and a set of
planetary rights that each generation holds, as a class. Planetary obligations are: a) the
duty to take positive steps to conserve resources; b) the duty to ensure equitable access to
use and benefits of these resources; c) the duty to prevent or mitigate adverse impacts on
the resources or on environmental quality; d) the duty to minimize disasters and provide
emergency assistance; and e) the duty to bear the costs of damage to these resources or
the environmental quality.429 The planetary rights of each generation are the obverse of
the planetary obligations. They are identified as: a) the right to receive the planet in no
worse condition than that of the previous generations; b) the right to inherit comparable
diversity in the natural and cultural resources base; and c) the right to have equitable
access to the use and benefits of the legacy.430
The duty to conserve resources applies to both renewable and nonrenewable
natural resources, as well as cultural resources. In the case of renewable resources (such
as fish stocks), the essence of the duty is to develop and use them on a sustainable basis –
424

Ibid, at 24.
Ibid at 38.
426
Ibid, at 38.
427
Ibid, at 38.
428
Ibid, at 38.
429
Ibid, at 50.
430
Ibid, at 95.
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i.e., they can be used and developed for the benefit of the present generation in any
manner consistent with their renewal and hence availability for future generations. 431
The comprehensive theory of intergenerational equity exposed by Brown Weiss
has been subject to certain critiques. A first critique relates to the human rights model
adopted to preserve the global environment – a rights-based approach.432 This model
presents two flaws, according to the critics. The first one is that future generations,
persons not yet born, cannot be holders of rights.433 Furthermore, it has been argued that
future generations cannot have rights because any action to protect the environment will
inevitably affect the composition of the next generations – creating the paradoxical result
that protecting the environment for future generations will harm individuals who, because
of those actions, will never come into existence.434 Weiss, in turn, argues that the
planetary rights are generational rights possessed by groups in relation to other
generations, and does not follow the traditional conceptual framework of rights as rights
of identifiable individuals.435
Another part of this critique relates to the uncertainty of future generation‘s
preferences. Present generations ―cannot know the numbers and kinds of generations that
will exist, their values, interests or technologies, and that as a consequence decisionmaking becomes less reliable the further it is extended into the future.‖ 436 Some argue
some kind of ―intertemporal imperialism‖ – by anticipating the needs of future
generations, the current generation is actually imposing its values on the future and
restricting rather than promoting future generations‘ liberty. 437 Redgwell responds to this
critique arguing that this is a matter of degree. ―Certain assumptions can be made; and the
model is not a static one. Later generations may alter assumptions about the preferences
of future generations as human society evolves and changes.‖438
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Ibid, at 51.
Catherine Redgwell, International trusts and environmental protection (Manchester, UK: Manchester
University Press, 1999) at 95-97.
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Ibid, at 81.
434
Anthony D'Amato, ―Do We Owe a Duty to Future Generations to Preserve the Global Environment?‖
(1990) 84 Am. J. Int‘l L. 190, at 190-194.
435
Edith Brown Weiss, ―Our Rights and Obligations to Future Generations for the Environment (1990) 84
Am. J. Int‘l L. 198, at 205.
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Supanich, cited by Redgwell, supra note 432, at 96.
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Mayeda, cited by Collins, supra note 418, at 112.
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Redgwell, supra note 432, at 97.
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A second critique is the anthropocentrism of the right-based approach. D‘Amato,
among other authors, contends that there is a duty to living creatures in the environment
per se, not as a consequence of an obligation owned to future generations of humans. In
other words, this position maintains that wildlife has an intrinsic value independent from
its utility to future generations of human being.439
Perhaps the most relevant critique from a legal perspective relates to the nature of
the proposed planetary obligations. The theory of intergenerational equity is argued to
exert binding force only on the moral plane, with the necessity for positive law to
translate planetary duties into normative obligations. Brown Weiss acknowledges that
―the translation of the expressed concern for future generations into normative
obligations that relate the present to the future to protect future generations still needs to
be done.‖440
The idea that current generations have some duties and responsibilities in the
exploitation of natural resources towards the future generations was recognized as early
as 1893.441 Today, the notion that humans have a responsibility for the future is widely
considered incontrovertible.442 There is a general consensus regarding the need to take
the interests of future generations into account.443
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D‘Amato, supra note 434; Redgwell, ibid, at 97-99. Brown Weiss seems to recognize the existence of
an obligation to conserve the environment due not to present or future generations of the human
community, but to the other species that share the natural system (See: Brown Weiss, supra note 416, at
23).
440
Brown Weiss, ibid, at 30. She also writes that ―as custodians of this planet, we have certain moral
obligations to future generations which we can transform into legally enforceable norms‖ (ibid, at 21).
441
According to the Opinon of Mr. Justice Harlan at the Conference of the Bering Sea Tribunal of
Arbitration, during the proceedings of the 1893 Fur Seal Arbitration, evidence was presented on the
detrimental effects of high seas pelagic catch of fur seal for its conservation. One of those evidences was
the testimony of Professor Blanchard, who stated: ―Now, the irremediable destruction of an eminently
useful animal species, such as this one, is, to speak plainly, a crime of which we are rendering ourselves
guilty towards our descendants. To satisfy our instincts of cupidity we voluntarily exhaust, and that forever,
a source of wealth, which properly regulated, ought, on the contrary, to contribute to the prosperity of our
own generation and of those which will succeed it‖ (Opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan at the Conference in
Paris of the Bering Sea Tribunal of Arbitration, in Bering Sea Tribunal of Arbitration, Proceedings of the
Tribunal of Arbitration Convened at Paris under the Treaty between the United States of America and
Great Britain, concluded at Washington for the determination of questions between the two governments
concerning the jurisdictional rights of the united states in the waters of Bering Sea, Vol. 1 (Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1895), at 127).
442
Patricia Birnie, Alan Boyle, and Catherine Redgwell, International Law and the Environment, 3d ed.,
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), at 121.
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Redgwell, supra note 432, at 115.
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However, the notion that the theory of intergenerational equity may have
normative status in international law has been viewed with more skepticism. Lowe has
stated that ―the principle of inter-generational equity is, in normative terms, a
chimera.‖444 Boyle, in turn, categorized the doctrine as ―misplaced utopianism,‖445
rejecting the possibility of international law extending to future generations as wildly
unrealistic.446 Birnie, Boyle and Redgwell, in turn, acknowledge that
(...) although the idea of moral responsibility to future generations is well
established in the writings of Rawls and other philosophers, it is less easy to
translate into law, or, more specifically, into rights for future indeterminate
generations.447
Despite this skepticism, notions of intergenerational equity or consideration of the
needs of future generations have been widely reflected in instruments of international
law, both binding and non-binding. Early examples can be found already in 1946.448
However, it was the 1972 Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment that put
intergenerational equity on the agenda of international environmental law and policy.
Both the preamble and several principles of the Declaration of the United Nations
Conference on the Human Environment adopted during the Stockholm Conference
include explicit references to the need to defend and improve the human environment for
present and future generations.449
444

Vaughn Lowe ―Sustainable Development and Unsustainable Arguments‖ in Alan E. Boyle and David
Freestone (eds.), International Law and Sustainable Development: Past Achievements and Future
Challenges (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999) 19, at 27.
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A. E. Boyle, Book Review of In Fairness to Future Generations: International Law, Common
Patrimony and Intergenerational Equity by Edith Brown Weiss, (1991) 40 I.C.L.Q. 230, at 230. He adds:
―It is already an intractable task to reconcile the environmental interests of those here and now in a weak
international legal and political system, without also embracing the interests of future generations‖ (ibid).
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Ibid.
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Birnie, Boyle and Redgwell, supra note 442, at 120.
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International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, 2 December 1946, 161 UNTS 72 (entered into
force on 10 November 1948). The first paragraph of the Convention states: ―Recognizing the interest of the
nations of the world in safeguarding for future generations the great natural resources represented by the
whale stocks.‖
449
See: 1972 United Nations Declaration on Human Environment, 16 June 1972, U.N. Doc.
A/Conf.48/14/Rev. 1(1973); 11 ILM 1416 (1972), at preamble paragraph 6: ―(…) To defend and improve
the human environment for present and future generations has become an imperative goal for mankind - a
goal to be pursued together with, and in harmony with, the established and fundamental goals of peace and
of worldwide economic and social development‖; principle 1: ―Man has the fundamental right to freedom,
equality and adequate conditions of life, in an environment of a quality that permits a life of dignity and
well-being, and he bears a solemn responsibility to protect and improve the environment for present and
future generations (…)‖; and principle 2: ―The natural resources of the earth, including the air, water, land,
flora and fauna and especially representative samples of natural ecosystems, must be safeguarded for the
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Further explicit references to future generations were included in the non-binding
1982 World Charter of Nature,450 and in the 1987 Brundtland Report.451 The latter report
includes the interests of future generations in its definition of sustainable development:
―the development that meets the needs of present generations without compromising the
ability of future generations to meet their needs.‖452 Intergenerational equity is a
fundamental principle of the overarching concept of sustainable development.453 Indeed,
some authors consider that it is the very foundation of this concept.454
The 1992 Rio Declaration encompasses intergenerational equity in principle 3,
linking it to the right to development: ―the right to development must be fulfilled so as to
equitably meet developmental and environmental needs of present and future
generations‖.455 The 2002 Johannesburg Declaration reaffirms the commitment to
sustainable development, with explicit recognition of the interests of our children and the

benefit of present and future generations through careful planning or management, as appropriate.‖ See also
principles 3, 5, and 11.
450
The preamble of the World Charter for Nature, in its para. 5, states: ―Reaffirming that man must acquire
the knowledge to maintain and enhance his ability to use natural resources in a manner which ensures the
preservation of the species and ecosystems for the benefit of present and future generations.‖ (World
Charter for Nature, adopted by the UN General Assembly at its 48 th plenary meeting on 28 October 1982,
A/RES/37/7, online: UN <http://www.un.org/en/documents>).
451
Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development: Our Common Future, transmitted
to the General Assembly as an Annex to document A/42/427 - Development and International Cooperation: Environment, also in G. Brundtland, (ed.), Our common future: The World Commission on
Environment and Development (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987) [hereafter Brundtland Report].
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Brundtland Report, ibid, Chapter 2 paragraph 1.
453
Sands identifies four elements of the legal concept of sustainable development: the principle of
intergenerational equity, the principle of sustainable use, the principle of equitable use (or intragenerational equity), and the principle of integration (Philippe Sands, Principles of International
Environmental Law, 2d ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003) at 253). Schrijver, in turn,
considers the seven principles of sustainable development included in the 2002 ILA New Delhi
Declaration: the duty of States to ensure sustainable use of natural resources, the principle of equity and the
eradication of poverty (which includes both inter and intra-generational equity), the principle of common
but differentiated responsibility, the precautionary principle and environmental impact assessment, public
participation, the principle of good governance, and the principle of integration and interrelationship (Nico
Schrijver, The Evolution of Sustainable Development in International Law: Inception, Meaning and Status
(Leiden; Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2008) at 171-207).
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See: Graham Mayeda, ―Where should Johannesburg take us? Ethical and Legal Approaches to
Sustainable Development in the Context of International Environmental Law‖ (2004) 15 Colo. J. Envtl. L.
& Pol‘y 29, at 30, citing McCloskey and Handl. Indeed, this approach has also been criticized as giving
preference to the needs of future generations, even above the needs of present generations. The same
criticism has been formulated to Brown Weiss theory of intergenerational equity, where intra-generational
equity is considered a sub-element – and even a subordinate element - of the former.
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United Nations, Report of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, CEDOR,
Rio de Janeiro, 3–14 June 1992, A/CONF.151./26/Rev.1 (Vol. I), Rio Declaration on Environment and
Development, principle 3.
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long-term perspectives required by sustainability.456 Most of the non-binding instruments
adopted since include a reference to future generations, either independently or as a
component of sustainable development.457
References to a notion of intergenerational equity have also been included in the
preamble section of various Conventions and treaties. Two early examples, roughly
contemporaneous with the Stockholm Declaration, can be found in the 1973 Convention
on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, 458 and the 1972
Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage.459
Most of the references can be found, however, in Conventions and agreements signed in
the 1990s, after the conclusion of the United Nations Rio Conference on Environment
and Development. The 1992 Convention on the Transboundary Effects of Industrial
Accidents;460 and the 1994 Convention to Combat Desertification in those Countries
Experiencing Drought and/or Desertification, Particularly in Africa, 461 acknowledge in
their preambles the needs of future generations. The Convention on Biological Diversity
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Sustainable Development, online: UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Division for
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(CBD) also recognizes the future generations in its preamble, 462 and in its definition of
sustainable use.463 Furthermore, the Conference of the Parties of the CBD has recognized
the ecosystem approach as the primary framework for action under the Convention and
endorsed the application of the Malawi Principles for Ecosystem Approach. 464 These
principles explicitly recognize the inter-temporal dimension of conservation by requiring
that the objectives for ecosystem management be set for the long term.465
In contrast, few treaties incorporate the interests of future generations in their
substantive or operational provisions. One of few treaties that do is the United Nations
Convention on Climate Change,466 which contains explicit references to future
generations both in the preamble467 and in the normative section.468 However, the
Convention does not develop the precise content of this responsibility. For this reason,
Redgwell sees this provision only as a starting point in the process of defining obligations
of the present generations ―to absorb the costs of reducing the risk of global warming for
future generations‖ and not a fully fledged normative provision.469
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The international jurisprudence has had a few opportunities to address
intergenerational equity, its status in international law, and its legal implications. The
most prominent cases were the two Nuclear tests cases,470 and the Nuclear Advisory
Opinion.471 In the two Nuclear tests cases, the Court did not address the issue. The
Advisory Opinion, on the contrary, made several references to generations yet unborn.
However, it did not rely on a principle of intergenerational equity or an explicit
recognition of the rights of future generations in rendering its opinion. 472 The missed
opportunities to address the principle and its legal status have been criticized and
lamented both outside473 and inside the International Court of Justice.474
Intergenerational equity has had, undoubtedly, ample recognition in international
law instruments. However, this recognition lies mainly in non-binding instruments or in
the preambles of treaties. Its practical implications are less than clear. Sands notes that,
although the interests of future generations were profusely included in the UNCED
instruments, ―there was little, if any, discussion in the negotiations which indicates what
practical consequences might flow from a recognition of the needs of future
generations.‖475
For these reasons, most authors believe that ―the principles of intergenerational
equity ―have not yet achieved the status of binding norms under international law.‖476
470

Nuclear Tests (Australia v. France), [1974] I.C.J. Rep. 253 and Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v. France),
[1974] I.C.J. Rep. 457; and Request for an Examination of the situation in Accordance with Paragraph 63
of the Court’s Judgment of 20 December 1974 in the Nuclear Tests Case (New Zealand v. France) [1995]
I.C.J. Rep. 288.
471
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, [1996] I.C.J. Rep. 226. Brown
Weiss has noted that ―[t]he Opinion on the use of the nuclear weapons raises, as no other cases except the
1995 Nuclear Test cases have raised, the issue of the effects of our actions today upon future generations‖
(Edith Brown Weiss, ―Opening the Door to the Environment and to Future Generations‖ in Laurence
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Despite this majority opinion, it should be noted that prominent scholars are of the
opinion that intergenerational equity is a principle of international law. One of those
proponents is Judge Weeramantry. In his dissenting opinion in the Request for an
Examination of the situation in Accordance with Paragraph 63 of the Court’s Judgment
of 20 December 1974 in the Nuclear Tests Case (New Zealand v. France), he stated:
(...) the rights of the future generations have passed the stage when they were
merely an embryonic right struggling for recognition. They have woven
themselves into international law through major treaties, through juristic opinion
and through general principles of law recognized by civilized nations.477
One of the sources of the rights of future generations cited by Judge Weeramantry
is the doctrine of intergenerational equity.478
The fact that intergenerational equity is, generally, not considered a binding norm
under international law does not mean that it does not have any legal implications.
Redgwell notes a ―creeping intergenerationalism‖ that is manifested in several ways.
First, the wide recognition of the interests of future generations in non-binding
international instruments and pre-ambular texts of international treaties allows a
conclusion that some general notion of intergenerational equity has likely emerged as a
guiding principle in international environmental law. This guiding principle performs the
role of a source of inspiration for the development and adoption of binding rules at both
national and international levels and as the basis for the development of new international
customary law.479 It can also be considered as a guiding principle in the application of
substantive norms, including existing treaty obligations, under international law.480
Secondly, it has been noted that there are several substantive principles of
international law that have an inter-temporal dimension and are, thus, important for the
doctrine of intergenerational equity. Redgwell cites, as examples of such substantive
principles, the principle of sustainable development, the common heritage of humankind,
Professor Brown Weiss, that the present generation has a legal relationship with future generations… In
other words, while the interests of future generations has unquestionable symbolism, and one that
underpins other concepts such as the principle of sustainable use and the precautionary approach, its own
normative status is clearly questionable.‖ (Duncan French, International Law and Policy of Sustainable
Development (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press; New York: Juris, 2005) at 61).
477
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479
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the principle of custodianship or stewardship, the precautionary principle, and the
principle of common but differentiated responsibility.481 In light of the Malawi Principles
on Ecosystem Approach, this latter principle can be included among them.
Finally, it must be mentioned that many of the ―planetary obligations‖ are already
included as principles of international law, and as normative obligations for States. In
light of its relevance to this thesis, it is worth noting, in particular, the duty to conserve
resources. While it is arguable whether a general duty to conserve resources exists in
international law,482 many treaties (including fishery treaties) contain an explicit
obligation to conserve natural resources and give this obligation certain normative
content. These existing normative obligations may acquire new emphases and focuses if
interpreted in the light of a duty to protect the environment for the benefit of future
generations.
Section 2. Intergenerational Equity in International Fisheries Law
Following the conclusions of the previous sections, an analysis of whether
intergenerational equity is reflected in international fisheries law requires determining:
whether intergenerational equity, or the concern for future generations, is explicitly
recognized in binding and non-binding instruments; and whether planetary obligations or
substantive principles with inter-temporal dimensions are included as normative
obligations. These two aspects will be analyzed in turn.
Intergenerational Equity as Reflected in International Fisheries Instruments
The explicit recognition of the needs and interests of future generations is
remarkably absent in international fisheries instruments, both binding and non-binding.
The first explicit reference to the interests of future generations can be found in the 1992
Cancun Declaration on Responsible Fisheries, which declares that States should adopt
effective fisheries planning and management to ensure supply of fish products to feed
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present and future populations.483 A few years later, the FAO Code of Conduct484
included the needs of future generations in the definition of the objective of fisheries
management. Article 6.2 states:
Fisheries management should promote the maintenance of the quality, diversity
and availability of fishery resources in sufficient quantities for present and future
generations in the context of food security, poverty alleviation and sustainable
development.
In line with this objective, article 7.1.1 states that
Conservation and management measures, whether at local, national, subregional
or regional levels, should be based on the best scientific evidence available and be
designed to ensure the long-term sustainability of fishery resources at levels
which promote the objective of their optimum utilization and maintain their
availability for present and future generations; short-term considerations should
not compromise these objectives.485
Successive non-binding international instruments on fisheries do not include
references to the needs of the future generations. However, most of them acknowledge
and reaffirm the principles of the FAO Code of Conduct, thus implicitly acknowledging
that conservation measures shall ensure quality, quantity, diversity and availability of
fishery resources for both present and future generations.486
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International Conventions and regional agreements do not explicitly recognize the
interests of future generations in their normative provisions.487 Furthermore, and contrary
to common practice in international environmental law, global Conventions and most
regional agreements do not recognize the interests of future generations in the preamble
of their texts. The only exception thereto is the WCPFC Convention, which in the first
paragraph of its preamble states that the contracting parties are
[d]etermined to ensure the long-term conservation and sustainable use, in
particular for human food consumption, of highly migratory fish stocks in the
western and central Pacific Ocean for present and future generations.488

“Planetary Obligations” in International Fisheries Law
As in the case of environmental law in general, the fact that intergenerational
equity as such is not generally mentioned either in binding or non-binding fisheries
instruments does not preclude the existence of certain obligations or principles with an
inter-temporal dimension that are components of the theory of intergenerational equity.
Three are of particular interest in the case of fisheries: the obligation of conservation, the
precautionary approach, and the ecosystem approach to fisheries.
It has already been noted that the planetary duty to conserve resources implies, in
the case of renewable resources, the obligation to exploit them on a sustainable basis,489
i.e. an exploitation consistent with their renewal and hence availability for future
generations.490 It is worth adding that sustainable exploitation is considered necessary for
maintaining economic growth, but this necessity is reinforced by concerns for justice
among generations.491
Responsible Fisheries‖). The 2005 St. John‘s Ministerial Declaration reiterates the ―commitment to
responsible fisheries‖ (2005 St. John‘s Ministerial Declaration, supra note 269, at para. 5).
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The duty to conserve and ensure sustainable use of marine living resources in the
high seas has been considered since the early codifications of international law of the
high seas. The 1958 Convention on Fishing and Conservation of Living Resources of the
High Seas defined the expression ―conservation of the living resources of the high seas‖
as the ―aggregate of the measures rendering possible the optimum sustainable yield from
those resources so as to secure a maximum supply of food and other marine products.‖492
The 1958 Convention reflected the objective of maximum sustainable yield for fisheries
management, defined as ―making possible the maximum production of food from the sea
on a sustained basis year after year.‖493 In this early formulation, thus, conservation was
considered mainly as a means to maintain economic growth.
The LOSC did not define the concept of conservation, although several provisions
refer to the conservation of living marine resources. It has been pointed out that the
LOSC only provides for conservation objectives.494 Although this may seem as a step
backwards in the definition of the obligations of States, some authors consider it
recognition of the complexity that conservation of living marine resources had reached.495
Furthermore, the qualification of the objectives of conservation by environmental factors
allows elaboration of the concept of conservation in light of new developments in
international environmental law.
Those new developments were readily identifiable after the UNCED conference.
The ecosystem approach, the precautionary approach, intergenerational equity, and
sustainable development, are elements that have been introduced in the interpretation of
the legal obligation to conserve natural resources. This wider and more comprehensive
concept of conservation is reflected in the definition provided by the World Commission
on the Environment and Development, which considers conservation as the
the management of human use of a natural resource or the environment in such a
manner that it may yield the greatest sustainable benefit to present generations
while maintaining its potential to meet the needs and aspirations of future
492
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generations. It embraces the preservation, maintenance, sustainable utilization,
restoration, and enhancement of a natural resource or the environment.496
It was consistent with these developments for the Cancun Declaration on
Responsible Fisheries and the FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries to include
the needs of future generations among the considerations to be taken into account while
defining the objectives of fisheries planning and management.497
UNFSA, however, did not consider the needs of future generations explicitly. It
did, nevertheless, strengthen the inter-temporal component of conservation in three ways.
Firstly, UNFSA defined the objective of the agreement as ―long-term conservation and
sustainable use‖ of the fisheries stocks. Although the meaning of long-term is not
defined, its explicit inclusion nevertheless reinforces the need to take into account the
effects of fishing in the future.
Secondly, UNFSA considers the precautionary approach as one of the principles
that need to be observed in the management of fisheries. Article 5 of UNFSA reads:
In order to conserve and manage straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish
stocks, coastal States and States fishing on the high seas shall, in giving effect to
their duty to cooperate in accordance with the Convention: (c) apply the
precautionary approach in accordance with article 6.
Article 6, in turn, reiterates that States shall apply the precautionary approach
widely to conservation, management and exploitation of straddling fish stocks and highly
migratory fish stocks in order to protect the living marine resources and preserve the
marine environment, and provides detailed guidance on how the precautionary approach
should be applied.498 In addition, Annex II of UNFSA provides further guidelines for the
496
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application of precautionary target and limit reference points in conservation and
management of straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks.
It has been recognized that the precautionary principle has a potential role in
achieving a balance of interest between present and future generations, 499 or at least a
direct and positive bearing on the interests of future generations.500 A FAO information
paper prepared for the UNFSA Conference and which served as the basis for the
discussion on precautionary approach in fisheries management states that the
precautionary approach seeks to
(...) promote a more equitable balance between the attention given to the needs of
present and future generations. Such an approach would address the issue of intergenerational equity (as required by UNCED) and would tend towards reducing
the cost of our present decisions for future generations.501
The paper qualifies intergenerational equity as a ―moral obligation placed on current
generations to exploit the resources and enact conservation measures in such a manner as
to preserve options for future generations‖ (emphasis added).502 Other documents
presented during the UNFSA Conference also acknowledged that the precautionary
management of living marine resources is instrumental to the preservation of future use
options.503
The concept of conservation adopted by UNFSA also includes concern for the
ecosystem. Article 5 calls upon States to
(d) assess the impacts of fishing, other human activities and environmental factors
on target stocks and species belonging to the same ecosystem or associated with
or dependent upon the target stocks;
recognizes ―that there is a diversity of ecological as well as socio-economic situations that require different
strategies‖ (FAO, The Precautionary Approach to Fisheries with Reference to Straddling Fish Stocks and
Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, A/CONF.164/INF/8, 26 January 1994, in Lévy and Schram, supra note 258,
555, para. 3 at 555).
499
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(e) adopt, where necessary, conservation and management measures for species
belonging to the same ecosystem or associated with or dependent upon the target
stocks, with a view to maintaining or restoring populations of such species above
levels at which their reproduction may become seriously threatened.504
Although the UNFSA does not provide more guidance on the implementation of a
principle of conservation of the ecosystem, this vacuum has been at least partially filled
by ongoing work by FAO and its member States. During the FAO Technical Consultation
on Ecosystem-based fisheries Management held in Reykjavik, 16-19 September 2002, the
parties adopted the Reykjavik Declaration on Responsible Fisheries in the Marine
Ecosystem,505 which endorses the ecosystem approach to fisheries. The Reykjavik
Declaration also requests FAO to develop technical guidelines for best practices in regard
with introducing ecosystem considerations to fisheries management. The resulting
guidelines state that
(...) the purpose of an ecosystem approach to fisheries is to plan, develop and
manage fisheries in a manner that addresses the multiplicity of societal needs and
desires, without jeopardizing the options for future generations to benefit from a
full range of goods and services provided by marine ecosystems. 506
In line with the Malawi Principles adopted by the Conference of the Parties of the CBD,
the FAO guidelines explicitly recognize intergenerational equity as one of the principles
relevant for ecosystem approach to fisheries management.507 It specifies that the principle
requires that future generations be given the same opportunity as the present ones to
decide on how to use resources.508
It can be concluded that, although the instruments on high seas fisheries
management seldom make explicit references to intergenerational equity or the needs and
aspirations of future generations, intergenerational considerations are implicit in three
obligations of the legal framework: the obligation of States to ensure long-term
conservation and sustainable use of living marine resources; the obligation of States to
implement a precautionary approach in the adoption of conservation and management
measures; and the obligation to implement an ecosystem approach to fisheries.
504
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The concept of conservation has evolved through time. This evolution has been
marked partially by the advances in fisheries science and partially by the influence of the
developments in international environmental law and international law in the field of
sustainable development. As a result, the concept of conservation has been broadened and
enriched. This evolution has emphasized the inter-temporal effects of fisheries
management, and therefore, reinforced intergenerational considerations in international
fisheries law.
This evolution can also be appreciated in regional fisheries agreements, and
particularly in the reforms of their Convention texts. Early Conventions, such as 1949
IATTC Agreement, stated as an objective of the agreement and organizations maintaining
the populations of fishes at a level which will permit maximum sustained catches year
after year.509 NAFO, in turn, established as the objective of the organization the optimum
utilization, rational management and conservation of the fishery resources in the
Convention Area. The amendments to these Conventions emphasize the long-term
objective of conservation efforts. The newly adopted Antigua Convention and the 2007
Amendment to the NAFO Convention both recognize, as objective of the organizations,
ensure the long-term conservation and sustainable use of the fish stocks.510 New
agreements, such as SEAFO, South Pacific RFMO, WCFPC, also follow closely the
wording of UNFSA in the definition of their objectives.
Furthermore, recent regional agreements have included in their texts, and as
substantive provisions, the obligations to adopt the precautionary and ecosystem
approaches to fisheries management.511 Both principles, as has been mentioned above,
include in their modern formulation the long-term conservation and the requirement to
take into account the needs of future generations.
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Section 3. Allocating TAC: Balancing Short and Long Term Needs
The previous sections analyzed intergenerational equity in international
environmental law and international fisheries law in particular. They support a conclusion
that, despite the fact that future generations are seldom explicitly mentioned in global or
regional instruments, the legal framework includes intergenerational considerations. They
are included in the duty to conserve and manage fish stocks with the objective of
achieving sustainable fisheries. Inter-temporal considerations are also essential to the
precautionary approach and ecosystem approach, widely accepted as guiding principles
for fisheries management and explicitly included in binding and non-binding global and
regional fisheries agreements.
It is beyond the scope of this thesis to analyze how RFMOs have been fulfilling
the obligation to ensure long-term conservation of stocks through, inter alia, the
application of the precautionary approach or ecosystem approach. 512 What is of the
interest to this thesis is how the TAC and allocation and, in particular, the practical
implementation of TACs and allocations, enables or challenges the consideration of intertemporal, or intergenerational, considerations. In other words, the interest of this and the
following sections is to analyze how TAC and allocation have allowed balancing short
and long term benefits of the exploitation of living resources.
TAC, Conservation, and Options for Future Generations
Chapter 2 has analyzed the origins and rationale of the TAC and allocation. It has
been pointed out that different studies concluded that the conservation of high seas
fisheries resources required reducing the rate of fishing mortality; that the best
mechanism available to do so was a quota or TAC; and that this TAC should be allocated
to States to allow them to improve fishing efficiency and thus the net economic benefit.
Therefore, the TAC is a fundamental conservation and management measure to ensure
the long-term conservation and sustainable use of fish stocks. In establishing a TAC
according to the precautionary and ecosystem approaches, it should be ensured that the
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options of future generations to benefit from the goods and services or marine ecosystem
are not jeopardized.
In the phase of establishing a TAC, the long-term timeframe for conservation (i.e.
the inter-temporal considerations) depends on decisions made in relation to the
exploitation rate. This, in turn, depends on the adopted limit and target reference points,
the accepted probability of reaching those limits, and the recovery time frame. Fishing
mortality producing maximum sustainable yield has been traditionally considered a target
reference point. It is, nevertheless, considered a non-precautionary target and its use as a
limit reference point is currently preferred.513
The same target reference point can be more or less precautionary depending on
the agreed probabilities of exceeding the limit reference point. For instance, it might be
agreed that the probabilities of exceeding the limit reference point are 25%, or 50%. This
decision will therefore alter the exploitation rate, being more or less precautionary and
thus, compromising more or less the ability of the stock to meet future needs.
In addition, the timeframe agreed to maintain or rebuild the stock also affects the
exploitation rate, the level of precaution, and the ability of the stock to meet future needs.
It should be mentioned that currently, the decision models for fisheries
management do not consider an objective quantification of the needs of future
generations. Nevertheless, economists have developed a series of approaches to the
consideration of future generations‘ interests in policy decision-making. These
approaches rely on discount rates to objectively assess and balance inter-temporal
allocation of scarce resources. These approaches have found some echo in fisheries
management science, with academic research on the use of modified discount rates to
actively and objectively consider future generations in fisheries management decisions.514

513
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Those attempts are, however, in their initial stage and have not been used by any RFMO
or, to the best of my knowledge, by any national fisheries authority.
Allocation, Conservation, and Options for Future Generations
The phase of agreeing on an allocation is, in this theoretical framework, an
independent decision that can be either previous, simultaneous, or subsequent to the TAC
decision. This decision relates exclusively to the distribution of fishing opportunities
between participating States in the present time, assuming that conservation (and intertemporal or intergenerational) issues have been, or are going to be, considered on their
own merit.
Experience shows, however, that both processes are intertwined. During the
negotiation, States cannot separate the adoption of a global TAC from their share in that
TAC. The relevance of the national quotas for the States‘ economies, fishing industries,
and fishing communities, makes the decisions on TAC dependent upon the national
allocation of that TAC. Considering this economic importance, and in the light of the
practices for allocation that have evolved in international fisheries law and that have been
described in previous chapters, a TAC and allocation process generates a rational selfish
State behavior that is characterized by four effects. These four effects are: the
announcement effect, the increased TAC, the paper fish effect, and increasing TAC to
accommodate new entrants. They are analyzed in turn.
a) The Announcement Effect: Postponing Measures and the Race to Fish
A rational chain of events, facing the announcement of a management regime
involving TAC and allocation, is for States to postpone the adoption of management
measures, and in particular the allocation discussion, until their participation in the
fishery satisfies their fishing aspirations or bargaining position. 515 In other words, the
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current allocation system provides incentives to both postponing measures for the
protection of the stock, and increase fishing effort and fishing capacity in the fishery - a
―powerful incentive to indulge in a race to fish.‖516 Considering the effects of the
allocation for their industries in the long-term, States have incentives to engage in fishing
activities even if it is not economically viable, and even though the activity requires State
subsidies.517
This effect has been widely, and early, recognized: the announcement effect. 518 It
dangerous consequences were also warned.519 Experience has shown repeatedly that
States and fishers behave almost inexorably according to this rationale.520 These
experiences have shown that
States with aspirations to participate in the fishery will avoid allocation
discussions or will defer joining an organization until their fishing activity has
increased to a point at which they perceive that the allocation formula will give
them a fair share. This delay in reaching an allocation decision has resulted in a
severe decline in stock and is a critical point of potential failure of RFMOs.521
b) Inflated TACs
If a fishery has followed its ―rational path‖, during the years prior to the adoption
of an allocation agreement, the participants of the fishery would have increased their
catches in order to increase their participation in the fishery and their bargaining power
with the goal of increasing their outcome: the national quota. In some cases, new
participants will enter the fishery with the same purpose. If all participating States, and
516
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some new States, engage in that rational behavior, the catches of the fishery would be at
very high levels at the moment of any possible agreement. More often, agreement can
only be reached when the stock already shows signs of overexploitation.
This unsustainable level of catches acts as the baseline for the fishing aspirations
of each State, and therefore their bargaining position. Not infrequently, agreement can
only be reached at this high level of TAC, which accommodates the aspirations of all
negotiating States.522 In other words, the TAC is not set at the level that ensures longterm conservation of the stock, but rather at the level that satisfies the aspirations of
participating States and that allows agreement (even though those aspirations are
unrealistic if considered in relation to the status of the stock).523 The short term individual
benefit overrides the long term conservation objective, with the result that the interest of
future generations is overridden by the short-sighted interests of current generations.
c) The “Paper Fish” Effect
The race to fish causes the TAC to be set at high levels, in order to satisfy the
aspirations of participating States. In many cases, the allocated TAC bears no relation to
the conservation status and production capacity of the stock. In other words, the
participating States ―create‖ an inflated TAC for allocation purposes, but in reality the
fishery does not support those levels of catches. Actual catches are often at much lower
levels – the fishery is already over-exploited or depleted.
This generates ―paper quotas‖, i.e., quotas to be found only in paper.524 As such,
they have little impact as effective conservation and management measures. Again, longterm conservation is postponed in light of short-sighted interests.
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Despite the fact that the fish population does not sustain high ―nominal quotas‖,
States have an interest in maintaining them. That is often done even against the clear
scientific advice to reduce TAC.525 The reasons behind that interest may vary. It is often
the result of a sense of entitlement to the fishery derived from the allocation of a specific
quota. The quota is the recognition of the share of the fishery that ―belongs‖ to a
particular State. Thus, even if at the present moment there are no fish available to actually
engage in fishing activities commensurate to the nominal quota, there is the expectation
that in the future the State will take full advantage of ―its share‖.
Another explanation for paper or nominal quotas may be found in a sense of
stability resulting from the negotiation process for that quota in particular or, more often,
of the package deal resulting from allocation of different stocks within the same RFMO.
A further reason for maintaining nominal quotas is to justify the exclusion of new
entrants on the basis that the fishery is fully exploited and fully allocated, even in
circumstances where the participating States may not be fishing their allocated quota.
That could be the case, for example, in the context of the resolutions adopted by NAFO
and NEAFC to guide the expectations of new members.
In addition, and as will be analyzed in further detail in chapter 7, there is an
increasing trend to allowing the negotiation (trade, purchase, or lease) of allocated
quotas. In light of this possibility, an allocated quota becomes a title with value of its
own, only indirectly related to the present status of the stock and the States‘ capability or
interest in the fishery. The valuable asset is the ―paper fish‖ – not the actual fish anymore.
d) Accommodating New Entrants
The reluctance of States to reduce their allocated shares has yet another
manifestation in the process of accommodating new entrants. In the alternative of
reducing their quota to accommodate new entrants or increasing the TAC for this
purpose, RFMOs usually prefer the latter alternative. In so doing, the RFMOs show a
―willingness to adopt a high risk management strategy, with the risk borne by the
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resource.‖526 Analyzing this behaviour from the perspective of intergenerational equity, it
can be added that the risk is borne by the resource but also by future generations.
Concluding Remarks
TACs are, in theory, a fundamental management tool to achieve long-term
conservation and sustainable use of high seas fish stocks. As such, they are one of the
mechanisms through which intergenerational considerations may be, and ought to be,
introduced in fisheries management. This purpose is frustrated, however, by the selfish,
but rational, behavior of participating States in light of the current practices for setting
TAC and allocation of national quotas. These practices create incentives to disregard
long-term, and therefore intergenerational, considerations.
The next section provides examples that illustrate, now from a practical
perspective, the effects of the establishment of TAC and allocations in RFMOs.
Section 4. Postponing Long-term Considerations: Some Examples
The consequences of TAC and allocation theoretically summarized in the
previous section have been extensively described in the literature with respect to specific
stocks. That is the case with blue whiting in the North East Atlantic (NEAFC),527 and
Southern albacore in the Atlantic (ICCAT).528 This thesis provides two other examples:
South Pacific jack mackerel and white hake.
South Pacific Jack Mackerel: a Recent Case of Announcement Effect
Chilean jack mackerel (Trachurus murphyi) is a schooling pelagic species
distributed throughout the South Eastern Pacific, both inside EEZs and on the high seas,
ranging from the Galapagos Islands and south of Ecuador in the north to southern Chile.
Fishing for jack mackerel in the South Pacific began in 1950s. The only fleets
fishing for that species were Chile and Peru, both the coastal States. In the 1970s,
DWNFs began to fish for the species in the South Pacific area: Bulgaria, Cuba, Korea,
526
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Japan, Poland and the U.S.S.R. In the 1980s, Ecuador joined the fishery as a coastal
State; and Estonia, Georgia, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, and Ukraine did too as DWFNs.
The distant fleet ceased its operations soon thereafter, and from 1993 to 1998, only the
three coastal States registered catches. In 1999 Japan again resumed operations. Ghana
and Russia joined between 2000 and 2004. EC, Faroe Islands and Vanuatu joined the
fishery afterwards.529
In 2005, New Zealand, Chile and Australia announced that the three countries were
co-sponsoring a multilateral negotiation for the establishment of a fisheries management
regime for the South Pacific.530 The initiative was triggered by cooperative management
problems with two species: jack mackerel Trachurus murphyi and orange roughy
Hoplostethus atlanticus. The multilateral negotiation took place between February 2006
and November 2009, and concluded with the adoption of the SPRFMO Convention on
November 14, 2009.531
An important component of the negotiation was to establish provisional or interim
conservation measures for the protection of jack mackerel and bottom fisheries. Such
measures were discussed already during the second international consultation, but after
lengthy and difficult negotiations agreement could not be reached. During the third
meeting held in Reñaca, Chile in May 2007, States participating in the international
consultations were able to agree upon voluntary interim measures for the protection of
jack mackerel, for deep sea species (bottom fishing), and for collection and sharing of
data.
According to the jack mackerel interim measure adopted in 2007, the States
participating in the international consultation committed themselves to limiting the total
529

The catch information has been extracted from: SPRFMO, Scientific Working Group, Information
describing Chilean jack mackerel (Trachurus murphyi) fisheries relating to the South Pacific Regional
Fishery Management Organisation, Working Draft, 30 April, 2009, SP-07-SWG-JM-02, online: SPRFMO
<http://www.southpacificrfmo.org>. Additional information on catch statistics can be found in the
document: SPRFMO, Interim Secretariat, Differences Between Mackerel (Trachurus species) Data
Submitted
to
SPRFMO
versus
the
FAO,
SP-08-SWG-INF-02,
online:
SPRFMO
<http://www.southpacificrfmo.org>.
530
The intention was first announced in the Conference on the Governance of High Seas Fisheries
Resources and the U.N. Fish Agreement: Moving from Words to Actions, held in St. John‘s,
Newfoundland and Labrador, May 1-5, 2005, organized by the Government of Canada (Governance of
High Seas Fisheries Resources and the U.N. Fish Agreement: Moving From Words to Actions, Conference
Report, 1 June 2005, at 27, online: Fisheries and Oceans Canada <http://www.dfo-mpo.gc.ca>).
531
For the documents of the meetings, see: SPRFMO, <http://www.southpacificrfmo.org>.

151

level of gross tonnage (GT) of vessels flying their flag fishing for pelagic stocks in 2008
and 2009 to the levels of total GT recorded in 2007 in the Area. Coastal States and States
with a catch history for jack mackerel with no fishing activity in 2007 could enter the
fishery and exercise voluntary restraint of fishing effort.
At the November 2009 Meeting, the States prorogued and revised the interim
measure adopted in May 2007.532 The revised measures are applicable from January 1st,
2010, to the date that the Convention enters into force and conservation and management
measures for jack mackerel are established.533 This voluntary534 measure limits the
fishing effort for jack mackerel to the gross tonnage (GT, or GRT when GT is not
available) of vessels flying their flag to those that have been actively fishing in 2007,
2008 or 2009 in the Convention Area.535 The provisional GT (or GRT) for each country
has been included in table 1 of the revised interim measure, but the numbers are
considered provisional until the information of vessels actively fishing in 2009 has been
submitted.536 They further agreed to voluntarily ―restrain catches by vessels flying its flag
in the Convention Area to the annual level of catches recorded by that participant in
either 2007, 2008, or 2009‖.537
Since the announcement of the intention to negotiate a Convention to establish an
RFMO in the South Pacific in 2005, the number of participants in the fisheries, the
vessels fishing for jack mackerel, and their catch reports, have increased significantly.
That has occurred even after 2008, the year States agreed to limit their fishing efforts to
existing levels in accordance with the voluntary interim measure.
Four States have started fishing operations for jack mackerel since 2005: EU,
Faroe Islands, Cook Islands, and Belize.538 In addition, three States (EU, China and
Korea) have not respected the interim measure of limiting fishing effort to 2007 levels,
increasing the GTR operating in the area between 2008 and 2009. These increases were,
however, recognized in the revised interim measure. Table 8 shows the authorized and
532
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active fleet in the area for 2007, according to the information provided by each State to
the Secretariat of the South Pacific RFMO, and the limits recognized in the revised
interim measures.
Table 8. Pelagic Effort in the South Pacific RFMO Convention Area539
State

Authorized
2007

Active
2007

Vessels active
2007

Australia
Belize
Chile

5,715
76,136
138,364.37+
7,855.55GRT
55,672
12,613GRT
77,209
At least 23,415
4,350.62
10,473

0
9,814
103,849

0
1
135

55,672
12,613 GRT
62,999
23,415

11
3
8
3

10,473

3

Revised
Interim
Measure
9,814
96,867.24 +
3,755.81GRT
74,516
12,613 GRT
78,600
23,415
4,350.62
15,222

4

40,000
25,000
23,235
31,220 GRT

China
Cook Island
EC
Faroe Island
Japan
Korea
Peru
High seas
Occasionally HS
Russian Federation
Vanuatu

31,220GRT

31,220GRT

More importantly, the catches for jack mackerel have increased considerably
since 2005. Table 9 shows a detail of the catches during the 2000-2008 period,
considering the latest catch reports provided to the Interim Secretariat of the SPRFMO.
The evolution shows an increase from 1,600,000 tonnes in 2000 to ca. 2,000,000 in 2004.
During the period 2005-2008, the catches have fluctuated between ca. 1,650,000 tonnes
to 1,950,000 tonnes. However, it should be noted that the catch information of the latter
period is still incomplete. Peru has not reported its catches, and other countries have
announced the existence of catches but have not quantified them. It is to be expected,
then, that catches are well above 2,000,000 tonnes.
539

The information provided in this table combines the following information: a) Tonnage of Pelagic
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included in Table 1 of the document SPRFMO Interim Secretariat, Report of the Interim Management
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2009, included in Table 2 of SPRFMO, Interim Secretariat, Report of the Interim Management Measures,
ibid, at 5; and c) the GRT included in table 1 of the Revised Interim Measures for Pelagic Fisheries, supra
note 407, which act as the limit of fishing effort limit for the participating States (albeit numbers are
provisional and may change pending the notification by participants of the GT or GRT of vessels flying
their flag actively fishing in 2009, in accordance with paragraph 6 of these Interim Measures).
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In particular, it should be noted that some States have increased their reported
catches considerably in the last few years. Noteworthy is the EC, which started operating
in the area in 2005, and in 4 years increased its catches from a little above 6,000 tonnes to
more than 106,000 tonnes. Faroe Island has not reported its catches for 2008, but in 2007
it reported ca. 40,000 tonnes with just one vessel operating in the area. Vanuatu, in just 6
years of operation, has caught between 53,000 tonnes and 129,000 tonnes annually.
China, in 8 years, has increased its catches from 20,000 to 160,000 tonnes, with later
catches ca. 140,000 tonnes.
Table 9. Jack mackerel catches in the 2000-2008 period
Chile
Ecuador
Peru
China
Ghana
Korea
Russia

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

1,234,299

1,649,933

1,518,994

1,421,296

1,451,599

1,430,434

1,366,770

1,565,401

1,415,846

7,144

134,011

604

-

-

296,579

723,733

154,219

217,734

186,931
143,000

160,000

140,582

143,182

x

20,090

76,261

94,690

131,020

2,472

1,157

-

-

-

0

-

-

2,010

7,438

x

10,474

10,940

12,600

0

-

-

7,540

62,300

7,040

0

0

x

53,959

94,685

77,356

129,535

112,501

100,066

6,179

62,137

123,511

106,655

38,700

x

Vanuatu
EC
Faroe
Island
Cook
Island
Belize
TOTAL

x
x
1,540,494

2,528,924

1,750,078

1,797,229

1,933,973

1,664,009

1,728,916

1,991,635

1,778,349

In the meantime, the interim scientific committee has reported preoccupation on
the status of the resource. According to the best scientific information available, fishing
mortality is likely to have exceeded sustainable levels since at least 2002, and continues
to do so.540 Current biomass levels are substantially below levels at the peak of the
fishery in the 1990s and, as a result of recent poor recruitment, are highly likely to be still
declining.541 Evidence indicates that further declines in stock status are likely unless
fishing mortality is reduced, particularly if recruitment remains poor. The interim
540
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scientific working group concludes that to stop further declines and re-build this jack
mackerel stock, urgent and adequate measures will be required to limit fishing mortality
to sustainable levels.542
NAFO and White Hake: Paper Quotas at Unrealistic High Levels
White hake (Urophycis tenuis) is a ground fish distributed along the Southwest
fringe of the Grand Bank, the edge of the Laurentian channel and southwest coast of
Newfoundland, in NAFO areas 3NO and 3Ps.
The directed fishery for this stock began only in 1988, by Canadian vessels.543
Before that, however, there were significant catches of white hake as bycatch of other
groundfisheries. The catches peaked in 1985 at 8,100 tonnes in Division 3NO.544 In 2002,
the EU (Spain and Portugal) joined the fishery, and so did the Russian Federation one
year later.545 As a result of the participation of new States, and a particular strong
recruitment of the 1999-year class, the catches reached another peak in the 2003-2004
period: between 5,300 and 6,700 tonnes, depending on the statistical record.546
In 2005, the fishery was put under an allocated TAC management regime. The
negotiation process was relatively short. In 2003, the Fisheries Commission requested
advice to the scientific committee, which was delivered to the 2004 Fisheries
Commission meeting. The scientific committee recommended that catches should be
limited to the levels of the two most recent years, which averaged 5,800 tonnes.547
However, instead, in the 2004 meeting, a Canadian proposal for TAC and allocation was
adopted by the Fisheries Commission.548 The TAC was set at 8,500 tonnes for the 3-year
period between 2005 and 2007. An allocation agreement was proposed by Canada, based
on ―standard allocation criteria‖ which were identified as coastal State status, percent
542
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biomass inside and outside Canada‘s 200 mile EEZ, coastal community dependence and
contribution to science and enforcement, catch history.549 The reports of the meeting do
not provide further details on the scientific basis or justification for the proposed (and
adopted) TAC, which was 46% higher than the scientific recommendation. Indeed, the
TAC was set at levels even higher than the catch peak of 8,100 tonnes reported in 1985.
Neither did the reports of the meetings specify the application of the allocation criteria
claimed to be used, their quantification, or their relative weight. The agreed allocation
was:
Canada
EC
Russia
Others
Total

2,500 tonnes
5,000 tonnes
500 tonnes
500 tonnes
8,500 tonnes

Following the adoption of the management measure, EC and Russia have
discontinued direct fishing for white hake in Division 3NO.550 Reported catches in that
area have fluctuated between 600 and 1,200 tonnes between 2005 and 2008.551
The scientific advice has consistently stated that given the intermittent recruitment
of this stock, and the change in fisheries between directed and by-catch, it is not possible
to give advice on an appropriate TAC. However, considering the lower biomass and poor
recruitment after the 1999 year-class, the Scientific Council has advised that catches of
white hake in Div. 3NO at the current TAC of 8,500 tonnes are ―not sustainable‖552 or
―unrealistic‖.553 The scientific committee recommended not exceeding the current level
of catches (ca. 1,100 in 3NO). Nevertheless, the Fisheries Commission maintained the
TAC and allocation for 2006, 2007, 2008 and 2009.
For 2010, the scientific committee again recommended that the 2006-2008
average annual catch level of 850 tonnes in Division 3NO not be exceeded.554 The
Fisheries Commission agreed to reduce the TAC to 6,000 tonnes, still seven times higher
549

Ibid.
NAFO, STACFIS Report, 4-18 June 2009, supra note 543, at 172.
551
Ibid, at 173.
552
NAFO, Scientific Council Reports 2005, Part A – Report of the Scientific Council Meeting 2-16 June
2005, at 21, online: NAFO <www.nafo.int>.
553
NAFO, Scientific Council Reports 2007, Part A – Report of the Scientific Council Meeting 7-21 June
2007, at 22-23, online: NAFO <www.nafo.int>.
554
NAFO Scientific Council, White hake stock assessment, supra note 544 at 22.
550

156

than the scientific recommendation.555 The allocation scheme was maintained without
discussion.556 Thus, Canada was allocated 1,765 tones, EC 3,529 tonnes, Russia and
―others‖ 353 tonnes each.557
Negotiation appeared to be easy in 2004 and again in 2009. No objections, debate,
concerns or complaints were reported. This may not be surprising, considering that only a
few States are interested in the fishery; that the national quotas apportioned to them are
larger than their historical catches and, therefore, no sacrifice was required for their
industries; and that the national quotas considerably exceed the real catches (and
therefore the economic interest) of their fleets. The fact that the status of the stock is
uncertain and declining, that the Scientific Council cannot determine reference points for
the stock, and that the TAC has been absolutely inconsistent with scientific advice every
year since the first conservation and management measure was adopted, appears to be
irrelevant for the management decisions.
In this particular case, the status of the stock and the management regime appear
to follow different paths. TAC and allocation do not act as a conservation and
management measure to limit fishing mortality at sustainable levels. Allocation has a
different purpose, although that purpose is unclear. A few hypotheses can be proposed.
White hake allocation may be playing the role of a bargaining chip within a ―package
allocation‖ that considers the several stocks managed by NAFO. The allocation may have
the objective of excluding potential new entrants to the fishery on the basis that the stock
is fully exploited and fishing opportunities are fully allocated. The allocation may be
considered as an investment for the future, in particular, considering that the stock is a
pulse recruiter capable of producing a large year class from a small spawning stock. What
is clear is that long-term conservation (and therefore intergenerational equity) is not the
concern of members in adopting the TAC and allocation.
Section 5. Intergenerational Equity in TACs and Allocation: Ways Forward
Intergenerational equity, or the concern for future generations, is only explicitly
stated as an objective of fisheries management in non-binding instruments. International
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Conventions and regional agreements do not generally contain an explicit reference to
this notion. Nevertheless, inter-temporal considerations and concern for future
generations are implicit in the duty of States to conserve high seas living marine
resources, a duty that has been reinforced by recent developments in international
environmental law. UNFSA recognizes those developments by acknowledging the longterm conservation of stocks as the objective of high seas fisheries cooperation, and by
requiring the implementation of the precautionary approach and ecosystem approach to
fisheries management.
TAC and allocation, as conservation and management measures, should therefore be
instrumental to intergenerational equity. It is particularly in setting the TAC that the
precautionary and ecosystem approaches should be implemented, thus balancing the
satisfaction of current needs with the requirement of ensuring options for future
generations.
In practice, however, an allocated TAC produces incentives to disregard future needs
in favor of immediate benefits. The rational selfish behavior of a State is to postpone
long-term considerations in order to obtain the short-term benefit of an increased national
quota. Several factors allow this rational, but detrimental, behavior. Among them, are:
a) The freedom of the high seas and its subsequent lack of quantitative restrictions
on fishing activities unless there is a specific agreement;
b) The decision-making process requiring consensus for the adoption of fishing
restrictions;
c) The process of adoption of TAC and allocations, concentrated in the same organs
of the RFMOs;
d) The lack of explicit criteria for conservation and, therefore, lack of explicit
consideration of the needs of future generations;
e) The fact that allocations are based, mostly, on historical catches, and in particular
historical catches of recent years;
f) The desired ―stability‖ in allocations, which in practice means roll-over of
allocation agreements after the first allocation.
To address the failures of TAC and allocation in achieving long-term conservation of the
fish stocks would require, therefore, addressing one or more of those factors.
Most authors addressing this problem in international fisheries law have proposed
that the decisions on TAC should be separated and insulated from decisions on
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allocations. Lodge et al. explicitly recommend that ―[d]ecisions on total allowable catch
or total allowable effort are insulated and separate from decisions on allocation.‖558
Willock and Lack, in their review of best practices in RFMOs, also conclude that
―negotiations over allocations should be transparent and separate from decisions on the
level of catch or effort.‖559 Lodge and Nandan concur in suggesting that ―[i]t is important
to emphasise that allocation rights, both in the EEZ and on the high seas, are subordinate
to the obligation to conserve.‖560 It is added that, for this purpose, allocations should be
based on percentage of TACs instead of volume of catch expressed in tonnes.561
Despite the logic of these suggestions, they face an almost insurmountable
challenge in their practical implementation. Decisions on TAC and allocations are made
by States, and in particular by the States participating in a specific cooperative
agreement. Decisions are therefore in the hands of those States, whether they are made in
the same body of the RFMO or in different bodies, and whether they are made together or
in different timeframes. As a consequence, they are necessarily related decisions. And it
is likely unrealistic to think that States will surrender jurisdiction to make decisions on
any of them.
The opposite solution, i.e. integrating both inter- and intra-generational aspects of
the decision, has also been proposed on the basis of the very concept of intergenerational
equity. Indeed, in Brown Weiss‘ theory of intergenerational equity, equitable access to
resources (thus intra-generational equity) is a component of intergenerational equity,
which denotes that they are note separate but inter-linked concepts.562 For this reason,
intergenerational equity has been categorized as an ―integrative‖ doctrine that recognizes
the legitimacy of multiple claims, and particularly the rights of members of the
developing world to enjoy equal access to planetary resources. 563 The integration is
supported in the fact that the balancing of the needs of present and future generations
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needs to take appropriate account of the needs of present generations. In the absence of
such a balance, future generations may benefit at the expense of current ones; or on the
contrary, their needs maybe overridden by current generation‘s needs and aspirations.
This integration of intergenerational and intra-generational equity cannot be
simply interpreted as considering a quota for future generations in the allocation of
fishing opportunities. Intergenerational allocation and international allocation have a
different temporal dimension and thus cannot be reduced to a uni-dimensional
distribution of fish stocks. Instead, the integration between current needs and future needs
in high seas fisheries could be translated, in practical terms, in an explicit and transparent
consideration of the trade-offs between present and future generations‘ needs.
Firstly, precautionary levels of exploitation would have to be defined with an
explicit reference to how that exploitation rate would protect the stock for the future.
These requirements already exist in UNFSA. In particular, article 6 on precautionary
approach and Annex II on Guidelines for the Application of Precautionary Reference
Points in Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory
Fish Stocks already establish the obligation to determine target and limit reference points
for each stock under management. However, with the exception of CCAMLR,564 this
requirement is seldom fulfilled by RFMOs.565
Even when those precautionary reference points exist and the scientific advice is
based on them, the scientific advice is often not followed by the management
commissions. This chapter has explained why allocation implications create incentives
for States to inflate TACs even disregarding scientific advice. As a result of these
deviations of the scientific advice, the impact of the decision on future generations is not
made explicit. Further transparency in the trade-offs between present and future
564
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generations would required, then, that the TAC finally agreed upon is joined by an
explicit declaration on how this decision would impact the availability of resources for
future generations.
Another strategy suggested to practically implement intergenerational equity in
environmental regimes is to include requirements to ―monitor and report on the status of
the trust corpus.‖566 The status of the fish stock is regularly monitored by each RFMO,
and in some cases also by independent reviews. Again, the transparency of these reports
with respect to intergenerational considerations could be greatly improved if they include
explicit declaration of the implication of the status for availability of resources for future
generations.
In relation to the transparency of the trade-offs between current and future
generations‘ needs, it is worth mentioning yet another strategy suggested to implement
intergenerational equity in international environmental law. This strategy is the
representation of future generations in the decision-making process. In this context, the
idea of an Ombudsman established at the international, regional, national or local level
has been proposed.567 The Ombudsman could have different functions: ensure that
international agreements incorporating planetary obligations and rights were properly
executed (with the capacity to intervene in administrative and judicial proceedings to this
end); to respond to citizen complaints and to investigate and mediate complaints
regarding the non-compliance with planetary obligations established in international
agreements; and to serve as watchdogs alert to impending problems affecting future
generations.
The idea faces skepticism. Brown Weiss acknowledges that the role of an
Ombudsman at the international level would face serious limitations on the basis of
national sovereignty.568 In general, the political will to ―implement and to abide by such
arrangement‖ has been doubted.569
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In relation to high seas fisheries, the idea of an Ombudsman actively participating
in the decision-making process has not been suggested and is, realistically, very unlikely.
However, another function attributed to the Ombudsman, namely the function of a
―watchdog‖, in practice has been exercised by the many institutions, academics and
NGOs that periodically review the performance of RFMOs.570 These ―watchdog‖
initiatives could either put pressure for RFMOs to integrate intergenerational equity in the
TAC decision making process, directly undertake that task by analyzing and publishing
how the TAC decisions of RFMOs impact the availability of resources for future
generations, and raise awareness of those tradeoffs.
At this point, it should be noted that the transparency of trade-offs by RFMOS or
watchdog initiatives are hindered by the limited responses available to address or
approach cases of weak performances. Beside public shame, they seldom result in a
practical and timely response that improves long-term conservation of the stocks. The
same is generally the case with the performance reviews undertaken by RFMOs, although
its institutional and official character may imply the necessity of a more proactive
response on the part of the RFMO and their member States. However, NGOs and public
pressure have proven successful mechanisms to promote change in some cases; its
potential should not be underestimated.
The alternative of resorting to international dispute settlement bodies on the basis
of breaches to the obligation of long-term conservation of living marine resources, the
obligation to cooperate for the conservation of those resources, or the obligation to
implement the precautionary or ecosystem approach, has generally not been exercised. 571
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Indeed, it has been widely noted that the current structure of dispute settlement
procedures is not suitable to address cases where multilateral action and global
conservation are at stake.572 However, as status of resources decline, this may be an
avenue that some States may pursue seriously in the future.
Finally, an approach that has been less explored as a means to avoid the persistent
disregard of long-term conservation in the adoption of TACs and allocation, is the
necessity to change the allocation criteria or mechanisms in order to remove the
incentives to engage in a race to fish. Indeed, the race to fish is motivated by two main
factors: the fact that historical catches, and furthermore, recent catches, are the
predominant allocation criterion; and the fact that the first allocation establishes the
participation of each State in the fishery on a permanent, or almost permanent, basis. As
long as these two features persist, so will the inevitable chain of events (―postponing
management measures - race to fish – increased catches – inflated TAC – paper quotas‖).
This particular proposal is further addressed in the next chapter.

Nations Law of the Sea Convention), (Arbitrators: Judge Stephen M. Schwebel, H.E. Judge Florentino
Feliciano, Rt. Hon. Justice Sir Kenneth Keith, KBE, H.E. Judge Per Tresselt, Professor Chusei Yamada).
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Chapter 5. TAC and Allocation and Intra-generational Equity
This chapter addresses the fundamental question of distribution of fishing
opportunities among competing States – a question of equity. It attempts to explore the
normative content of the concept of equity as a legal standard for the allocation of a
scarce resource.
The question is posed in the context of an evolution that denotes an ongoing
struggle to achieve predictable and objective patterns of distribution. That struggle has
been depicted in chapters 2 and 3. Since predictability and objectivity are predominant
roles of law, it is therefore implied in this struggle that there is a perceived need to define
and refine legal principles applicable to the distribution of fishing opportunities. In other
words, there is a need to identify normative content to equity considerations.
But the question is also posed in the context of a belief that the distribution – and
indeed equity - is a political rather than a legal issue. Oda has categorically asserted that
in the issues of allocation of benefits and burdens of ocean management and
conservation,
(...) the concept of equity has a predominant impact, while legal norms play little
or no role. Equity comprises no objective legal criterion and varies in each
circumstance. Its evaluation or determination is not a simple matter. Solutions in
the above categories nonetheless will need to be found; but they will not be found
simply in rules and regulations of law, and they are not subject simply to judicial
determination.573
In the same line, Molenaar noted that the ―allocation process is to a large extent
governed by political and negotiating factors, and constrained only by very general rules
and principles of international law.‖574
The purpose of this chapter is to explore and ultimately challenge those
assertions. An attempt is made to determine what role can law fulfill in order to provide
objective and predictable solutions to the distributional problem; to identify those ―very
general rules and principles of international law‖ applicable to the issue; and to refine, or
at least suggest ways to refine, their normative content.
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To address this task, it is necessary to address first the meaning and role of equity
in international law. Within this wider framework, the concept of intra-generational
equity in international environmental law and in the field of sustainable development is
analyzed. This first task proved not to be easy. Equity is a controversial,
multidimensional, and evolving, concept. Schachter has stated that ―no concept of
international law resists precise definition more than the notion of equity‖.575
Weeramantry cites a scholar defining equity as "a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an
enigma."576 This thesis has no ambition for solving the riddle. An introductory section on
equity is needed, however, to address the main focus of this chapter: equity as a legal
standard for allocation of resources. That extended introductory analysis provides a
framework to address whether equity is considered in the international fisheries legal and
regional framework.
After these general introductory analyses, the chapter explores, in successive
sections, three legal principles rooted in equity. The first section addresses the role of
equity in maritime delimitation. This analysis provides important insights on the
construction of a normative concept of equity in international law, as interpreted and
applied by international tribunals.
The second section analyses the concept of equitable utilization in the law of nonnavigational uses of international watercourses. This field of international law was
considered relevant because it is with respect to this shared resource that the principle of
equitable utilization has had most developments at the legal, policy and jurisprudential
level. In addition, its legal framework offers significant parallelism with the legal
framework for straddling and highly migratory stocks, analyzed in chapter 3. Water
shares with straddling and highly migratory stocks the fact that they ―move‖ across
boundaries.
The third section addresses the principle of common but differentiated
responsibility, and the extent that it provides a useful standard for allocation of burdens
and benefits.
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The purpose of this analysis is to draw on lessons and key concepts on the
contribution of equity to solving allocation problems. Those lessons and contributions are
summarized in the last section of this chapter, including an analysis of the particular
conflicts of interests identified in chapter 3.
Section 1. Equity in International Law
Equity is multi-dimensional. It is a philosophical, ethical, political, and legal
concept. The role of equity, and its relation to law, has long been debated. Some consider
that equity is not a legal concept, but just an ethical one. Some consider that equity is the
moral foundation of international law. Others see in equity the objective of international
law (and thus, more lege ferenda then lex lata). However, currently there seems to be
agreement in that equity, and equitable principles, is part of substantive and procedural
legal frameworks.577 It is equity as a legal concept that is of interest for this thesis,
although references to the relationship between equity as a legal concept and ethical,
political or social concepts of equity are inevitable.
Even narrowing the meaning of equity to its legal meaning, it is a concept that is
understood differently and plays different roles in common law and civil law systems,
and in domestic and international law systems. The aspect relevant for this thesis is the
legal concept of equity as understood and applied in international law.
The traditional concept of equity arises from Aristotle‘s Nichomachean Ethics.
Along with the two forms of particular justice,578 Aristotle identifies a procedural notion
of equity, or the equitable, as corrective justice. Corrective justice implies an
individualization of the general law to specific cases. Aristotle stated: ―[w]hen the law
speaks universally, then, and a case arises on it which is not covered by the universal
statement, then it is right, where the legislator fails us and has erred by over-simplicity, to
correct the omission – to say what the legislator himself would have said had he been
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present, and would have put into his law if he had known.‖579 Equity, or the equitable,
acts then as a ―correction of law where it is defective owing to its universality.‖580
Janis has stated that ―equity acting as a form of judicial discretion is the oldest
and most generally accepted role for equity in international law.‖581 In this respect, it is
useful to distinguish equity, as a legal concept, from ex aequo et bono, which the
Tribunals may apply to the settlement of disputes with the consent of the respective
States. As stated by Sir Jennings, the difference between these two notions of equity is
not only the source of discretion (States‘ consent, or law). The content of equity and the
process of its application are different, as well. ―[E]quity, as a part of law, should mean
the application to the case of principles and rules of equity for the proper identification of
which a legal training is essential. The appreciation and application of equity so
conceived is essentially juridical.‖582
The issue is, however, not settled. Controversy exists on the extent to which an
international judge can exercise discretion to complement, or even modify, international
law and in particular treaty law. In this respect, three types of equity have been identified:
equity infra legem,583 equity prater legem,584 and equity contra legem.585 While equity
infra legem is generally accepted (and even recognized as ―the ordinary process a court
has to go through to arrive at its judgment‖)586, the recourse to equity praeter legem and
contra legem is debated and, in the latter case, mostly rejected.
A second form of equity that has had recognition in international law is
autonomous equity587, or broadly conceived equity.588 In this case, equity does not
mitigate the unfair effects of the application of the rule of law to a particular situation, but
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is itself the dominant rule of law. As can be imagined, such a broad concept of equity has
been resisted as a legal concept – and considered as cases of application of ex aequo et
bono.
A key element of both forms of equity is their connection to the factual situation.
The application of equity requires, then, a legal process of identifying the factors of the
specific case that have legal relevance, and considering how those factors affect the
application of the rule of law. Among those relevant factors are the rights, entitlements
and interests of parties that are in conflict. ―Equity infra legem allows the court to
determine which interpretation is the most just, having regard to the circumstances and
balancing the rights and obligations of the parties‖.589 Schachter has also identified as one
of the methods of operation of equity, the balancing of interests of the parties. Thus,
equity is also understood as an exercise of balancing the rights, interests, needs and other
considerations that are in conflict in a specific situation.
Equity is also understood as a legal standard for allocating shared resources; and
more generally, allocating the benefits, resources, burdens, and costs that derive from a
common resource. Schachter, for example, mentions equitable standards for the
allocation of sharing of resources and benefits as one of the five uses of equity in
international law. Shelton, as well, classifies rules for allocation of scarce resources as
substantive norm of equity. Franck considers that equity is a mode of introducing justice
into resource allocation;590 and adds that equity lends ―important assistance in this task,
affording judges a measure of discretion, within a flexible rule-structure, commensurate
with the uniqueness of each dispute and the rapid evolution of new resource recovery and
management technology.‖591
Many authors refer to this notion of equity as synonymous of distributive
justice.592 Distributive justice, or equity, tracks its roots back to Aristotle. He defined
distributive justice as one form of particular justice that requires that the distribution of
honor, money, or other things that fall to be divided among those who have a share in the
589
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constitution, according to merit, although not all may agree on the sort of merit that shall
be relevant for the distribution.593
Equity as distributive justice is understood also with a different emphasis. It is
understood not as a correction of strict rules of law, nor balancing of competing rights
and interests, but as a norm correcting existing distribution of wealth. In this
understanding, the principle of distributive justice and economic equity justifies a transfer
of resources from developed to developing States, in order to reduce and if possible
eradicate the gap that exists between a minority of rich nations and a majority of poor
nations.
Janis has observed that the concept of equity is understood under two different
conceptions by western and third world international lawyers, respectively. Western
laywers, following a traditional conception of equity as corrective equity and therefore as
judicial discretion, view equity as ―a flexible corrective function in specific cases not
well-handled by strict universal rules‖594 (which he calls discretionary justice). Third
world international lawyers, in turn, ―see equity notions as emerging from perceived
economic and political injustices in the global distribution of wealth and power.‖595
These equity notions, thus, would correct those inequalities in the distributions of wealth.
This dual meaning of the concept of equity is also noticed by Schachter. He notes
that ―equity and distributive justice are identified almost entirely with the demands of the
poor and disadvantaged for a larger share of resources‖.596 Indeed, he notes that for
economists, distributive justice is used ―virtually as a code word for wider income
distribution and transfer payments to the poor.‖597 He acknowledges, however, that the
idea of equity has a much wider meaning for governments than this narrow interpretation
of the term.598
In this respect, it is useful to mention a distinction made by the International
Court of Justice in the field of maritime delimitation. Although equity is considered a
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principle of international law applicable to maritime boundary disputes (and actually, one
of the main areas where equity as a legal principle has been recognized and applied), the
International Court of Justice has explicitly ruled that maritime delimitation is not a
matter of distributive justice.599 The judgment on the North Sea Continental shelf cases600
stated that the task of the tribunal was related to
delimitation and not the apportionment of the areas concerned or their division
into converging sectors. […] Delimitation in an equitable manner is one thing, but
not the same thing as awarding a just and equitable share of a previously
undelimited area […].601
The exclusion of matters of distributive justice from maritime boundary disputes
has justified the rejection of economic and social factors as relevant criteria in the search
for an equitable solution. Judge Oda, in his dissenting opinion in the Continental Shelf
(Libyan Arab Jarnahiriya/Malta) Judgment, states that consideration of socio-economic
elements involve
global resource policies, or basic problems of world politics, which not only could
not be solved by the judicial organ of the world community but stray well beyond
equity as a norm of law into the realm of social organization.602
Does this imply that the apportionment of shared resources – distributive justice is necessarily a political rather than legal decision? Fuentes, commenting on international
watercourses law, argues not. She argues that the distinction between delimitation and
apportionment is rather artificial,603 and that the ―real objection to the inclusion of socioeconomic factors does not lie in a per se extra-legal nature of the socio-economic criteria,
but on how these factors should operate in the process of delimitation so that the decision
599
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does not intrude into the political realm.‖604 In other words, the inclusion of socioeconomic elements in the application of the rule of equitable utilization ―does not
necessarily transform what is to be a judicial decision into a political one.‖ 605 The correct
approach, in this interpretation, is to distinguish between relevant and non-relevant socioeconomic factors.606 Thus, and according to this interpretation, establishing just and
equitable shares of an undivided resource is not, per se, excluded from the application of
equity as a rule of law.607
In this distinction, it is the latter concept of distributive justice which seems to be
denied a legal character – while the balancing of rights and interests (even when those
rights and interests have an economic or social component) is considered a matter of law
if they are relevant to the dispute, and to the extent to which they are relevant.
It seems apparent that international lawyers and scholars alike address equity as
distributional justice under two different notions, or doctrines in the terms of Janis. One is
a legal notion of equitable principles that allow making case-specific decisions on
balancing different interests and rights, a function that is intrinsically a legal reasoning
(what could be called distributional justice in a narrow, technical or legal, sense). The
other is a socio-political concept of re-distribution of wealth to correct social injustices –
a concept that is extra-legal in nature (what could be called distributional justice in a
broader, or political, sense).
Janis, however, makes a note of caution with respect to the attributed extra-legal
nature of distributional justice in a broader sense. He acknowledges that this notion does
not necessarily imply any legal quality, but economic, political or moral aspirations; and
that it is simple to dismiss them as not having any meaning in international law or that
they represent, at best, lege ferenda.608 However, he notices that this explanation is
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inadequate for two reasons: first, because it does not take into account the references to
equity made in subsequent international practice in relation to economic relations; and
secondly, it does not take into account a doctrine (the ―third world doctrine‖) that
ascribes a legal quality to the broader concept of distributional justice.609
Both of these arguments are best understood while analyzing the principle of
intra-generational equity in the field of sustainable development.
Section 2. International Environmental Law, Sustainable Development, and IntraGenerational Equity
Equity is considered to be a key concern, and indeed an important element of
political division, in environmental law and law of sustainable development.610 This
equity concern arises from the global impacts on the environment that can be created by
development efforts, and the increased interdependency of countries in the globalized
world. It arises as well from the interactions between environmental protection and
development opportunities, subsumed in the concept of sustainable development. It is a
possibility and a reality that while some communities reap the benefits of development,
others bear its environmental costs. It is also possible that costs of environmental
protection are imposed unevenly among and within communities. Those distributional
problems are equity problems; and they have created sharp divisions among countries.
Brown Weiss noted that
[a]t the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED),
countries were deeply divided over questions of equity (…) While [countries]
agreed that environmental protection and economic development were compatible
through sustainable development, they disagreed about who should pay for it and
how much.611
The concern of equity in the integration of environmental protection and
economic and social development has been present since the first conferences addressing
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those issues.612 However, its emphasis – and consequently the political divisions– became
stronger along with a stronger emphasis on the development aspects of sustainable
development.613
The 1992 Rio Declaration was adopted ―with the goal of establishing a new and
equitable global partnership through the creation of new levels of cooperation among
States, key sectors of societies and peoples.‖614 Its third principle states: ―The right to
development must be fulfilled so as to equitably meet developmental and environmental
needs of present and future generations.‖ It adds in principle 5:
All States and all people shall cooperate in the essential task of eradicating
poverty as an indispensable requirement for sustainable development, in order to
decrease the disparities in standards of living and better meet the needs of the
majority of the people of the world.
On the basis of this declaration, the International Law Association has included
equity and eradication of poverty as one of the principles which ―application and, where
relevant, consolidation and further development […] would be instrumental in pursuing
the objective of sustainable development in an effective way.‖615 The principle of equity
includes, in this formulation, both inter- and intra-generational equity, which is defined as
―the right of all peoples within the current generation of fair access to the current
generation‘s entitlement to the Earth‘s natural resource‖.616 In respect to the latter, the
ILA states:
The right to development must be implemented so as to meet developmental and
environmental needs of present and future generations in a sustainable and
equitable manner. This includes the duty to co-operate for the eradication of
poverty in accordance with Chapter IX on International Economic and Social Cooperation of the Charter of the United Nations and the Rio Declaration on
Environment and Development as well as the duty to co-operate for global
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sustainable development and the attainment of equity in the development
opportunities of developed and developing countries.617
Several references to equity can be also found in the environmental agreements
that were elaborated in recent years and in particular under the umbrella of UNCED
conferences. Prominent examples thereof are the Climate Change Convention,618 and the
Biodiversity Convention.619
It is somehow paradoxal that, despite the deep division by countries on matters of
equity,620 the concept is nevertheless profusely invoked in international instruments. It is
therefore not a surprise that the actual meaning of those equity references, its legal status,
and practical consequences are not clear.621 Sands notes:
Little consideration was given, however, to what the concept means or to its
consequences when applied to a particular set of facts. Indeed, the way it was
sometimes referred to suggests that some of its main proponents had little
understanding of its prior use in international law, especially as recently applied
by the International Court of Justice. At UNCED, the term provided a convenient
way of introducing flexibility and ambiguity into the rights and obligations which
were being put in place. Its frequent usage reflects a lack of consensus (as
opposed to the existence of consensus) in efforts to allocate rights and
responsibilities for States with differing levels of economic development and
perspectives on their future needs and priorities.622
The ambiguity can be found not only in legal instruments, but also in the work of
scholars. Albeit all recognize equity, intra-generational equity, or equitable use as
components of the broader concept of sustainable development, their understanding of
617
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the concept differs. In many respects, this ambiguity reflects the distinction between
―discretionary justice‖ and ―distributive justice‖ identified by Janis and discussed in the
previous section.
Sands, for example, addresses intra-generational equity as a synonym of equitable
use, which he perceives in terms similar to judicial discretion (albeit applied to
negotiations): ―a flexible means of leaving the extent of rights and obligations to be
decided at a subsequent date‖623 and with an emphasis on the balancing of relevant
factors.624 References made to allocation of shared freshwater resources, as well as the
Icelandic Fisheries case, and the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros625 case reinforce that, in Sands
approach, intra-generational equity is equivalent to equity as understood and applied by
international tribunals: as a rule or principle of law.
Other authors, on the contrary, address intra-generational equity as a concept
with, mainly, a redistributive objective. This can be clearly seen from the ILA New Delhi
Declaration, which addresses equity together with eradication of poverty. 626 Schrijver,
who follows the principles identified in this declaration in his analysis, notes in respect to
intra-generational equity that it can refer to: a) more equal development opportunities; or
b) a more just income distribution within a country as well as in an international NorthSouth context.627
Perhaps the clearest exposition of the multiple, and evolving, roles of equity
within the concept of sustainable development is explained by French. He starts by
stating that equity has both a legal and political meaning, but then focuses on the political
meaning of equity. In this respect, French observes that within the concept of sustainable
development, equity means different things, or more precisely, has become to mean
different things as the agenda of sustainable development has broadened. 628 On one side,
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it means simply that environmental protection must be accompanied by developmental
aspects. But progressively, the purpose of equity has evolved to consider quality-of-life
and human development that need to be addressed if sustainable development is to
become meaningful. ―The role of equity within sustainable development is consequently
to confront the wider structural issues of injustice and unfairness within the international
economic and political system that have hindered the South‘s development since the
1960s.‖629 From this role of equity would derive a moral and legal injunction upon the
North to assist the South with its efforts to develop sustainably.630 Not surprisingly,
French notes that the North does not share this notion of equity, and instead prefers a
narrower concept of equity that simply highlights the fact that poverty is a major cause of
environmental degradation.631
This is the place to discuss, then, the legal status of equity or intra-generational
equity as a component of sustainable development. Generally, the concept of sustainable
development has been denied the status of a legal principle or legal norm in international
law.632 The same is true for one of its components: intra-generational equity. It has been
noted that ―there is little in the way of State practice and opinio juris to suggest that it is
customary international law‖.633 Schrijver, for example, considers that ―intra-generational
equity can at best be allocated a ‗soft law‘ status.‖634 Sands does not address the legal
status of the principle explicitly.
However, even understood as a political statement and thus as an objective of
policy action, rather than as a normative concept, it has legal implications. Two of them
can be identified: a) the interpretation of legal concepts – including the legal concept of
629
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equity;635 and b) the inception and development of legal principles of rules of
international law.636
The Brundtland report has defined sustainable development as ―development that
meets the needs of present generations without compromising the ability of future
generations to meet their own needs.‖637 This definition highlights two key elements of
the concept of sustainable development:
a) The idea of limitations to development imposed by the carrying capacity of the
environment;
b) The emphasis on ―needs‖, which implies the idea that people in developing countries
as well as future generations should be able to meet their basic needs.638
Equity, in the concept of sustainable development, puts an emphasis on the social
and development considerations, along with environmental concerns. Thus, the concept
of sustainable development sheds a new, and stronger, light into social and economic
aspects – need – in the decision making process.
Equity, interpreted in the light of sustainable development, would require that
emphasis, or at least careful consideration be given to the social and economic aspects in
this balancing exercise. And as has been already noted in the previous section, this
emphasis or careful consideration to social and economic aspects and the needs of the
parties does not necessarily transform a decision based on equity as a legal norm, into a
decision based on politics.
There is still another legal implication of the concept of sustainable development
in the interpretation, inception and development of legal standards. Sustainable
development emphasizes the material differences between the countries involved. An
equal treatment of States that are formally equal, but substantially unequal, is by
definition unjust. Giving emphasis to the material situation of the State, and establishing
appropriate responses according to these differences, is a matter of equity or justice. And
this equity concern is precisely the justification of the principle of common but
635
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differentiated responsibility. The acknowledgment of different material circumstances
through the principle of common but differentiated responsibility has had distributive
consequences; it implies that ―the cost of preventive measures is not met equally by all
States.‖639
Section 3. Equity and Equitable Principles in International Fisheries Instruments
The previous sections have explained how the concept of equity, and equity as a
norm for the allocation of scarce resources (i.e. distributional justice), has been
understood in international law and in international law in the field of sustainable
development. The current section addresses whether equity, in its narrow or broad
meaning, have been included as a principle in international fisheries law.
References to equity in international fisheries law leave one with a mixed feeling.
On the one hand, the LOSC has as clear objective the achievement of equity. On the other
hand, references to equity ever since the LOSC have almost disappeared from
international instruments.
The LOSC includes several references to equity. The preamble states
Recognizing the desirability of establishing through this Convention, with due
regard for the sovereignty of all States, a legal order for the seas and oceans which
will facilitate international communication, and will promote the peaceful uses of
the seas and oceans, the equitable and efficient utilization of their resources, the
conservation of their living resources, and the study, protection and preservation
of the marine environment,
Bearing in mind that the achievement of these goals will contribute to the
realization of a just and equitable international economic order which takes into
account the interests and needs of mankind as a whole and, in particular, the
special interests and needs of developing countries, whether coastal or landlocked,
References to equity are also made in the substantive sections of the treaty, in the
following context:
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a) As a fundamental legal norm to resolve conflicts of interests in the EEZ;640
b) As a standard to regulate access to the fish stock surplus in the EEZ from the
same subregion or region by land-locked States and geographically
disadvantage States;641
c) As the standard and objective of maritime delimitation of EEZ and continental
shelves;642
d) As a legal standard for the distribution of the payments and contributions
made by coastal States to the International Seabed Authority with respect to
the exploitation of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles;643
e) As a legal standard for the distribution of the benefits of the exploitation of the
international seabed, common heritage of humankind;644
f) As a guiding principle for the transfer of marine technology for the benefit of
all States concerned;645 and the training of members of the managerial,
research and technical staff constituted by the Seabed Authority;646 and
g) To guide the composition of international organs by States through geographic
representation.647
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According to Janis, the equity provisions of the LOSC ―display a considerable
and confusing degree of variety.‖648 Although in some cases he ascribes a particular
reference to one of the doctrines of equity he previously identifies, 649 many equity
references can be read with different emphasis, according to the reader‘s eyes.
Most importantly for this thesis, the provisions regulating the high seas, and
particularly the conservation and use of living marine resources in the high seas, do not
have any reference to equity or equitable principles. Similarly, UNFSA does not make
any references to equity in its preamble or in its substantive provisions. This absence is
more remarkable if it is considered in the context of a LOSC where equity is explicitly
stated as an objective in many provisions and institutions.
Is equity, therefore, a principle for high seas fisheries governance regimes? And if
so, what does equity mean for the high seas fisheries regulatory framework?
The foundations of the high seas fisheries regime are in the LOSC and thus, the
general principles of the LOSC shall be considered applicable to it. The preamble of the
LOSC recognizes the desirability of establishing, through the Convention, a legal order
that promotes, inter alia, ―equitable and efficient utilization of their resources‖. 650 It could
be argued, therefore, that the objectives of the high seas fisheries regime should be in line
with equity and efficiency. However, this preamble can also be read as to mean that this
equitable and efficient utilization of the resources is achieved through the carefully
balanced rights and obligations of States as developed in the LOSC provisions. In other
words, it can be argued that equity and efficiency were the guiding principles in the
overall design of the different regimes of the oceans included in the LOSC. That does not
mean, or at least not necessarily, that equity and efficiency are directly applicable as
guiding principles in each of the regimes; in particular in the high seas fisheries regime
where equity is not explicitly mentioned.
The objectives for high seas fisheries management, as established in articles 63,
64, and 118 of the LOSC regulating the duty for States to cooperate in the case of high
648
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seas fisheries, is the ―conservation‖651 and ―optimum utilization‖ of the high seas living
marine resources.652 UNFSA, in turn, states as an objective of the agreement, and thus of
the cooperation of States, the ―long-term conservation‖ and ―sustainable use‖ of
straddling and highly migratory stocks. Is equity included, implicitly, in those objectives?
It has already been mentioned in chapter 4 that the term conservation, which
originally was centered in maximizing productivity as in the concept of maximum
sustainable yield, can be interpreted in the light of the principles advanced by
international environmental law. Following those developments, FAO has defined the
objective of fisheries management as maintaining the quality, diversity and availability of
fishery resources in sufficient quantities for present and future generations in the context
of food security, poverty alleviation and sustainable development.653 UNFSA, in turn,
also reflects those developments in its provisions, and in particular in the broader concept
of conservation that includes ecosystem considerations and the precautionary approach.
This broader concept of conservation is also reflected in the objective of the agreement:
the long-term conservation and sustainable utilization of straddling and highly migratory
stocks.
It has been doubted if this objective - to ensure the long-term conservation and
sustainable use of straddling and highly migratory stocks - can be regarded as a specific
norm governing the outcome of an allocation process.654 Even if it is considered as an
overarching objective of high seas fisheries management and therefore governing the
specific management measure of TAC and allocation, it is doubtful that it includes equity
651
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as a principle guiding access to fishing opportunities. Long-term conservation, as it has
been stated in the previous chapter, has an emphasis on the inter-temporal dimension of
conservation. The term sustainable utilization, in turn, is probably used in the sense of the
utilization that is compatible with the regeneration of the stock. In other words, the term
sustainable refers probably to a biological sustainability of the stock (inherent in the
terms maximum or optimum sustainable yield), rather than to the concept of sustainable
development (including intra-generational equity).
The latter interpretation can be supported by reference to the history of the
concept of sustainable development. Schrijver notes that the concept of sustainability
acquired its earliest expression in fisheries, and in particular in the concept of maximum
sustainable yield.655

However, he also notes that the substance of the concept of

sustainable development has been formed by a convergence of international
developments in the fields of environmental conservation, development and human
rights.656 In the early manifestations of the term sustainable, therefore, the development
aspect and the related idea of intra-generational equity, were not yet present.
This interpretation can also be supported by the principles of sustainable
development recognized by scholars. Sands and Schrijver, for example, identify
sustainable use as a distinctive element of sustainable development, and different from
intra-generational equity.657
It must be noted, however, that the objective for fisheries management included in
provision 6.2 of the Code of Conduct makes an explicit reference to sustainable
development (and not sustainable use). This reference may allow a conclusion that the
elements of sustainable development – and in particular intra-generational equity – are
guiding principles for the adoption of conservation and management measures, including
TAC and allocation. However, the Code of Conduct applies to all fishing activities within
and beyond EEZs, so its interpretation as a guiding principle for allocation of fishing
opportunities in the high seas may be questioned. In addition, the non-binding character
of the code must be taken into account.
655
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Other non-binding international instruments do not make references to equity
either. But more interesting is the fact that, in the drafting of several documents, explicit
references to equity or equitable allocations were deleted and replaced with reference to
―transparent‖ allocation criteria consistent with ―existing international law.‖ Several
examples can be cited in this respect.
The first example is the Johannesburg Plan of Action. The Plan includes a
paragraph (nr. 30) which identifies several actions to achieve ―sustainable fisheries‖. One
of those actions, included in subparagraph e), is to
encourage relevant regional fisheries management organizations and
arrangements to give due consideration to the rights, duties and interests of
coastal States and the special requirements of developing States when addressing
the issue of the allocation of share of fishery resources for straddling stocks and
highly migratory fish stocks, mindful of the provisions of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea and the Agreement for the Implementation of
the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10
December 1982 relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish
Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, on the high seas and within exclusive
economic zones.
An earlier proposal included the expression "equitable and" sustainable fisheries
as a goal for the actions listed in paragraph 30; and subparagraph (e) included a reference
to "the rights of coastal States‖ in the allocation of highly migratory fish stocks. Both the
reference to equitable in the chapeau of the paragraph, and the reference to rights of
coastal States in the high seas, was objected to by several States.658 It was argued, for this
latter point, that the LOSC did not recognize any rights of coastal States in the high seas.
After lengthy negotiation, the difficulty was settled by a package deal that included: a)
amending subparagraph (e) to reflect the language of LOSC in article 116 - ―rights,
duties, and interests of coastal States‖ -

and to add a reference to the special

requirements of developing States; and b) remove the reference to ―equitable‖ fisheries in
the chapeau.659
Another example is the IPOA IUU. Molenaar observes:
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It is noteworthy that para. 71 of the Sydney Draft IPOA on IUU Fishing […],
stipulated that RFMOs ―should address the issue of access to the resource in a
timely, realistic and equitable manner in order to foster co-operation and enhance
sustainability in the fishery''. In the October 2000 Draft IPOA on IUU Fishing
[…], the words ―in a timely, realistic and equitable manner'' have been left out,
although the sentence now ends with ―in accordance with international law''.660
Another example is offered by the work developed by the Informal Consultation
of the States parties to the UNFSA to agree on elements for assessing the adequacy and
effectiveness of the Agreement, in preparation for the 2006 UNFSA Review Conference.
During the fourth Informal Consultation, its Chairman circulated a working paper with
possible criteria for assessing the effectiveness of the Agreement.661 This working paper
included, among other, the following element: ―Fishing allocation – extent to which
RFMOs have allocated fishing opportunities fairly and equitably‖. The Consultation
discussed the draft assessment criteria during the next informal UNFSA preparatory
meeting in March 2006, on the basis of a revised Chairman working paper that would
take into account the suggestions made by the delegates and submitted in the interim.662
The agreed document on ―Elements for assessing the adequacy and effectiveness of the
Agreement‖ worded the criteria in the following terms: ―participatory rights – extent to
which RFMOs have agreed, as appropriate, on participatory rights, such as allocation of
allowable catch or levels of fishing effort.‖663
Not surprisingly, the same debate took place during the Review Conference of
UNFSA, where participatory rights and allocation of fishing opportunities was explicitly
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addressed by the Conference. Delegates acknowledged that ―articles 10(b) and 11 of
[UNFSA] provided the framework for participatory rights‖, as well as the effort
undertaken by some RFMOs to address participatory rights and allocation issues.
However, they noted that ―further work is needed to develop more detailed criteria for
participatory rights, bearing in mind the importance of addressing social and economic
interests in a manner consistent with conservation objectives.‖664 As a consequence, the
Conference agreed to recommend that States, individually and collectively through
regional fisheries management organizations,
(...) address participatory rights through, inter alia, the development of transparent
criteria for allocating fishing opportunities, taking due account, inter alia, of the
status of the relevant stocks and the interests of all those with a real interest in the
fishery.665
Once again, the wording of this recommendation was subject to debate and
negotiation. An earlier draft included the need to develop ―equitable criteria for allocating
fishing opportunities‖, an expression that was later replaced by ―transparent criteria‖.666
At the regional level, most RFMO Conventions do not make a reference to equity
as either a goal or objective of the organization, or a goal or objective of the allocation
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processes in particular.667 The only exceptions thereto are SEAFO and IOTC, which have
explicitly mentioned equitable utilization, equitable benefit or equitable participation in
the preamble and, in the case of IOTC, in the normative text of their Conventions.668
The lack of references to equity, and furthermore, the explicit attempt to delete
references to equity in global instruments, may lead to the conclusion that equity was
intentionally not considered as a fundamental norm in the high seas fisheries regime.669
The opposite interpretation (i.e. to consider equitable use as a fundamental norm
guiding the allocation process, despite the fact that it has not been considered explicitly in
LOSC or UNFSA670) has been supported with reference to two arguments.671 One of
them is based on the decisions in the Fisheries Jurisdiction (Federal Republic of
Germany v. Iceland) and Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (United Kingdom v. Iceland)
cases,672 where the ICJ explicitly held that the States involved were ―under mutual
obligations to undertake negotiations in good faith for the equitable solution of their
differences concerning their respective fishery rights'',673 and that ―in order to reach an
equitable solution of the present dispute it is necessary that the preferential fishing rights
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of Iceland, as a State specially dependent on coastal fisheries, be reconciled with the
traditional fishing rights of the Applicant.‖674 The ―significance of equity in multilateral
fisheries management in general, and of allocation in particular, is also apparent in many
other paragraphs of the Judgment.‖675
A second argument arises from several regional practices that, paradoxically,
recognized equity explicitly as a guiding norm for allocation of fishing opportunities.
Beside the two regional agreements already mentioned above, the cases of ICCAT and
NAFO are worth considering. ICCAT criteria for allocation of fishing opportunities states
explicitly that ―the allocation criteria should be applied in a fair and equitable manner
(…)‖.676 The work undertaken by NAFO to develop guidelines for allocation was also
built upon a general support for the view that allocation criteria ―should reflect the
principle of equity‖.677 These examples demonstrate that States assign a role to equity in
the allocation processes.
Scholars, on the other hand, provide wide support for the application of equity to
high seas governance, in general, or high seas fisheries management, in particular. It has
been noted that Molenaar supports the application of equity to high seas fisheries
allocation conflicts. Rayfuse and Warner also identify intra-generational equity as one of
the ―modern norms of international law‖ which conditions the exercise of the freedom of
the high seas.678 Freestone, in turn, identifies sustainable and equitable use as one
principle for high seas governance in the 21st century.679 This opinion has been reflected
in the IUCN ten modern principles for high seas governance.680
In this very obscure and contradictory description, it is hard to assess whether
States consider equity as a fundamental principle for high seas fisheries management and
674
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of allocation of fishing opportunities in particular. An explanation of these contradictory
records may be found, however, by focusing on the different meanings of equity in
international law provided in the previous sections.
Indeed, the expression of ―equitable criteria for allocation‖ has been replaced by
―transparent criteria for allocation according to international law‖ in those cases where,
because of the context of the document and their global scope, equitable may have been
understood as distributive justice in its re-distributive meaning. On the contrary, a
technical concept of equity as balancing the different rights and interests according to the
relevant circumstances of the particular case, does not create such an objection.
In addition, scholars that consider equity as a principle to be applied to high seas
governance or allocation of fishing opportunities consider equity in this technical sense:
as an act of balancing the rights, interests and relevant factors of the particular case. That
is demonstrated, for example, by the fact that the principle has been sustained in the
references to equity made by the ICJ in the Fisheries Case. It is also demonstrated by the
fact that scholars make a reference to equitable use or equitable utilization, which is
widely recognized as a principle of international law. In addition, IUCN defines explicitly
equitable use as ―balance between the rights and interests of individual users and those of
the international community.‖681
There are other legal arguments that support a role for equity in its legal meaning.
One of them is the provision of articles 87(2) and 116(b) of the LOSC. According to
article 87(2), the freedoms of the high seas shall be exercised by all States with due
regard for the interests of other States in their exercise of the freedom of the high seas.
According to article 116(b), the States have the right to fish in the high seas, but a right
that is qualified by the rights, duties and interests of coastal States with respect to, among
others, straddling and highly migratory stocks. The provisions of ―due regard‖ and
―subject to‖ imply an act of accommodation and balancing of the rights and interests of
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the States (both fishing in the high seas and coastal States), which is the essence of equity
in its legal meaning.
The same conclusion arises from the provisions of UNFSA, in articles 7, 11 and
24. All these provisions identify a series of ―relevant factors‖ that need to be taken into
account in decisions on compatibility of measures within and outside EEZ, and allocation
of fishing opportunities to new members. The consideration of all relevant factors of the
particular case is also an element of the essence of the traditional legal notion of equity.
For these reasons, whether explicitly stated as an objective of the allocation
process of the RFMO or not, it can be concluded that at least prima facie, a technical or
legal meaning of equity can be considered as a guiding principle in the allocation
processes.
However, this raises the question of what that implies for allocation processes.
What is the normative content of equity in international law? How does it constrain the
discretion of States?
To address these questions, the following three sections will analyze the
implementation of three equitable principles. The first is equitable delimitation in
maritime boundary delimitation; the second is the law of non-navigational uses of
international watercourses; and the third is the principle of common but differentiated
responsibility. At the end of this analysis, lessons for high seas fisheries are drawn.
Section 4. The Principle of Equitable Delimitation in Maritime Boundary
Delimitation
It has been already noted that there is one significant difference between equitable
delimitation and allocation of shared resources. The ICJ has explicitly stated that the task
of the tribunal was related to
(...) delimitation and not the apportionment of the areas concerned or their
division into converging sectors. […] Delimitation in an equitable manner is one
thing, but not the same thing as awarding a just and equitable share of a
previously undelimited area […].682
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Delimitation is also intrinsically linked to geographic characteristics, where
allocation of straddling or migrating fishing resources does not have a clear, and
permanent, geographical connection. As a consequence, delimitation of a boundary has a
permanent character while allocation of fishing opportunities is subject to changes due to
changes in circumstances.
Despite those differences, the analysis of equitable delimitation is useful in the
search for a legal principle with normative content. On the one hand, it has already been
noted that at least some authors do not see dramatic differences between the act of
delimitation and the act of apportionment.683 In addition, the method for arriving at such a
delimitation has some similarities with an allocation process. In particular, as it is the
case in equitable use, ―the delimitation is to be effected in accordance with equitable
principles and taking account of all relevant circumstances, so as to arrive at an equitable
result‖.684 Thus, it has been suggested that maritime delimitation law can provide some
assistance in addressing the problem of allocation of fishing opportunities.685 Most
importantly, the jurisprudence on the concept of equity in the context of maritime
boundaries delimitation provides valuable insights into the question of normative content
of equitable principles – and thus as equity as law.
Equity with a Normative Content
The concept of equity has played an essential role in the field of maritime
boundary delimitation, both in the cases of delimitation of continental shelf and EEZs.
Indeed, the LOSC provides very limited guidance on how the delimitation of maritime
boundaries is to be effected. According to its provisions, it has to be made ―by agreement,
on the basis of international law, as referred to in Article 38 of the Statute of the
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International Court of Justice, in order to achieve an equitable solution.‖686 It has been the
dispute settlement bodies which, through a series of judgments that have been considered
as ―case law‖,687 have enriched the normative content of equity as a norm of law. It
should be mentioned that this process has not been linear or uncontroversial.688
Nevertheless, its general evolution and the scholar commentaries it has generated provide
valuable insights on equity as a substantive legal standard.
A starting point in this evolution is the 1969 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases
(Federal Republic of Germany v. Denmark; Federal Republic of Germany v.
Netherlands).689 In its judgment, the ICJ denied the equidistance rule the status of a rule
of law,690 and instead declared that the delimitation of continental shelves was to be done:
a) by agreement of the parties, and b) on the basis of equitable principles, and taking
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account of all the relevant circumstances.691 In 1982, and in the light of the new text of
the LOSC recently adopted, albeit not yet in force, the ICJ reiterated this notion in the
Continental Shelf (Tunisia v. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) by stating that
[c]learly, each continental shelf case in dispute should be considered and judged
on its own merits, having regard to its peculiar circumstances; therefore, no
attempt should be made here to overconceptualize the application of the principles
and rules relating to the continental shelf.692
The same judgment ruled that ―there was only one truly normative rule of
maritime delimitation, namely that the result must be equitable.‖693
In this construction of equity, ―a principle was equitable only if it led to an
equitable result, which depended entirely upon the facts of the particular case.‖ 694 In the
same line, the methods used for delimitation were only techniques which the tribunal was
free to use or discard.695 While emphasizing the result of the delimitation process, the
Court diminished the role of equity principles. In subsequent judgments, it abandoned the
terminology of ―equitable principles‖ for ―equitable criteria‖,696 which in fact ―were
analyzed as relevant circumstances.‖697
691
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This notion of equity which emphasizes the result and is highly dependent upon
the particular circumstances of the individual case, has been termed by Kolb as the theory
of the unicum, and by Jennings as the doctrine of the equitable result. The role of equity,
in this reasoning, is an autonomous equity acting ―at first hand‖. 698 The notion of
corrective equity was abandoned in favor of this autonomous equity because, as has been
pointed out, it ―is not valid in the field of continental shelf delimitation by reason simply
of the absence of a general rule of law which is to be moderated or corrected in its
concrete application.‖699
This notion of autonomous equity was severely criticized by judges, practitioners,
and scholars alike. It was qualified as ―unstructured discretion‖, an exercise of ex aequo
et bono, distributive justice, and incompatible with the very concept of law. 700 Judge
Gros, in his dissenting opinion in the Gulf of Maine case, stated:
Controlled equity as a procedure for applying the law would contribute to the
proper functioning of international justice; equity left, without any element of
control, to the wisdom of the judge reminds us that equity was once measured by
‗the Canchellor‘s foot‘; I doubt that international justice can long survive an
equity measured by the judge‘s eye. When equity is simply a reflection of the
judge‘s perception, the courts which judge in this way part company from those
which apply the law.701
Sir Jennings, in turn, stated that
[t]he doctrine of the ‗equitable result‘ (…), leads straight into pure judicial
discretion and a decision based upon nothing more than the court‘s subjective
appreciation of what appears to be a ‗fair‘ compromise of the claims of either
side.702
States parties to disputes, in turn, have claimed that
(...) an excessive individualization of the rule of law, which changes from one
case to another, would be incompatible with the very concept of law. Every legal
rule presupposes a minimum of generality. A rule which is elaborated on a case
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by case basis rests on the discretionary power of the judge, on conciliation, on
distributive justice – in brief, on ex aequo et bono.703
This line of jurisprudence was reversed in the 1985 judgment on the Continental
Shelf (Libyan Arab Jarnahiriya v. Malta).704 In this judgment, the Court ruled:
Thus the justice of which equity is an emanation, is not abstract justice but justice
according to the rule of law; which is to say that its application should display
consistency and a degree of predictability; even though it looks with particularity
to the peculiar circumstances of an instant case, it also looks beyond it to
principles of more general application. This is precisely why the courts have, from
the beginning, elaborated equitable principles as being, at the same time, means to
an equitable result in a particular case, yet also having a more general validity and
hence expressible in general terms; for, as the Court has also said, "the legal
concept of equity is a general principle directly applicable as law (I.C.J. Reports
1982, p. 60, para. 71)‖.705
Thus, as Kolb notes, the ICJ judgment asserts that there are principles that are
equitable in themselves and could thus be used as direction-finders for the purpose of
achieving an equitable result.706 These principles once again took on the character of
legal norms, albeit highly open and flexible ones.707
The equitable principles that act as direction-finders to achieve an equitable result
have been identified by the ICJ as the following:
a) the principle that there is to be no question of refashioning geography, or

compensating for the inequalities of nature;
b) the related principle of non-encroachment by one party on the natural

prolongation of the other, which is no more than the negative expression of
the positive rule that the coastal State enjoys sovereign rights over the
continental shelf off its coasts to the full extent authorized by international law
in the relevant circumstances;
c) the principle of respect due to all such relevant circumstances;
d) the principle that although all States are equal before the law and are entitled

to equal treatment, ―equity does not necessarily imply equality […], nor does
it seek to make equal what nature has made unequal; and
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e)

the principle that there can be no question of distributive justice.708

In addition, the ICJ qualified the relevant circumstances that can be taken into
account in the application of a legal concept of equity, by stating that
[f]or a court, although there is assuredly no closed list of considerations, it is
evident that only those that are pertinent to the institution of the continental shelf
as it has developed within the law, and to the application of equitable principles to
its delimitation, will qualify for inclusion.709
In the process of identifying equitable principles and the relevant circumstances
that need to be taken into account to achieve an equitable result, the ICJ moved away
from autonomous or discretionary equity, towards a concept of equity based on the rule
of law.710
As noted by Weil, the Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jarnahiriya v. Malta) case
did not attempt to ―integrate principles of equity into the law has not been extended to
methods of delimitations,‖711 a situation that he certainly criticizes considering that
method permits putting equity into practice.712 This situation appears to be changing,
since recent judgments have relied upon the use of equidistance to draw a provisional
line, and to special circumstances to adjust the provisional line, if required– the
equidistance/relevant circumstance rule.713
Weil, analyzing the normativity content of the concept of equity as applied in
maritime delimitation law, states that when law of maritime delimitation contains no rule
of law other than the ―fundamental norm‖ (or what Kolb called autonomous equity), its
level of normativity is at its lowest. A little higher on the scale of normative density is the
approach which includes the definition of equitable principles within the legal
framework. And at the highest level of all, the legal field is broadened to include, in
addition to the definitions of equitable principles and relevant circumstances, the methods
themselves.714
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As a summary, a normative concept of equity requires the definition of equitable
principles, relevant circumstances, and equitable methods to achieve at an equitable
result. Van Dijk, using a different terminology, arrives at the same conclusion: a
normative content of equity requires the definition of some substantive and procedural
criteria by which the equity standard can be objectified.715
Sir Jennings, similarly, identifies three normative elements of an apparatus of
decision according to equity: the legal rule to be applied, the appreciation of the
particular facts, and the application of known equitable criteria relevant to those facts. He
acknowledges that in the final stage of the decision there must be an area of judicial
discretion.716 However, he highlights that ―this equitable procedure is now looking very
different from the decision ex aequo et bono‖.717 A normative, or controlled, equity
―possesses or acquires certain coherence and predictability‖718 which are, indeed,
characteristic of the rule of law.
The Relevant Circumstances
It has been noted already that the application of equity in maritime delimitation
requires to take into consideration all relevant circumstances, and that although there is
no closed list of such circumstances, only those that are pertinent to the legal institution
are to be considered legally relevant to that effect. Several authors, on the basis of several
judgments, have broadly categorized circumstances that are deemed relevant. A first
classification is usually made between geographical and non-geographical factors.
Geographical factors are considered the primary factors to be taken into account in the
resolution of conflicts of delimitation of areas under sovereignty or sovereign rights of
States.719 Among non-geographical factors, the following are mentioned: socio-economic
factors, conduct of parties, historic rights, security interests, navigation, environmental
factors, and traditional livelihood.
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Because of their usefulness for the analysis of allocation of fishing opportunities,
two of them will be addressed in more detail: the socio-economic factors, and the conduct
of parties, or historic rights.
a) The Socio-Economic Factors
It has been already explained that the ICJ makes a distinction between equitable
delimitation of an area already, in principle, appertaining to the coastal State, and the
apportionment of a ―just and equitable share‖ of a previously undelimited area. 720 The
latter is considered an exercise of distributive justice. It has also been mentioned that the
principle that there can be no question of distributive justice has resulted in a refusal to
take social and economic factors into consideration in the settlement of maritime
boundary delimitation disputes. This is the time to take a closer look at this issue.
As a general statement, it is often said that economic factors are not considered
relevant circumstances by the ICJ and thus, that they have no influence in the maritime
delimitation process. However, a more precise analysis of the jurisprudence warrants a
distinction. This distinction is based on two different contents of the socio-economic
considerations, which Tanaka calls socio-economic factors and economic factors in a
strict sense. The socio-economic factors include economic dependency on natural
resources, and national economic wealth. The economic factors in strict sense include the
existence of natural resources (such as oil, gas, and fish) in the disputed area.
The analysis of the jurisprudence allows concluding that the ICJ has consistently
rejected socio-economic factors as relevant circumstances in maritime delimitation
disputes.721 It has been ascertained that those factors are foreign to the legal basis of the
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title,722 and that political and economic considerations are not proper for a judicial
organ.723 It has also been justified in that social and economic factors are variable and
even unpredictable.724
In contrast, economic factors in a strict sense have had a role, albeit very limited,
in maritime delimitations. In the North Sea Continental Shelf cases, the ICJ accepted that,
as far as known or readily ascertainable, the existence of natural resources constitutes a
factor to be taken into account in a negotiation.725 That opinion was repeated in
subsequent judgments.726 However, albeit recognizing economic factors in a strict sense
as relevant circumstances, they actually have not been applied for delimitation. 727 Three
exceptions can be cited in this respect: the Gulf of Maine case, the St. Pierre and
Miquelon case, and the Greenland/Jan Mayen case.
In the Gulf of Maine case, the Chamber did not consider socio-economic factors
in the operational stage of the delimitation, but did consider them during the verification
stage when testing the equitableness of the boundary established. The Chamber verified if
the result was ―radically inequitable, that is to say, as likely to entail catastrophic
repercussions for the livelihood and economic well-being of the populations of the
countries concerned.‖728 The ICJ was convinced that the boundary drawn by geographical
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criteria alone did not produce those results. However, through this a posteriori test, it
introduced social and economic factors in the maritime delimitation process, albeit in a
rather limited way. Equity, in this approach of the ICJ, requires a ―negative minimum‖:
avoidance of catastrophic repercussions. In this limited way, ―the old restrictive attitude
to socio-economic factors, feared to open an excessively wide path towards the
redistribution of wealth, was translated into the strictly negative configuration of this new
ex post facto test.‖729
This ―negative minimum‖ was to be applied, once again, in the St. Pierre et
Miquelon (Canada v. France) case.730
A different approach was taken in the Greenland/Jan Mayen case. In this case,
the ICJ actively adjusted the boundary so as to ensure equitable access to the important
capelin (fish) resources. Although justified in certain particular circumstances of this
case,731 the decision has been harshly criticized as intruding in the realm of distributive
justice.732
In summary, with respect to the role of economic and social factors in the process
of judicial maritime delimitation, a distinction has been made between socio-economic
factors, and economic factors in strict sense (which relate to the presence of natural
resources in the disputed area). The position of the ICJ has been to deny a role to socioeconomic factors as maritime delimitation excludes questions on distributive justice.
Economic factors in a strict sense have been, theoretically, considered relevant
circumstances. It has been recognized that in practice, the sharing of resources ―cannot be
ignored since it is in reality the heart of the matter [of maritime delimitation].‖733
However, the ICJ has, in most cases, afforded these factors a very modest role in the
adjudicatory process.
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b) Historical Rights and Prior Uses
In many conflicts on maritime delimitation, States have justified their claims on the
basis of historical rights or conduct of the parties. In several cases, those rights and
conduct were based on the development of fishing activities. That was the case, for
example, in the Continental Shelf (Tunisia v. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) case, the Gulf of
Maine case (Canada v. U.S.A). The argument of the parties in those cases was to assert
their presence in a disputed area, with the consent or at least tolerance of the other party
to the dispute.
In the Continental Shelf (Tunisia v. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) case, the ICJ recognized
the importance of the conduct of the parties as a legal circumstance. The ICJ noted that
―historic rights must enjoy respect and be preserved as they have always been by long
usage‖. The judgment applies the ―well established principle of the law of nations that the
state of things that actually exists and has existed for a long time should be changed as
little as possible,‖ already asserted in the Grisbådarna case.734 The Court considered it
unnecessary, however, to make a reference to these historical rights in the operational
part of the judgment.735
In further cases, the ICJ has either disregarded historical presence in the disputed
areas, or considered that the maritime boundary delimitation was independent, or not
conditioned, by the findings of historical or traditional fishing regimes.736
Weil argues that ―not only did the Chamber in Gulf of Maine reject the arguments of
the parties based on their previous conduct, but it was careful to make it clear that equity
734
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did not require that present exploitation practices be maintained in the future.‖737 In his
view, accepting the conduct of the parties would result in including efficiency as one
criterion for maritime boundary delimitation, in circumstances that occupation does not
constitute a legal title.738 Therefore, he concludes that this ―questionable relevant
circumstance is likely, from now on, to come into play only very exceptionally.‖739
In the same line, Tanaka acknowledges a theoretical incompatibility between the
consideration of historic rights and the ipso facto and ab initio nature of the continental
shelf rights.740 However, his view is that the limited jurisprudence and the lack of general
views of the Court in relation to the relevance of historic rights in maritime delimitation,
joined by an unclear State practice, do leave the issue unsettled.741
Section 5. The Principle of Equitable Utilization in the Law of Non-Navigational
Uses of International Watercourses
Equitable utilization (also referred to as ―equitable use‖ or ―equitable and
reasonable utilization‖742) is a legal standard (―principle‖) for allocation of resources and
benefits. It has been characterized as ―a maxim which implies that the use of a common
resource by each country, while aiming in principle at optimum exploitation, must be
compatible with the safeguard of the interests of other countries concerned, on the basis
of the conjunction of a series of criteria which vary according to the particular
situation‖.743
Equitable utilization is widely included in international law as the guiding
principle for the use of, access to and sharing of shared resources. It has been included in
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the UNEP Environmental Guidelines and Principles on Shared Natural Resources. 744 It is
also considered as a guiding principle for the allocation of radio-frequency spectrum and
any associated orbits, including the geostationary-satellite orbit.745 But it is in the area of
the law of non-navigational uses of international watercourses where the concept has
been considered to have originated.746 The legal principles of law applicable in this field
are considered as the ―archetypical‖ for the international law of shared natural
resources.747 In addition, its importance in this field has been underlined by extended
State practice, several binding748 and non-binding749 international instruments, inter-State
and international jurisprudence, the work and commentaries of the International Law
Commission750 and the International Law Association,751 and considerable scholarly
work.
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Equitable Utilization: Theoretical Foundation
The principle of equitable and reasonable utilization finds its legal and theoretical
basis in the doctrine of limited territorial sovereignty, widely accepted by States as the
basis upon which the substantive rules of international watercourse have evolved.752 The
doctrine of limited territorial sovereignty means that: a) watercourse States enjoy equal
rights to the utilization of an international watercourse; and b) each watercourse State
must respect the correlative rights of other watercourse States. 753 The doctrine relies,
thus, on the notion of equality of rights. As stated in the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros case,
each riparian State has a right to the use of the international watercourse that is perfectly
equal to the right of any other riparian State, which excludes any preferential privilege of
any one in relation to the others.754 As a consequence, no State has an inherently superior
claim to the use of the watercourse.755 It has been stressed, however, that equality of right
does not mean equal apportionment of water.756
This equality not only provides an equal right to use the waters, but also imposes
the obligation to recognize the equal sovereignties of other States. Thus, riparians have
reciprocal rights and duties in the use of waters of international watercourses.757
A consequence of the legal acceptance of the theory of limited territorial
sovereignty is the recognition of two guiding principles for decisions on non-navigational
uses of international watercourses, and the apportionment of water resources among
States: the principle of equitable utilization, and the principle of no harm.
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Both are considered part of customary international law of non-navigational uses
of international watercourses.758 As such, they were included in the ―earliest complete
formulation of this body of law‖759: the Helsinki Rules on the Uses of International
Rivers, adopted by the International Law Association in 1966 (1966 Helsinki rules).760
They were also included in the 1997 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Nonnavigational Uses of International Watercourses (1997 Watercourse Convention),761 text
prepared by the International Law Commission over a period of almost three decades.
They were, as well, included in the 1992 UNECE Convention on the Protection and Use
of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes.762
In 2004, ILA reformulated the Helsinki rules, consolidating it with the various
supplementary rules approved by the Association since 1966, and including in their
formulation some developments in the field of international environmental law and
international human rights law that were absent in the earlier formulation. In addition, it
expanded the scope of the rules to address the obligations of customary international law
that govern the management of waters within the State as well as transboundary waters
(and including groundwater).763 The work was approved by the Association as the 2004
Berlin Rules on Water Resources (2004 Berlin rules).764 Again, the text recognizes
equitable utilization and the principle of no harm as substantive norms governing the
relationships between States in the law of non-navigational uses of international
watercourses.765
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Equitable Utilization in International Law of Watercourses
The principle entails recognition of the real and substantial interests of all States
involved, and of the need to ―reconcile those interests as best they may‖.766 It requires,
thus, an ―exercise of an informed judgment on a consideration of many factors.‖767 As
summarized by the United States Supreme Court, it is ―a flexible doctrine which calls for
the ‗exercise of an informed judgment on a consideration of many factors‘ to secure ‗a
just and equitable‘ allocation.‖768
A first thing that should be noted is that the standard in all these documents is the
―equitable and reasonable use‖. For example, article 5 of the 1997 Watercourse
Convention reads:
Equitable and reasonable utilization and participation
1.Watercourse States shall in their respective territories utilize an international
watercourse in an equitable and reasonable manner. In particular, an international
watercourse shall be used and developed by watercourse States with a view to
attaining optimal and sustainable utilization thereof and benefits therefrom, taking
into account the interests of the watercourse States concerned, consistent with
adequate protection of the watercourse.
2.Watercourse States shall participate in the use, development and protection of
an international watercourse in an equitable and reasonable manner. Such
participation includes both the right to utilize the watercourse and the duty to
cooperate in the protection and development thereof, as provided in the present
Convention.769
The terms equitable and reasonable can be considered synonyms, since one of the
meanings of equity is ―fairness, reasonableness.‖770 However, most authors considered
that the term involves two different standards: the use of international watercourses must
766
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be both equitable and reasonable. While the equitable use standard looks at the quantity
of water vis-à-vis the requirements of other States, reasonable use looks at what the State
in question does with the water.771 Some authors consider that a use, in order to be
equitable, needs to be reasonable.
A second aspect that is important to remark is that the standard of ―equitable and
reasonable use‖ is applicable only in cases of conflict of interests among riparian States,
i.e., when one or more of the riparian States is not able to satisfy its needs as a result of
another State‘s use of the international watercourse. In the absence of such a conflict,
each State, in the exercise of its sovereignty, is entitled to use the watercourse to satisfy
its needs without substantive restrictions.
In this regard, it is also important to note that typically, those conflicts of interests
will not arise simultaneously. The ―questions involving the uses of the waters of a river
will not arise among all the coriparian states at a particular point of time. On the contrary,
a river will be developed gradually by the coriparian states, each moving forward at
varying rates.‖772

The Content of Equitable Utilization
Is has been noted that equitable utilization requires an act of balancing the rights,
interests and other relevant factors in the decisions on the non-navigational uses of
international watercourses. International law provides some guidance on what the
relevant actual circumstances may be. The 1997 Watercourse Convention includes a nonexhaustive list of factors that shall be taken into account while determining equitable and
reasonable use in accordance with article 5. The factors in article 6 are the following:
(a) Geographic, hydrographic, hydrological, climatic, ecological and other factors
of a natural character;
(b) The social and economic needs of the watercourse States concerned;
(c) The population dependent on the watercourse in each watercourse State;
(d) The effects of the use or uses of the watercourses in one watercourse State on
other watercourse States;
(e) Existing and potential uses of the watercourse;
771
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(f) Conservation, protection, development and economy of use of the water
resources of the watercourse and the costs of measures taken to that effect;
(g) The availability of alternatives, of comparable value, to a particular planned or
existing use.
The 1966 Helsinki rules and 2004 Berlin rules also include similar factors. 773 Neither the
Convention nor any other document addresses the weight that each factor should have.
On the contrary, the 1997 Watercourse Convention, following the Helsinki rules, states
that
[t]he weight to be given to each factor is to be determined by its importance in
comparison with that of other relevant factors. In determining what is a
reasonable and equitable use, all relevant factors are to be considered together and
a conclusion reached on the basis of the whole.774
This necessity of flexibility in the implementation of equitable utilization to
particular situations is noted by all scholars. ―It seems clear that the problems of each
river are normally unique and general rules are valid only insofar as they are feasible in
the particular situation.‖775 McCaffrey even suggests that the indicative lists of factors in
the Helsinki Rules and the 1997 Watercourse Convention are ―neither exhaustive nor
even necessarily fully relevant. Everything depends upon the unique characteristics of the
case at hand.‖776 This approach to equitable utilization resembles the theory of the
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unicum that, according to Kolb, prevailed in the maritime delimitation case law during a
time of the evolution of the legal standard.777
Not surprisingly, this lack of guiding rules for the balance of different relevant
factors has been criticized. Bourne states that
[t]he substantive law on the utilization of the waters of international drainage
basins is defined in the vague language of the doctrine of ‗equitable utilization‘
and offers little guidance to states on how they may proceed lawfully with the
utilization of these waters in their territories.
In the same line of thought, Hey, commenting on the 1997 Watercourse
Convention, concludes that it ―leaves watercourse states with the situation in which they
are to balance the various interests in good faith, without any significant guidance, by
way of substantive obligations, on how such balancing is to take place.‖778
Fuentes, in turn, acknowledges the importance of the circumstances of the
particular situation in the weighting and balancing of interests. However, she also
postulates that some general guidelines can be drawn on the role that the prospective
relevant factors may play in the process of determining an equitable utilization of an
international watercourse. Those guidelines, it is asserted, should be followed by States
and international tribunals when applying the rule of equitable utilization.779
The Relevant Circumstances
Fuentes identifies, in the 1997 Watercourse Convention, five different categories
of relevant factors that are likely to be in issue in disputes concerning the utilization of
international rivers. Those are:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)

the economic and social needs of the States;
existing uses;
local customs;
the efficiency of the different uses; and
the geography and hydrology of the river.
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Because of their relevance to fisheries disputes, this thesis will analyze in this section
the circumstances listed in paragraphs (a), (b), and (e), in a different order.
a) Geography and Hydrology of the River
Article 6 of the 1997 Watercourse Convention identifies, as one of the relevant
factors or circumstances for the determination of an equitable utilization: a) the
geography of the basin, including in particular the extent of the drainage area in the
territory of each basin State; b) the hydrology of the basin, including in particular the
contribution of water by each basin State; and c) the climate affecting the basin.780
Similar factors were included in the Helsinki and Berlin rules, although the Berlin rules
included other environmental factors as a consequence in the emphasis on environmental
protection, as well as concepts particular to groundwater.
The ILC considers that
‗Geographic‘ factors include the extent of the international watercourse of each
watercourse State; ‗hydrographic‘ factors relate generally to the measurement,
description and mapping of the waters of the watercourses; and ‗hydrological‘ factors
relate, inter alia, to the properties of the water, including water flow, and to its
distribution, including the contribution of water to the watercourse by each
watercourse state.781
With respect to the weight of geographic, hydrographic and hydrological factors,
Fuentes identifies two extreme positions that have been advocated by scholars. On one
extreme, some scholars consider that geography and hydrology have no role to play in the
determination of equitable utilization, need being the only factor relevant for allocation of
water.782 On the other extreme, some scholars consider that geographical and
hydrological elements of an international watercourse are the most important criteria in
the process of allocation as they are factors creating legal rights.783
The two positions relate to the unresolved issues underlying the legal status of shared
natural resources.
Many States and scholars view transboundary resources as being within the
sovereignty of each State, to the extent that the resource is located therein. There
780
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782
Lipper, cited by Fuentes, ibid, at 395.
783
Chauhan, cited by Fuentes, ibid, at 395.
781

209

have been challenges to this notion for more than two centuries, however, by those
who have claimed that no part of a shared resource can belong exclusively to the
individual State if the entire resource extends over the territory of several States;
instead, the resource must be considered the common property of all.784
While the first doctrine would naturally conclude that geography and hydrology are
the main criteria for determining equitable use, the latter would deny them such a role.
The legal consequences of qualifying an international watercourse a shared resource,
and particularly the legal consequences over territorial sovereignty, provoked
considerable discussion in the ILC.785 A reference to shared resource included in earlier
drafts was omitted from the final text. This circumstance, joined by State practice, allows
Fuentes‘ conclusion that geography and hydrology have a role in the determination of
equitable utilization.786 However, she denies it being a prominent role based on the
fundamental principle of equality of rights.787 Her opinion, supported by federal
jurisprudence, is that the appropriate role of the above mentioned criteria should be low
in the hierarchy of relevant factors, and limited to adjusting provisional allocation figures
established by other criteria. Furthermore, in her opinion, that adjustment should only
operates in situations where the water is not enough to satisfy the requirements of all the
parties.788
b) Prior and Existing Uses
The 1997 Watercourse Convention includes ―existent and potential uses of the
watercourse‖ as one of the factors and circumstances that needs to be taken into account
while determining the equitable utilization of an international watercourse. An equivalent
factor is included in the Berlin rules. This constitutes a partial innovation to the criterion
included in the Helsinki rules, which emphasized past and current uses rather than
‗potential‘ ones.789
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Once again, different scholarly opinions exist on the weight that prior and existing
uses deserve in the balancing act of determining an equitable utilization of watercourses.
Some authors consider that past uses (historical entitlement) are the most important factor
to be considered in the allocation of water resources.790 Most authors, however, conclude
that affording a special protection to past uses is actually a contradiction to the principle
of equitable utilization.791 McCaffrey adds that it is unsound as a matter of both policy
and law, since it would encourage a ―race to the river‖ and reward the ―winner‖ with
absolute protection.792
Fuentes analyzes these arguments in the light of the jurisprudence in maritime
boundary delimitation. She observes that
[w]hat these decisions make clear is that in a dispute over access and
apportionment of natural resources, the historic argument based on utilization of
the resource by the parties ought to be accompanied by and evaluated on the basis
of other criteria, such as economic dependence and the vital needs of the
population.793
On this basis, she concludes that existing uses as a relevant factor should not
operate independently of the considerations of the social and economic needs of the
parties.794 Nevertheless, she recognizes that existing uses generally create such
dependency.795

commentaries to the 2004 Berlin Rules, the ILA noted that the future uses were not ―explicitly‖ included in
the Helsinki Rules.
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c) Economic and Social Needs of the States
The social and economic needs of the watercourse States concerned, including the
population dependent on the watercourse in each of the watercourse States and the
availability of alternatives, are recognized explicitly as relevant factors in the
determination of the equitable utilization of the international watercourse.796
It has already been noted that the inclusion of socio-economic aspects does not
transform the decision from a legal to a political one.797 In this respect, Fuentes makes a
distinction between relevant and non-relevant social and economic factors.798 The
concept of non-pertinent socio-economic criteria refers to the comparison between levels
of economic development of the States concerned.799 As non-pertinent factors, she denies
them a role in the legal principle of equitable utilization. The pertinent socio-economic
factors, in turn, relate to social and economic needs of the parties in so far as the
satisfaction of these needs depends on the use of the disputed waters.800
The distinction drawn by Fuentes coincides, in general terms, with the distinction
between socio-economic factors and economic factors in strict sense identified by Tanaka
in the field of maritime boundary delimitation. And as in the case of maritime
delimitation, social-economic factors in a broad sense are denied a role and considered a
matter of world politics. Economic factors in strict sense not only are recognized as
having a role in determining equitable utilization, but indeed are considered the most
relevant factors to be considered in disputes concerning water use.801 In this respect, their
relevance is more significant than the role played in maritime boundary delimitation.
In this regard, it is worth mentioning a study undertaken by Aaron Wolf in which
he described the practice of international water allocations as exemplified in 49 treaties
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that address the question of allocation of water resources. 802 As a general trend observed
during this analysis, he notes that: ―[a] tendency for a shift in positions to occur during
negotiations, from ‗rights-based‘ criteria, whether hydrography or chronology, towards
‗needs-based‘ values, based on e.g., irrigable land or population.‖803 Since this shift is
perceived in the negotiation process, it can be justified in negotiation strategy or practical
advantages.804 However, if the observed trend is accurate, it reflects the relative
importance of social and economic needs in the allocation of international watercourses.
Concluding Remarks
Equitable and reasonable utilization is widely considered a legal standard for the
determination of the use of an international watercourse. However, its precise content is
open. It requires the consideration of all the relevant factors, but identification of the
relevant factors, and how much weight they should be afforded, depend on the specific
situation. The concept of equitable utilization thus resembles the autonomous equity
mentioned in previous sections.
Nevertheless, the principle relies upon some principles or doctrines of
international law: the limited territorial sovereignty doctrine, and their corollaries of
equality of rights of all riparian States, and correlative duties to acknowledge and respect
the sovereign rights of other States.
These theoretical foundations, combined with a particular analysis of the criteria
included in the international instruments, allow at least some trends on the consideration
of the factors. In particular, the factors that are of interest for the purpose of this thesis are
as follows:
a) geographical and hydrological factors may have a limited role considering the
equality of right;
b) prior utilization requires protection by the principle of equitable utilization, but not
absolute protection;
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c) socio-economic factors in strict sense, i.e. social and economic needs of the parties in
so far as the satisfaction of these needs depends on the use of the shared waters, have
an important, even predominant, role in the determination of equitable utilization; and
d) general socio-economic factors, i.e. comparison between levels of economic
development of the States concerned, has no role in the legal concept of equitable
utilization.
Section 6. Intra-generational Equity and the Principle of Common but
Differentiated Responsibility
The previous sections have analyzed t he application of equitable principles in
cases of delimitation or distribution of resources – equitable delimitation and equitable
utilization. In recent years, another principle rooted in the concept of equity has risen in
international environmental law: the principle of common but differentiated
responsibility (CBDR).
The principle of CBDR has two elements: a) common responsibility, which
derives from the increasing interdependence and globalization of environmental problems
and the subsequent realization that the solution to them cannot be found domestically;805
and b) differentiated responsibility.
The concept of differentiated responsibility has traditionally rested on two
justifications.806 The first is the different capacity and ability of developed States to
address the environmental problems,807 and the fact that the most devastating effects of
environmental degradation are going to be felt by developing States that have the least
capacity to prepare and adapt to them.808
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The second justification is the bigger impact that developed countries have had on
the environment, i.e., their contribution to the environmental problem.809 For some, this
justification includes not only the negative impacts that developed States have inflicted
on the environment, but also the benefits that the developed countries have received
thereof.810
Both of these arguments are reflected in principle 7 of the Rio Declaration, which
includes CBDR as an independent, and fundamental, principle of sustainable
development.811 Principle 7 reads:
States shall cooperate in a spirit of global partnership to conserve, protect and
restore the health and integrity of the Earth's ecosystem. In view of the different
contributions to global environmental degradation, States have common but
differentiated responsibilities.
The developed countries acknowledge the responsibility that they bear in the
international pursuit to sustainable development in view of the pressures their
societies place on the global environment and of the technologies and financial
resources they command.
CBDR ―is based on the perception that global environmental risks have mainly
been caused by, and should therefore be tackled primarily by, developed states‖. 812 This
perception legitimizes a differential treatment for developing States, differential treatment
that is a deviation from the principle of sovereign (formal) equality among States but is
then justified by the existence of substantive inequalities among them.813 As pointed out,
this is an application of the old principle that like cases be treated alike and that
dissimilarly situated people should be treated dissimilarly. 814 As such, it can be seen as
―defining an equitable balance between developed and developing States.‖815
It has been pointed out, however, that the justification of CBDR, as reflected in
the first paragraph of principle 7 of Rio Declaration, rests on contribution to
environmental degradation and not on the socio-economic development of the State in
question. Currently, it is widely considered that the States that have contributed to global
809
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environmental degradation are developed States (i.e. the North). In other words, CBDR
reflects today a relationship between developed and developing States. But conceptually,
it can be the case that in the future, developing States have the bigger share of that
contribution and thus a bigger share of the responsibility.816
The practical implementation of the principle of CBDR can result in various
forms of differential treatment. These different forms have also enjoyed different levels
of acceptance in international environmental agreements. A first form relates to
differential environmental standards, either in the form of exceptions for developing
States or less stringent measures for developing States. This differential treatment can be
drafted explicitly, but it can also result from the text allowing the consideration of other
factors in the implementation of an otherwise generally applicable standard. That is the
case of texts introducing expressions such as ―reasonable‖, ―as far possible‖, or ―as
appropriate.‖817
A second form is the concession of ―grace periods‖ for the implementation of
environmental standards. Another expression of practical application of the CBDR is the
requirement for provision of technical and financial assistance to developing States. A
fourth form suggested as a variant of the former is to condition the implementation of
environmental commitments by developing States to the provision of such technical and
financial assistance.818
The principle of CBDR has had recognition both in binding and non-binding
instruments. It is explicitly recognized in the Rio Declaration819 and the Johannesburg
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Plan of Implementation.820 Furthermore, it is identified as one of the principles of
sustainable development.821 It has also been referred to in international dispute
resolutions.822
The principle of CBDR has also been implicitly applied in several recent
environmental agreements that establish exceptions for developing States,823 extended
timeframes for implementation of environmental standards by developing States,824 or
less restrictive conservation measures for developing States. Its relevance in binding
instruments has been highlighted in the climate change regime, since it has been
explicitly included in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change825
and the Kyoto Protocol.826 Nevertheless, it should be noted that the principle is not
uncontroversial in international law. There are debates about its precise meaning, its legal
status either as soft law or legal principle of international environmental law, the areas of
international law in which it is recognized, and its benefits.827
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CBDR in High Seas Fisheries
The purpose of this section is to analyze if the principle of CBDR can have a role
in the search of equitable solutions for allocation of fishing opportunities. At first sight,
the principle seems to operate at a different level. The focus of the principle of common
but differentiated responsibility is on the burdens, costs, and restrictions imposed by
environmental protection. It calls those who have the bigger share of responsibility for
environmental deterioration, and the technological and financial capacity to do so, to
―take the lead‖828 in the resolution of the environmental problem (and thus bear the
bigger burden of that solution). In contrast, the allocation of fishing opportunities is a
case of distribution of resources, or more precisely, of the possibility of engaging in an
economic activity and its extent.
However, allocation of fishing opportunities can also be viewed from the
perspective of the restriction to fishing activities that are necessary for the conservation
of stocks and the protection of living marine resources and their ecosystem, in general. 829
Indeed, a quota imposes a restriction on national fishing activities that otherwise would
not have a quantifiable limit according to international law. Therefore, the question can
be framed as: who should ‗take the lead‘ in assuming the costs of the necessary
restrictions in fishing activities? This perspective can be perceived more easily in cases
where the TAC has already been established and allocated but the quota needs to be
reduced for conservation purposes.
A first aspect to be analyzed is whether the principle of common but
differentiated responsibility is included in the global or regional agreements on high seas
fisheries management. A crucial aspect for this thesis is whether the principle of common
but differentiated responsibility can be recognized as a principle guiding allocation
decisions. Both aspects will be analyzed in turn.
A review of the texts allows a conclusion that, although it is not explicitly
mentioned as such, at least some of its elements are recognized in the legal framework for
international fisheries. According to LOSC and UNFSA, all States have the obligation to
conserve the fishing stocks and living resources from the high seas and to cooperate with
828
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other States to that end.830 Article 17 of UNFSA reinforces that common responsibility by
establishing that States non-members to RFMOs and which do not otherwise agree to
apply the conservation and management measures established by such organization, are
not discharged from the obligation to cooperate in the conservation and management of
the relevant straddling and highly migratory fish stocks. This cooperation includes,
according to article 17(2), the obligation to restrain from fishing for the relevant stocks.
According to these provisions, the conservation of straddling and highly migratory stocks
is a common responsibility. Furthermore, it can be considered a universal responsibility,
although the application of this provision to non-parties and non-signatories to UNFSA
may be disputed.
Both LOSC and UNFSA also request that, in implementing the obligation of
cooperation for the conservation of fisheries resources, consideration should be given to
the special requirements of developing States.831 In the LOSC, that special consideration
is provided:
a) In the design of conservation and management measures for the conservation
of fisheries resources in the EEZ and the high seas, including but not limited
to TAC;832
b) In the determination of access to the surplus of TAC in the EEZ of a coastal
State;833
c) Technical and financial assistance and capacity building;834
UNFSA, in turn, considers the special requirements of developing States in
different provisions, and devotes a special part, Part VII, to the requirements of
developing States. The special requirements of developing States shall be considered,
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according to UNFSA, at three different stages. The first stage is in the adoption of
conservation and management measures. According to article 5(b) of UNFSA
In order to conserve and manage straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish
stocks, coastal States and States fishing on the high seas shall, in giving effect to
their duty to cooperate in accordance with the Convention:
(b) ensure that such measures are based on the best scientific evidence available
and are designed to maintain or restore stocks at levels capable of producing
maximum sustainable yield, as qualified by relevant environmental and economic
factors, including the special requirements of developing States, and taking into
account fishing patterns, the interdependence of stocks and any generally
recommended international minimum standards, whether subregional, regional or
global;
Article 24(2) adds
In giving effect to the duty to cooperate in the establishment of conservation and
management measures for straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks,
States shall take into account the special requirements of developing States, in
particular:
(a) the vulnerability of developing States which are dependent on the exploitation
of living marine resources, including for meeting the nutritional requirements of
their populations or parts thereof;
(b) the need to avoid adverse impacts on, and ensure access to fisheries by,
subsistence, small-scale and artisanal fishers and women fishworkers, as well as
indigenous people in developing States, particularly small island developing
States; and
(c) the need to ensure that such measures do not result in transferring, directly or
indirectly, a disproportionate burden of conservation action onto developing
States.
A second stage is the implementation, mutatis mutandis, of the principles of
UNFSA in the conservation and management of straddling stocks and highly migratory
stocks within the EEZs of the coastal States. Article 3(3) reads
States shall give due consideration to the respective capacities of developing
States to apply articles 5, 6 and 7 within areas under national jurisdiction and their
need for assistance as provided for in this Agreement. To this end, Part VII
applies mutatis mutandis in respect of areas under national jurisdiction.
A third stage is through the enhancement of the developing States abilities to
develop their own fisheries, and to participate in the high seas fisheries. In the latter case,
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however, this participation is subject to articles 5 and articles 11 on fishing opportunities
for new entrants. Article 25(1) paragraphs a) and b) read:
1. States shall cooperate, either directly or through subregional, regional or global
organizations:
(a) to enhance the ability of developing States, in particular the least-developed
among them and small island developing States, to conserve and manage
straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks and to develop their own
fisheries for such stocks;
(b) to assist developing States, in particular the least-developed among them and
small island developing States, to enable them to participate in high seas fisheries
for such stocks, including facilitating access to such fisheries subject to articles 5
and 11.835
A fourth level for the consideration of special requirements of developing States
is in the participation, establishment and strengthening of RFMOs,836 and the
implementation of the Agreement, including assisting developing States to meet the costs
involved in any proceedings for the settlement of disputes to which they may be
parties.837
Regional agreements follow different trends in the way they address the special
requirements of developing States. Most pre-UNFSA agreements do not have references
to developing States.838 Some modern agreements, in turn, follow closely the provisions
of UNFSA.839 The Antigua Convention establishes only a general provision on assistance
to developing States.840 The IOTC Convention is the only text that explicitly addresses
the special requirements of developing States in connection to the equitable benefit from
fishing activities.841
835

The preamble of UNFSA also states: ―Recognizing the need for specific assistance, including financial,
scientific and technological assistance, in order that developing States can participate effectively in the
conservation, management and sustainable use of straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks.‖
UNFSA, article 25(3), specifies as objectives of the assistance the collection, reporting, verification,
exchange and analysis of fisheries data and related information, stock assessment and scientific research,
and MCS and enforcement.
836
UNFSA, article 25(1) subparagraph (c), and article 26(2).
837
UNFSA, article 26(1).
838
That is the case of NAFO, NEAFC, ICCAT, and CCAMLR Conventions.
839
That is the case of WCPFC Convention (with special reference to small island developing States, and, as
appropriate, territories and possessions in the region); SPRFMO Convention (with special reference to least
developed States and the small island developing States, and, as appropriate, territories and possessions in
the region); and SEAFO Convention.
840
Antigua Convention, supra note 86, article XXIII.
841
IOTC Convention, supra note 88, preamble states: ―Desiring to contribute to the realization of a just and
equitable international economic order, with due regard to the special interests and needs of developing
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It has already been pointed out that there are different interpretations on whether
these provisions provide for a preferential allocation of fishing opportunities in the high
seas.842 Some authors, based on article 25(2), conclude that the only obligation with
respect to developing States is in the provision of financial and technical assistance and
transfer of technology. Article 25(2) reads
Cooperation with developing States for the purposes set out in this article shall
include the provision of financial assistance, assistance relating to human
resources development, technical assistance, transfer of technology, including
through joint venture arrangements, and advisory and consultative services.
That interpretation appears to be too narrow in light of the text of both LOSC and
UNFSA. Firstly, article 25(2) does not limit the recognition of developing States to
technical and financial assistance, but only States that this shall include such assistance.
Secondly, and most importantly, that interpretation does not take into account article 119
of the LOSC and 5(b) of UNFSA, which explicitly state that, in the design of
conservation and management measures, States shall take into account the special
requirements of developing States. Those conservation and management measures
include the TAC, and, at least in some interpretations, its allocation in national quotas.
Furthermore, article 24(2) reiterates that obligation and specifies what the special
requirements of developing States are. In particular, it includes the ―need to ensure that
such measures do not result in transferring, directly or indirectly, a disproportionate
burden of conservation action onto developing States.‖843
What this provision recognizes is that required conservation and management
measures could, in some cases, imply different actual burdens for the participants. It also
requires that a disproportionate burden shall be avoided. These provisions allow

countries‖; and ―Recognizing, in particular, the special interests of developing countries in the Indian
Ocean Region to benefit equitably from the fishery resources‖. In addition, article 5 establishes, as
functions of the commission, to: ―(b) encourage, recommend, and coordinate research and development
activities in respect of the stocks and fisheries covered by this Agreement, and such other activities as the
Commission may decide appropriate, including activities connected with transfer of technology, training
and enhancement, having due regard to the need to ensure the equitable participation of Members of the
Commission in the fisheries and the special interests and needs of Members in the region that are
developing countries; and to (d) to keep under review the economic and social aspects of the fisheries based
on the stocks covered by this Agreement bearing in mind, in particular, the interests of developing coastal
states.‖
842
See: chapter 3.
843
UNFSA, ibid, article 24(2)(c).
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concluding that if a required conservation measure imposes a disproportionate burden
upon developing States, a differential treatment may be necessary.
The question that follows is: disproportionate in respect to what? In the theoretical
foundation of the principle of common but differentiated responsibility, the sources of
that differentiation can be either the difference in capacity, or the difference in historical
responsibility, i.e., the contribution to the environmental problem. It seems that the lack
of capacity is considered as a source of differentiation in UNFSA. This is implicit in the
requirement of article 25 to provide developing States with financial and technological
assistance, transfer of technology, as well as assistance to enhance their human resources.
But lack of capacity can also be interpreted in a wider sense. On the basis of article 24, it
can be interpreted that a lack of capacity exists in cases of vulnerability of developing
States and their population. Thus, a burden can be disproportionate either because it
imposes costly arrangements that developing States are not in a position to afford, or
because the social, economic, or cultural impact of the conservation measure demands a
much higher sacrifice than the measure demands of developed States.
With respect to the second source of differentiated responsibility—the historical
responsibility—the situation is different. There is no reference in UNFSA, in the regional
agreements, or in the allocation criteria, that imply historical responsibility of traditional
fishing States in the over-exploitation of a stock, much less in connection to allocation of
fishing opportunities.844 Thus, the fact that past fishing patterns were unsustainable
appears not to have any impact on the distribution of benefits and burdens of high seas
fisheries management.845

844

The argument, however, has not been absolutely absent of the allocation debates. During the 2002
Meeting of Panel 4 of ICCAT, and after Japan suggested that an allocation proposal for North Atlantic
swordfish was rewarding the sacrifices made by the four main fishing nations in past years for the
conservation of the stock, the delegate of Venezuela ―expressed his surprise at the notion of sacrifice
concerning this stock as indicated by the four Contracting Parties with the largest catches in the North
Atlantic swordfish fishery (Canada, EC, Japan and United States). In effect, the historical fishers are
responsible for the over-exploitation. This signifies that it is perfectly normal for these countries to have
made sacrifices to rebuild this stock for the benefit of humanity.‖ ICCAT, Report for biennial period, 20022003, Part I (2002), supra note 303, para 6.1.20 at p. 317.
845
The situation is different with respect to fishing activities undertaken in violation of established
conservation and management measures. Compliance with conservation and management measures is
generally a criterion considered for allocation. It should also be noted that in some cases, the main fishing
States undertake comparatively greater fishing reductions. This differential treatment can be justified in the
capacity of those States to uphold those reductions, rather than in their contribution to overexploitation.
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The interpretation that the principle of CBDR should be applied in the allocation
decisions, based on the vulnerability of some States, seems to be sustained in the specific
allocation criteria considered by some RFMOs. The SPRFMO and WCFPC Conventions
include, among their allocation criteria, references to the needs and aspirations of
developing States in the region, in particular small island developing States and territories
and possessions; and the particular interests of developing coastal States. ICCAT
guidelines also make explicit reference to ―the interests of artisanal, subsistence and
small-scale coastal fishers‖ and ―the socio-economic contribution of the fisheries for
stocks regulated by ICCAT to the developing States, especially small island developing
States and developing territories from, the region.‖846
CBDR in Practice
An analysis of current practices in RFMOs supports a conclusion that the
principle of common but differentiated responsibility has had practical applications in
allocation exercises through various forms of differential treatment. In particular, RFMOs
have often adopted the practice of establishing exceptions to conservation and
management measures limiting fishing effort or catches, and differentiated levels of
fishing restrictions.
A common practice, and usually the first step, towards allocation is to limit
fishing mortality by limiting the fishing effort and/or catches of participating States to the
level of a certain reference point. This ‗freezing‘ of the fisheries activities is not an
explicit allocation. It involves, however, an implicit allocation recognizing current
catches as a baseline, and thus entitlement as primary principle for distribution.847
Often, measures limiting fishing effort or catches have exceptions or differential
(less restrictive) rules for some category of States. These exceptions or differential rules

See, for example: ICCAT, Recommendation 2006-05 to establish a multi-annual recovery plan for bluefin
tuna in the eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean, online ICCAT <http://www.iccat.int>.
846
ICCAT, Resolution 01-25, supra note 300, para. III(c) subparagraphs 7 and 9.
847
Agnew et al. call this practice a ―de facto‖ allocation (Agnew et al., supra note 10, at 45). Since the
level to which catch or effort is frozen is usually the reference level for subsequent explicit allocations, it is
a form of giving entitlement priority in the allocation process.
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apply usually either to (fishing or coastal) States with low catches,848 to States whose
catches have one particular use,849 or to coastal States.850 The differential treatment can
consist of either an exception to the restrictions on fishing,851 or a fishing restriction that
nevertheless allows for some development of the fishery.852
The technique of differential treatment has also been used in cases where an
allocation has been agreed to, but adjustments to the TACs require a revision of national
allocations. According to the principle of formal equality, the reductions (or increases)
should be equal for all participants. However, in many cases, the adjustments have a
differential component to protect vulnerable fishing sectors (either developing States, or
coastal communities particularly dependent upon fisheries).853 This differentiated

848

See, for example, WCPFC Conservation and Management Measure CMM 2008-01 for bigeye and
yellowfin tuna in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean. Online: <http://www.wcpfc.int/conservation-andmanagement-measures>, para. 32: ―Paragraph 31 does not apply to members and participating territories
that caught less than 2,000 tonnes in 2004.‖
849
See, for example: WCFPC CMM 2008-01, ibid, para. 35: ―Further to paragraph 34, the reductions
specified in paragraph 33 for 2010 and 2011 shall not apply to fleets of members with a total longline
bigeye tuna catch limit as stipulated in Attachment F of less than 5,000 tonnes and landing exclusively
fresh fish ….‖
850
An earlier example of differential treatment favoring coastal States can be found in the first allocation
adopted by ICCAT for bluefin tuna in the Western Atlantic. The allocation agreed exempted two coastal
States (Brazil and Cuba) from any fishing limitation. See ICCAT, Record of the Meeting on the Western
Atlantic Bluefin Management Measures, 8–12 February 1982, Miami, Florida, online: ICCAT
<http://www.iccat.int>. See also, ICCAT Recommendation 82-01 on New Regulations for the Atlantic
Bluefin Tuna Catch (1983), para. 5, online: ICCAT <http://www.iccat.int>; WCFPC Conservation and
Management Measure 2008-05 of swordfish, para. 6, online: WCPFC <http://www.wcpfc.int>. Similar
exceptions were included, for example, in CMM 2006-03 (replaced by 2008-05); CMM 2005-01 on Bigeye
and Yellowfin tuna (replaced by CMM 2008-01); CMM 2008-01, para. 34; and CMM 2006-04 on Striped
Marlin.
851
See, for example, ICCAT Recommendation 82-01, ibid.
852
This can be expressed in terms of a certain amount that acts as an upper limit in the increases of catches
for small fishing States (and thus as a minimum level for participating States). That is, for example, the
case of CCM 2008-01, supra note 848, para. 32, which allows States with catches lower than 2,000 tonnes
to maintain catches at that level for the following three years. It has also been expressed in terms of
allowing a ‗responsible development‘ of a fishery, where the ‗responsible development‘ is presumably
subject to scrutiny by the RFMO (usually operationalized by imposing the requirement of a development
plan to the Commission of the RFMO).
853
A clear example thereof is the allocation of the quota adopted by the CCSBT at their annual meeting
held in October 2009. The quota was reduced by 20 percent due to scientific concerns over the status of the
stock. The reduction of catches in the CCSBT was absorbed by member States, and not by cooperating
non-members. In addition, in consideration of the artisanal character of Indonesia‘s fisheries and other
special circumstances, Indonesia reduced its catches only by about half of that required of other members
(expressed in percentage of reduction). Information provided by the Secretary Executive of CCSBT, Mr.
Robert Kennedy, on private e-mail communication.
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treatment usually favors developing States; however, this is by no mean a constant
rule.854
Section 7. Lessons for International Fisheries Law
The previous chapters have described how the international community is in
search of a framework for allocation of high seas fishing opportunities that is equitable,
transparent, and predictable. This chapter has analyzed the role that a legal concept of
equity can fulfill in that search. From the analysis of the legal concept of equity, and the
implementation and evolution of equitable principles (equitable delimitation – equitable
utilization - CBDR) in other areas of international law, some observations can be made in
relation to allocation of fishing opportunities. These observations are presented in three
separate sections, following the different levels of normativity of the concept of equity.
Thus, the first group of observations relates to the applicability of equity as a
fundamental norm to guide allocation decisions. The second group of observations
addresses the normative elements of the substantive concept of equity, or controlled
equity, in high seas allocation frameworks. Finally, the third group of observations
analyzes some of the normative elements of the concept of equity, and particularly
equitable principles and relevant circumstances, as developed in other areas of
international law, and their applicability to the distributional conflicts identified in
chapter 3.
This third group of observations is necessarily a tentative exercise. It is tentative,
firstly, because the areas of international law that have been examined are limited.
Secondly, the conclusions that can be drawn from the implementation of equitable
principles and the different categories of relevant factors are more aptly defined as trends
in an evolutionary process. Thirdly, the analysis has to take into account the different
features of the analyzed fields of international law.
In this respect, it is worth making the main differences explicit. A first difference
relates to the nature of the exercise: establishing a geographical or spatial boundary is
different from apportioning a common resource. The ICJ has already pointed out that
854

The rule of paragraph 35 of the WCPFC CMM 2008-01, supra note 848, for example, was established
considering the interests of the USA. See T. Aqorau, ―Current legal developments: Western and Central
Pacific Fisheries Commission‖ (2009) 24 Int‘l. J. Mar. & Coast. L. 737, at p. 745.
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difference. This difference has consequences both in the role of geographical factors in
the delimitation and allocation process, as well as in the stability of the solution. While
delimitation is a permanent decision, the allocation of water or fish resources may, and
indeed should be, revised periodically.
Another important difference relates to the number of participants. In the case of
maritime boundary delimitation and water allocation conflicts, the number of
participating States is limited and defined by geography. That is not the case in
international fisheries, as a consequence of the principle of freedom to fish in the high
seas. The number of participants in the allocation of fishing opportunities is undefined
and, if not unlimited, at least clearly inconsistent with the renovation capacity of any fish
stock.
The Applicability of Equity in International Fisheries
It has been noted in this chapter that States have a general reluctance to make
references to equity in the context of the high seas fisheries regime. The main
Conventions and non-binding instruments adopted by the international community do not
make explicit references to equity in the context of high seas fisheries. Furthermore, in
several cases explicit references to equity were deleted from earlier drafts.
Two related reasons can explain this reluctance. The first reason is that traditional
high seas fishing States want to maintain the ―first-come first-served‖ principle regulating
access to high seas fisheries. It has been noted, indeed, that many authors consider the
absolute protection of prior uses as incompatible with equity. The second reason may lie
in the different meanings of equity in international law. States avoid making references to
equity in documents that, due to their scope and forum, may be interpreted as calling for a
re-distribution of the resources of the ocean.
Nevertheless, this does not preclude the application of equity understood in its
classical meaning, i.e., as the act of balancing the interests and rights of States and other
relevant circumstances of the particular case. Several legal arguments, some State
practice, and scholarly opinions support this interpretation.
Equity in international fisheries law has the character of autonomous equity.
Indeed, it has been pointed out in chapter 3 that neither the LOSC nor UNFSA contain
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any rule of law or fundamental norm governing the allocation of fishing opportunities.
Thus, equity would act as such a fundamental norm, and not as an equitable correction of
a rule of law.
Autonomous equity, however, has been criticized as a discretionary concept with
no normative content. It does not, so it is argued, restrict the discretionary powers to
decide on what is equitable, and therefore opens a door for unpredictability and
inconsistency. Therefore, the application of a legal concept of equity requires providing
the concept with some normative content.
Constructing a Normative Content of Equity
Maritime boundary delimitation law provides valuable lessons for the
construction of an equitable standard with normative (i.e. legal) content. A normative
concept of equity consists of equitable principles, relevant circumstances, and equitable
methods. These elements constrain the discretion of the decision-maker and allow greater
transparency, objectivity, and predictability in the process of achieving an equitable
result.
It is useful to compare the developments of the standard of equitable delimitation
and utilization against the limited developments in international fisheries, to assist the
construction of a normative framework for allocation of fishing opportunities. The global
fisheries instruments, and for a large part also the regional regimes, provide for just one
of the elements identified in maritime law as pertaining to a normative concept of
equitable utilization: relevant circumstances. ―Relevant circumstances‖ in international
fisheries are called ―allocation criteria‖. By focusing exclusively on identifying these
criteria, the international community and the regional regimes have neglected the
development of equitable principles and equitable methods, which provide the special
circumstances and the process as a whole with purpose and direction to achieve an
equitable distribution. In other words, it has failed to provide those with decision-making
powers with any substantial guidance on how to balance those special circumstances.
In relation to maritime delimitation, Weil makes the following remarks regarding
the relationship between relevant circumstances and equitable principles:
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It follows from this that relevant circumstances must always be taken into
consideration. But it also follows that (…) they (…) do not constitute a selfsufficient factor in delimitation.
It is important to note that the facts do not dictate the solution (…) Facts are
silent. What is equitable? What is not? By themselves, the facts have no answer to
these questions. Only human judgment can fulfill this task. The consideration and
balancing-up of relevant circumstances are deliberate legal acts. They presuppose
what might be called a philosophy of equity. (…) This philosophy is expressed by
equitable principles.
The concept of equitable principles implies a judgment on these elements of facts
and a particular view of the purpose of the delimitation. Relevant circumstances
are nature‘s gift. Equitable principles exist on the level of value judgments. They
are man-made.
(…) relevant circumstances and equitable principles go hand in hand (…). In
short, equitable principles acquire substance only by reference to the relevant
circumstances in the case, and the relevant circumstances in the case operate only
with the help and in the context of equitable principles.855
Although RFMOs, for the great extent, have not explicitly identified equitable
principles that can act as direction-finders of equitable solutions, it should be noted that
two organizations have taken some steps in that direction. ICCAT is the organization that
has taken the most steps towards identifying ―considerations‖ that can act as directionfinders, in a way similar to the way in which equitable principles act as direction-finders
in maritime boundary delimitation law. According to ICCAT‘s Resolution 2001-25, the
allocation criteria should be applied by the relevant Panels on a stock-by-stock basis; they
should be applied in a fair and equitable manner with the goal of ensuring opportunities
for all qualifying participants; they should be applied to all stocks in a gradual manner
(…) in order to address the economic needs of all parties concerned, including the need to
minimize economic dislocation; they should be applied so as not to legitimize illegal,
unregulated and unreported catches; they should be applied in a manner that encourages
cooperating non-contracting parties, entities and fishing entities to become contracting
parties, where they are eligible to do so; and they should be applied to encourage
cooperation between the developing States of the region and other fishing States for the
sustainable use of the stocks.
855

Weil, supra note 605, at 211-212.
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Another, rather different, example is offered by the WCPFC. In 2008, the
organization adopted a non-binding Resolution on the Aspirations of Small Islands
Developing States (SIDS) and Territories.856 According to this resolution, contracting
parties and cooperating non-contracting parties ―commit to achieve the goal of ensuring
that by 2018, the domestic fishing and related industries of developing States, in
particular, the least developed SIDS and Territories, accounts for a greater share of the
benefit than what is currently realized of the total catch and value of highly migratory
fish stocks harvested in the Convention Area.‖857 This measure appears closer to a policy
objective for distributional justice, rather than an equitable principle emerging from the
legal framework. However, it reflects what the parties consider equitable considering the
specific situation of the WCFPC. And as a policy objective, it provides at least some
guidance on how to allocate fishing resources in the future.
The Allocation Conflicts in the Light of the Experience of Other Fields of
International Law
This last group of observations attempt to analyze some of the elements of a
normative concept of equity, as developed in other fields of international law, to shed
some new light on the conflicts of allocation of fishing opportunities described in chapter
3. In particular, the potential role of some equitable principles identified in maritime
delimitation law and the law of international watercourses, and the role and relevance of
different categories of relevant factors, is taken into account. The purpose is not to
―solve‖ the distributional conflicts, but to identify aspects and trends to be taken into
account in the construction of a normative framework of equity.
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WCPFC, Resolution 2008-01 on Aspirations of Small Island Developing States and Territories, adopted
at the fifth general session of the Commission of the WCPFC held in Busan, Korea, 8-12 December 2008,
online: WCPFC <www.wcfpc.int>.
857
WCPFC, ibid, at para. 4. It is interesting to note that the proposal originally presented to the
consideration of the Commission included a more precise quantitative target: by 2018, Small Islands
Developing States could account for 70 per cent of all highly migratory fish caught in the Convention Area.
The proposal was not accepted (WCPFC, Fifth Regular Session of the Commission for the Conservation
and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean, supra note
314, para. 214 at 32).

230

a) The EEZ/High Seas Distributional Conflict in the Light of Other Experiences
The EEZ/high seas distributional conflict can be analyzed in light of the experiences of
maritime boundary delimitation and international law of watercourses. Of particular
interest is the consideration of the relevant circumstances related to features of nature
rather than man-made: geography, hydrography, hydrology, and distribution of the
stocks.
In the case of maritime boundary delimitation, geography is a predominant relevant
circumstance. The focus on geography is a logical consequence of the nature of the
process. Firstly, the objective of maritime boundaries is precisely to define areas of
jurisdiction over the oceans. Secondly, the legal source of the powers that the State can
exercise in the marine areas is the land.858 Therefore, ―geographic considerations inspire,
if they do not dictate, most delimitations.‖859
The case of international watercourses presents, in this respect, more similarities with
international fisheries for straddling and highly migratory stocks. In both cases, the
boundaries of areas under different jurisdiction are identified; but the object of
distribution moves across boundaries. It has already been pointed out that, in the case of
the law of international watercourses, there are different interpretations with respect to
the role of geographical, hydrographical and hydrological factors. While some consider
that it is the most important factor, since it derives from the legal title of sovereignty,
others consider that it does not enjoy such preference because the waters of the
international watercourse are a common resource for all States on the basis of State
equality.
This particular distributional conflict can be revisited in the light of equitable
principles identified in previous sections. Particularly relevant are the principle of
sovereignty, proportionality, the principle that equity does not seek to make equal what
nature has made unequal, and the principle of equality. They are addressed in turn.
Respect for national sovereignty is one of the pillars of international law. As such, it
has influenced the legal framework of international watercourses. Indeed, the legal
858

Proper Weil, ―Geographic Considerations in Maritime Delimitation‖ in Jonathan I. Charney and Lewis
M. Alexander, International Maritime Boundaries, vol.1 (Dordrecht; Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers,
1993)115, at 115.
859
Ibid, at 119.
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framework is constructed on the basis of the theory of (limited) sovereignty of the States.
The theory of a ‗community of interests‘, also proposed as a theoretical foundation, has
not been followed by States.860 That is demonstrated also by the ILC lengthy debated on
the use of the term ‗shared resources‘ in law of international watercourses, and its
potential implications for national sovereignty. It was based on the respect to national
sovereignty that the term was dropped from the final document.
The importance of sovereignty is also latent in the evolution of the law of the sea, in
general. Its importance is evident in the extension of maritime jurisdictions. And it is also
present in the establishment of TACs and allocations. As it may be remembered from
chapter 2, in the origin of TACs and allocations, this measure had as one of its
justifications the respect and protection for the sovereign rights of States. They were
implemented so as to allow States to pursue their own economic and social objectives,
without being affected by the behavior of the other States over a common resource.
Thus, an international regime should respect the sovereign rights of States. The
question is: how should that respect be reflected in the allocation of fishing
opportunities? There are two arguments supporting that the respect should be based
mainly on the application of the criterion of zonal attachment for distribution of resources
between EEZ and HS.
A first argument is the principle of proportionality used in maritime boundary
delimitation. The principle of proportionality reflects the need that the maritime space
adjudicated to each State is proportional to the coast length, being the coast length what
provides the basis of the title for that maritime space. Applying the same legal reasoning,
the proportionality in allocation of straddling and highly migratory stocks would require
that the distribution of TAC between EEZ and high seas would be proportional to the
presence of the relevant stock in each area, since it is the area (EEZ) and not the stock
that provides the basis of the legal title.
The second argument lies on the principle that equitable use does not seek to make
equal what nature has made unequal. Thus, an equitable allocation of fishing
opportunities shall not compensate for a presence, or absence, of distribution of the
relevant stock in a particular side of the man-made boundary.
860

McCaffrey, supra note 752, at 147-167.
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It has been noted that Fuentes considers that the geographic and hydrologic criterion
in the application of equitable utilization of international watercourses, albeit having a
role, should not be a predominant factor. This opinion is based on the perfect equality of
rights among participating States, perfect equality that in turn derives from the national
sovereignty. Whether one shares this argument for the law of international watercourses
or not, it should be noted that the perfect equality of States in the distribution of high seas
fishing opportunities between EEZ and high seas can be questioned. Albeit all States
have a right to fish, the title for that right is not equal. The coastal State has a right to fish
that derives from a sovereign right, while the right to fish of DWFNs derives from a
freedom to fish in areas where no spatial and exlcusive jurisdiction is exercised. This
difference in the legal title, it can be argued, allows also making a distinction in the
allocation process.
The particular relevance of zonal attachment as a criterion for the distribution of
fishing opportunities between EEZ and high seas appears to be confirmed by State
practice. In the case of straddling stocks, zonal attachment has been always a determinant
factor in the allocation of fishing opportunities. It appears, as well, that its importance is
increasing. Evidence thereof is, for example, the sharing agreement for cod, haddock and
yellowtail flounder on Georges Bank, proposed by the Gulf of Maine Transboundary
Management Guidance Committee and accepted by the fisheries administrations of USA
and Canada in 2001.861 The sharing agreement considered a gradual shift (over a period
of 8 years) from an allocation key based 60% on the distribution of the stock, and 40% on
historical catches, to an allocation key that considered each criterion on a 90% and 10%
basis, respectively.
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See: Gulf of Maine Transboundary Management Guidance Committee, ―Development of a Sharing
Allocation Proposal for Transboundary Resources of Cod, Haddock and Yellowtail Flounder on Georges
Bank‖, Fisheries Management Regional Report 2002/01, January 2002, Attachment 9, online: Maritimes
Region of the Department of Fisheries & Oceans Canada, <http://www.mar.dfo-mpo.gc.ca>.
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Table 10. Weighting of resource distribution v. historical landings (express in
percentage) in the sharing agreement adopted by the Gulf of Maine Transboundary
Management Guidance Committee on December 2001
Year
Distribution
Historical
landings (%)

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

60/40

60/40

65/35

70/30

75/25

80/20

85/15

90/10

v.

This agreement governs the allocation of transboundary resources within the EEZs of
two coastal States. However, it reflects a preference for a neutral and objective criterion
that can be also applicable in the distribution of stocks between the areas of EEZ and the
high seas.
In the case of highly migratory stocks, and as has been pointed out already in chapter
2, the zonal attachment was initially not considered a relevant criterion and today its
applicability is, in practice, limited. However, it should be noted that its initial exclusion
in tuna RFMOs was influenced by one particular historical factor that no longer holds
relevant.862 Currently, the trend in tuna RFMOs is also to give broader recognition to the
distribution of the stocks in the allocation of fishing opportunities. A clear example
thereof is the ICCAT Criteria for the Application of Fishing Possibilities, which
explicitly includes the following criterion: ―the occurrence of the stock(s) in areas under
national jurisdiction and on the high seas.‖863 Even more remarkable were the opinions of
many States after the adoption of the non-binding criteria. The inclusion of this criterion
was widely considered as recognition of the legal rights of the coastal States, and it even
removed the practical and legal impediments of some coastal States to become parties to
ICCAT. Thus, the interpretation and expectation of States is that the distribution of the
stock shall be a significant factor in the distribution of fishing opportunities.
The preference for zonal attachment criteria can be found not only in the fact that it
respects sovereign rights of coastal States, but also in that it is a neutral and objective
criterion. This neutrality has also been one consideration for the preference for physical
geography in maritime boundary delimitation. It has been argued, however, that the value
of the criterion is diminished because the migration patterns are unknown, uncertain, or
862
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variable. This is held particularly in respect to highly migratory stocks. This uncertainty
and variability may arise because of the characteristics of the migration patterns, or
because of insufficient scientific knowledge. Despite the reasonableness of this argument,
both circumstances can be taken into account explicitly and objectively in the
determination of the role of the criterion in the allocation process. The more uncertain or
variable the migration or distribution patterns, the less weight that should be given to this
criterion. As a consequence, it would need to be supplemented by other criteria. This can
be either on a permanent or temporary basis, until scientific knowledge is acquired and
adjustments can be made.
A particular aspect that should be analyzed, in the applicability of the criterion, are
the situations where the stock is fully exploited, but the coastal State has not developed
the fishing capacity to catch its proportion of the quota.864 In these cases, the fishing
activities of the coastal State do not represent its theoretical share of the stock according
to the distribution of the stock; but any adjustment to its national quota will imply a
sacrifice by DWFNs. This situation, in turn, may arise for two reasons: because the
coastal State attempts, not to fish its quota, but to give access to the TAC surplus in its
EEZ; or because the coastal State aspires to fully develop its fishing capacity.
There are three theoretical responses to these questions: a) it can be decided that the
coastal State shall be allocated its share in any case, leaving to the coastal State the
possibility to afford access to its EEZ and quota to DWFNs; b) it could be decided to
allocate a share according to distribution of the stock only when the coastal State is
developing its own fishing capacity (and as a consequence, the share of DWFNs shall be
reduced); or c) it could be decided that the national quota of the coastal State cannot be
accommodated if it implies a reduction of the share of DWFN.
The latter response should in principle be rejected as contrary to the equitable
principles identified above. A further analysis that could be introduced, to answer this
question, is the assessment of the new activities by a coastal State according to standards
of reasonableness. This aspect will be addressed further below.
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b) Historical Catches, Intergenerational Equity and New Participants
Historical catches play a considerable role in the allocation of fishing opportunities in
the high seas. It has been the predominant allocation criterion since its inception, and it is
the main criterion used today.865 The ―first-come first-served‖ or ―first in time, first in
right‖ philosophy seems to have been, and in many respects still is, the predominant
philosophy for high seas fisheries.
According to international law, historical rights or prior uses deserve legal protection.
As noted above, the Permanent Court of Arbitration considered a ―well established
principle of the law of nations that the state of things that actually exists and has existed
for a long time should be changed as little as possible.‖866 The ICJ has reaffirmed this
principle by stating that ―historic rights must enjoy respect and be preserved as they have
always been by long usage.‖867
The historical rights or prior uses that are offered legal protection are, however, uses
that exist now and have existed for a long time. Without doubt, the requirement of long
usage is warranted in the cases of maritime delimitation because their effect is to
establish the legal basis for a claim to sovereignty or sovereign rights. Nevertheless, the
requirement that prior uses have existed for long time is also warranted by the
justification of this protection: to protect the stability of situations.
Furthermore, as Fuentes notices in relation to non-navigational uses of international
watercourses, the prior use is a demonstration of socio-economic dependency. As a
consequence, she asserts that legal protection is afforded to prior uses inasmuch as they
are reflections of such dependency. This interpretation seems to have support in the
jurisprudence of the ICJ in the Fisheries Jurisdiction Case.868 The case involved the
unilateral extension of exclusive fisheries jurisdiction by Iceland in an area where,
according to the judgment, international law recognized only a preferential right of the
coastal States. In the Fisheries case, the court acknowledged the need to balance the
preferential rights of coastal States with the concurrent rights of other States,
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and particularly of a State which, like the Applicant, has for many years been engaged
in fishing in the waters in question, such fishing activity being important to the
economy of the country concerned. The coastal State has to take into account and pay
regard to the position of such other States, particularly when they have established an
economic dependence on the same fishing grounds.869
Furthermore, in the following paragraph the ICJ considered not only the long time
that the applicant, United Kingdom, had been fishing in the area, but also the fact that its
catches were remarkably steady, and that it constituted its main distant water fishing
grounds for demersal species. All these elements denoted, in the opinion of the ICJ, not
only the dependency on the fish grounds, but also an interest in their conservation.870
This paragraph of the ICJ decision supports, therefore, the principle that prior uses
deserving legal protection, or at least particular legal protection, are the uses that have
continued for a considerable time and that have, therefore, created both a dependency and
an expectation for the respective State.
The analysis of the practices of RFMOs in allocation of fishing opportunities
described in chapters 2 and 3, and in particular the use of the criterion of past
performance or historical catches, demonstrates a rather different trend. The allocation of
fishing opportunities tends to favour a ―short-term history‖. This is done in some cases
directly and explicitly. That has been the case with the allocation key discussed by NAFO
in 1969, or in the allocation keys recently discussed for the shrimp fishery. 871 It is also
done indirectly, by establishing recent reference periods for the limitation of fishing
effort or fishing mortality, as discussed in earlier chapters.
The consideration of a short-term fishing history creates wrong incentives for
fisheries conservation, as has been analyzed in chapter 4. Indeed, in the expectation of
receiving a bigger share, States have incentives to increase the fishing activities in the
period prior to the establishment of a management regime that includes TAC and
allocations. This increased short-term fishing activity is then ―protected‖ through its
recognition and relevance in allocation decisions, even though it may have been
deliberately inconsistent with conservation objectives.
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But in addition, the consideration of a short-term history creates wrong signals for
equity. Indeed, the recognition of ―last minute history‖ implies that recent activities
would deserve the same protection than activities that have been developed for decades
or centuries. This conclusion does not follow and even contradicts the legal reasoning for
the protection of prior uses, as understood in international law.
A task that needs to be addressed in the construction of a normative framework for
allocation of fishing opportunities is to determine, therefore, the requirements that
historical catches have to fulfill to receive legal protection in the allocation process.
Provided that prior uses comply with the requirements to deserve legal protection, the
further question that needs to be asked is if this protection is absolute. The experience in
other areas of international law demonstrates that historical titles or prior uses do not
receive absolute protection. Indeed, absolute protection is, in the opinion of most
scholars, incompatible with the principle of equitable utilization.
The recent experiences in RFMOs allow the conclusion that allocation of fishing
opportunities does not provide absolute protection to prior uses either. Indeed, RFMOs‘
recent work on allocation criteria is an attempt to move away from historical catches as a
sole or predominant criterion of distribution. However, it should be noted that this
attempt has mostly been related to a new approach to address the distributional conflict
between EEZ and the high seas. With respect to high seas fishing opportunities, it has
only been timidly raised.
In this latter respect (i.e. the distribution of fishing opportunities for the high seas
component of the stock), a crucial difference between the international fisheries
management regime and other areas of international law analyzed in this chapter should
be noted. That crucial difference is the number of potential participants in the regime.
While in maritime delimitation and international watercourse the number of participants
is limited and defined by natural factors, the potential number of participants exercising
the ―freedom of the high seas‖ is, if not unlimited, at least incompatible with a
sustainable and economically viable activity.
In addressing this particular reality, UNFSA does not recognize the right of
participation in the RFMO to all States, but only to States with a real interest.
Unfortunately, it fell short in defining the concept of real interests and debate exist on its
238

meaning. An alternative way to address this particular problem would be to address the
problem from the perspective of legal protection of prior or historical uses. The task,
then, would not be to positively answer what the content and conditions of ―real interest‖
is, but rather to answer the reverse: to which interests, and in which circumstances, does
the legal protection to prior uses retreat.
A few answers on this latter question can be attempted. On the basis of the arguments
of the previous section, it can be concluded that the prior or historical do not prevail
against the exercise of sovereign rights by the coastal States. It can also be concluded that
prior uses do not receive absolute protection in cases of economic and social dependency
from States fishing for the resources, and in particular from developing States in the
region, as will be explained in the next section. In respect to other new entrants, the
protection of prior uses should indeed be higher, albeit not necessarily absolute. A few
guidelines can also be proposed in balancing the protection to prior uses and the
aspirations of new entrants:
a) New entrants shall have the capacity to perform responsible fisheries.
b) New entrants shall qualify as such, to avoid providing quota to actors that recur to
flags of convenience to increase their fishing opportunities in the RFMO.
c) Limitations to new entrants shall only be applicable in case of scarcity, i.e., in
case of conflict between new entrants aspirations and the status of the stock.
d) States with historical entitlement shall ensure optimum and reasonable
exploitation of the stocks. Underexploited quotas shall be re-allocated. Unjustified
wasteful fishing activities should not be protected.
c) The Developing States/Developed States Conflict: Socio-Economic Factors
The consideration of socio-economic factors is undoubtedly the most difficult aspect
of the normative concept of equity. Socio-economic considerations lean the concept
towards distributive justice in its broad sense, and therefore taint the decision with
political rather than legal considerations.
The approach adopted by the ICJ distinguishes between relevant and non-relevant
socio-economic factors. The social and economic development of the respective States is
deemed irrelevant for delimitation or allocation purposes: they are a matter of distributive
justice – of world politics – and not of legal principles. The existence of natural resources
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in the disputed area, on the contrary, have been considered a relevant circumstance and
given a role, albeit limited, in maritime delimitation. A similar approach has been
suggested for the law of international watercourses. Socio-economic development of the
State is deemed a political consideration irrelevant for the concept for equitable
utilization. The social and economic dependency on the resources of the particular
watercourse, on the contrary, are considered not only relevant but, in the opinion of some
authors, the most important criterion to be considered in the determination of equitable
utilization.
This approach can be compared to the provisions of the global and regional
frameworks for allocation of fishing opportunities. As has been explained in chapter 3,
the allocation criteria in UNFSA include explicitly socio-economic factors and the
special requirements of developing States. In particular, they recognize:


Dependence of coastal States, including:
 needs of coastal fishing communities which are dependent mainly on fishing
for the stocks
 the coastal States whose economies are overwhelmingly dependent on the
exploitation of living marine resources
 the particular interests of developing coastal States



Dependence of States fishing on the high seas on the stocks concerned



Needs and dependence of developing States, including:
 vulnerability of developing States which are dependent on the exploitation of
living marine resources
 vulnerability of developing States to meet the nutritional requirements of their
populations or parts thereof;
 the need to avoid adverse impacts on, and ensure access to fisheries by,
subsistence, small-scale and artisanal fishers and women fishworkers;
 the need to avoid adverse impacts on, and ensure access to fisheries by,
indigenous people in developing States, particularly small island developing
States;
 the need to ensure that such measures do not result in transferring, directly or
indirectly, a disproportionate burden of conservation action onto developing
States.
RFMOs Conventions and allocation guidelines, if available, also include socio-

economic factors and special requirements of developing States as factors to be taken into
account in the allocation of fishing opportunities.
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A first aspect that needs to be addressed is the nature of the socio-economic factors
considered in the global and regional frameworks. Indeed, LOSC, UNFSA and the
regional frameworks explicitly call to take into account the special requirements of
developing States. Is this an aspect of the allocation of fishing opportunities that cannot
be included in a normative content of equity?
There are reasons to believe that that is not the case. The special requirements of
developing States are not mentioned in isolation of any other circumstance. They are
mentioned either in conjunction with their character of coastal State; with a particular
dependency on the exploitation of living marine resources (including for meeting
nutritional needs); and with exploitation patterns of subsistence, small-scale and artisanal
fishers and indigenous populations. Thus, it is not the stage of development alone what
deserves special consideration in international fisheries law, but the special vulnerability
of the developing States, their population, or part thereof, based on their dependency on
the resource managed by an RFMO. Considered from that perspective, allocation of
fishing opportunities is again not an exercise of distributive justice but of equitable
principles within the law.
The next aspect that needs to be addressed is the practical implementation of socioeconomic factors in an equitable allocation. Few RFMOs have developed indicators to
assess economic and social aspects of the fishing activities. The performance review
panel of NEAFC, for example, expressed its frustration with the lack of focus and
information available on economic and social benefits;872 and recommended that the
organization develops an annual fisheries status report which encompasses not just
biological factors for the fish stocks concerned but also social, environmental and
economic performance.873 Mooney-Seus and Rosenberg, in turn, note that few RFMOs
have ―well-articulated strategies for identifying and accounting for (…) socio-economic
needs.‖874 Allen, as well, notes that ―[t]una RFMOs have given little attention to
economic criteria in determining management standards‖.875
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This ―veil of States‖ on social and economic factors probably has as one of its causes
the fact that allocation was designed precisely to allow each State to decide and pursue
their own social and economic objectives with independence from the international
management regime. As a consequence of this, socio-economic data is usually not
collected. But the issue is not only a problem of data collection but an issue that has much
deeper implications. Indeed, allocating fishing resources on the basis of socio-economic
criteria would entail a comparison and even prioritization of socio-economic objectives
that, in isolation, may differ considerably,876 but that are also rooted in broader social and
economic contexts. Judge Gros refers to this difficulty by stating that
[t]o hold the balance between the economic survival of a people and the interests of
the fishing industry of other States raises a problem of the balanced economic
development of all, according to economic criteria, in which fishing is only one of the
elements taken into account, and of which the bases are international interdependence
and solidarity. (...) it is clear that differences of views on these questions do not give
rise to justiciable disputes, since these are problems of economic interests which are
not the concern of the Court. But the Court cannot make them disappear by refusing
to see anything but a conservation problem; the balance of facts and interests is
broken.877
Two alternatives to deal with this difficulty can be proposed. The first is to abandon
the State approach to define fisheries socio and economic objectives for high seas
fisheries, and commend that task to RFMOs. The other is to give effect to the socioeconomic considerations through a more systematic use of the principle of CBDR and the
technique of differentiation, establishing standards that reflect and take into account the
different social and economic dependency, and in particular the special needs of
developing States. RFMOs already have used this approach, albeit in an unsystematic
way. Some examples have already been mentioned: exceptions to fishing effort or
catches limitations considered in WCPFC and ICCAT conservation and management
measures; and the differentiated ―sacrifice rate‖ required by CCSBT to one developing
contracting member.
Thus, differentiated treatment can be a practical tool to give effect to socio and
economic factors (dependency, need) in allocation of fishing opportunities. The criteria
876
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would not be used as a positive factor in the allocation process (which would require a
comparison of very different social and economic objectives) but as a negative factor (in
order to avoid disproportionate negative impacts on one State). As such, the consideration
of socio-economic factors resembles not only the CBDR but also the test of negative
minimum used by the ICJ in some of the few cases where socio-economic considerations
were included in the process of maritime boundary delimitation.
A few observations need to be made in relation to this suggestion and its implications
for international fisheries. Firstly, it is worth mentioning that there is a difference
between utilizing differential treatment as a means to take into account socio-economic
considerations, and as a means of taking into account the special requirements of
developing States. It has already been pointed out that the principle of CBDR addresses,
at least in its current formulation, the relationship between developed and developing
countries. However, it can be also used to address cases of strong dependency on the
relevant fish stock, regardless of the development stage of the State in question.
Secondly, it should be noted that the differential treatment is an exercise of corrective
justice.878 It implies, therefore, that there is one or more factors that serve as primary
allocation criteria, which application is then tempered through a differentiated restriction
requirement for States with high dependency on the resource. This can be resisted by
some countries, and particularly developing countries, which may consider their
particular social and economic dependency– their need - as an entitlement factor rather
than a correction factor.
d) Other Fundamental Norms in International Fisheries Allocation
Another aspect that is worth analyzing is the convenience of supplementing the
fundamental norm for allocation, equity, with other norms or objectives that can facilitate
the resolution of conflicts over scarce resources. In particular, a reference to reasonable
use is warranted.
It has been noted that the principle for decisions on use of an international
watercourse is the principle of equitable and reasonable utilization. While some scholars
see these two standards as synonymous, most consider that they act at different levels.
878
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While the equitable use standard looks at the quantity of water vis-à-vis the requirements
of other States, reasonable use looks at what the State in question does with the water. In
this sense, it is argued that an unreasonable use of the resource is, in itself, inequitable.
A standard of reasonableness, as has been mentioned above, can be considered a
relevant supplementary standard to assess conflicts between existing users and new
entrants, or between coastal States and DWNFs. The protection of existing uses, or of
potential uses, can be provided only if that existing or future use is reasonable,
considering the circumstances of the particular case.
A standard of reasonableness would require the identification of unreasonable,
wasteful uses. But most importantly, it requires information on the fisheries activities
developed by participating States. And as has been pointed out, States are reluctant to
provide that information. This has its basis in the original justification for quota
allocation: allowing States to use the surplus in the form they consider appropriate.
However, in cases of increased scarcity and conflict, it can be questioned if this is an
aspect of the fisheries regime that need, or can, be maintained. Considering that high seas
fisheries have an international component, and that sacrifices are being made by all
participating States, the international community and the RFMO should be entitled to
verify that the use of the resources by the participating States is reasonable (although not
necessarily the most efficient or cost-effective), considering the particular circumstances
of the fishery and its participants.
e) Equity as an Open Concept
This third section has attempted to highlight some of the key aspects that need to
be addressed in the construction of a normative concept of equity, and to shed some light
in relation to developments in other fields of international law. It must be acknowledged,
however, that even a concept of equity with high degree of normativity does not exclude
a realm of discretion. Excluding it would imply establishing a rule of law, instead of an
equitable standard that, by definition, has the flexibility to adapt to the particular
circumstances of each case.
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Chapter 6. Institutional and Procedural Implications
The previous chapter analyzed the allocation of fishing opportunities from the
perspective of equity as a legal standard for allocation of scarce resources. It was
concluded that, following the jurisprudence of the ICJ in maritime delimitation, a
normative concept of equity requires the development of equitable principles, relevant
circumstances, and equitable methods. This chapter addresses some of the institutional
and procedural implications that arise from this concept. In so doing, this chapter will
critically assess the wide consensus highlighted in chapter 2, namely, that RFMOs are the
fora called to develop transparent allocation criteria in accordance with international law.
For this purpose, the chapter addresses first the adequacy and need of a normative
concept of equity in negotiated allocation processes. Secondly, it assesses the different
institutions that, at least theoretically, could participate in the development of a normative
concept of equity for high seas allocations. This assessment allows determining to what
extent RFMOs are the only organizations capable of addressing equitable allocation
frameworks. Finally, the chapter assesses the contribution of a normative concept of
equity to transparency in the allocation process. This latter aspect also allows some
general comments on legitimacy and good governance in RFMOs.
Section 1. Role of Equitable Principles in Negotiated Allocations
The normative content of equitable delimitation has been developed by and for
judicial decisions. Decisions on allocation of high seas fishing opportunities, however,
rest in a political forum: the regional fisheries management commissions or meetings of
the parties. Allocations are discussed and negotiated by States through the decision
making process of RFMOs. The first question that arises, therefore, is if a normative
content of equity is applicable in this different setting.
In the field of maritime delimitation, the ICJ has asserted that States are under the
requirement, not only to negotiate in order to arrive at an equitable delimitation, but also
to take equitable principles into account in that negotiation. The ICJ stated that
[t]he normative character of equitable principles applied as a part of general
international law is important because these principles govern not only
delimitation by adjudication or arbitration, but also, and indeed primarily, the duty
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of Parties to seek first a delimitation by agreement, which is also to seek an
equitable result. 879
Nevertheless, scholars have objected the idea that States are under the obligation
to apply, in negotiated delimitations, identical rules than the dispute settlement bodies. In
this respect, Weil states:
States may enjoy complete contractual freedom. Courts and arbitrators, called on
to decide on the basis of international law, do not. The judge or arbitrator, as we
have seen, is required to find a solution which not only seems equitable to him but
is also grounded on legal considerations. And, whereas the equity applicable to
governments in a negotiation has a very broad, ill-defined meaning, the equity of
the judge or arbitrator is narrowly confined infra legem.880
In the same line, Kolb noted that
[t]he parties can negotiate and compromise on their rights. Thus the equitable
principles can be analyzed, from their perspective, as flexible obligations to be
taken into account, indicating a general objective. Here the equitable principles
are neither obligations of means nor, strictly speaking, obligations of result. This
is so because the consent of the parties eo ipse brings about the result and is not
subject to external criticism to want of equity.881
According to these opinions, therefore, States are free to part from a substantive
normative concept of equity to favor bargaining and negotiation. In other words, equity in
the negotiated agreement does not necessarily imply a form of ―controlled equity‖, but
equity as a form of discretion. Following this line of thought, member States of an RFMO
would have discretion to adopt any allocation agreement they consider appropriate. This
agreement would be reputed equitable by the sole fact that it has been agreed. In other
words, an ―equitable‖ agreement would be the result of bargaining, and bargaining alone.
The premise of this thesis has been, however, that a substantive and normative
framework for allocation of fishing opportunities is useful and even necessary for
allocation of high seas fishing opportunities. Indeed, previous chapters have described
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how the evolution of TAC and allocation demonstrate that there is an ongoing search for
some substantive framework or standard that makes the decision-making process on
allocations transparent, predictable, non-discriminatory, and fair. Some reasons can be
proposed for this perceived need.
A first reason may be found in the multiplicity of actors engage in the bargaining
process. In a two State negotiation, it is comparatively easier that an ad-hoc bargaining
leads to satisfactory trade-offs for all parties involved. In a 30 State negotiation (which is
often the case in RFMOs negotiations) such an ad-hoc bargaining may prove inadequate.
A second reason can be found in the iterative nature of the process. Allocation
decisions cannot be permanent because of natural variability of the fish stocks, scientific
uncertainty, and variability in the participants. The iterative negotiation process, if done
in conditions of ad-hoc bargaining, imposes to the participants a degree of uncertainty
that affects the cooperative behavior and the stability of the cooperative regime.
A third reason relates to the international character of high seas fisheries. The fish
in the high seas are a global common, open for the exploitation of all States. It has been
already highlighted that this freedom to fish in the high seas is qualified by the obligation
to cooperate in the conservation of fish stocks. If the terms of that cooperation are,
however, established by bargaining alone, again the cooperative behavior of nonparticipants may be eroded. Regional cooperation is improved in respect to nonparticipants if it is based on a transparent and substantive normative framework for
distributing fishing opportunities, instead of the result of bargaining power.
Section 2. Constructing a Normative Concept of Equity: RFMOs’ Role
If agreed that the development of a normative content of equity is useful and
necessary for international fisheries law, the next issue that needs to be addressed is the
appropriate forum to develop it. Traditionally, as has been noted, the international
community has considered that this is best done at the regional level. Indeed, it is argued,
an equitable allocation needs to consider the particularities of each region and fish stock.
This understanding of an equitable allocation resembles the theory of unicum
briefly sustained, but later abandoned, in maritime boundary delimitation law. As it may
be remembered, the theory of unicum emphasized the equitable result, which depended
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entirely upon the facts of the particular case.882 The approach of the ICJ changed,
however, towards the application of an equitable framework with normative content, a
framework that requires a combination of elements: a) equitable principles; b) relevant
circumstances; and c) equitable methods; to achieve an d) equitable result.
This equity framework has different components with different levels of
generality. Accordingly, each of them can be developed at different levels as well. While
it has to be agreed that the fact-intensive task of identifying relevant circumstances and
equitable methods are best suited for RFMOs (as will be addressed in further detail in the
next section), there is no such requirement in the case of equitable principles. Equitable
principles are, indeed,
means to an equitable result in a particular case, yet also having a more general
validity and hence expressible in general terms; for as the Court has also said,
―the legal concept of equity is a general principle directly applicable as law‖
(…).883
A consequence of this generality inherent in equitable principles is that their
development is not necessarily restricted to RFMOs. This opens the door for different
avenues that could participate in the development of equitable principles.
Before entering into an analysis of which those organizations may be, it should be
noted that the role of RFMOs is, nevertheless, central to a normative concept of equity
for, at least, two reasons. Firstly, equitable principles need to be endorsed by the RFMOs.
Equitable principles do not arise ―from any natural or logical necessity; it is the result of a
legal choice.‖884 Secondly, equitable principles have a limited role in the normative
structure of equity. Indeed, equitable principles are an element, but only one element, of
this normative structure. Equity requires, by its own essence, the blending of the
generalities of the principles with the particularities of the facts. This has been clearly
explained by Weil while noting that
(…) relevant circumstances and equitable principles go hand in hand (…). In
short, equitable principles acquire substance only be reference to the relevant
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circumstances in the case, and the relevant circumstances in the case operate only
with the help and in the context of equitable principles.885
As noted, the fact that a normative concept of equity has some elements that are
of general character opens the door for the participation of other agents in its
development. This conclusion supports some proposals of a more active role for the
global fora in the search for a substantive framework for allocation.886 Theoretically
perspective, these avenues could be global or regional; they could be public or private;
and they could have a political or technical emphasis.
Global fora with a strong political component are represented by instances such as
the UN General Assembly, the Informal Consultations of the State Parties to UNFSA, the
Review Conference of UNFSA, or the Informal Consultative Process of the United
Nations for the Ocean and the Law of the Sea (UNICPOLOS). 887 FAO provides a global
fora with a stronger technical component; while the joint tuna RFMO meetings offer an
opportunity to analyze the particular issues of highly migratory stocks.888
Academia has a lot to offer in this exploration. It seems apparent that a better
understanding of the concept and different expressions of equity for the allocation of
scare resources, in general, and for high seas fisheries, in particular, is required.
Independent reports, also common in recent years,889 may also provide valuable insights
to this process. A current avenue is represented by the International Law Association or
the International Law Commission, both of which have been instrumental in the
development and codification of the law of international watercourses and the law of the
885

Ibid, at 211-212.
Lodge and Nandan, supra note 282, at 74, proposed the development of FAO guidelines on
implementation of articles 10 and 11 of UNFSA. Lodge et al., at 11, state: ―Although any allocation of
participatory rights by an RFMO will almost invariably represent a negotiated outcome between members,
there is a potentially important role for external organizations, including independent experts and
academics, in driving debate forward.‖
887
By Resolution 54/33, the UN General Assembly decided to ―establish an open-ended informal
consultative process in order to facilitate the annual review by the General Assembly, in an effective and
constructive manner, of developments in ocean affairs by considering the Secretary-General‘s report on
oceans and the law of the sea and by suggesting particular issues to be considered by it, with an emphasis
on identifying areas where coordination and cooperation at the intergovernmental and inter-agency levels
should be enhanced‖ (UNGA, Resolution on Results of the review by the Commission on Sustainable
Development of the sectoral theme of ―Oceans and seas‖: international coordination and cooperation,
A/RES/54/33, 18 January 2000, para. 2, online DOALOS <http://www.un.org/Depts/los/index>). There has
been 11 UNICPOLOS meetings from 2000 to 2010, addressing a variety of themes on oceans and law of
the sea.
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See: <http://www.tuna-org.org>.
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See, for example: Lodge et al., supra note 11; OECD, supra note 15.
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sea. The current work of ILA Committee on International Law on Sustainable
Development may provide opportunities for the analysis of at least some of the
difficulties of high seas fisheries allocation.890 They ILC, on the contrary, has manifested
certain reticence to address global commons issues.891
The participation of international dispute settlement bodies could also be
considered, but the probability of allocation conflicts being resorted to third party
settlement is likely low.892 However, some mechanisms to facilitate negotiations have
been included within the structure and processes of some RFMO. Indeed, newlyestablished RFMOs or revised constitutional texts have included negotiation facilitators
— including conciliators and expert panels —in the decision-making process.893
Negotiation facilitators may be instrumental for the explicit definition of substantive and
procedural standards that a particular RFMO needs to take into account when deciding on
allocation of fishing opportunities.
Another avenue is the work of performance review panels. Review panels are
usually given the task to assess the extent to which an RFMO is adopting compatible
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The objective of the Committee is to study the legal status and legal implementation of sustainable
development. For this purpose the Committee‘s mandate includes: (i) assessment of the legal status of
principles and rules of international law in the field of sustainable development, with particular reference to
the ILA New Delhi Principles (now also published as UN Doc. A/57/329), as well as assessment of the
practice of States and international organizations in this field; (ii) the study of developing States in a
changing global order, particularly the impact of globalization on the sustainable development
opportunities of developing countries; (iii) in the light of the principle of integration and interrelationship, a
re-examination of certain topics of the international law of development, including analysis of a. the
position of the least developed countries in international law; b. the right to development, and; c. the
obligation to co-operate on matters of social, economic and environmental concern‖ (ILA, First Report of
the International Committee on International Law on Sustainable Development, Berlin Conference 2004,
online: ILA <http://www.ila-hq.org>).
891
The topic of shared resources was proposed for the long-term working program of the ILC in 2000. The
proposal restricted the scope to resources shared within jurisdictions of 2 or more States, since
―environment and global commons raise many of the same issues, but a host of others as well‖ (ILC,
Report on the work of its fifty-second session , 1 May-9 June and 10 July-18 August 2000, Supplement No.
10 (A/55/10), Annex, Syllabuses on topics recommended for inclusion in the long-term programme of
work of the commission, Annex 3 Shared natural resources of states (Robert Rosenstock), at 141, oline:
ILC <http://www.un.org/law/ilc>).
892
For an analysis of the different interpretations on the application of compulsory settlement of disputes to
conflicts over management of straddling and highly migratory, see: Oude Elferink, supra note 357, at 598–
602.
893
The SEAFO Convention considers, at the request of any member State, the intervention of an ad-hoc
expert panel in case of objections to any conservation and management measures. In this case, the ad-hoc
expert panel can make recommendations on interim measures only. (SEAFO Convention, article 23.1
subparagraph g). The WCFPC Convention considers the possibility of appointing a conciliator for the
purpose of reconciling the differences in order to achieve consensus (WCPFC Convention, article 20.4).
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conservation measures, the extent to which the RFMO agrees on the allocation of
allowable catch or levels of fishing effort, and the extent to which the RFMO provides
fishing opportunities in accordance with article 11 of UNFSA.894 In performing their
mandate, the expert and independent panelists may also provide a useful platform for the
definition of some explicit guidelines.
Table 11. Institutions potentially involved in the development of equitable principles for
allocation of high seas fishing opportunities

Global level

UNGA
UNFSA Review Conference
Informal Consultation of State Parties to
UNFSA
UNICPOLOS
FAO

Regional
level

International organizations and mechanisms

Meeting of Tuna RFMOs
Review panels
Dispute resolution mechanisms (conciliators,
experts)

Private organizations
ILA
ILC
Academia
NGOs

Each of these fora has something to offer to the process of giving equity a
normative content to allocation of high seas fishing opportunities. International
organizations at the global level have the advantage of creating a political momentum for
development, as has been the case for several issues in high seas fisheries, not to mention
other fields. Clear examples thereof are the UNGA Resolutions on large-scale pelagic
drift-net fishing and its impact on the living marine resources of the world's oceans and
seas,895 and the protection of deep sea vulnerable marine ecosystems in the high seas.896
Technical fora would have the advantage of their expertise and impartiality. Regional
initiatives would have the advantage of addressing concrete situations in a more
pragmatic way. If proved successful, the solutions may then be adopted by other
894

See: UN, Report of the Sixth Round of the Informal Consultation of State Parties to UNFSA, New York,
23-24 April 2007, ICSP6/UNFSA/REP/INF.1, 29 May 2007, Annex II Recommended Minimum criteria
for Reviewing the Performance of Regional Fisheries Management Organizations (RFMOs), Draft, 13
April 2007, online: DOALOS <http://www.un.org/Depts/los/index>.
895
UNGA Resolutions 46/215, 47/442, 48/445, 49/436, 50/25, 51/36, 52/29, 53/33, and 55/8 adopted
between 1991 and 2000, online: DOALOS <http://www.un.org/Depts/los/index>.
896
UNGA Resolutions 58/14, 59/25, and 60/31 and adopted between 2003 and 2005, online: DOALOS
<http://www.un.org/Depts/los/index>.
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organizations in a process of transferring best practices that is also a common among
RFMOs.897
Although all these organizations and mechanisms could potentially participate in
the definition of equitable principles, as one element of a normative concept of equity for
high seas allocation, the real issue is which of these organizations or mechanisms is in a
practical situation to do so. In this regard, it should be recalled that the processes for
development of allocation criteria in NAFO and ICCAT revealed the interests of many
States to maintain the status quo. This incentive has also been reflected in the complex
relationship between allocation and conservation, as explained in chapter 4 on
intergenerational equity. In that scenario, State-led global fora are probably not
promissory avenues.
In other areas where change was also resisted by at least some States – and
particularly the conservation agenda – the efforts of environmental non-governmental
organizations (ENGOs) have been fundamental for progress in legal frameworks and
regional practices.898 However, ENGOs have not intervened in the distributional
problems of RFMOs, limiting themselves to point out the negative environmental
consequences of current allocation practices that have been extensively described in
chapter 4.
It is apparent that, for the reasons described above, the introduction of equitable
principles and procedures to high seas fisheries allocation is not currently, and is not
likely to be in the near future, on the agenda of most of these organizations. Therefore,
from practical feasibility rather than legal imposition, each RFMO remains the most
suitable avenue to develop an equitable allocation framework that is tailored to its
particular needs. It is, nevertheless, possible that the equitable principles and methods
developed would then be adopted by other RFMOs, if they prove successful in avoiding
or minimizing conflict.
The process could, however, be assisted by scholarly work, whether general or
directed to one RFMO or fish stock in particular. Indeed, and as has been illustrated in
897

An example of a practice originally adopted by one or few RFMOs that has become general practice is
the adoption of ―black lists‖ of IUU fishing vessels.
898
In relation to protection of high seas deep-sea vulnerable marine ecosystems, see:
<http://www.savethehighseas.org/index.cfm>.
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the previous chapter, the concept of equity is evolving in international law, in
international environmental law, and in international law in the field of sustainable
development. The analysis of these developments, both substantial and procedural, and
their implications for high seas fisheries, may contribute in the ongoing search for
equitable and transparent allocation frameworks.
Section 3. Transparency in Allocation: the Contribution of Equity
The potential avenues to develop and propose equitable principles for the
allocation of high seas fishing opportunities do not preclude the central role of RFMOs,
or more precisely, their member States. RFMOs not only can participate from the
development of those equitable principles, but they have a crucial role in two respects: a)
they have to accept and adopt those equitable principles if they are going to translate into
effective practices; and b) they are the only organization that can construct a complete
substantive framework for allocation of fishing opportunities. Indeed, RFMOs are
responsible for the blend between normativity and flexibility899 that is the essence of the
concept of equity. The process of particularizing general substantive norms so that they
can guide action is the function of procedure.900
Current Allocation Procedures in RFMOs
The decision-making process in RFMOs has been extensively described
elsewhere.901 It suffices to say here that decisions in RFMOs require consensus or
qualified majority of the participating member States.902 In some of the RFMOs where
899

Kolb, supra note 587, at 318, states: ―Without the normativity there is no ‗rule‘ and everything is
reduced to the act of decision-making; without the factual aspects, the ‗rule‘ is only an abstraction, without
any concrete life of its own.‖ Van Dijk refers to a process of objectification or crystallization of the equity
standard through substantive and procedural criteria (van Dijk, supra note 715, at 6-7).
900
Lawrence B. Solum, ―Procedural Justice‖ (2004-2005) 78 S. Cal. L. Rev. 181, at 186.
901
See: McDorman, supra note 10.
902
CCSBT requires unanimity for adopting decisions (CCSBT Convention, article 7). CCAMLR and
SEAFO adopt decisions on substantive matters by consensus (CCAMLR Convention article XII.1; SEAFO
Convention, article 17); ICCAT adopts decisions by majority (ICCAT Convention, article III.3). NEAFC
and IOTC adopt their decisions on conservation and management measures by a two-thirds majority of the
members present and voting (NEAFC Convention articles 3.9 and 5.1; IOTC Convention, article IX.2).
SPRFMO adopt its decisions by consensus but, if consensus is not possible, decisions on substantive
matters are adopted by a two-third majority (SPRFMO Convention, article 16.1 and 16.2). NAFO adopts its
decisions by majority of members present and voting (NAFO Convention, article V.2). All organizations

253

decisions are generally made by qualified majority, the Convention text requires that
allocation decisions be made by consensus.903 In addition, most RFMO Conventions
consider an objection or ―opt-out‖ procedure, by which individual member States can
unilaterally decide not to be bound by an adopted conservation and management
measure. These opt-out procedures may be simple or ―ring-fenced‖, i.e. subject to certain
requirements and conditions.904 Only WCPFC does not consider an objection
procedure;905 however, its decisions on allocation are made by consensus.906
With respect to the procedure for decision-making itself, UNFSA generally
establishes that States ―shall provide for transparency in the decision-making process and
other activities of subregional and regional fisheries management organizations and
arrangements.‖907 A similar provision is established in the FAO Code of Conduct.908

but the WCPFC consider in their constitutional texts an objection procedure, which can be simple or ―ringfenced‖. For decision-making procedures in WCFPC and IATTC, see infra note 903.
903
That is the case in WCPFC and IATTC. WCFPC adopts its decisions by consensus (WCPFC
Convention, article 20.1). However, in the case that consensus cannot be reached, decisions on substance
are adopted by a three-fourths majority of States present and voting provided that such majority includes a
three-fourths majority of the members of the South Pacific Forum Fisheries Agency present and voting and
a three-fourths majority of non-members of the South Pacific Forum Fisheries Agency present and voting
and provided further that in no circumstances shall a proposal be defeated by two or fewer votes in either
chamber (WCPFC Convention, article 20.2). Decisions on allocation of fishing quotas or fishing effort,
however, are adopted by consensus (WCPFC Convention, article 10.4). IATTC, in turn, adopts its
decisions by consensus, unless provided otherwise (IATTC Antigua Convention, article IX.1). The
consensus of all the members of the Commission is required for decisions on criteria for, or decisions
relating to, the allocation of total allowable catch, or total allowable fishing capacity, including carrying
capacity, or the level of fishing effort IATTC Antigua Convention, article IX.3 and VIII.1 subparagraph l).
904
NEAFC, NAFO, ICCAT, IOTC, include a simple objection procedure. SEAFO includes a ―ring-fenced‖
objection procedure that requires that the objecting State ―shall at the same time provide a written
explanation of its reasons for making the notification and, where appropriate, its proposals for alternative
measures which the Contracting Party is going to implement. The explanation shall specify inter alia
whether the basis for the notification is that: (i) the Contracting Party considers that the measure is
inconsistent with the provisions of this Convention; (ii) the Contracting Party cannot practicably comply
with the measure; (iii)the measure unjustifiably discriminates in form or in fact against the Contracting
Party; or (iv)other special circumstances apply‖ (SEAFO Convention, article 23.1 subparagraph d). The
SPRFMO Convention considers similar conditions: ―A member of the Commission that presents an
objection shall at the same time: (i) specify in detail the grounds for its objection; (ii) adopt alternative
measures that are equivalent in effect to the decision to which it has objected and have the same date of
application; and (iii) advise the Executive Secretary of the terms of such alternative measures. (c) The only
admissible grounds for an objection are that the decision unjustifiably discriminates in form or in fact
against the member of the Commission, or is inconsistent with the provisions of this Convention or other
relevant international law as reflected in the 1982 Convention or the 1995 Agreement‖ (SPRFMO
Convention, article 17.2 subparagraphs b and c).
905
The WCPFC Convention does not include an objection procedure but only a review process (WCPFC
Convention, article 20.6).
906
WCPFC Convention, article 10.4; and supra note 903.
907
UNFSA, article 12.1.
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Recent RFMO Conventions usually consider a similar provision on transparency
requirements.909 These transparency requirements can generally be categorized as
directed towards ―external transparency‖: they address mostly participation of nongovernmental organizations and stakeholders, as well as appropriate dissemination of
non-confidential information.910 Transparency in the internal processes of decisionmaking is less addressed. It appears to be the opinion that the consensus-based decisionmaking process of most RFMOs is sufficient warrantee of participation of, and
transparency among, contracting parties.911
However, this assumption is not necessarily warranted by practice, as can be
concluded from the historical review of TAC and allocation negotiations, from the
performance reviews, and from public opinion. The historical overview provided in
chapter 2 has explained that, since its inception and to this day, decisions on allocation
are often made in closed meetings, with the participation of head of delegations only.912
In some cases, negotiation take place among a limited number of participants.913 In
others, allocation negotiations have taken place outside the framework of the RFMO.914 It
908

FAO, Code of Conduct, supra note 25, article 7.1.9: ―States and subregional or regional fisheries
management organizations and arrangements should ensure transparency in the mechanisms for fisheries
management and in the related decision-making process.‖
909
WCPFC Convention, article 21: ―The Commission shall promote transparency in its decision-making
processes and other activities. (…)‖; IATTC Antigua Convention, article VI on Transparency: ―1. The
Commission shall promote transparency in the implementation of this Convention in its decision-making
processes and other activities‖; SEAFO Convention, article 8.9: ―The Commission shall adopt rules (...) to
provide for transparency in the activities of the Organisation‖; SPRFMO Convention, article 18.1: ―The
Commission shall promote transparency in decision making processes and other activities carried out under
this Convention‖.
910
See, for example: UNFSA, article 12.1; IATTC Antigua Convention, article 12.1; SEAFO rules of
procedure, rules 33-38; SPRFMO Convention, article 18.2 to 18.4; ICCAT Rules of Procedure in ICCAT,
Basic Texts, supra note 209, rule 5, and Recommendation 05-12 on Guidelines and Criteria for Granting
Observer Status at ICCAT Meetings; IOTC Convention, article VII on Observers.
911
That seems to be implied in CCAMLR, Performance Review Report, supra note 81, para. 6 at 83, which
states: ―The consensus procedure followed by CCAMLR can be considered as transparent and consistent.‖
912
For historical examples thereof, see: supra notes 179, 183, and 223.
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See: supra note 225 and 226, and accompanying text. For modern example, see: ICCAT, Report for
biennial period, 1998-99, Part I (1998) (Madrid, Spain: ICCAT, 1999), Annex 10, Report of the Panels 14, in Report of Panel 3, para. 6.b.14 at 155, online: ICCAT < http://www.iccat.int>.
914
This is the case in NEAFC with respect to fisheries that are under the primary responsibility of coastal
States (see: NEAFC, Performance Review Report, supra note 81, at 17). It has also been the general
practice in CCSBT for the negotiation of quotas to be allocated to new members (CCSBT, Report of the
Fifth Annual Meeting of the Commission, Second Part, 10 - 13 May 1999, Tokyo, Japan, Agenda Item 6:
Relationship with Non-members, online: CCSBT <http://www.ccsbt.org>: ―Japan advised that bilateral
discussions had been held recently with representatives from Korea and Taiwan on this matter. However,
Japan noted that no firm commitments were received‖; CCSBT, Report of the Special Meeting of the
Commission, 16-18 November 2000, Canberra, Agenda Item 2: Status of non-members, para. 11 at 2,
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also has highlighted that allocation negotiations, and particularly the data, criteria and
relative weights used in the allocation decisions, are usually not reflected in the records
of the meetings.915 Decisions on allocations are made through ―black-box processes‖ in
which both the decision-maker and the decision-process are obscured.916
It is of no surprise, then, that complaints of lack of transparency abound. Lack of
transparency in allocation decisions has been noted and criticized during performance
reviews. For example, the NEAFC Performance Review Panel recommended providing
more transparency of the meetings of coastal States on allocation issues.917 The ICCAT
Performance Review Report explicitly noted issues on transparency. In particular some
complained to the panel about an unduly influence and even arbitrariness exercised by a
limited number of important participants in the decisions on allocation.918 It is no surprise
either that the international community has made repeated calls for RFMOs to develop
―transparent‖ allocation criteria.919
Towards Transparency: Procedural Aspects of Equity
It seems evident that allocation decisions in RFMOs are in need of improved
transparency. The adoption of a normative concept of equity, and one of its elements in
particular, may provide a solid basis to achieve that objective.
According to scholars920 and, arguably, recent jurisprudence,921 the normative
concept of equity includes ―equitable methods.‖ Equitable methods, in maritime
online: CCSBT <http://www.ccsbt.org>: ―The Chair advised that a series of bilateral discussions had been
held with nonmembers‖.
915
See: supra note 408 and accompanying text.
916
Daniel Esty, ―Good Governance at the Supranational Scale: Globalizing Administrative Law‖ (20052006) 115 Yale L.J. 1490, at 1528.
917
NEAFC, Performance Review Report, supra note 81, at 48.
918
―Transparency was raised in the context of the so-called ‗big four‘ members (USA, Canada, European
Community and Japan). Some other Parties were of the opinion that this group had undue influence on the
decision-making processes in ICCAT including the selection of chairs and officials and the allocation of
quota to new CPCs. An alternative view put by CPCs of the ‗big four‘ is that they actively try to move the
business of ICCAT forward at a pace that reflects the needs of ICCAT and the fisheries‖ (ICCAT,
Performance Review Report, at 70). ―In discussions with ICCAT CPCs some were concerned with the
actual process used to make allocations. Criticisms were made of the so-called ―big four‖ players (Japan,
EC, US and Canada) arbitrarily making allocations to members that do not necessarily follow the criteria
laid down in 01-25‖ (ibid, at 73).
919
See: chapter 2; Lodge et al., supra note 11, at 41-42.
920
See: Weil, supra note 605, at 183-185.
921
See: Kolb, ibid, at xx.
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delimitation law, is understood at the technical methodologies to draw the boundary line:
equidistant or median line, line perpendicular to the general direction of the coast,
prolongation of the land boundary, or thalweg system.922 In a first approach, and
considering the differences in the task, it seems that a technical ―method‖ for allocation
of fishing opportunities is indeed unnecessary. However, the issue can be viewed more
broadly. Weil notes that:
It would be a mistake to think that the argument about the ‗legalization‘ of
methods boils down to the question of equidistance as the starting point for the
delimitation operation. (…) There is no reason why there should not be rules for
every stage of the operation.923
This broader view of ―stages of operation‖ coincides with van Dijk‘s reference to
procedural criteria in the normative concept of equity.924 Thus, equity requires not only
equitable principles, but also procedural criteria or rules that operationalize those
equitable principles in the particular situation, considering the relevant circumstances of
the case. Procedure acts as a bridge between the abstract and general equitable principles
and the particular circumstances of the case, establishing a clear flow of the decisionmaking process to avoid ―black-box‖ processes.925 In so doing, the transparency of the
decision-making process is improved.
Procedure in RFMOs Allocation Frameworks: Some Examples
A normative concept of equity, thus, contains not only equitable principles, but
also equitable methods, or procedural criteria, which allow operationalizing those
922

See: Tanaka, supra note 731.
Weil, supra note 605, at 185. Those ―stages of the process‖ where identified by Brownlie as the
following steps: First: if necessary the area of overlapping claims is divided into separate regions;
Secondly: the distance criterion is applied. In the case of opposite coasts this produces a provisional median
line (but this is not an application of the equidistance method). In other cases, a line is drawn which reflects
the general configuration of the coast of the parties; Thirdly: the application of relevant circumstances may
produce a ―correction‖ or ―adjustment‖ of the provisional median line; Fourthly: the factor of
proportionality any be applied ex post facto to test the overall equity of the delimitation; Fifthly: in disputes
concerning access to fisheries, the Court may, if it considers it necessary, and as an ex post facto test,
enquire whether the overall result ―should unexpectedly be revealed as radically inequitable, that is to say,
as likely to entail catastrophic repercussions for the livelihood and economic well-being of the population
of the countries concerned (Ian Brownlie, The Rule of Law in International Affairs: International Law at
the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations (The Hague; Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1998) at
176).
924
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equitable principles in the particular situation. The RFMOs allocation frameworks can be
re-assessed through this perspective, then, to more accurately identify the source of their
shortcomings. Two rather different examples of frameworks are used for this purpose:
ICCAT allocation criteria, and the CCSBT Memorandum of Understanding. Both were
analyzed with some detail in chapter 3.
ICCAT Resolution 01-25 on allocation criteria contains only three criteria that
can be considered to have a procedural character. Those criteria are the following:
a) These criteria should apply to all stocks when allocated by ICCAT.926
b) The allocation criteria should be applied by the relevant Panels on a stock-bystock basis.927
c) The allocation criteria should be applied to all stocks in a gradual manner,
over a period of time to be determined by the relevant Panels, in order to
address the economic needs of all parties concerned, including the need to
minimize economic dislocation.928
With no further guidance on how the equitable principles and the relevant
circumstances (the ―allocation criteria‖) shall be operationalized to have concrete
expression in particular cases, it shall amount to no surprise that they are reduced to little
more than ―a well constructed shopping list‖929 from which each party chooses the most
convenient to support its national interest. The allocation guidelines would benefit,
therefore, not only by the explicit identification of further equitable principles that act as
direction-finders of equitable results, but also with the definition of the procedure or
method that gives those equitable principles a concrete and objective expression in the
decisions.
A rather different example is given by the CCSBT allocation framework
contained in the memorandum of understanding signed by the three original parties to the
Convention.930 Although the memorandum of understanding has not been published and
therefore their details have not been available for this research, it can be concluded that
the memorandum has a focus on procedural aspects. It identifies landmarks to be
achieved that trigger a certain pre-determined variation of allocations and allocation
926

ICCAT, Resolution 01-25, supra note 300, section II para. 3.
Ibid, section IV para. 20.
928
Ibid, section IV para. 21.
929
Butterworth and Penney, supra note 15, at 181.
930
See: supra note 396 and accompanying text.
927
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keys.931 This allocation framework is, therefore, predictable, objective and transparent to
the parties.932 The CCSBT memorandum of understanding, however, apparently failed in
making explicit the equitable principles that parties considered in the design of the
procedure. Therefore, it has not provided any guidance with respect to the allocation of
fishing opportunities to the new actors that have entered the fishery. As such, the
allocation framework of CCSBT has been incomplete, resulting in its adequacy to
address the particular allocation challenges of this organization.933
These two examples show that, albeit not sufficient in themselves, the explicit
description of procedural aspects in the allocation frameworks is desirable and even
necessary to increase normativity, and thus predictability and transparency, of the
allocation decisions. Those procedural aspects may vary from case to case, thus no one
particular procedural framework can be proposed. However, it is possible to suggest
some of the aspects that RFMOs may tackle in the development of procedural aspects of
equitable allocation. These may include, are inter alia:
a)

the precise scope of relevant circumstances

b)

the objective measurement of the relevant circumstances

c)

a time frame for submission of data and its analysis

d)

the sequential or simultaneous application of allocation criteria

e)

the organs or groups in charge of the different steps of the procedure: in this
respect, it may be worth considering if the relevant data should be gathered,
compiled and analyzed by a ―fact-finding group‖ or even external consultant. It
may also be considered, as suggested by Willock and Lack, to resort to arbitrated
negotiation or an advisory panel of external experts ―in order to facilitate a more
transparent and focused discussion‖.934

f)

the timeframe for revision of allocations935

931

Ibid.
The transparency of the Memorandum was not sufficient to ease the allocation problem, though. The
parties had serious differences regarding the status of the stock and, thus, the allowable catch. These
differences led to an arbitration process that was later dismissed because of lack of jurisdiction. See:
Butterworth and Penney, supra note 15, at 176-181.
933
See: CCSBT, Report of the Sixteenth Annual Meeting of the Commission, supra note 312, Appendix 3,
Report of the Extended Commission of the Sixteenth Annual Meeting of the Commission, 20 - 23 October
2009, Jeju Island, Republic of Korea, para. 57-59, at 7.
934
Willock and Lack, supra note 10, at 27.
935
Lodge et al. state: ―The experience of RFMOs to date strongly suggests that at the time a decision is
taken on allocation an explicit review process should also be agreed. (...) A periodic review would also
assist in increasing the degree of transparency associated with allocations‖ (Lodge et al., supra note 11, at
42).
932
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g)

a time frame for the re- assessment of the allocation framework itself.
Some of the proposals for the allocation problem made by scholars and

practitioners are also oriented to method or procedure and can be considered by RFMOs
in this context. One of those suggestions is the use of the mechanism of attrition of
national quotas for the allocation of fishing opportunities to new entrants.936 Similarly, a
mechanism for re-allocation of unused quotas can be part of an allocation method or
procedure. More broadly, Cox has suggested several options of flexible arrangements,
including two-tiered system of allocation for permanent and flexible quotas;937 permanent
and seasonal entitlements; senior and junior rights; high security and low security
entitlements. These proposals do not provide substantive guidance on how to allocate
fishing opportunities, but they provide mechanisms to gradually reallocate fishing
opportunities according to previously identified equitable principles. As such, they can be
valuable components of the procedure necessary to arrive to equitable, predictable and
stable allocations.
Section 4. Concluding Remark: a Digression
This chapter has addressed some institutional and procedural implications of the
normative concept of equity discussed in the previous chapter. The emphasis has been in
three main considerations. The first consideration relates to the role of a normative
content of equity in negotiated agreements. The second is the opportunity for different
fora to participate in the construction of a normative structure of equity, albeit with
important limitations. The third is the need to establish procedural criteria, or methods,
acting as a bridge between the general equitable principles and the relevant circumstances
of a particular case. This third component of equity further enhances the normative
content of the concept.
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Butterworth and Penney, supra note 15, at 181; Anthony Cox, Quota Allocation in International
Fisheries, OECD Food, Agriculture and Fisheries Working Papers No. 22 (OECD, 2009), online: OECD
<http://www.oecd.org>, at 38.
937
―[A]n example of such an approach might involve a certain proportion of the total quota rights being
allocated as base quota to the founding members of an RFMO on a permanent basis. The remaining quota
could be classified as flexible quota and could be distributed on an annual basis to either RFMO members
or non-members through a mechanism such as an auction‖ (Cox, ibid, at 41).

260

This third element of equity deserves a digression to outline two aspects that are
related to this requirement of the definition of equitable procedures or methods in the
construction and transparent implementation of equity. The first of those aspects is the
concept of good governance, which is a component of the concept of sustainable
development938 and, indeed, a one of the principal themes of UNCED. 939 Schrijver, citing
the Cotonou Partnership Agreement, provides the following account of the term:
[G]ood governance is the transparent and accountable management of human,
natural, economic and financial resources for the purposes of equitable and
sustainable development. It entails clear decision-making procedures at the levels
of public authorities, transparent and accountable institutions, the primacy of law
in the management and distribution of resources and capacity building for
elaboration and implementing measures aiming in particular at preventing and
combating corruption.940
If good governance entails clear decision-making procedures, transparent
institutions, and the primacy of law in the management and distribution of resources, then
a normative concept of equity, and indeed its procedural aspects, are instrumental to
achieve good governance in RFMOs.
A deeper look on this issue allows suggesting yet another aspect for
consideration. Franck‘s theory of justice in international law and institutions suggests that
fairness is ―a composite of two independent variables: legitimacy and distributive
justice.941 Legitimacy, in his definition, is ―the attribute of a rule which conduces to the
belief that it is fair because it was made and is applied in accordance with ‗right
process.‘‖942 He also identifies four indicators of legitimacy: determinacy, symbolic
validation, coherence, and adherence. The ICJ‘s construction of a normative concept of
equity seeks, indeed, to find some determinacy and coherence to an otherwise contentless concept of autonomous equity.943 Following Franck‘s analysis on legitimacy, then,
the search for a framework of controlled equity increases the legitimacy of the allocation
decisions adopted by RFMOs, and of the organizations themselves.
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Both the principle of good governance and legitimacy of RFMOs and their
allocation decisions support the need to make progress in a structured and substantive
equity.
These two aspects provide a good framework to analyze one of the solutions for
the problem of allocation of high seas fisheries that has been proposed in different fora
and by academics and practitioners, in particular economists. That solution is to keep the
scope of bargaining as broad as possible,944 and to use ―side-payments‖ or ―negotiation
facilitators‖ in the negotiation process.945 The proposal emerges from economical
analysis based on game-theory that concludes that any cooperative arrangement will only
be stable if
(...) each and every participant in a cooperative arrangement must anticipate
receiving long term benefits from the cooperative arrangement that are at least
equal to the long term benefits, which it would receive, if it refused to
cooperate.946
Since that is a difficult objective when the problem is the distribution of a limited
resource among too many, and increasing number, of participants, the solution proposes
to increase the bargaining scope with negotiation facilitators and side-payments. Munro
considered that
[s]ide payments become truly significant when the management goals of the
coastal states sharing the resource differ. (...) when there are differences in
management goals, it is invariably the case that one player places a higher value
on the fishery than does the other. (...)When side payments are possible, then the
optimal policy is one in which the management preferences of that player placing
the highest value on the resource should be given full reign.947
This proposal assumes an unstructured process for negotiation of national quotas,
where States would have the freedom to incorporate in the negotiation not only any
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allocation criteria but also any number of interests or ―bargaining chips‖. Although it may
be a sound economic proposal, it may enter into conflict with other values, and in
particular with good governance and legitimacy as expressed above. A compromise
between those different values may be necessary.948
The aspects briefly introduced here fall outside the scope of this thesis and even
outside the field of law and into political science. However, while there is no attempt to
analyze those issues further, the linkages of good governance and legitimacy with the
legal notion of equity, as constructed by the ICJ, should at least be mentioned.
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Chapter 7. Quota Trading: Efficient and Equitable?
The purpose of this thesis is to analyze whether, and under what conditions, a
legal concept of equity can provide assistance to the allocation of high seas fishing
opportunities. For this purpose, previous chapters have analyzed equity as a legal
standard for allocation of scarce resources, its status in international law, its acceptance in
international fisheries law, and its content. Also, some institutional and procedural
implications of the normative concept of equity for high seas fisheries have been
highlighted. To finalize this study, this chapter addresses one particular aspect of
allocated TAC: the possibility of trading national quotas. The analysis of quota trading in
the light of equity considerations is relevant for two reasons. The first reason is that it has
been widely recommended by scholars and practitioners as a mechanism that would
provide some solutions to current allocation problems. The second reason is that these
recommendations do not fully address equity considerations.
The chapter starts by describing the potential benefits of quota trading in a high
seas fisheries regime. To better understand the rational of those benefits, a brief overview
of right-based management in fisheries is included. This provides a good framework to
analyze a concept of particular relevance: the legal nature of national quotas. The chapter
further summarizes the discussions on quota trading that have been carried by some
RFMOs, as well as current practices. Finally, the implications of quota trading for
intergenerational and intra-generational equity are presented. The chapter ends with a
summary of the main conclusions on this topic.
Before addressing these issues, a few words are necessary on three concepts that
have some relationship. Indeed, in the case that a RFMO member is not able to catch its
allocated quota, there are four options available to the organization. The first is the
obvious option of doing nothing: the quota remains uncaught. Three other approaches are
available to the organization and its members: the yearly adjustment of over and undercatches, vessel chartering or leasing agreements, and quota trading.
The adjustment of under and over-catches consists on a transfer of quota from one
fishing year to the next, without changing the quota holder. Under-catches are added to
the quota allocated to the member for the next year, and over-catches are discounted from
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it. From a management and conservation perspective, an unrestricted transfer from one
year to another is not desirable. Thus, in some cases restrictions to this transfer have been
placed by RFMOs.949 These restrictions usually include penalizing over-catches with a
certain percentage of the over-catch.
Another option is to charter or lease950 a vessel from another State to catch the
quota. This possibility has been seen with certain caution by RFMO members, both
because of their implications for allocation agreements and because of control,
monitoring and enforcement challenges.951 For these reasons, albeit generally allowed, it
is usually subject to certain obligations and limitations.952
Lastly, quota trading involves the transfer of whole or part of the quota allocated
to a State to another State, whether the recipient is or is not holder of quota in the same
fishery. In theory, this transfer can be temporary or permanent. A temporary transfer
would involve the transfer of the allocated quota for a particular year or number of years.
This latter option is usually resorted to when there is a multi-year scheme in place, and
there is certainty or at least reasonable certainty of the quota allocated and susceptible of
trade. A permanent trade, on the other hand, would involve the transfer of the
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participatory rights of a State in a fishery, or parts thereof. This last figure – quota trading
– is the subject of this chapter.
Section 1. Trading Quota: the Golden Solution
Trading national quotas was already proposed in the early discussions on TAC
and national allocations in international fisheries. In the panel discussion that took place
at the Law of the Sea Institute in 1968, participants identified the negotiability of the
quotas as a central element of the system.953 The suggestion was not further considered at
that time, but more recently different scholars and policy advisors, and particular
economists, have supported trade of national quotas in international fisheries
management. The Norway-FAO consultation on management of shared fish stocks,954
Lodge et al.,955 Grafton et al.,956 Cox,957 and Allen,958 among others, have praised the
benefits of such a feature in the TAC and allocation system. OECD, more cautious,
suggests it as a topic to be explored by governments.959
The benefits of a tradable system of national allocations rest mostly in economic
efficiency. It is proposed that allowing States to trade their national quotas will allow
fishing opportunities to be used by those fishers who produce the greatest economic
benefits,960 i.e., the most efficient fishermen. This, in turn, would lead to elimination of
overcapacity.961
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It is also suggested that trade mechanisms would invest the quota regime with the
required flexibility to cope with extraordinary circumstances. Examples of these
extraordinary circumstances are the situation of fishing fleets taking by-catches of what
are target stocks for others;962 and the situation of resources that are highly mobile,
particularly between areas under different jurisdiction.963
It is proposed further that such a system would improve prospects for
cooperation964 and lead to more stable fisheries regimes.965 In particular, trade of national
quotas are suggested as a way to respond to the apparently insurmountable problem
represented by new entrants to the fisheries.966 Trade mechanisms, it is argued, would
strike an appropriate balance between three interests: the interests of current participants
in the fishery, the aspirations of new participants, and the conservation of the stock. With
a trade mechanism, current participants would be rewarded for their past efforts; new
participants would have the opportunity to participate in the fisheries based on a nondiscriminatory basis; and the fishing activity over the stock would remain at sustainable
levels.
Since the benefits assigned to quota trading are multiple, the system of quota
trading can also be designed with an emphasis on one or more of them. In particular, the
quota trading system can be designed so as to represent flexible management options,
complementing but not substituting national quota allocations; or it act as a mechanism
for access to quotas (and thus, to fishing in the high seas). This latter option is mostly
presented as an alternative to allow new entrants to the fisheries.
Section 2. Towards Right-based Management in High Seas Fisheries?
To better understand the reasons to advocate for tradable quotas, it is useful to
give an overview of rights-based fisheries management. It is widely believed that
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property rights are a necessary element of sustainable fisheries. 967 An ―open access‖
regime necessarily leads to a tragedy of the commons.968 Property rights, on the contrary,
provide incentives for their holders to invest in long-term conservation of the stocks
because ―higher future returns from fishing will be incorporated into the value of their
asset.‖969 This higher future returns are represented by stable and higher quotas, or better
price for their quotas if trade is allowed.
While property is often used to refer as a thing, legally property is a description of
a legal relationship with a thing,970 or, in other terms, a ―bundle of rights‖ over a thing.971
The powers included in the bundle are identified as: the power to use a thing, the power
to take its yield, and the power to dispose it.972 From an economic perspective, Scott
identifies four characteristics of property: exclusivity, duration, security, and
transferability.973 The stronger these characteristics are, the stronger the power
relationship with a thing or, in other words, the stronger the property. As stated by Gray,
―[p]ropertiness is represented by a continuum along which varying kinds of property
status may shade finely into each other.‖974 In Gray‘s analysis, the most important
characteristic, and which determines ―propertiness‖, is excludability. 975 ―A resource is
excludable only if it is feasible for a legal person to exercise regulatory control over the
access of strangers to the various benefits inherent in the resource‖.976 As a consequence,
he asserts that property is not about enjoyment of access but on control over access.977
The history of fisheries regulation can be viewed as a history of measures that aim
at establishing rights that attain, as far as possible, the characteristics of exclusivity,
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duration, security and transferability. At a national level, those characteristics were
included by introducing regulatory measures: limitation on access, quotas, individual
quotas, and eventually individual transferable quotas.
At the international level, the same trend can be observed. The introduction of the
EEZ was an important step to introduce (national) exclusivity to vast fisheries resources
that were, by then, subject to an (international) open access regime. The obligation of
cooperation to conserve high seas fisheries resources, and in particular the provision of
UNFSA that bans fishing activities outside the regional management frameworks, can be
considered a further step to increase exclusivity in high seas fisheries.978 Additional
efforts to improve exclusivity are undertaken through the plethora of initiatives aimed at
stopping illegal, unregulated, and unreported catches, which include IUU black lists, flag
State measures, trade documentation schemes, market measures, and port State
measures.979 The TAC and national allocations were also measures that attempted to
increase the exclusive character of fishing in the high seas. As was mentioned in chapter
2, the goal of TAC and allocations can be viewed as an effort to establish ―boxes of
jurisdiction‖ in the high seas. These functional ―boxes of jurisdiction‖ were supposed to
allow States access to the fishery without interference by other States. Quota trading,
therefore, can be regarded as yet another progressive step aimed at improving the
property qualities of high seas fisheries regime. And, it is claimed, if the property
qualities of high seas fisheries regimes are stronger, then the benefits described in the
previous section could be achieved.
The property right system faces, however, a fundamental contradiction with the
high seas legal regime. Property rights require exclusivity or excludability; the
fundamental principles of international fisheries law are freedom of the high seas and
sovereign State equality. It is true that UNFSA and recent developments have made
important legal and practical progress in improving exclusivity, as was just pointed out.
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But it is also true that important legal and practical obstacles remain and make that
exclusivity somewhat illusory. Among those obstacles, it is important to mention: the
consensus-based decision making in RFMOs and the objection procedures; the
inapplicability of UNFSA provisions to non-parties to the agreement; flags and ports of
convenience; and compliance and enforcement challenges for both members and nonmembers.
Because of these circumstances, the exclusivity – the control of access – is limited
in the high seas both from a legal and practical perspective. Thus, property in its full legal
and economic sense cannot exist. This is the conclusion to which Serdy arises while
analyzing the question: ―national allocations under open access – what are they?‖980 He
argues, therefore, that in agreeing to national allocations, States are not establishing a
property right but departing inter se from the residual freedom of fishing on the high
seas981 by agreeing on a limit to their own catch in return from the acceptance of similar
limits by other member States.982 In this interpretation, the practice of quota trading is not
legally a transfer of rights, but an amendment to the reciprocal limitation agreement that
requires, therefore, the waiver of all participating States.983
In this regard, it is however worth remembering the relative nature of the concept
of property, as explained by Gray. He asserted that ―[p]ropertiness is represented by a
continuum along which varying kinds of property status may shade finely into each
other.‖984 Thus, depending on the practical barriers for exclusivity, the duration of quota
allocations, and the conditions of quota trading, a national quota can in practice, if not
legally, become close to property. If not a right, a quasi right.985
Section 3. Trading Quotas in RFMOs: Theory and Practice
Despite the multiple benefits advocated by scholars and policy advisors, trade
mechanisms for national quotas have faced the reluctance of RFMOs member States.
None of the Conventions make a reference to this possibility. At the framework level,
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only ICCAT has an explicit reference to trade of national quotas, prohibiting its
practice.986 Quota trading practices are not common either. Serdy identifies three
organizations where quota trading has been reported: ICCAT, NAFO, and NEAFC.987
What follows is a review of the way quota trading has been addressed by different
RFMOs, both at the level of discussions and practical implementation.
Quota Trading in ICCAT
Quota trading was explicitly discussed in the ICCAT ad-hoc working group on
allocation criteria. The approach to the subject can be categorized as dual. Selling and
trading of quota had a widespread condemnation.988 Some delegations insisted that, if
allocation was adjusted to the needs of each contracting party, no trade would be
necessary.989 At the same time, the advantages of allowing temporary transfers were also
acknowledged and indeed some transfers had already taken place in some fisheries. 990 In
the opinion of the members of the ad-hoc working group on allocation criteria, quota
transfers were not an allocation but rather a management issue.991
The topic could not be solved by the working group and was raised to the
Commission for its resolution.992 The draft criteria presented by the working group
included a prohibition on selling and trading quota, but its chair explained to the
Commission that there was a wide-spread acceptance of temporary transfers. As a
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consequence, the Commission kept the prohibition in the allocation guidelines,993 but
adopted Recommendation 2001-12 regarding the temporary adjustments of quotas. This
recommendation limited itself to state that ―any temporary quota adjustment shall be
done only under authorization by the Commission.‖994
Thus, ICCAT has generally proceeded on a case by case basis allowing temporary
transfer of quotas according to Recommendation 2001-12. The authorized transfers are
usually reflected in the stock-specific conservation and management recommendations,
identifying the parties involved in the quota trade and the amount traded.995 A novel
approach, however, was introduced in the rebuilding program of Western Atlantic bluefin
tuna. Recommendation 2006-06 introduced a blank authorization to transfer quota for
contracting parties with quota allocation, subject to various restrictions. The system was
maintained, with a slight modification, by Paragraph 10 of Recommendation 08-04. The
current text reads:
Notwithstanding the Recommendation by ICCAT Regarding the Temporary
Adjustment of Quotas [Rec. 01-12], in between meetings of the Commission, a
CPC [Contracting Party] with a TAC allocation under paragraph 6 may make a
one-time transfer within a fishing year of up to 15% of its TAC allocation to other
CPCs with TAC allocations, consistent with domestic obligations and
conservations considerations. The transfer shall be notified to the Secretariat. Any
such transfer may not be used to cover overharvests. A CPC that receives a onetime quota transfer may not retransfer that quota. For parties with a quota
allocation of 4 t, the transfer may be up to 100% of the allocation.996
OECD has noted that ―[t]he use of quota exchanges has reportedly become
increasingly common in ICCAT (...), although there is limited transparency on such
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transactions.‖997 The ICCAT performance review panel, in turn, noted that the prohibition
of quota trading contained in the ICCAT Resolution 01-25 is reasonable in this particular
case, considering that ICCAT ―catch reporting is unreliable for most species and the
ability to trade quota would only further confuse the data reliability.‖ 998 Considering
these difficulties, but also the advantages of allowing quota trading both to new entrants
and existing contracting parties, the panel recommends the Commission to analyze the
implications of a quota trade market in ICCAT.999
Quota Trading in NAFO
Quota trading was not explicitly discussed in the NAFO working group on allocation of
fishing opportunities to contracting parties. Only some tangential references were made
while discussing possible margins for reallocation of fishing opportunities for stocks
under TAC.1000 As a consequence, the unadopted NAFO allocation guidelines are mute in
this respect.1001
The quota trading practices in NAFO are limited. The Fisheries Commission
adopted, at least with respect to squid Illex in subareas 3 and 4, a ―blank‖ authorization
allowing an increase in the national allocations resulting from a transfer from any coastal
State.1002 Some trade has apparently occurred without prior explicit authorization.1003
However, trades are not a common practice.1004
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Quota Trading in NEAFC
As in the case of NAFO, trade of quotas has not been explicitly discussed in NEAFC.
Nevertheless, the organization has allowed, or more precisely acknowledged, the practice
of quota trading in one particular fishery. Recommendation I:2010 on conservation and
management of blue whiting in the Convention Area establishes in para. 6 that
[q]uotas that are transferred to a Contracting Party to be fished within national
waters of another Contracting Party may be fished in the areas defined in
paragraph 3 a, subject to agreement between the Contracting Parties concerned.
No communication to the secretariat is explicitly required; however, control of
quotas makes that communication necessary and therefore it is to be presumed that it
occurs.1005
It should be noted, however, that NEAFC management system for some species
rely on coastal States agreements. Thus, bilateral agreements regarding quota trading and
access to EEZ are not necessarily reflected in the NEAFC recommendations.
Quota Trading in WCPFC
The working paper on allocation prepared for the WCPFC Secretariat included quota
trading as one of the aspects to be considered by the Commission in the design of
appropriate allocation criteria. Although the authors of the paper apparently endorse
quota trading for high seas fisheries management, they were cautious to recommend
annual, or short-term, transfer at the beginning of the system.1006
The discussion of allocation has been postponed in the WCPFC agenda, and to
this day it has not been resumed.
Quota Trading in CCSBT
More interesting is the discussion process that took place in the CCSBT. In 2003, the
issue was raised in the commission, which recommended further analysis including
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independent legal advice.1007 This legal opinion concluded that trade of national quotas
was feasible with the authorization of the Commission but not as a unilateral act of any
member. Access to members EEZ, on the other hand, could be arranged on bilateral
arrangements without the approval, but with advice to, the Commission.1008
Despite the favourable opinion, most members remained reluctant to address the
issue and declared that they were ―not generally disposed towards quota trading in the
current situation of the [Southern bluefin tuna] stock and where Members were
considering a reduction in catches‖.1009 The different opinions expressed by the delegates,
as summarized in the respective meeting report, were:
• That quota trading should be considered when the Management Procedure is
implemented since at that stage, the TAC would be based on scientific
information and a procedure should be in place for deciding national allocations
of the TAC;
• While the stock was considered to be in a serious state, unused quota should not
be re-allocated through quota trading which would increase catch; and
• That in principle quota trading was not desirable because a Member should not
profit by trading its unused quota with another Member and because allocations
are not conferred on a permanent basis.1010
Despite the insistence and support expressed by two members,1011 the issue was
not brought up again in the Commission since it was not considered a priority.
It should be noted that CCSBT has initiated a process to adopt a Strategic Plan for
the Commission. A draft Strategic Plan was presented for consideration of the
Commission at their 2009 meeting.1012 The draft plan includes the implementation of
flexible management arrangements, including quota trading; and considers, among the
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activities of the plan, developing a framework for quota trading between members and
cooperating non-members.1013 This activity was assigned a low to medium priority.1014
The strategic plan will be further discussed during the 2010 meeting.1015
Quota Trading in CCAMLR
As has been mentioned above, CCAMLR management regime does not rely on national
quotas, but on a TAC distributed to specific geographical areas. Thus, transfer of quotas
has not arisen as an issue for discussion. However, it is worth mentioning that the
performance review panel of CCAMLR encouraged the analysis of the implementation of
a system of tradable quotas. This recommendation derives from the concern expressed by
the panel on a potential blow-out of fishing capacity and effort in the CCAMLR,
considering that the management regime does not provide disincentives for overcapacity.
To address this issue, the Panel recommended the establishment of a small group of
experts to explore and report on the advantages and disadvantages of approaches and
actions to prevent or eliminate excess fishing capacity, to afterwards review and adopt
appropriate approaches and actions as a matter of urgency.1016 The panel included, as one
of the approaches which analysis it was recommended, ―a system of annual tradable units
of quota with a very clear understanding that they bestow no ongoing rights and will be
reallocated for each successive fishing period.‖1017 The Commission has not yet acted on
this particular suggestion.
A Summary of RFMOs Practice
Quota trading faces a mixed reaction by RFMOs members. Quota trading as a general
mechanism to enter the fishery has generally a negative response by State members.
There is a preoccupation and reluctance to transform RFMOs in quota seller
organizations, or for quota holders to have a financial benefit from selling its quota.
Quota trading as a mechanism to allow some flexibility in quota management is, on the
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other hand, more accepted. This dual approach is clearly reflected in the ICCAT
framework and practices.
The practices of quota trading are limited, albeit reportedly growing in ICCAT. In
all cases, trade occurs exclusively between traditional fishing States for the relevant
stock, i.e., between members of the RFMO with a previously allocated quota in the same
fishery. Thus, in practice, quota trading does not act as a mechanism to accommodate the
fishing aspirations of new entrants or of existing members without a quota in the fishery.
It should be noted, as well, that transfers from coastal States participating in the
international management, in particular with respect to straddling stocks 1018 but also in
the case of highly migratory stocks,1019 appears to be more frequent and less of a concern
for contracting parties.
The agreements to trade quota trading are made on a yearly or multi-year basis,
but not indefinitely. In other words, what States transfer is not their participation in the
fishery as recognized in the allocation agreements, but more limited, the annual allocation
that the participation creates.1020
From a procedural point of view, quota trade requires agreement of the respective
Commission. This agreement can be given either on a case-by-case basis, or as a prior,
but conditioned, authorization. These conditions usually refer to the number of
transactions allowed any given year, limits on the quantities to be transferred, and
limitations on re-transfers of quota. In the case of a quota trade pursuing a prior blank
authorization, communication to the secretariat is required.
Section 4. Quota Trading in Light of Equity
The previous sections provided a brief background on the rationale for quota
trading, and of actual trade practices in RFMOs. This chapter analyzes them critically
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from the perspective of equity. Before entering that analysis, however, a few remarks are
warranted in regard to the main objective of quota trading: efficiency.
The objective of establishing TAC and national quotas, and of allowing quota
trading, is to provide the high seas fisheries access with more characteristics of property.
Property right based management is believed to increase the incentives for long-term
conservation and to make the use of resources more efficient. Indeed, quota trading, so it
is believed, would allow the resources to be allocated to the most efficient fisher.
Efficiency, as may be remembered, was also the main reason to adopt TAC and national
allocations in the first place. The rationale behind these measures was that, by eliminating
competition with other States over a common resource, States would have incentives to
improve the efficiency of the fishing activity and therefore improving net economic
benefit. During those early analyses, however, it was recognized that there are other
rational, non-economic, reasons driving fisheries management, and that those reasons
may lead States not to adopt efficient management measures.1021 Among the noneconomic objectives of fisheries management, particular mention was made to the
maintenance or expansion of employment, and to the protection of vulnerable coastal
fishing communities.1022
This parallelism deserves three observations. The first observation is that the
proponents of quota trading as a solution for the efficient allocation of resources may be
overlooking, once again, the importance of non-economic objectives in national fisheries
management. Indeed, and although TAC and quota provided with the incentives to
improve economic efficiency, that is far from being the case in reality.1023 Undoubtedly
this is the consequence of several factors, including the already mentioned feeble nature
of ―property rights‖ of high seas fisheries resources. However, non-economic objectives
for fisheries management may also be part of the explanation.
The second observation relates to the pertinence of one of the efficiency
arguments presented for the advocates of quota trading to high seas fisheries. Quota
trading, it is proposed, would reward quota holders in case they exit the fishery. It is
1021
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precisely because the quota share has a value for the retiring fishermen that it provides
incentives for long-term conservation. This makes a strong case at the national level. But
allocating quotas to fishing companies or fishworkers is different from allocating fishing
opportunities to States. Before considering the option of trading quota, it is a more logical
pattern of State behaviour to re-allocate available fishing opportunities among their own
nationals.
This logic is even more appalling if one considers the past experience of
allocation of fishing opportunities in the high seas. As has been extensively described in
chapters 3 and 4, allocation agreements are usually possible only after States have
engaged in a race to fish that increases their participation in the fishery to levels
unsustainable for the fish stocks. As a consequence, fishing opportunities allocated are
almost inevitably below the existing fishing capacity of States participating in the fishery.
In a scenario where there has already been a sacrifice for each participating State and
their fishing companies and communities, it is doubted that any ―surplus‖ will be
available for trade.
It has to be acknowledged, though, that this logic does not follow from situation
where the coastal State has been allocated a share according to criteria different than past
performance or historical catches, and particularly if the allocation has been made
according to the criterion of geographical distribution of the stock (zonal attachment).
That requires, though, that zonal attachment becomes the main criterion for allocation of
fishing opportunities regardless of the fishing capacity of the coastal State. This is, as has
been pointed out in chapter 5, an option available for RFMOs in the design of their
allocation framework, and a practice that can be considered established for straddling
stocks1024 and increasing for highly migratory stocks.1025
The most important observation, however, is this: once again, equity
considerations have remained, for the most part, unaddressed. This section is an attempt
to fill that gap but identifying some equity considerations that should be taken into
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account in the design of a quota trade system. For this purpose, the following sections
address the implications of quota trading in intergenerational and intra-generational
equity, respectively.
Quota Trading and Intergenerational Equity
In chapter 4 it was asserted that, in a first approach, allocation should not have
implications for the long-term conservation of the fish stocks. Indeed, allocation of
national quotas requires that the TAC has already been set, and it is in the setting of the
TAC that precautionary and ecosystem considerations have to be taken into account to
ensure long-term conservation of the stock. But it was also analyzed how allocation does,
nevertheless, create perverse incentives for long-term conservation.
What was said for allocation applies as well to quota trading. Trading of quota
takes place only after the TAC is set (and therefore, in theory, long-term conservation of
the stock has already been ensured); and even after national allocations are made.
Nevertheless, quota trading produces and even exacerbates some undesirable incentives
for short-term gains and against long-term conservation of fish stocks. First, if the regime
considers the possibility of trading quota, there are more incentives for each State,
individually, and for all States, collectively, to increase the initial TAC above
scientifically recommended levels and even above their fishing capacity. By doing so,
they can benefit from quota trading even though they may not have the capacity to
actually engage in fishing activities. In other words, trading quota increases the incentives
to have ―paper fish‖.
Cox acknowledges this perverse effect by stating that ―[a]nother potential issue
that arises in the use of tradable rights schemes is the potential for rights holders to resist
any reductions in the TAC as this will reduce the value of their rights.‖ 1026 The
consequence of this potential issue is, once again, that TAC and allocations would not act
as a limit or restriction of fishing capacity, and that long-term conservation would
probably be postponed in favour of short-term gains.
There is, in addition, a second perverse effect of quota trading: they allow quotas
to be fully caught. This can be viewed, and is actually presented, as a beneficial effect of
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quota trade: it ensures the optimum utilization of the fish stock. Indeed, if one State is not
efficient to catch its quota for any reason, the quota can be transferred to some other State
that has that capacity. Although this is a reasonable objective, it assumes that the TAC is
set strictly at scientific recommended levels. And it has already been noted in chapter 4
that there are many incentives for States not to adopt those sound TACs, including, as
just described, quota transfers.
One example illustrates this risk. During the discussion on conservation and
management measures for South Atlantic swordfish in ICCAT for the 2003-2006 period,
a group of States tabled a proposal of a TAC of 15,631tons for 2003, increasing up to
16,055 tons in 2006.1027 Another group of States manifested their concern, considering
that the scientific advice was that the TAC should not exceed 14,000 tons.1028 The report
of the meeting cites one delegate stating that
the real catches will, without a doubt, be less than 15,000 t since the developing
countries were seeking fishing opportunities but the unused portion of TAC
would be significant (although the total amount of the autonomous quota was
more than 20,000 t) (...) He stressed that the proposal was well in accordance with
the SCRS Recommendations.1029
Other delegates also endorsed this position, reaffirming that ―this TAC limit
would not be reached, and therefore the (...) concerns were not justified.‖1030 Quota
trading, however, may allow that the TAC be reached (unless the stock is already
depleted and there is no fish available, a possibility that does not taint the theory with any
brighter light).
States seem to be aware of those undesirable incentives. The limitations to quota
trade in the Western Atlantic bluefin tuna fishery imposed in ICCAT Recommendation
08-02 probably respond to those concerns. Furthermore, as was described previously, the
members of CCSBT stated them explicitly: quota trading should be considered when
TAC is based on scientific information and according management procedures, and
procedures for national allocations are in place; in over-exploited or seriously threatened
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fisheries, unused quotas should not be reallocated through quota trading which would
increase catch.1031
Quota Trading and Intra-generational Equity
It has been noted in a previous section that a system of tradable quota can have
one of two emphases: a mechanism of flexible management of quotas for extraordinary
cases; and a system of access to the fishery. It is this latter aspect that has more acute
implications for intra-generational equity, and the following sections are devoted to this
mechanism.
A tradable quota system can theoretically be constructed on the basis of initial
allocations made through auctions, and subsequent transfers through transactions among
States. This system has been suggested by few scholars,1032 but no RFMO is really
considering it. What has been more widely proposed, instead, is to resort to a system of
quota trade as a mechanism for new entrants to access the fishery.
Considering that design for analysis, the first aspect that needs to be stressed is
that quota trading does not substitute or eliminate the equity concerns that have occupied
most of this thesis. Indeed, a system of quota trading does not eliminate, at the very least,
the initial allocation. That has been recognized by all authors while analyzing the
introduction or enhancement of quota trade schemes in RFMOs.1033
On the contrary, it can be expected that conflict over that first allocation will be
even more intense. First, the effects of the initial allocation would be permanent, since
any modification to an agreed allocation would be based on quota trading rather than reallocation by agreement. Secondly, and as has been explained in the previous section, the
first allocation would have a value of its own (―paper fish‖) independent from the fishing
1031
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capacity of the State. In other words, the tradability of national quotas brings them closer
to a property right, rather than a mutually agreed limitation on fishing activities. As a
consequence, what is distributed in that first allocation would be, if not property right, a
quasi-right.
Adopting quota trading as a mechanism to accommodate new entrants to fisheries
poses, however, additional equity problems. Two of such problems are: discrimination,
and the consequences for developing States.
An allocation regime based on quota trading as the mechanism allowing
participation of new entrants to the fisheries would make a distinction between two
groups of States: charter members, and new participants. While the first would be
allocated the quota according to some criterion or combination of criteria, the second
group would pay for access to the resource (whether that payment is money or other
advantages given to the quota holder). In words of Lodge et al., this system would
involve ―(non-coastal State) new members in effect buying their way into the
RFMO‖.1034 Is this different treatment discrimination?
The question is legally relevant in light of article 119(3) of LOSC: ―States
concerned shall ensure that conservation measures and their implementation do not
discriminate in form or in fact against the fishermen of any State.‖ Article 8(4) of
UNFSA, in turn, states:
The terms of participation in such organization or arrangement shall not preclude
such States from membership or participation; nor shall they be applied in a
manner which discriminates against any State or group of States having a real
interest in the fisheries concerned.
A first aspect that needs to be addressed is how a mechanism that requires new
entrants to ―buy their way into the RFMO‖ is different than a system that requires new
entrants to comply with the measures adopted by an RFMO, including measures that
eventually may lead to non-access to the fishery. Most authors conclude that there is no
discrimination in this latter situation. Burke states that it is non-discriminatory simply to
expect adherence to the same regulatory structure as applies to all participants.1035 Thus,
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[i]f shares are determined on historical grounds, then the problem is averted. The
new entrant gets the same share as all other non-participants, which is zero. On
the other hand, if the regime is established on the basis of an auction or other
means of allowing the purchase of a share, then the new participants may compete
for a share in the same basis as any other participant.1036
The same conclusion is exposed by Orrego Vicuña:
[t]o the extent that the non-discrimination clause is observed, the new entrant will
be bound to comply with the obligation so established and could not claim a right
to fish separate from the arrangements lawfully made under the Convention.
The two situations, however, are considerably different. While in one case the
same rule applies to both groups of States (albeit the result of that regulation may imply
that the extent of the rights of each State is different), in the second case it is the access
regime itself which is different. Thus, the assumptions of Burke and Orrego Vicuña,
namely that new entrants ―may compete for a share in the same basis as any other
participant‖ is precisely what is missing. The basis of access is not the same. Does that
distinction amount to discrimination according to international fisheries law?
The non-discrimination provision of article 8(4) prohibits discrimination against
any State or group of States having a real interest in the fishery. It may be argued, on the
basis of article 8(4) of UNFSA, that a lawful distinction can be made between States with
real interest in the fishery, and other States. However, caution should be exercised with
this interpretation since it presents three problems. The first problem is the non-universal
ratification of UNFSA.1037 The second problem has already been explained in some detail
in chapter 3: UNFSA does not define ―real interest‖, introducing an element of ambiguity
to the provision that would make the practical implementation of such a distinction
extremely difficult. A third difficulty is that the non-discrimination provision is narrower
than the non-discrimination clause of the LOSC, which states that high seas conservation
measure and their implementation cannot ―discriminate in form or in fact against the
fishermen of any State”1038 (and not just States with a real interest). It is hard to find an
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interpretation that harmonizes these two provisions, but harmonization is required by
article 4 of UNFSA.
The concern on an eventual breach to the obligation of non-discrimination arises
with more strength considering the interpretation of discrimination given in a complaint
against the Icelandic transferable quota regime that, like in the case in analysis, made a
distinction between original quota holders and successive buyers or renters. The
complaint was presented in 2007 to the United Nations Human Rights Committee to the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,1039 in application of its Optional
Protocol,1040 by two Icelandic fishermen.1041
In this situation, the Human Rights Committee considered that the distinction
amounted to discrimination.1042 The Committee reasoned that the Icelandic quota-based
fisheries regime made a distinction between groups of fishers: the first group receives a
quota share for free; the second group has to buy or rent a quota share for the simple
1039
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reason that they were not owning and operating fishing vessels during the reference
period. It concluded that this distinction was based on grounds ―equivalent to those of
property‖. Next, it analyzed if this distinction was legitimate, i.e., if it was based on
reasonable and objective criteria. In this regard, it concluded that ―the State party has not
shown that this particular design and modalities of implementation of the quota system
meets the requirement of reasonableness.‖ They based this conclusion on two pillars: a)
the fact that according to section 1 of the Icelandic Act, fishing banks around Iceland are
common property of the Icelandic nation; and b) the fact that the distinction, when
established as a permanent measure, transformed original rights to use and exploit a
public property into individual property.1043
Although applicable to a national fisheries regime, the interpretation of
discrimination may be useful for the analysis of quota trading as access mechanism for
new entrants in the high seas. The first of the arguments on which the Committee based
its view was the fact that section 1 of the Icelandic Act explicitly states that fishing banks
around Iceland are common property of the Icelandic nation. There is no equivalent
provision in high seas fisheries; however, it can be concluded that the freedom to fish in
the high seas establishes that common property.
The second element of the view of the Committee is that the tradable quota
system established on a permanent basis transformed the right of the holder from a right
to use a common property to an individual property. Indeed, the benefits of conservation
efforts accrue to the quota holder and not the Icelandic society, and are reflected in the
price of the quota share. The same would apply in a high seas regime with improved
exclusivity where new entrants had quota trading as their only option to access the
fishery. Following the views of the Human Right Committee, thus, this distinction in the
access mechanism for high seas fishing would entail unlawful discrimination.
1043
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There is, however, one argument that may provide some legitimate basis for a
distinction. Members of RFMOs make costly investments in form of financial
contributions, scientific research, data gathering, and control and motoring efforts. These
elements are indispensable for the sound management of the stock, and thus the value of
the national quotas. A new entrant, on the contrary, could benefit from those investments
without incurring in equivalent costs. It could be argued, then, that the need to buy quota
is justified in the financial and non-financial contribution to sound management that the
quota holder has made. The different access regime demands from both quota holder and
new entrants a financial contribution, albeit that financial contribution is provided in
different forms.
Beside the potential of discrimination in quota trading as a mechanism to allow
access to fishing by new entrants, there is still another aspect of intra-generational equity
that needs to be highlighted. That aspect is the special requirements of developing States.
The system assumes that quota trading provides all States with equal opportunities to
participate in high seas fishing. It has long being acknowledged, however, that this formal
equality does not translate into substantial equality. It is to be presumed that only States
with more means, either in terms of financial resources or of other tradable interests, will
be able to access high seas fishing. This, as stated by Cox, will only exacerbate the
conflicts between developing and developed States.1044
Section 6. Some Concluding Remarks
Quota trading has been presented as a necessary, albeit not sufficient, solution to
high seas problems. It is argued that tradability increases the characteristics of property
rights in the high seas, which in turn increases the incentives for long-term conservation.
It is also proposed as a solution for the problem of new entrant. In addition, it is argued, it
provides flexibility to address by-catch and seasonal population variations. With these
varied benefits in sight, it can be concluded that a system of quota trading can be
designed either as providing flexibility in quota management; or as providing access to
high seas fisheries for new entrants.
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However, several aspects need to be taken into account in the design of a quota
trading system. This chapter has highlighted some of them.
The applicability of a right-based management regime to the high seas faces legal
and practical challenges that need to be taken into account. Without improving
exclusivity in the high seas, quota trading is less attractive or bluntly impracticable.
Secondly, the efficiency arguments that support quota trading may face challenges in
high seas fisheries, both because of the quota holder (State instead of companies) and
because it assumes that efficiency is the only fisheries objective of the participating
States. As has been shown in the past, this is far from being a reality.
More importantly for the purposes of this thesis, the emphasis on efficiency
arguments has mostly relegated one again the consideration of equity implications of
such a measure. This is particularly troublesome considering that quota trading has
negative incentives for both conservation (and thus intergenerational equity), and intragenerational equity.
Quota trading creates incentives to maintain a high value to that asset, which is
associated with the TAC. Thus, although design to create incentives for long-term
conservation, it also creates at least short-term incentives for unsustainable management.
Quota trading as a mechanism to allow accommodation of the interests of new
entrants faces particular intra-generational equity problems. Firstly, its compatibility with
international law is less than clear. Indeed, there are several arguments that allow
concluding that it entails discrimination against States, discrimination that is prohibited in
the international law of the sea. In addition, quota trading would leave developing States
in a disadvantaged position to participate in high seas fisheries. It is to be expected,
therefore, that conflicts between developed and developing States would intensify, rather
than ameliorate, with such a system.
It is not surprising, therefore, that RFMOs have been cautious in the
implementation of quota trade mechanisms. Progress has been made towards providing
flexible mechanisms to quota management that allow making an efficient use of
resources in extraordinary circumstances. In some cases, quota trade appears to be used
to facilitate negotiation on national allocations. However, quota trading as an access
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mechanism for the high seas seems farther away in the horizon of high seas fisheries
management.
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Chapter 8. Conclusions
TAC and allocations have been widely recognized as best practices with respect
to conservation and management measures of high seas fisheries. UNFSA and regional
agreements include them as the responsibility or function of the RFMOs. However, while
UNFSA and the regional agreements consider substantive guidance on how to adopt a
TAC (mainly by application of precautionary and ecosystem approaches), the legal
frameworks do not provide equivalent guidance with respect to the allocation of national
quotas or effort. This lack of guidance has become one of the main conflicts for high seas
fisheries management. The inability to resolve allocation issues in a timely and
satisfactory manner has become a threat to the sustainability of fisheries.
This thesis had the purpose of exploring if, under what conditions, and with which
shortcomings, a legal concept of equity can provide assistance in the allocation of high
seas fishing opportunities. To this end, it has reviewed the historical origins of allocation
of quotas, and it has summarized the current global and regional legal frameworks for
allocation, as well as the common features of allocation practices. It has reviewed
whether intergenerational and intra-generational equity is considered in the international
legal framework for high seas fisheries. It has also analyzed what the legal and practical
implications of their inclusion in high seas fisheries regime are.
The purpose of this final chapter is not to review each of the key concepts and
findings identified throughout the thesis. Rather, it will attempt to provide an answer to
the initial question: does the legal concept of equity provide any useful guidance for the
allocation of high seas fishing opportunities? For this purpose, the following sections
address several related issues drawing upon different sections of this thesis.
Balancing Efficiency and Equity: Losing the Battle?
The first adoption of TAC and allocation of national quotas in the high seas
fisheries in the early 1970s, and its rapid acceptance as best management practice, have
been guided by economic objectives. Chapter 2 dwelled extensively on the theoretical
background and rationale that were key in the promotion of allocation as a conservation
and management measure. That background was economy; the rationale to increase the
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net economic benefits of the fishing activity by eliminating international competition for
a common resource and, consequently, creating the appropriate incentives for States to
increase efficiency. Despite the obvious distributional consequences of the measure,
equity considerations were raised but not addressed. ―[W]ho is to define equity?‖1045 was
a question left unanswered. The evolution of the allocation framework and the allocation
practices of RFMOs demonstrate the struggles to fill that gap.
Almost forty years later, the main approach to address the ―common pool‖
resource problem is, once again, economic efficiency. Chapter 7 looked at one widely
accepted suggestion that, so it is claimed, would contribute to alleviate the allocation
problem: a system of tradable quotas. According to its proponents, tradable quotas would
allow fishing opportunities to be used by those fishers who produce the greatest
economic benefit, i.e., the most efficient fishing States.1046 The same rationale underlies
another proposal that has been presented in chapter 6: the suggestion for RFMOs to
widen the scope of bargaining through side payments or negotiation facilitators. As stated
by Munro,
[s]ide payments become truly significant when the management goals of the
coastal states sharing the resource differ. (...) when there are differences in
management goals, it is invariably the case that one player places a higher value
on the fishery than does the other. (...)When side payments are possible, then the
optimal policy is one in which the management preferences of that player placing
the highest value on the resource should be given full reign.1047
Thus, by allowing side payments, all participants are better off than without side
payments and the global return from the fishery, as well as the wealth of each participant,
is thereby maximized.1048
These modern proposals have the same vacuum that the original proposal for
TAC and allocation had in the 1960s and 1970s: they rely on economics, failing to
incorporate equity considerations into the analysis. Therefore, as in the case of allocation
of national quotas, they may prove to be incomplete and finally unsatisfactory solutions
to address the complicated problem of ―who gets what‖.
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The experience of high seas fisheries is not unique. The same can be ascertained
more broadly with respect to fisheries management. Cochrane has noted that the balance
between sustainability, economic efficiency and equity ―is yet to be pursued
seriously.‖1049 With respect to water allocation, it has been ascertained that
(…) the conceptual framework for resolving water disputes on which much of
contemporary academic and political analysis has settled is a focus on increased
efficiency.1050
This emphasis on economics and efficiency contrasts with the increasing concerns
for equity in international environmental law, generated by the scale of the environmental
challenges and the necessary interdependence in their solution. Brown Weiss noted that
equity has become a central concern.1051 This concern can be evidenced in the
proliferation of equity principles in main concepts shaping international law and
international environmental law: sustainable development, ecosystem approach,
precautionary approach, common but differentiated responsibility. It has permeated
maritime delimitation, water law, biodiversity conservation, and climate change. Equity
in international relations is here to stay.
It is evident that more and better efforts have to be made to introduce equitable
considerations into the design and implementation of international regimes, and of high
seas fisheries regimes in particular. But efforts, so far, have been scarce: equity has had a
stormy road in international fisheries law.
The Stormy Road of Equity
After the initial establishment of TAC and quota allocation as management
practice in high seas fisheries regimes, which mostly did not include equity
considerations, the RFMOs have struggled to achieve a framework for allocation that is
regarded as equitable and transparent by their members and new entrants. This struggle
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has been marked by a tension between the need to achieve equitable allocations, and the
reluctance of States to address equity issues.
This reluctance is reflected in international fisheries instruments addressing high
seas fisheries. References to equity, either as intergenerational or intra-generational
equity, are remarkably absent in such instruments. Furthermore, explicit references to
equity, or equitable allocation, have been consciously avoided on several occasions. This
vacuum has led to a necessary analysis on whether equity is even considered as a
principle of high seas fisheries management.
With respect to intergenerational equity, it can be confidently argued that, despite
the lack of explicit references to the principle or the needs and aspirations of future
generations, the principle has entered the international framework. Its ―port of entry‖ is
through substantive obligations and guiding principles that have an inter-temporal
component: the obligation of conservation; the principle of sustainable use; the
precautionary approach; and the ecosystem approach. All these obligations and principles
entail the need to ensure the long-term conservation of the stocks and their ecosystem and
thus, implicitly if not explicitly, protect the interests of future generations. Furthermore, it
can be argued that the principle of intergenerational equity has been strengthened through
recent developments that emphasize long-term conservation as a fundamental pillar of
fisheries management. Whether this recognition translates into effective implementation
is another matter, an issue that has been dealt with extensively in chapter 4.
The acceptance of intra-generational equity in the legal framework for
international fisheries appears more doubtful. There is an apparent contradiction between
an outright rejection to any mention of equity in international instruments, and the
explicit recognition of equity as a guiding principle for allocation in other (mostly
regional) fora. This cautious, and even contradictory, approach to equity considerations
may be explained by the existence of different interpretations of the concept of equity
itself. In particular relation to this thesis, equity – or distributional justice - has been
understood with two different emphases: as an act of balancing the interests, rights and
relevant circumstances of a particular situation; and as a requirement for redistribution of
wealth. It is safe to say that there is no agreement on the implementation of this latter
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meaning of equity in the high seas fisheries regime. The former meaning of equity,
however, appears to be generally accepted by States, practitioners and academics.
On this basis, it can be concluded, therefore, that equity understood as a principle
that seeks to balance the different rights, interests, and relevant circumstances of the
particular situation, can be considered a guiding principle for the allocation of high seas
fisheries opportunities.
Equity: a Useful Concept?
Accepting that equity can be considered a guiding principle for the allocation of
high seas fishing opportunities, it must be concluded that it acts as autonomous equity.
Indeed, it cannot act as corrective of the harshness of the applicable legal rule precisely
because the legal framework does not contain such a rule. What does that mean for
allocation decisions? What is the guidance that autonomous equity provides for the
decision-making process?
Many authors would answer: nothing. Equity has been considered a content-free
concept. Judge Rosalyn Higgins asserted: ―I don‘t find justice either a useful decisionmaking tool or a recognizable objective for international law.‖1052 Lauterpacht, as well,
concluded that equity and equitable principles were elements in a legal decision which
had no objectively identifiable normative content.1053 Ian Brownlie argued that
[w]hatever the particular and interstitial significance of equity in the law of
nations, as a general reservoir of ideas and solutions for sophisticated problems it
offers little but disappointment.1054
As was noted in the introduction to this thesis, this is also the opinion of Oda
referring particularly to high seas fisheries. He noted, in this respect, that ―[e]quity
comprises no objective legal criterion and varies in each circumstance.‖1055 It is, thus,
because he considers equity a concept free of any normative content that he denied a role
for law in the allocation problem.
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But this view of equity in international law has been contested. Franck has noted
that ―[f]ar from being contentless, equity is developing into an important redeeming
aspect of the international legal system.‖1056
An important contribution to this equity with normative content has been the
jurisprudence in the field of maritime delimitation law. Through several decisions that
deal explicitly with equity considerations, the ICJ defined the elements of a concept of
equity that is not ex aequo et bono but an equity within the law. Those elements, which
represent higher levels of normativity of the concept of equity, are: equitable principles,
relevant circumstances, and equitable methods. Equity within the law, or controlled
equity, does have substantive and procedural content that limits the discretion of the
decision-maker.
The developments in international fisheries law, as the analysis of this thesis
shows, have focused on the identification of categories of relevant circumstances that
need to be taken into account in the process of balancing the different interests and rights
at stake. By so doing, the international community has neglected the development of
equitable principles, which give purpose and direction to those relevant circumstances
and allows balancing and weighting them. It also has neglected the development of
equitable methods or procedures, which bridge the abstractness of equitable principles
and the particularities of the relevant circumstances. It is the equitable method or
procedure which allows an objective and systematic implementation of the equitable
principles to the particular circumstances of the case. The development and definition of
those three elements allow applying a concept of equity that is far from pure discretion.
With some cynicism, it can be argued that this construction of a normative content
of equity implies precisely that RFMOs have to adopt the tough decisions that they have
been unable to make. In other words, if such a normative content of equity needs to be
constructed, how is that better than the situation that exists today? What is the
contribution of equity to the allocation problem?
The contributions are basically three. Firstly, the jurisprudence in maritime
delimitation law does not answer the question ―what is equitable?‖, but it does answer the
question ―what needs to be done in order to achieve an equitable framework that has a
1056
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substantive normative content?‖ Showing the path towards a possible solution is already
part of the solution.
Secondly, it demystifies that the solution to allocation problems have to be found
in RFMOs, by RFMOs alone. Although it remains true that equity varies in each
circumstance, it can be acknowledged that at least some of its normative elements –
namely equitable principles – are general and abstract in character. This acknowledgment
has a clear consequence: it is unquestionable that RFMOs‘ role is central and
unavoidable; but there is also room for other fora to participate in the debate. In
particular, it is proposed that scholars can make a contribution to the process, for reasons
that will be highlighted further below.
Related to this latter point, there is a third contribution of equity to the ―allocation
problem‖. Allocation can be viewed not subject to bargaining and bargaining alone, but
also subject to certain equitable principles. This opens the door for analysis of the
developments of equity as a legal standard for the fair distribution of benefits or burdens,
a standard that is evolving in international law, international environmental law, and
international law of sustainable development.
This thesis has attempted part of that analysis in chapter 4 and 5. With respect to
intergenerational equity, it reviewed the possible avenues to incorporate explicitly the
needs of future generations in the TAC and allocation regime. With respect to intragenerational equity, the evolving concept of equitable delimitation and equitable use were
analyzed to identify principles that have underlined their progress in international law:
the respect to sovereignty and sovereign rights; the protection of historical uses, its
limitations and conditions; the timid but increasing role of socio-economic factors in
need-based allocation schemes; the principle of substantive equality operationalized with
the consideration of special requirements of developing States and importantly, the
principle of CBDR. All these shed some new light in addressing the distributional
conflicts of high seas fisheries, as extensively addressed in chapter 5.
The process of translating those influences into concrete and substantive
frameworks in high seas fisheries is certainly not an easy one, and it definitely requires
political will. But the approach to the allocation issue – from pure politics to a principled
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and controlled mechanism to arrive at acceptable distributional results – can change the
paradigm in addressing the problem.
Allocation: Pure Policy?
The introduction of the thesis highlighted that allocation of fishing opportunities
is widely considered to be a political issue.1057 Agreements are the result of bargaining
without any significant guidance by legal norms. Against that background, this thesis has
explored the guidance that could be provided by one concept that is part of international
law: equity. This analysis does not provide sufficient basis to refute the assertion that
allocation of fishing opportunities is a political issue, but it does allow qualifying it.
Allocation of high seas fishing opportunities is in urgent need of guidance in the
form of a substantive structure or framework that allows equitable and transparent
allocation of fishing opportunities. This need is manifested in the struggles of RFMOs to
develop such a framework. Equity is invoked to play a prominent role in it.
Equity is not a content-free concept, but a concept that is in evolution in
international law. Brown Weiss asserted in 1995 that ―there is a search, though
unsystematic, for a new definition [of equity].‖1058 She added that ―[p]articularly as our
international system becomes more complex, we will need to consider carefully how to
reconcile competing equitable demands and move toward normative frameworks
acceptable to all members of the international community.‖1059
What is said in respect to international environmental law in general, is also
applicable to high seas fisheries law: there is currently a search for a definition of equity
and equitable allocation of high seas fishing opportunities. Equity as a legal standard for
high seas fishing allocation, therefore, is law in the formation stage. As such, it is
undoubtedly political. But it is also legal, in that it requires identifying, defining and
refining substantive and procedural principles and criteria that lead to a crystallization of
equity in the particular and complex field of high seas fisheries management. This
process should be forged not in isolation but grounded in current developments in
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international law. It is for this reasons that it deserves more legal attention, and more
academic attention, than it has yet received.
There is yet a second reason why allocation of high seas fishing opportunities has
to be considered a political issue. Even if a higher level of normativity is achieved,
discretion would not be absolutely eliminated from the allocation decisions, and politics
are bound to enter in this realm. But it is a fairly different to say that there is room for
politics, than to say that it is just and strictly a political decision.
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1

Albania

2

Algerie

3

Angola

4

Argentina

5

Australia

6

Barbados

7

Belgium

8

Belize

9

Brazil

10

Canada

11

Cape Verde

12

Chile

13

China

14

Colombia

15

Comoros

16

Cook Islands

17

Costa Rica

18

Côte D'Ivoire

19

Croatia

CCAMLR

SEAFO

NEAFC

NAFO

WCPFC

CCSBT

IOTC

ICCAT

IATTC

UNFSA

State

LOSC

Appendix. States Ratification or Accession to LOSC, UNFSA, and RFMOs Conventions
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20

Cuba

21

Denmark

22

Ecuador

23

Egypt

24

El Salvador

25

Equatorial Guinea

26

Eritrea

27

European Union

28

Fiji

29

France

30

Gabon

31

Germany

32

Ghana

33

Guatemala

34

Guinea

35

Honduras

36

Iceland

37

India

38

Indonesia

39

Iran (Islamic Republic of)

40

Italy

41

Japan

42

Kenya

CCAMLR

SEAFO

NEAFC

NAFO

WCPFC

CCSBT

IOTC

ICCAT

IATTC

UNFSA

LOSC

State
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43

Kiribiati

44

Lybian Arab Jamahiriya

45

Madagascar

46

Malaysia

47

Marshall Islands

48

Mauritania

49

Mauritius

50

Mexico

51

Micronesia (Federated States of)

52

Morocco

53

Namibia

54

Nauru

55

New Zealand

56

Nicaragua

57

Nigeria

58

Niue

59

Norway

60

Oman

61

Pakistan

62

Palau

63

Panama

64

Papua New Guinea

65

Peru

CCAMLR

SEAFO

NEAFC

NAFO

WCPFC

CCSBT

IOTC

ICCAT

IATTC

UNFSA

LOSC

State
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66

Philippines

67

Poland

68

Republic of Korea

69

Russian Federation

70

St.Vincent and the Grenadines

71

Samoa

72

Sao Tome and Principe

73

Senegal

74

Seychelles

75

Sierra Leone

76

Solomon Islands

77

South Africa

78

Spain

79

Sri Lanka

80

Sudan

81

Sweden

82

Syrian Arab Republic

83

Thailand

84

Tonga

85

Trindad y Tobago

86

Tunisia

CCAMLR

SEAFO

NEAFC

NAFO

WCPFC

CCSBT

IOTC

ICCAT

IATTC

UNFSA

LOSC

State
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87

Turkey

88

Tuvalu

89

Ukraine

90

U.K.

91

United Republic of Tanzania

92

United States of America

93

Uruguay

94

Vanuatu
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic
of)

95

CCAMLR

SEAFO

NEAFC

NAFO

WCPFC

CCSBT

IOTC

ICCAT

IATTC

UNFSA

LOSC

State

Notes
1)
2)
3)
4)

The RFMOs considered were: IATTC, ICCAT, IOTC, CCSBT, WCPFC, NAFO, NEAFC, SEAFO and CCAMLR.
The table does not consider States that participate as cooperating non-parties to RFMOs.
The table does not consider the fishing entity of Chinese Taipei.
The table does consider members of the EU that participate in RFMOs with respect to their overseas territories, as well as in
CCAMLR.
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